Case Summary and Outcome

The High Court of Gujarat refused to stay the conviction of the Petitioner, an Indian politician Rahul Gandhi, a leader of the Indian National Congress (INC), who faced a criminal defamation charge for comparing Prime Minister Narendra Modi to known economic offenders during a public speech in 2019. Purnesh Modi, a member of the opposing party, filed the complaint, alleging defamation against the larger “Modi” community. The Gujarat High Court refused to stay Rahul Gandhi’s conviction, which led to his disqualification from Parliament, stating that his false statements during an election campaign, scandalizing individuals, and breaching societal norms, constituted a serious offense involving moral turpitude. The Court emphasized that as a prominent political figure, Rahul Gandhi’s remarks impacted a significant section of the public and held him accountable for exercising caution in his statements to prevent harm to specific identifiable groups. Despite arguments regarding the right to free speech, the Court affirmed the seriousness of the defamation offense, dismissing Rahul Gandhi’s plea for suspension of his conviction and urging prompt resolution of the case at the district level.

Update: The Supreme Court ordered a stay on conviction till the pendency of the appeal before the Second Appellate Court. The Supreme Court noted that the Petitioner’s statements were not in good taste, and that “a person in public life is expected to exercise a degree of restraint while making public speeches”. However, in light of the wide-ranging implications, which not only affected the Appellant’s right to continue in public life but also the electorate’s right to representation, and considering the absence of reasons provided by the learned Trial Judge for imposing the maximum sentence, which led to Petitioner’s disqualification, the Supreme Court stayed the conviction order during the pendency of this appeal.

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Facts

The Petitioner, Rahul Gandhi is an Indian Political Leader of the Indian National Congress (INC). At a public event in Kolar, Karnataka on April 13, 2019, Gandhi addressed the gathering with a question, “In sab choron ke naam Modi, Modi, Modi, Kyun hai? Nirav Modi, Lalit Modi, Narendra Modi” (Why are all these thieves named Modi? Nirav Modi, Lalit Modi, Narendra Modi). In his speech, the Petitioner compared Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India with economic offenders of India like Nirav Modi and Lalit Modi. [para 2.1]  He accused the Prime Minister of being involved in corruption in the Rafale deal (Rafale deal controversy in India revolves around the acquisition of 36 Rafale fighter aircraft from France’s Dassault Aviation for ₹58,891 Crore, sparking political debate about corruption and scrutiny regarding the procurement process and pricing) rather than acting as a guardian (“chowkidar”). He asserted that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had allegedly funneled a staggering sum of INR 30,000 crore to his ‘thief friend’ Anil Ambani (a businessman), insinuating that this money had found its way directly into Ambani’s pockets in connection with the Rafale deal [para. 2.1]

On April 16, 2019, Purnesh Modi, a Member of the Legislative Assembly from the opposite party i.e., the Bhartiya Janta Party, filed a criminal defamation case against the Petitioner under Sections 499, 500, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, (1860) before the Magistrate Court. The Respondent who shared the “Modi” last name contended that he was also defamed and asserted that Petitioner’s comment defamed the entire community of “Modi”. On the other hand, the Petitioner asserted that his comments were focused on corruption and were not directed toward the “Modi”’ community.

On March 23, 2023, the Magistrate Court convicted the Petitioner. The Magistrate Court held that the Petitioner’s comments amounted to criminal defamation and sentenced the Petitioner to undergo simple imprisonment of two years. [para. 2.3] The Petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Court, which was subsequently, dismissed. [para 2.4] Meanwhile, just after the conviction and sentence order, the Petitioner was disqualified from the Indian Parliament under Section 8(3) of the Representation of People Act, which states that any person convicted of any offense and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years is disqualified.

Aggrieved against the conviction and sentence order, the Petitioner filed a Criminal Revision Appeal before the High Court of Gujarat. 

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Decision Overview

Justice Hemant M. Prachchhak of the Gujarat High Court delivered the judgment. The prima facie question before the Court was whether the Petitioner’s remarks amounted to criminal defamation or whether they were protected under freedom of expression.

The Petitioner contended that the offense registered against him is not serious in nature nor does it involve moral turpitude, which are the criteria for denying suspension of conviction. It was contended that there is no identifiable class to maintain the complaint, raising questions about its maintainability. The Petitioner contended that the Respondent lacked the locus standi to file the defamation complaint under Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as he was not an aggrieved person. The alleged defamatory statements were directed at Narendra Modi, and only a person directly affected by defamation could file a case. The Petitioner contended that the term “Modi” did not constitute an identifiable group, and even if it did, the Respondent’s surname was not “Modi” but “Bhutala”, further weakening his claim. [para. 4]

Furthermore, the Petitioner pointed out serious flaws in the trial process. The Petitioner critiqued the lack of concrete evidence supporting the prosecution’s case, especially regarding the authenticity of the alleged offending speech. The Petitioner questioned the credibility of witnesses and the sudden appearance of new evidence, suggesting it was an afterthought. Moreover, the Petitioner contested the Respondent’s ability to continue the case, emphasizing that he had no role post-conviction, and highlighted the absence of proper certification for the electronic evidence presented. [para. 4]

The Petitioner challenged the factors considered by the Appellate Court, including derogatory remarks against Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the notion of holding a Member of Parliament to a higher moral standard. The Petitioner argued that his criticism was protected under the constitutional right to free speech, and even if his statements were considered true, they amounted to political hyperbole or satire, protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. The Petitioner also highlighted the irreversible and irreparable consequences of his conviction. Being a representative of a constituency in the Parliament of India, the Petitioner was disqualified from Parliament due to the conviction, depriving both him and his constituency of proper representation. This absence led to a loss of voice for his constituents in the democratic process, representing a general detriment to the public interest of the country. [para. 4]

The Respondent contended that on the one hand, the Petitioner filed an application for Criminal Revision against the sentence order and conviction order, and on the other hand, the Petitioner filed an application seeking the quashing of a FIR, which is not permissible under the law. The Respondent emphasized the seriousness of the offense and its impact on himself, the community, and society at large. The Respondent highlighted that the Petitioner held the position of an elected representative and served as the President of the Second-Largest National-Level Political Party, which had governed the Central Government for over 50 years. [para. 15]

According to the Respondent, during this speech, the Petitioner made false factual statements, specifically in the context of the election, and the Petitioner invoked the name of the Prime Minister to generate sensation, seemingly to impact the election in the concerned constituency of Kolar, which belonged to the Prime Minister’s party. Furthermore, the Respondent highlighted that the Petitioner didn’t stop at that point but went on to insinuate, “Saare Choro ke naam Modi Modi Modi hi Kyu Hai” (why every thief’s name is Modi?) suggesting a broader implication regarding the use of the name “Modi” by all wrongdoers [para. 16]

The Respondent also submitted that the “Modi” last name represented an identifiable and well-defined class of individuals who could rightfully claim to be aggrieved by the alleged defamation. He supported this by producing documentary evidence, government orders, and testimony that established the “Modi” surname as part of a particular caste and community, making it a suitable and identifiable class. Therefore, the Respondent, contended that he possessed the “Modi” surname and belonged to the “Modi Community,” and therefore, fell within this class and qualifies as an aggrieved party. [para. 16]

The Respondent pointed out that if the Court does not disqualify the Petitioner from the Parliament, then Parliament itself has provisions for disqualification, indicating that the Respondent has not disqualified the Petitioner, and thus, the Petitioner cannot claim to be suffering an irreversible loss. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that maintaining the sanctity and dignity of the highest institution of the country is mandatory and that powers under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. should be exercised only in the “rarest of rare cases”. The Respondent further referred to the Petitioner’s public statements and behavior and contended that the Petitioner has shown irreparable conduct through his comments and actions, which further justifies his disqualification. [para. 15]

Similarly, the Public Prosecutor representing the State supported the Respondent’s arguments and contended that the proceedings under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure grant the Public Prosecutor the authority to make submissions. The Prosecutor emphasized that the legislature permits a maximum sentence of two years, and if the Magistrate deems it appropriate, they can impose this maximum punishment, within the permissible legal limits. The Prosecutor further contended that the current stage of the proceedings is not the appropriate time for the Petitioner to contest the quantum of the sentence since the Court has not exceeded the allowable term. He pointed out that both the Magistrate and the Appellate Court have already assessed the seriousness of the case. The Prosecutor further asserted that although the offense is non-cognizable and bailable, given the Petitioner’s sentencing, this is not a scenario where the conviction can stay, indicating that the gravity of the offense is a crucial factor to be considered at this stage. [para. 37]

The High Court’s first addressed on its power under revisional jurisdiction. It held that under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code, the High Court possesses revisional jurisdiction allowing it to review the records of inferior courts and assess the correctness, legality, or propriety of their decisions and proceedings. However, this power is discretionary and should only be used sparingly to prevent miscarriages of justice or when there are glaring defects in procedure or legal errors leading to a failure of justice. The High Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate on questions of fact unless the lower court’s decision is shown to be perverse, legally untenable, based on irrelevant evidence, or disregarding relevant evidence. Interference with the lower court’s order in revisional jurisdiction is impermissible unless these conditions are met. [para. 40]

The High Court referred to the case of Shyam Narayan v . Union of India, (2018) in the context of Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, emphasizing that giving a hearing to the Public Prosecutor indicates the seriousness of an offense but is not the sole determining factor. It notes that offenses categorized as “serious” or involving moral turpitude are treated equally for the purpose of staying convictions. [para. 42-43]

The High Court then proceeded to analyze the case at hand. It noted that the Petitioner in this case is a Member of Parliament and a prominent political figure, who had made a false statement during an election campaign that was intended to affect the election’s outcome. The High Court held that this offense falls within the category of “seriousness”. The High Court referred to the case of Sushil Kumar Singhal  v. Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, (2010) to define moral turpitude as conduct inherently base, vile, or depraved. The High Court held that Petitioner’s false statements scandalized individuals and breached societal norms, falling within the category of moral turpitude. The High Court also referred to Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, classifying offenses committed by Members of Parliament into different categories and stating that the offense in question falls within the “serious category”. [para. 44-45] 

The High Court rejected the argument that the Respondent did not belong to an identifiable class, asserting that the Respondent, belonging to the “Modi Community” with a specific surname, constitutes an identifiable and suitable class. The High Court upheld the decision of the lower court to issue a summons based on the complaint’s verification and documents produced, stating that this amounted to an inquiry under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court also addressed the challenges to the oral and electronic evidence, emphasizing that these issues should be dealt with during the final hearing of the appeal and are not grounds for intervention at this stage. The High Court noted that the evidence provided by witnesses and electronic sources should be considered during the appeal proceedings. [para. 45]

The High Court further quoted Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, which defines defamation, emphasizing that not only intention or knowledge but also “reason to believe” is a factor in bringing the imputer to prosecution. The High Court noted that all three elements – intention, knowledge, and reason to believe – are established in the present case. [para. 46-48]

The High Court outlined the principles for suspension of conviction, stating that it should be in rare and exceptional circumstances.  It underscored that the seriousness of the offense and the presence of moral turpitude are vital considerations, and even the criminal antecedents of the accused are relevant. The High Court rejected the notion that being a sitting MLA/MP is a sufficient reason for staying the sentence and highlighted that the right to be elected is a statutory, not a fundamental, right. The High Court emphasized that being a public servant and losing a job is not grounds for suspension of sentence. It clarified that the right to be elected is a statutory right and not a fundamental or common law right. [para. 53-56]

The High Court underscored the significance of the offense of defamation, linking it to the fundamental rights of individuals who were defamed. It referenced the Supreme Court case Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) to emphasize that reputation was a fundamental human right and part of an individual’s personality. The court highlighted the right to life under Article 21, encompassing life with human dignity, which included social and economic justice and the right to reputation. [para. 58-59] 

The High Court noted that defamation in the case at hand involved a large identifiable class, elevating the offense to affect a significant section of the public, not just an individual. Additionally, the Petitioner, being a prominent political figure, enjoyed extensive media coverage, making his utterances widely publicized and leaving a lasting imprint in various forms like website links and videos. [para. 59-60]

The High Court dismissed the Petitioner’s argument that the offense was less serious due to the maximum punishment being two years. It emphasized that defamation was a public offense involving fundamental rights to reputation and dignity. The High Court held that the Petitioner’s attempt to seek a stay on his conviction was considered unfounded, given the serious nature of the offense and the need for purity in politics. The Court emphasized that the stay of conviction was an exception and not a rule, and in this case, there was no reasonable ground to stay the conviction. [para. 61-63]

In conclusion, the High Court ruled against staying the conviction, affirming the decision of the Appellate court and dismissing the Petitioner’s application for revision. The High Court urged the district judge to decide the criminal appeal promptly and in accordance with the law. [para. 65-66]

Update: The Supreme Court ordered a stay on conviction till the pendency of the appeal before the Second Appellate Court. The Supreme Court noted that the Petitioner’s statements were not in good taste, and that “a person in public life is expected to exercise a degree of restraint while making public speeches”. However, in light of the wide-ranging implications, which not only affected the Appellant’s right to continue in public life but also the electorate’s right to representation, and considering the absence of reasons provided by the learned Trial Judge for imposing the maximum sentence, which led to Petitioner’s disqualification, the Supreme Court stayed the conviction order during the pendency of this appeal.

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