Case Summary and Outcome

The U.S. District Court in Southern New York dismissed Michael Lindell’s defamation complaint against Mail Media Inc. (MMI) and Laura Collins and granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss since Lindell failed to state a viable claim. Lindell claimed that the article entitled, “EXCLUSIVE: Trump-loving MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell had a secret romance with 30 Rock actress Jane Krakowski and wooed her with flowers and champagne in a relationship that BAFFLED her friends” was defamatory. However, the Court noted that Lindell failed to identify any statements in the article that “a reasonable person would view as defamatory”, both regarding his alleged romance with actress Jane Krakowski and his association with alcohol gifts. The Court asserted that dating an actress, whether secretly or not, would not have evoked “public hatred”, “shame,” “ridicule”, or similar sentiments towards Lindell as both of them were unmarried adults. The Court observed that the article did not impute “immoral relations” between them. The Court determined that the article did not defame Lindell either expressly or implicitly. In light of the dismissal of the complaint, the defendants argued for attorneys’ fees under New York’s SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. However, it was not granted due to the absence of a separate lawsuit.

Facts

Michael Lindell, known for his role as the CEO of MyPillow, filed a defamation claim against the defendants, Mail Media, Inc. (MMI), a Delaware corporation publishing the tabloid news website www.dailymail.com, and Laura Collins, the Chief Investigative Reporter for the Website. [p. 1]

On January 21, 2021, MMI posted an article entitled, “EXCLUSIVE: Trump-loving MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell had secret romance with 30 Rock actress Jane Krakowski and wooed her with flowers and champagne in relationship that BAFFLED her friends”. [p. 2] The article stated Lindell “wooed the actress for close to a year, showering her with gifts and flowers.” [p. 2] It recounted how Lindell “sent flowers” to Krakowski “almost every week,” as well as “champagne and bottles of different liquor.” [p. 2] The article stated that he was “shown the door” by Krakowski in the summer of 2020, possibly because Krakowski “didn’t like the way [Lindell] treated women”. [p. 2]

Lindell alleged that the article was false as “the [alleged] romance between Lindell and Krakowski never took place”. [p. 2] Before the article was published, Lindell emailed the defendants and told them he had never heard of Krakowski. Krakowski also denied having ever met Lindell. Both denials were printed in the article’s sub-headline and at the end of its text. [p. 2]

Lidell argued that the article “disparaged his moral character”. Lindell asserted that his reputation “in the field of addiction recovery as well as in religious communities” had been damaged. [p. 3] He was portrayed in the article as engaging in a “scandalous” secret romantic relationship, which he vehemently denied based on his commitment to sobriety, his Christian faith, and his dedication to family, civic involvement, and charity. Lindell claimed that the false portrayal in the article contradicted his public image as a recovering alcoholic who would never buy or promote alcohol for others. [p. 3]

MMI denied owning or publishing the Website, but the court accepted Lindell’s claim that MMI does publish the Website for the purpose of the motion.

Decision Overview

The Court began by discussing the first element – whether the alleged statement itself could be defamatory prima facie. The Court’s assessment depended on whether it exposed “an individual to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation, or disgrace, or induce[d] an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, and deprive[d] one of confidence and friendly intercourse in society” (Buskirk v. The New York Times Co. , 325 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2003). [p. 5]

The Court dismissed Lindell’s claim that the article falsely associated him with alcohol consumption by stating he purchased champagne and other bottles of liquor for Krakowski. Emphasizing the indirect nature of the association, the Court cited Cohn v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 50 N.Y.2d 885, 430 N.Y.S.2d 265, 408 N.E.2d 672, 673, which directs the court against straining to find a defamatory interpretation where none exists. Rejecting Lindell’s argument that buying alcohol for a dating partner after recovering from addiction could cause “public hatred,” “shame,” or “ridicule”, the court observed that no reasonable reader could find it offensive. The Court concluded that Lindell’s claim failed to meet the legal threshold for defamation. [p. 6]

The Court determined that the article did not expressly defame Lindell, leading him to argue that the statements could defame him by implication. [p. 6] He contended that “in the context of his profession” as the founder of the Lindell Recovery Network, “allegations that he is a hypocrite about issues of Christian morality and alcohol consumption can plausibly allege defamatory meaning.” [p. 7] He argued that if his credibility were attacked, then it would also damage his ability to run Lindell Recovery Network. [p. 7]

However, the Court found his reasoning to be flawed for three reasons: first, the court found no language in the article suggesting Lindell to be a hypocrite, particularly regarding his romantic relationships or alcohol abstention. Notably, the article omitted any discussion of Lindell’s Lindell Recovery Network or his broader work with individuals grappling with substance abuse. The Court deemed information about Lindell’s nonprofit as extrinsic facts not known to the general readership, rendering it irrelevant to the libelous nature of the article. [p. 7] The Court observed that the article did not “undermine his religious or charitable mission when the reader was never told about that mission in the first place”; second, even if the article implied Lindell’s hypocrisy, the court asserted that Lindell had not adequately alleged that the defendants “intended” to convey such a message. Per the court, Lindell failed to make a “rigorous showing”—that the defendants intended to portray Lindell as a hypocrite for dating an actress or for buying her alcohol. [p. 7]; third, while acknowledging the importance of context in determining defamatory meaning, the Court asserted the relevant context of the article as a whole, not the subjective context of Lindell’s outside life or nonprofit activities. The Court declined to assess the article by asking how an “amorphous subset of evangelical Christian readers” would understand them.

Consequently, the complaint was dismissed for failing to state a viable claim. [p. 5]

In light of the dismissal of the complaint, the defendants argued for attorneys’ fees under New York’s SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute, which provides protection to defendants facing “meritless” lawsuits. [p. 8] However, the SLAPP statute requires the defendants to initiate “an action, claim, cross-claim or counterclaim” to seek attorneys’ fees (N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 70-a; Palin v. New York Times Co., 510 F. Supp. 3d 21, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)). While the defendants requested attorneys’ fees in their memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss, they did not assert a standalone counterclaim for attorneys’ fees. As the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint prior to any answer filed by the defendants, the Court suggested that, according to New York law, the defendants had to initiate a separate lawsuit to recover attorneys’ fees. [p. 8]

However, the Court acknowledged that the award of attorney’s fees was not assured even if the defendants filed a separate lawsuit. There was a divergence of opinion, with some Courts suggesting that the new attorneys’ fees provision of the SLAPP statute did not apply in federal court, while others awarded attorneys’ fees under the statute. [p. 8]