Case Summary and Outcome

The High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, dismissed a libel claim brought by Mr. William Spicer against the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. The claim stemmed from a Metropolitan Police press release that Mr. Spicer alleged portrayed him in an inculpatory light despite his acquittal on charges relating to the death of Ms. Hina Shamim. The Court held that the claim failed in light of the statutory defenses of truth, privilege, and lack of serious harm under the Defamation Act 2013.

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Facts

The case arose from the tragic death of a young college student, Ms. Hina Shamim, who was fatally struck by a vehicle driven by Mr. Farid Reza on the night of 31 March 2015. [para. 1] The prosecution alleged that Mr. Spicer contributed to the incident by racing his car alongside Mr. Reza’s vehicle, causing both drivers to travel at excessive speeds, which ultimately resulted in Ms. Shamim’s death. [p. 7] Although Mr. Reza’s vehicle struck the victim, Mr. Spicer—who was driving immediately behind Mr. Reza—continued past the scene and returned only after parking his car, leaving again without identifying himself to the police. [para. 3.] Both Mr. Reza and Mr. Spicer were subsequently arrested and charged with causing death by dangerous driving and causing serious injury by dangerous driving, contrary to sections 1 and 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988. [p. 5]

Mr. Spicer was tried for contributory negligence in encouraging Mr. Reza to drive at excessive speed and causing serious injury and death by dangerous driving, as penalised in the Road Traffic Act, 1998(“RTA 1998”). The trial court however, acquitted him for charges under the RTA 1998 as well as dangerous driving, and instead only convicted him of careless driving. [para. 11] The libel claim arose thereafter, when, on the day of verdict and sentencing of the accused, the Metropolitan Police published a press release bearing the title – “Two guilty of killing a woman while racing their cars,” on their website. The Claimant argued that the press release wrongly imputes him for Ms. Shamim’s murder, discernible from the title and a few paragraphs of the report, since he had been acquitted of charges associated with her death. [para. 14]

Judge Warby J. decided on the preliminary issue of whether the press release, as a whole, meant that the claimant was one of two found “guilty of killing a woman while racing their cars”.

The learned judge, placing reliance on Allen v. Times Newspapers [(2019) EWHC 1235 (QB)] for ascertaining the meaning of defamation in common law, and Chalmers v Payne [(1835) 2 Cr M & R 56] for applying the “bane and antidote” test to the headline and body of the press release. Per Allen Times, “a statement is defamatory of the claimant if, but only if, (a) it imputes conduct which would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally, and (b) the imputation crosses the common law threshold of seriousness, which is that it “[substantially] affects in an adverse manner the attitude of other people towards him or has a tendency so to do.” Similarly, in Chalmers, “[If] in one part of the publication something disreputable to the plaintiff is stated, but that is removed by the conclusion, the bane and the antidote must be taken together.”

He noted that headlines can create libel even if the article does not, because editors or sub-editors, who write headlines for impact, may not fully grasp the article’s nuances, and ordinary readers often focus on the most prominent, usually negative, aspects. Nevertheless, the article’s content can neutralise the potential harm of a misleading headline, serving as an antidote to the negative impression created by the headline’s “bane.” [para. 17] He further emphasized that the “established legal principle holds that the meaning of a published article or statement must be derived from the article or statement as a whole.” [para. 18]

In 2019, Judge Warby concluded that the press release, as a whole, only provided the proper sequence of events that had taken place – Mr. Spicer racing his car by driving irresponsibly, reasonably suspected for the death of Ms. Shamim, and arrested, charged, tried and acquitted of the offences except careless driving. [para. 21]

Subsequent to this, Mr. Spicer amended his claim to which the defendant Commissioner of Police raised the defences of no serious harm, substantial truth, and statutory absolute and qualified privilege. Pursuant to this, two cross applications were filed – first, by Mr. Spicer for “striking out the defence of substantial truth as an abuse of process” and second by the Commission of Police for “requiring the Claimant to remedy deficiencies in his Reply.” [para. 24]

In 2020, Judge Saini J dismissed the first application and ordered for an amendment to Mr. Spicer’s reply.

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Decision Overview

Justice Julian Knowles delivered the judgment for the Court. The issue before the Court was whether the three defences of truth, privilege, and no serious harm, as provided under the Defamation Act, 2013, were applicable to the present case. 

Mr. Spicer rebutted the defence of truth by holding fast to the evidence and argued that a review of the facts would reveal that he was not racing his vehicle during the commission of the offence. [para. 222-23]. As for the defence of privilege, Mr. Spicer argued on the ground of inaccuracy and unfairness in the report [para. 227], and rested the claim for serious harm as being self-evidentiary due to the grave defamation meaning of the article. [para. 230]

The Commissioner of Police relied on R v L [(2011) RTR 19] to establish causation between Mr. Spicer’s driving and the fatal accident in order to apply the defence of truth. He argued that the the core of the libel was narrower than the defamatory claim and that a reasonable reader would understand the key accusation to be of irresponsible driving, rather than racing. The Defendant also contended that while the assertion of the arrest of Mr. Spicer was not true, it was only a minor detail. [para 236] Furthermore, he argued that he was protected by absolute, or alternatively, qualified privilege, as the report was a fair and accurate account of court proceedings. [para. 237] Finally, he stated that Mr. Spicer could not show serious harm resulting directly from the publication of the report, and therefore no claim for serious harm could be made. [para. 241]

The Defamation Act of 2013 as well as the Defamation Act of 1996 were applicable in the present case. Whereas Section 1 and Section 2 of the Defamation Act of 2013 talk about the defences of ‘serious harm’ and ‘truth’ respectively, Sections 14 and 15 of the Defamation Act of 1996 provide for the defence of absolute and qualified privilege of reports of Courts.

Defense of Truth

The Court first dealt with the argument of the Commission of Police on the core of the libel imputation not corresponding, in particular, to the allegation of racing by discussing the judgments of Simpson v Mirror Group Newspapers Limited [(2016) EWCA Civ 772], and Turcu v News Group Newspapers Ltd [(2005) EWHC 799 (QB)], which were relied upon by the Defendants. The Commissioner of Police had primarily argued that as the allegation of “racing” did not form part of the core of the libel, he was not required to prove “substantial truth” of the statement relating to the racing of vehicles. [para. 254] The Court, however, held that the argument did not hold water and only “inaccuracies around the edge” could stand ignored by the Court. [para. 262]

The Court then turned to deal with the imputations that arose from the press release’s meaning as was decided by Warby J, and broke down the article into two aspects. The first was called the “Chase one level imputation” dealing with an actual accusation of guilt of the impugned behaviour by which Mr. Spicer had raced the car and after the accident, failed to stop at the scene. On the other hand, the second was the “Chase two level imputation” dealing with grounds to suspect the guilt of Mr. Spicer based on the dangerous driving for which he was arrested, charged and acquitted. [para. 263]

With respect to the first imputation, the Court was called upon to decide whether the imputation of the Commissioner of Police was substantially true. For this, reliance was placed on Sutherland v Stopes [(1925) AC 47] wherein it was held that a plea does not fail because of the inability of the defendant to prove every minute detail. The Court, after extensive appreciation of the evidence, held that the fact of the matter, which was the race between tMr. Spicer and Mr Reza, having been proved, the case of the Defendant stood substantially true. As for the second imputation, the case of Musa King v Telegraph Group Ltd [(2004) EWCA Civ 613] was relied upon where the Court enlisted a ten point formulation of principles to determine what amounts to “reasonable grounds to suspect.” As the Defendant was able to justify the primary facts which gave rise to suspicion of Mr. Spicer having committed the crime, the level two imputation stood proven in favour of the Defendant.

Privilege

The Court in Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [(1964) AC 234], so as to protect the reputation of an individual, had stated that the Defendant cannot escape liability by attributing a statement to a third party. Moreover, in terms of extraneous material found in a report that seeks protection of absolute or qualified privilege under Section 14 or 15 of the Defamation Act of 1996, Arden LJ in Curistan v Times Newspapers Ltd [(2009) QB 231] had held that a report does not lose its character of fairness if there are minor omissions. However, a “substantial or material misstatement” makes the report lose its immunity under the Act. [para. 324] 

In this case, the Court had to determine which parts of the press release could be considered as part of a report on court proceedings, and whether they were fair and accurate. The Court also had to assess if any additional material in the press release was extraneous. After reviewing the evidence, the Court concluded that while the extraneous material in the press release did not affect its accuracy and fairness [para 347], the press release, as a whole, could not be protected by this privilege. [para 353] This was because a reasonable reader might have understood Mr. Spicer’s acquittal to mean that he was not found guilty of causing death or serious injury.

Serious Harm

The Court noted that the law relating to serious harm has been concretised in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [(2020) AC 612], [12], where the Supreme Court laid down that the threshold of seriousness has to be determined by the impact from the actual facts and cannot be limited to mere meaning of the words. [para. 354] Drawing majorly from the judgment and other subsequent developments, the Court held that the necessary requirement of proving causation under Section 1 of the Defamation Act of 2013 was not met by Mr. Spicer in the present case.

The Court underlined that, in the present case, there were many articles published by reputed media houses with similar language as that of the press release, hence the Metropolitan Police’s press release was not the sole factor in making the acts of Mr. Spicer known to the general public. The Court highlighted that while the distinctive feature of the press release as compared to other published reports was the headline, Warby J had already held, on the application of the “bane and antidote” test that its effect was cancelled out by the rest of the article, and no reasonable reader would construe the article to mean that Mr. Spicer was responsible for Ms. Shamim’s demise. [para. 370]

The Court then noted that the tragic death of Ms. Shamim, which occurred in front of the University, likely led to widespread gossip and speculation within the University community, particularly after Mr. Spicer and Mr. Reza were charged. By January 2017, some people might have believed Mr. Spicer was guilty, influenced by media reports. [para. 371]

The Court also found that there was no specific evidence showing serious harm caused by the publication of the press release. Mr. Spicer’s own evidence was deemed too vague and general, and there was no solid proof linking the article to the reactions of those who allegedly shunned him or denied him opportunities. [para. 372]

The Court further stated that it was not clear whether those who re-tweeted the police’s tweet believed Mr. Spicer was guilty or were endorsing the article. Mr. Spicer’s assertion that the article led to him being excluded from university networks, denied references, or targeted for a degree removal lacked concrete evidence. The Court found it unlikely that the article alone caused these issues, particularly as some events occurred after he graduated and the article was published. [paras. 373-376]

The Court therefore held that Mr. Spicer failed to prove that the press release caused serious harm to his reputation as required per Section 1 of the Defamation Act of 2013. [para. 378]

In conclusion, the Court ruled in favour of the Commissioner of Police.

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