Case Summary and Outcome

A Polish court dismissed a lawsuit brought by a political party against a law professor for describing the party as an “organized criminal group” on Twitter. The professor had made the post in relation to a large march which had been described as racist and fascist in the past. The Court found that although the statement violated the party’s personal rights, the violation was not unlawful, as there was a need to strongly protect political speech and a greater latitude to speech made on social media. The Court also emphasized the role of political commentators in society who have a “duty to the state and should react” when they believe democracy is under threat. [p. 23]

---

Facts

On November 10, 2018, a Polish professor of law, W. S., posted a message on his private Twitter account in which he referred to the P. party, a large political party in Poland, as an “organized criminal group.”

The message read: “If anyone still had any doubts, after the events of the last two days, it should be clear: no decent person should march in a parade of defenders of the white race who have temporarily hidden their phalanges and swastikas, in collusion with the organized criminal group P.”

This post was a comment on the events that had taken place earlier in connection with the celebration of National Independence Day. This included the decision of Warsaw authorities to ban the regular gathering of the radical nationalist “Independence March” Association, taken in connection with the turbulent nature of previous editions of this gathering (when, among other things, slogans were shouted that some considered racist and referring to fascism), and the declaration by the president and prime minister to organize, together with the aforementioned association, a joint march under the patronage of the president and of a state ceremonial nature. Ultimately, however, the decision of the Warsaw authorities to ban the march was overturned by the court, and two independent marches covering the same route took place.

The post by W.S. was published on the day before the planned joint march and was a response to the declaration.

W. S., who specializes in the philosophy of law and constitutionalism and is also a publicist and an active commentator on political life in Poland, has repeatedly criticized the P. party in public, expressing the view that it is seeking to transform the democratic system into an authoritarian one. His criticism has concerned the party leadership, the parliamentary majority, the government, and the Polish president. The actions W.S. has criticized include the amendment of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, the amendment of the Act on Common Courts, the president’s pardon of a person convicted by a non-final judgment, changes related to public media, and the disciplinary system for judges. In his criticism, W.S. repeatedly compared the actions of the P. party to those of an organized criminal group, using terms such as “operates like an organized criminal group,” “it looks like the modus operandi of an organized criminal group,” “members of an organized criminal group that dismantled Polish democracy,” and “behaves like a gang leader.”

In response, the P. party brought a civil action against W.S. for violation of its personal rights in the District Court in Warsaw – 2nd Civil Division. The P. party sought an order that W. S. be ordered to apologize to the P. party in the form of a public apology posted on Twitter and in the form of a letter sent to the party’s headquarters, to refrain from further infringing the party’s personal rights, in particular from making statements in which the party’s activities are compared to criminal activities, and paying the amount of PLN 20,000 (approximately US$5,500 in April 2026) to charity.

---

Decision Overview

The central issue for the Court’s determination was whether W. S.’s statement was an unlawful violation of the P. party’s personality rights.

The P. party argued that calling a legally operating political party an “organized criminal group” damaged its reputation and credibility and exposed it to a loss of public trust. It referred to a definition taken from Wikipedia, which clearly links the term used by W. S. to criminal activity and argued that W.S.’s statement should be interpreted as a statement of fact, which is subject to a truth-false test. The P. party emphasized that neither it nor its statutory representatives were subject to any criminal charges and noted that W. S. constantly used the term “organized criminal group” in relation to it and its representatives, citing several examples. It referred to the fact that W. S. is a well-known professor of law in the public debate makes his words particularly credible to the public and therefore harmful to party. The P. party pointed out that detailed data on the popularity of W. S.’s Twitter profile clearly demonstrates the very high social impact of his statement, and so the significant damage suffered by the party.

W. S. requested that that the lawsuit be dismissed. He pointed out the key importance of two circumstances: the P. party’s conduct of politics since 2015 which he and other people involved in political debate believed violated the standards of a democratic state governed by the rule of law; and his own public activity, consisting of open criticism of the P. party’s conduct of politics. In his critical public comments, W. S. repeatedly compared the actions of the P. party to those of an organized criminal group, but he explained the purpose of these statements was not to claim that the P. party was an organized criminal group in the sense of criminal law, but that it operated on the basis of mechanisms that function in a criminal group. The description of the P. party as an “organized criminal group” was therefore metaphorical in nature and was a method of presenting an opinion. W. S. submitted that Wikipedia is not a reliable and accurate source of information, and in interpreting the term “organized criminal group,” one should refer to its colloquial meaning, which is broader in scope than the criminal law meaning, and is described in the Polish language dictionary under the heading “mafia.” He noted that politicians from the P. party often use legal terms such as “murder,” “treason,” or “theft” in public discourse in a non-legal context, and in such situations it is clear that the meanings of these terms change. W. S. emphasized that his post was part of the public debate in Poland and concerned the actions of the ruling party, which were of widespread public interest.

The Court noted that the normative basis for the action brought is Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code. Article 23 states: “Personal interests of a human being, such as in particular health, freedom, dignity, freedom of conscience, surname or pseudonym, image, the confidentiality of correspondence, inviolability of the home as well as scientific, artistic, inventive and reasoning activities shall be protected by the civil law regardless of the protection provided for by other provisions”. Article 24 states, among other things: “A person whose personal interests are jeopardized by another person’s action may demand that the action be abandoned unless it is not illegal. In the case of actual violation, he may also demand that the person who committed the violation perform acts necessary to remove its consequences, in particular, that the latter make a statement of relevant content and in a relevant form. On the basis of the principles provided for by the Code, he may also demand pecuniary compensation or a payment of an adequate amount of money for a specified community purpose”.

The Court ruled that these provisions hold that liability for infringement of personal rights may be incurred if three conditions are met cumulatively: 1) personal rights exist, 2) those rights have been infringed, 3) the infringement of that right was unlawful, on the rebuttable presumption of unlawfulness of the infringement. It emphasized that “[t]herefore, if an infringement of personal rights is proven, only evidence of the absence of unlawfulness can release the perpetrator of the infringement from liability”. [p. 10]

In assessing whether personal rights existed, the Court noted that the P. party is a political party, so is a legal person and not a natural person. But it emphasized that, pursuant to Article 43 of the Civil Code, the provisions on the protection of personal rights of natural persons apply mutatis mutandis (similarly, but with the necessary changes) to legal persons. Referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling of November 14, 1986 (II CR 295/86), the Court stated that “the personal rights of legal persons are non-pecuniary values that enable a legal person to function in accordance with its scope of activity”. [pp. 10-11] Accordingly, the Court concluded that in the case of a political party, values such as good name and credibility constitute its legally protected personal rights and so the first condition for liability for infringement of personal rights was met in this case.

With regard to determining whether those personal rights had been infringed, the Court found that the term “organized criminal group” used by W. S. violated the P. party’s good name. However, it found that, contrary to the party’s claim, the term used by W. S. should be understood in its colloquial rather than legal sense. Thus, the content of this term is not a statement about the criminal nature of the actions of the P. party, but a very harsh and sharply worded assessment of the actions of the P. party. The Court found that, when assessing the meaning of this statement, it is not enough to refer to the semantics of the expressions used in it, but the entire context must be taken into account. It stated that in this case, “[i]f a word or expression in a language is assigned a referent, i.e., an object corresponding to the name, this does not automatically mean that the use of that word or expression should be understood directly in this way. Such an understanding of language would be poor and limited. Language is not only words, but also a wealth of other means, the combination of which allows us to understand the actual content of a statement and the intention of its author”. [p. 19] The Court emphasized the importance of context for the interpretation of a statement and noted that “[t]he simplest example can be cited here, remaining within the realm of personal rights violations. By calling another person a ‘goat’ in a discussion, which is an offensive term in colloquial language, the person uttering these words obviously does not mean an animal with specific characteristics, but rather attributes a not very keen intellect to the person thus named. This understanding is obvious because in the Polish language, the use of the invective ‘goat’ in a specific context has precisely this meaning. Similarly, the use of the words ‘organized criminal group’ should be assessed. Although there is a definition of this term in criminal law, it is obvious that it was not used in this sense by the defendant, but to express criticism of the actions of the ruling party.” [p. 19] Accordingly, although the Court agreed that the words used by W. S. violated the personal rights of the P. party, the violation did not consist in a false description of reality, but in the offensive manner in which the assessment was formulated.

In determining whether the violation of the P. party’s personal rights was unlawful, the Court noted that, in accordance with the established doctrine of Polish courts, in order for the unlawfulness of a violation of personal rights to be excluded, at least one of the following circumstances must occur: an action in accordance with legal provisions; the exercise of a personal right; the consent of the victim; or an action in defense of a legitimate interest.

The Court found that W. S.’s violation of the P. party’s rights was not unlawful.  It stated that the provisions on the protection of personal rights should be read in the light of the protection of freedom of expression in Article 54(1) of the Polish Constitution (“Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom to express their views and to obtain and disseminate information”) and Article 10 of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court emphasized that freedom of expression plays a key role in democratic societies and that the right to freedom of expression and the right to protection of good name have an equal position in the Polish legal system, and that any conflict between these rights must always be resolved in the context of the specific case.

The Court stressed that the present case concerned critical commentary on political events and, in accordance with the accepted interpretation of Article 10(2) of the European Convention, “there is little scope for imposing restrictions on political speech or debates on matters of public interest”. [p. 12] It referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Kącki v. Poland, and noted that, according to the established case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the rulings of Polish courts, public officials and politicians may be criticized more harshly and with greater exaggeration than ordinary citizens; it is assumed that anyone who undertakes to perform important public functions accepts that they may be subject to harsh assessment and blunt criticism. The Court noted that this approach applies “all the more to political parties, and to the highest degree – as was the case here – to the ruling party”. [p. 25] The Court added that the European Court of Human Rights case law, when referring to the distinction between descriptive statements (i.e., those that can be classified as true or false) and evaluative statements (i.e., those that cannot be classified in this way), requires that the category of evaluative statements be understood broadly. Such a broad interpretation means that, firstly, statements of a hybrid nature, containing a mixture of descriptive and evaluative elements, should be treated as evaluative statements and, secondly, that in case of doubt as to the nature of a statement made in a public debate, such doubts should be resolved in favor of recognizing the evaluative nature of that statement. The Court explained that in the case of evaluative statements, the limits of freedom of expression are interpreted very broadly, and so “[t]he greater the social importance of the matter, the greater the scope of permissible criticism. In case of doubt, however, freedom of expression should take precedence”. [p. 16]

The Court drew attention to the increasingly harsh language used in public debate, noting that despite its sharpness, W. S.’s statement was not among the harshest expressions used in public debate, including in the press and on the Internet. It noted that “[t]he statement may be distasteful in terms of language, taste, sensitivity, and the expected higher level of public debate, but these categories are different from the assessment of whether the statement is legally permissible and whether it should be sanctioned”. [p. 24] It also emphasized the importance of the place where the statement was published and that Twitter assumes brevity of statements and quick reactions to events, and these characteristics justify the use of harsher terms. The Court also noted that if the statement had been formulated in a milder manner, it would not have been as effective and, in this sense, would not have fulfilled its function as intended by W. S. It added that W. S.’s statement was made in the context of a march organized by the Independence March Association, an event that had been highly controversial in previous years, with some viewing it as patriotic and others – including a large part of the domestic and foreign media – as promoting fascism, anti-Semitism, and racism. The statement therefore concerned a politically controversial and, at the same time, important issue. The Court, referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling of February 23, 2017 (I CSK 124/16), found that, given the great social significance of the issue raised by the statement, particularly strong protection of freedom of expression is needed: “It is not excluded that even drastic and controversial forms of expression of views on issues of great social importance may be used”. [p. 12]

The Court also stated that W. S., as a professor of law and political commentator, not only has the right but also the duty to speak out publicly when, in his opinion, something dangerous to democracy is happening. It added that there are professional groups, such as historians, lawyers, philosophers, or sociologists, who, “due to their education and awareness of the scientifically researched mechanisms that led to the tragedy of World War II as a result of fascist ideology, have a duty to the state and should react”. [p. 23]

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the P. party’s claim on the basis that, although the first two conditions were met, the third was not and so it found that, although there had been a violation of the personal rights of the P. party, the presumption of unlawfulness of the violation was rebutted on the basis of a weighing of the conflicting values. The Court ruled that W.S.’s actions were not unlawful, as he acted within the limits of the law, exercising his right to freedom of expression, bearing in mind the public good, and with the indirect consent of the P. party, which stems from the place of political parties in a democratic system.

This judgment was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal in Warsaw – 5th Civil Division, which dismissed the appeal in its judgment of November 6, 2020, and by the Supreme Court, which refused to accept the cassation appeal for consideration in its decision of January 21, 2022.

---