Case Summary and Outcome

The Hungarian Constitutional Court held that calling a media personality a “psychopath” who was making lives miserable and who had obtained contracts “under murky circumstances” on social media did not infringe his personality rights, reputation and dignity. The media personality had sued a social media commentator and the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeal had dismissed his application. The Constitutional Court examined the nature of public figures and their required higher tolerance of public criticism, and held that the lower courts had correctly balanced the competing rights of freedom of expression and reputation in dismissing the media personality’s case.

Facts

In December 2014, a Hungarian commentator, who frequently voiced his opinions on public issues in public, published posts on his Facebook profile, which contained statements about a well-known Hungarian media personality. The media personality had initiated a series of civil and criminal proceedings against the commentator. The impugned post included the statements describing the media personality as a “psychopath making all our lives miserable” and “this psychopath”, who had obtained “public television contracts under murky circumstances”, and characterized his conduct as “the legal terror of the media psychopath”.

The media personality filed a case against the commentator, on the grounds of presumed violation of personality rights related to good reputation and human dignity. He sought an order directing the commentator to desist from further infringement, to pay aggravated damages (compensation for injury to feelings) totaling HUF 1,600,000 (approximately USD 4,400 in 2025) and that the commentator provide apologies in the form of “restitution” and “satisfaction.”

The Court of First Instance dismissed the media personality’s action. It noted that the case concerned  a dispute between two public figures and, after examining the commentator’s posts as a whole, it held that the contested statements and expressions expressed an opinion. The Court stressed that public figures have a broader, wider duty of tolerance when it comes to opinions with the limit only the violation of human dignity, and found that the contested passages, regarding the media personality as a public figure, did not exceed the threshold that would justify finding a violation of personality rights. It held that the parties’ expressions had the characteristics of a social and professional debate, which precluded the possibility of finding an infringement. The Court took into account the specific characteristics of the Facebook post genre and the fact that the general style of the wording of internet posts differs significantly from the usual language used in the media, with the use of coarser language being more common on the internet.

The media personality appealed to the Budapest Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal found that the Court of First Instance was correct in its assessment of the communications as expressions of opinion. It highlighted that the media personality had filed a series of criminal proceedings and civil actions against the commentator and that this context had to be considered in assessing the commentator’s subjective assessment of the media personality’s conduct towards him. The Court of Appeal held that it was not possible to disregard the personal conflict between the two and the court proceedings initiated as a result. It held that the opinions expressed and value judgments made by the commentator did not contain any insulting or degrading statements that would have justified legal protection and that the adjectives “psychopath” and “media psychopath” did not constitute an infringement of the media personality’s rights as it is common parlance to use the terms “mentally ill” and “psychopath” to describe someone who does not do what the other party likes or expects.

The media personality then filed a constitutional appeal against the final judgment to the Constitutional Court, in which he requested that the Constitutional Court annul the judgment of the Budapest Court of Appeal.

Decision Overview

The Constitutional Court delivered a unanimous decision. The central issue for the Court’s determination was whether the statements in the Facebook post violated the media personality’s reputation and dignity.

The Court examined the constitutionally protected scope of freedom of expression, with reference to its own previous jurisprudence and that of the European Court of Human Rights. It stressed that “in considering whether a public communication falls within the scope of the protection under freedom of expression, the primary consideration is whether the communication concerns the free discussion of public affairs”. [para. 43] It added that the nature of a public communication “is not determined by the personal status of the persons concerned by the communication, but vice versa: the personal status of the persons concerned must be assessed in relation to the subject-matter of the communication”. [para. 43]

In the case of public statements made in the context of the discussion of issues of wide societal interest, the Court considered it necessary to examine whether the subject of the statement is a public figure. It stressed that determining the public figure’s status is “always up to a case-by-case evaluation” and that “the fact that a public speech is related to public affairs per se shall not automatically lead to a reduced protection of the personality rights of the persons concerned”. [para. 43] The Court noted that no uniform criteria can be established for defining the public figure status, but that it is not limited to politicians and persons exercising public authority and that the circle of public figures cannot be considered a constant and homogeneous characteristic defining the status of individuals, because “the changing social conditions, especially the spread of telecommunications, have led to a broadening of the circle of public figures. As a result of this trend, people who – by virtue of their status – were not previously public figures have the opportunity to become active participants in public debates.” [paras. 45-46] The Court held that media personalities who are active in the media, are well-known and have a strong influence on the shaping of public opinion on public affairs are included in the category of public figures. It added that a court must also consider the ability of the public figure to respond to “expressions of concern about his or her person, activities, views or credibility” and that a person who “voluntarily takes part in public life is less in need of protection if they can make more extensive and effective use of the mass media against attacks on their person than anyone else”. [para. 49]

The Court examined the basic principles in determining whether speech constitutes a statement of fact or a value judgment, and referred to its previous consistent interpretation, as set out in Constitutional Court resolution 13/2014. (IV. 19.), that it is a specificity of value judgments that their truth cannot be verified, whereas “statements of fact always contain concrete facts, the veracity of which can be proved and verified by means of evidence”. [paras. 31 and 40]

In concluding the constitutionality assessment, the Court referred to its position on respect for human dignity as an absolute limit and limitation of expressions related to public affairs and public figures. It recalled its relevant jurisprudence and stated that the dialogue on public debates cannot be considered as unlimited, since respect for the dignity of every human being, which is an inviolable core of the human personality and embodies the human status of every human being, constitutes an absolute limit to freedom of expression.

The Court stated that, in balancing competing rights, “when courts have to deal with a legal dispute in which a fundamental rights conflict arises in the relationship between legal entities due to one private individual’s exercise of fundamental rights endangering another private individual’s fundamental rights, […] they must make their decision by exploring the scope of protection of the affected fundamental rights and by balancing the affected fundamental rights (‘with gentle reconciliation and equitable balancing’)”. [para. 68]

In the present case, the Court examined whether the statements in the Facebook post could be linked to a public issue or the activities of public figures, whether they constituted a statement of fact or opinion (value judgment), and whether the commentator’s statements did or did not go beyond the constitutional framework of absolute respect for human dignity. The Court held that the media personality is obliged to tolerate critical comments about his person to a greater extent than the average person, since “it is of decisive importance that the petitioner is a widely known person who presents important social issues in his programmes, which have a significant national audience, thus significantly influencing the discussion of public issues in a particular area”. [para. 79] In respect of the words used, the Court held that neither the use of the term “psychopath” nor the statement “under murky circumstances” could be considered as statements of fact, but as statements of opinion, since the commentator had expressed his subjective value judgments and reactions to the media personality’s previous conduct, and that this was well understood by the receiving audience. With reference to the judgment of the Court of First Instance, the Court held that “the communications examined in the case at hand are shocking, crude, attention-grabbing, bitterly critical texts, but they do not cross the line that the petitioner, one of the most well-known and prominent media personalities in the country, must still bear in the context of the duty of higher tolerance”. [para. 84]

Accordingly, the Court found the decisions of both the lower courts and their reasoning on the balancing of the fundamental rights concerned to be in line with the relevant constitutional interpretative framework, and therefore dismissed the constitutional appeal.