Case Summary and Outcome

The Sixteenth Collegiate Tribunal for Administrative Matters of the First Circuit of Mexico City held that remarks made about journalist and political commentator Max Kaiser Aranda during the federal government’s morning press conferences infringed his fundamental rights to honor, privacy, and intimacy. The case arose from statements made in President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s daily morning briefings and disseminated through the administration’s official YouTube channel and other social media platforms. The Tribunal noted that the videos contained disparaging characterizations and public accusations directed at Kaiser in retaliation for his critical commentary on federal policy. Kaiser filed an amparo petition asserting that the officials’ conduct and omissions both violated his constitutional rights and generated a chilling effect on his speech. Recasting the dispute as a conflict between the State’s duty to inform and an individual’s rights to dignity and private life, the Tribunal applied the standards articulated by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, which require that official communications be of public relevance, truthful, and objectively impartial. Finding these conditions unmet, the Tribunal granted relief, ordered the removal of the videos from official platforms, and instructed public officials to refrain from making similar references in future broadcasts.

Facts

Between June 30, August 26, and October 6, 2021; January 26, May 18, June 1, July 6, August 3, and November 4, 2022; and April 19 and May 17, 2023, former President Andrés López Obrador’s morning press conferences included the segment “¿Quién es quién en las mentiras?” [Who is who in the lies?]. The segment was presented by Ana Elizabeth García Vilchis, then Director of Networks of the federal government’s communications office, headed by Jesús Ramírez Cuevas, then General Coordinator of Communications and Spokesperson for the Government of the Republic. In that segment, officials periodically responded to statements attributed to political opponents and other critics of the then-federal government, rebutting critiques circulating in private media.

Across its broadcasts, the segment referred to a range of public figures. In the broadcasts—on the dates listed above—, García Vilchis referred directly to political analyst, Max Kaiser Aranda, describing him as “one of the main promoters of disinformation,” [p. 74] and someone who “continually attacked the government, twisting the facts and misinforming the public.” [p. 75] She also said that Kaiser was one “of the principal figures behind [the disinformation campaign against the electoral reform].” [pp. 80-81]

In light of these circumstances, Kaiser filed an amparo action (an application for the protection of constitutional rights) on 9 June 2023. He requested an order directed at both Ana Elizabeth García Vilchis and Jesús Ramírez Cuevas. Regarding García Vilchis, he wanted her to stop referring to him in the morning press conferences and disseminating his personal data, arguing that those references affected his honor and raised privacy concerns. As to Ramírez, Kaiser argued that he oversaw the government’s official communications strategy and the channels used for the press conferences, and therefore bore responsibility for ensuring that the content disseminated through those official platforms complied with applicable legal and constitutional standards. Kaiser further alleged that Ramírez failed to guarantee him “symmetric access” to respond to the statements made about him in that setting.

The Eleventh District Court in Administrative Matters in Mexico City admitted the case and, after holding a hearing on September 22, 2023, issued a judgment on January 5, 2024, that partly dismissed the claim but granted amparo protection to Kaiser. Specifically, it considered that the omissions attributed to Ramírez did not exist. The District Court otherwise granted amparo protection regarding the remaining challenged acts and ordered the responsible authorities to remove the relevant videos from official government platforms and to refrain from further similar references. Under Mexico’s amparo procedure, the non-prevailing party may challenge the district court’s judgment through an appeal for review (recurso de revisión), which is decided by a Collegiate Circuit Court. In this case, the government authorities filed an appeal for review, prompting Kaiser to file a contingent cross-appeal (revisión adhesiva).

The case was assigned to the Sixteenth Collegiate Tribunal for Administrative Matters of the First Circuit of Mexico City.

Decision Overview

The Sixteenth Collegiate Tribunal for Administrative Matters of the First Circuit of Mexico City issued its decision on August 7, 2025. The main issue before the Tribunal was whether statements made by public officials about journalist, political commentator, and political activist, Max Kaiser Aranda, during the federal government’s morning press conferences were protected as official speech on matters of public interest, or instead violated Kaiser’s fundamental rights to honor, privacy, and intimacy.

Kaiser claimed that Vilchis, acting in her official capacities, failed to carry out the institutional responsibilities associated with the federal government’s morning press conferences, and that those omissions infringed his fundamental rights. He alleged that each defendant official failed to comply with sections III, IV, and VI of Article 6 of the Federal Government’s Social Communication Policy Agreement in relation to the issuance and dissemination of those press conferences. He further alleged that Ramírez failed to guarantee Kaiser “symmetric access” to respond and counter argue the impugned statements. Regarding García, Kaiser challenged her “verbal acts, pronouncements, and comments,” [p. 3, which—he asserted—were made because of, and in response to, the public opinions he expressed on social media. Kaiser claimed her conduct violated his freedom of expression, and fostered self-censorship out of fear of reprisals.

Ramírez and García argued that the statements and comments at issue were made within García’s freedom of expression and could not be characterized as stigmatizing or as seeking to criminalize Kaiser. They further maintained that, because Kaiser was a “public figure with public prominence,” he was subject to a “more rigorous scrutiny of his private life.” [p. 61] In that respect, the defendants asserted that the restriction imposed by the district court “entailed prior censorship” of the opinions that García expressed in the exercise of her freedom of expression. They further emphasized that the remarks were made in García’s personal capacity rather than in the exercise of her public functions. The defendants also claimed that Article 7 of the Constitution made the freedom to disseminate opinions, information, and ideas “inviolable” through any medium and did not distinguish among private individuals, persons with public prominence, or authorities. Finally, Ramírez and García sought to rebut any suggestion that the remarks amounted to hate speech, arguing that the attributed statements did not discriminate against or stigmatize Kaiser based on his social, religious, ethnic, or national affiliation.

The Tribunal determined that the legal issue revolved around a tension between constitutional guarantees: on the defendants’ side, the State’s obligation to inform the public about matters of public interest and relevance; and on the plaintiff’s side, the fundamental rights to honor, privacy, and intimacy. The Tribunal explained that, under Article 6 of the Constitution, the right to information includes the possibility of disseminating information, which translates into the right to inform—namely, the right “for any person to express or communicate, through any means, the information […] they possess.” [p. 68; Sup., 2931/2015 (2015)] The Tribunal further noted that, where the right to be informed conflicts with the rights to honor or privacy, the authority’s decision on the dissemination of [that] information must be based [p. 69] on the following criteria: (i) the information has to be of public relevance or general interest; (ii) the information has to be truthful; and (iii) the information has to be objective and impartial. [p. 69; Sup. 2931/2015 (2015)]

Under the governing jurisprudential framework for balancing freedom of expression and the right to be informed against honor, privacy, and intimacy, the Tribunal first emphasized that the public relevance of the information played a decisive role. It explained that the State’s responsibility to “inform the population about matters of public interest and public relevance” [p. 69] could not disregard the simultaneous duty to protect and guarantee individuals’ rights to privacy and honor. Considering this, the Tribunal stated that information is deemed to be of public relevance or general interest when it addresses “matters of social significance” or concerns “persons with public and social impact.” [p. 69] It further noted that, to avoid infringing the essential core of the right to intimacy, courts have to weigh the constitutional provisions in tension and assess whether any intrusion into private life is justified by a legitimate public interest in keeping society informed about matters that affect “the functioning of the State or [implicated] general interests or rights.” [p. 86] Considering the specific case, the Tribunal held that the challenged information did concern “the activity of the federal public administration” and referred to Kaiser, who—because he was a person with “public or social impact”—was subject to a different level of protection regarding his reputation or honor and, correspondingly, had to tolerate a higher threshold of criticism.

Regarding the veracity requirement, the Tribunal explained that it did not demand “conclusive truth,” but rather “a sound approximation to reality at the time the information was disseminated.” [p. 69] It added that official bodies and State authorities bore a heightened burden because their communications had to reflect a “diligent dissemination of the truth” [p. 89] and comply with objectivity and impartiality standards. In this case, the Tribunal considered that this requirement was not met because the statements about Kaiser did not reflect a diligent dissemination of the truth: the defendants did not cite investigations, rely on official data within the authorities’ possession, or refer to facts that were publicly available. Instead, the Tribunal characterized the remarks as unfounded, including labeling Kaiser as a corrupt person “without any objective data to support it.” [p. 89]

Objectivity and impartiality, the Tribunal explained, require information to be free of “any intervention of subjective judgments or value assessments” [p. 69] typically associated with freedom of expression. In other words, the dissemination of information should avoid characterizing a person, group, or situation in value-laden terms. Since the contested remarks were delivered in a public, State context by a public official acting in her official capacity and were disseminated through official government communication channels, the Tribunal treated them not as García’s purely personal speech, but as a State dissemination of information subject to the constitutional requirements of objectivity and impartiality. Applying that standard, the Tribunal found that the morning press conferences conveyed content that rested on subjective judgments and value assessments rather than communicating objective and truthful information. It thus treated the broadcast content as seeking to shape public opinion about Kaiser’s conduct, rather than to inform the public through objective and verifiable information.

Next, the Tribunal discussed the scope of the right to privacy. This right, the Tribunal stated, belongs to all individuals and entails the right to “separate aspects of [one’s] private life from public scrutiny.” [p. 69] On this point, the Tribunal further noted that public officials enjoy a less extensive sphere of privacy than other citizens because they are subject to heightened social scrutiny due to their official activities and the exercise of their functions. Accordingly, it stated that “the right to privacy of public persons, and particularly of public officials, is limited by the right to information.” [p. 71]

Although Kaiser was not a public official, the Tribunal treated him—under Mexican jurisprudence—as a person with “public projection” (amparo directo 6/2009)—meaning someone whose circumstances or condition were “publicly known” and who could therefore be considered a public figure. It reasoned that, given Kaiser’s notoriety as a political commentator and journalist, there was “public interest or public relevance” in information or opinions published about him. Along the same lines, amparo directo 8/2012 stated that a private person could have public profile “because of [their] political activity [or] profession.” [p. 72] Considering this, the Tribunal concluded that Kaiser, as a commentator, had such public profile. As a result, it stated that he “had to withstand a greater level of interference with his privacy than persons who did not engage in a public activity,” [p. 72] while emphasizing that scrutiny and information about him could not “disregard the limits of veracity, objectivity, and impartiality” [p. 89] recognized by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. It also noted that the challenged acts were carried out by a State authority and, in that context, there was no proportionality in the conditions and power dynamics between the person who issued and disseminated the criticism and the person who received it.

Building on the limits governing the State’s dissemination of information, the Tribunal also addressed the constitutional boundary at which expression loses protection because it infringes constitutional rights. It reiterated that the right to honor prevailed when speech relied on expressions “excluded from constitutional protection—that is, when they were absolutely abusive.” [p. 91] The Tribunal explained that such unprotected expressions were those that were “offensive or opprobrious, depending on the context,” and “impertinent to conveying opinions or information.” [p. 91] It added that the political and social context of a publication could reduce the offensive significance of speech and increase the required degree of tolerance.

Drawing on the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation’s jurisprudence, the Tribunal described hate speech as an expression aimed at inciting violence and, through contemptuous or insulting language, generating hostility against persons or groups; unlike mere rejection or dissent, it pursues a practical end by creating a climate of hostility that could incite violence and foster impunity for violent conduct. Applying those principles, the Tribunal reasoned that the impugned remarks could not be treated as purely private speech since authorities used official government communication channels and failed to prove that the comments were truthful, objective, or impartial. The Tribunal further observed that the remarks about Kaiser were denigrating and unsupported and therefore deserved a hate-speech analysis insofar as they generated hostility. The Tribunal clarified, however, that this did not mean the grant of an amparo relief rested on a future and uncertain harm; rather, the ruling ultimately rested on the constitutional and jurisprudential analysis supporting the conclusion that the responsible authorities had not shown the information disseminated was truthful, objective, or impartial.

Finally, the Sixteenth Collegiate Tribunal for Administrative Matters of the First Circuit of Mexico City decided to uphold the amparo protection granted by the lower court and ordered the responsible authorities to remove from YouTube and any other social media platforms the videos containing the challenged remarks about Kaiser, and to refrain from continuing to disseminate or publish information or comments about him that were similar in nature and that generated a climate of hostility.