Defamation / Reputation, Political Expression
The Case Against Daniel Santoro
Closed Expands Expression
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New York Times, and established the “actual malice” standard to provide protection for erroneous statements made in the public interest. The New York Times had published an advertisement created by supporters of Dr. Martin Luther King that included some inaccuracies and was critical of the Montgomery, Alabama police. Sullivan, a Montgomery city commissioner, sued the Times for defamation on the basis that as a supervisor of the police, statements in the ad were personally defamatory. Finding that Alabama’s libel laws did not provide sufficient protection for freedom of the press, the Court extended constitutional protections to alleged libel by invoking the First and Fourteenth Amendments to prohibit elected officials from recovering damages for false statements made regarding their official conduct, unless they were made with “actual malice.” “Actual malice” created a different fault standard than ill-will, and required a plaintiff to prove with clear and convincing evidence that false or inaccurate statements were made with knowledge of its falsity, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
Amidst all the turmoil of the civil rights movement in the 1960s, in 1960 the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South decided to take action in the form of a full-page newspaper advertisement. Published in the New York Times, the advertisement covered a lot of ground: it voiced political grievances, named those who supported the committee’s cause, described recent oppressive events African Americans had endured, and attempted to raise money for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s legal defense fund. The advertisement was entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices” and also described how various governmental bodies, such as the police, had failed to respect the civil rights of southern African Americans, especially those in Montgomery, Alabama.
As the court stated however, many of the statements in the advertisement were either false or, at the very least, misleading. The events described in the full-page advertisement did not reflect how, in reality, the events played out. Some of the critical language was hyperbole. Finally, specific criticisms of the police were unwarranted; for example, police did not, in fact, “padlock” the doors of a local college in order to repress protest and did not sit idly while MLK’s house was bombed, instead pursuing the perpetrators to the fullest extent.
The plaintiff, L.B. Sullivan, served as one of three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. In their roles, the commissioners oversaw all of the city’s administrative bodies, including the police, who were the subject of much criticism in the advertisement. Arguing that Sullivan himself, as the police’s supervisor, was implicated in the false statements, Sullivan sued for libel. Notably, Sullivan was never mentioned by name in the advertisement. The trial judge instructed the jury that in instances of libel per se, such as when a false statement damages one’s occupation, the plaintiff asserting defamation charges need not prove exactly how they were damaged and in what monetary amount. In other words, merely by proving that the statements in the advertisement falsely criticized Sullivan’s occupation entitled Sullivan to an economic award. Sullivan asked for $500,000 and the jury awarded him the full amount.
The New York Times appealed, but the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the jury’s award. The state high court also made further legal findings. Specifically, the court held that in the publication of the advertisement, actual malice could be inferred because the New York Times failed to engage in any fact-checking of the events described in the advertisement and did not confirm that the names of those listed who supported the Committee’s causes in fact supported them. The New York Times thereafter filed a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court of the United States, which was accepted.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that Alabama’s libel laws were wholly inadequate in terms of providing newspapers with the constitutional freedoms of speech and the press. Thus, because the very laws under which the New York Times was held civilly liable were invalid, the high court held that the entire matter must be remanded in accordance with the United States Constitution.
The court first quickly dispensed with two issues that were dismissed as inapplicable by the Alabama courts. First, the Fourteenth Amendment does apply to private actions, not just actions taken by the state or local government. Thus, the New York Times was entitled to protection under that amendment. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the stricter scrutiny applied to “commercial” speech did not apply to this matter; instead, because the advertisement conveyed political grievances of the highest public interest, it was entitled to the full protection offered by the constitutional freedoms of speech and the press.
The court noted, somewhat philosophically, that while speech criticizing the government may be “caustic” or offensive, the public interest in protecting that form of speech greatly outweighed an occasional “erroneous” statement about a public official. Instead, the court held that the standard that must be applied by courts when publications make statements about public or governmental officials is not merely to determine whether or not the statement is false. Instead, the public official claiming defamation must prove that the publication set forth the statements with “actual malice.” The Supreme Court defined actual malice as publishing the statement knowing that the information was false or recklessly disregarding whether it was false or not. If the plaintiff is unable to prove such actual malice, then the publication retains its privilege under freedom of speech and cannot be held for damages as a result of libel or slander.
The key problem with Alabama’s laws is that they did not require a showing of actual malice in order for a public official to recover damages against a national newspaper. On remand, the trial court must instruct the jury on the definition of actual malice and not award damages unless actual malice can be shown.
Decision Direction indicates whether the decision expands or contracts expression based on an analysis of the case.
The case clearly expanded the freedom of expression in instances where a public official is suing a publication for defamation. In this case, the high court held that merely proving that the statement is false is not enough to recover monetary damages; henceforth, public officials must prove that a publication acted with “actual malice” in order to recover an award for defamation.
Global Perspective demonstrates how the court’s decision was influenced by standards from one or many regions.
Case significance refers to how influential the case is and how its significance changes over time.
Of course, this decision imposes binding precedent on all the federal and state courts within the United States.
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