The Court applied these principles to the facts of the instant case and arrived at the following observations:

First, the Court noted lack of evidence indicating that the police’s recourse to physical force against the applicants was made strictly necessary by their conduct [p. 498] since the protesters intended to be obstructive but peaceful, gathering by occupying a space in the capital’s central square to draw the attention of the authorities and the public at large [p. 497]. The Court remarked that although the protesters had erected barricades, set up tents and platforms and occupied several administrative buildings, there was no information indicating that the protesters’ intention was to be violent rather than being obstructive [p. 499]. Relying on Karpyuk v Ukraine, Application Nos. 30582/04, the Court observed that obstructive actions in principle enjoyed the protection of Articles 10 and 11 [p. 497]. The Court also emphasised that the mere possibility of occurrence of violence was insufficient to conclude that the organisers of the gathering had violent intentions and that an individual did not lose protection under right to freedom of peaceful assembly due to sporadic violence or acts committed by others in the course of a demonstration if the individual in question remained peaceful in his or her own intentions [p. 501]. In the light of the foregoing, the Court found that all the applicants enjoyed the protection of Article 11 of the Convention [p. 505].

Second, the Court opined that the governmental authorities interfered with applicants’ right to peaceful demonstration by using force to disperse them however, it had to be determine whether it was “prescribed by law” to pursue “legitimate aims” and was “necessary in a democratic society” [p. 507]. While deciding if the actions were “prescribed by law”, the court highlighted that “Ukraine lacked clear and foreseeable legislation laying down the rules for holding peaceful demonstrations” [p. 508]. The Court was unable to assess the specific legal grounds on which the actions of the police were based but noted that Ukrainian law empowered police officers to “interfere with public gatherings, including by using proportionate force, where it was necessary to stop the commission of offences, to overcome resistance to their lawful orders, maintain public order” [p. 511].  Although there was lack of clarity on this issue, the Court proceeded with the assumption that there was a basis in domestic law for the police intervention at issue and didn’t find it necessary to determine issues relating to the quality of the domestic legal framework in question [p. 514]. The Court noted that although the authorities might have “legitimate aims” to enforce the above mentioned restrictions to maintain “an orderly passage of pedestrians and the flow of traffic and, overall, preventing disorder, as well as protecting the rights of others”, the Court deferred again and didn’t consider it necessary to decide this issue [p. 516].