Case Summary and Outcome

On April 02, 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a landmark decision, dismissed an appeal by Mr. and Mrs. Lucas, who had been sentenced to prison for 18 months and 12 months, respectively, for falsely accusing and defaming a police officer of allowing or facilitating the rape and sodomy of an eight-year-old child. While addressing whether the offence of defamatory libel infringed the constitutional protection of freedom of expression under Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Court held that it constituted a reasonable limit prescribed by law under Section 1 of the Charter. The Court emphasised that protecting individuals from willful and false attacks on their reputation upholds personal dignity and supports meaningful participation in society, making the prevention of such harm a legitimate aim of criminal law.

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Facts

The present appeal was filed by John David Lucas and Johanna Erna Lucas (“the appellants”) following their sentencing to prison terms of 18 months and 12 months, respectively, for falsely accusing and defaming a police officer (“the defendant”) by alleging his involvement in the rape and sodomy of an eight-year-old child. The police officer had been investigating sexual abuse allegations made by three children—Michael R. and his twin sisters, Michelle R. and Kathleen R.—against their birth parents, foster parents, and various members of their foster family. The investigation resulted in criminal charges against 16 individuals, including the children’s natural parents, foster parents (Mr. and Mrs. K.), and members of the K. family.

During the investigation, the appellants informed the police officer of inappropriate sexual behaviour displayed by the children. They also informed him that Michael had sexually assaulted his sisters on numerous occasions. However, relying on the opinion of the children’s therapist, the officer decided to keep the three children together in the same specialised foster home.

Mr. John Lucas, who was active in a prisoners’ rights group, was approached by some of the accused individuals seeking advice on coping with the allegations’ impact on their lives. These individuals provided Mr. Lucas with documents, including reports from the children’s therapist, describing the sexual activities of the three children. Based on these documents, the appellants concluded that Michael had raped, sodomised, and tortured his sister Kathy and had repeatedly engaged in sexual activities with his other sister, Michelle. They further concluded that the officer was aware of these incidents and, as a police officer, had a duty to intervene. Despite making complaints to the Police Commission, the Premier’s office, and the Attorney General’s office, they received no satisfactory response.

On 20 September 1993, the appellants and a small group of supporters picketed outside the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan and the police headquarters where the officer worked. Mrs. Lucas carried a sign prepared by Mr. Lucas, which read on one side: “Did [the police officer] just allow or help with the rape/sodomy of an 8 year old?” and on the other: “If you admit it [officer] then you might get help with your touching problem.” Mrs. Lucas was arrested and charged with defamatory libel under sections 300 and 301 of the Criminal Code of Canada. The following day, Mr. Lucas picketed again in front of the Provincial Court and police headquarters, this time carrying a sign that read on one side: “Did [the police officer] help/or take part in the rape & sodomy of an 8-year-old. The papers prove [the officer] allowed his witness to rape”; and on the other side: “The papers prove [the officer] allowed the false arrest & detention of Mrs. Lucas, with a falsified information.” Mr. Lucas was subsequently arrested and charged under the same provisions.

At trial, the appellants argued that their freedom of expression, as guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, had been infringed. The trial court agreed but concluded that section 300 was justified under section 1 of the Charter. The court found both appellants guilty of defamatory libel under section 300, holding that they should have known the statements on their placards were false.

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Decision Overview

The case was presided over by Justices Antonio Lamer, Claire Dubé, John Sopinka, Charles Gonthier, Peter Cory, Beverley McLachlin, Frank Iacobucci, John C. Major, and Michel Bastarache.

The central issues before the Court were whether ss. 289, 299, and 300 of the Criminal Code infringed on freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the right to life, liberty, and security under s. 7, and whether there was sufficient evidence that the appellants had subjective knowledge of the falsity of the defamatory statements [p. 22].

The appellants submitted that ss. 298, 299, and 300 of the Code contravened the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter, as the very purpose of these sections was to prohibit a particular type of expression. Relying on R. v. Keegstra, the Court held that all expression should be protected, regardless of its content, unless the form in which the expression is manifested excludes protection (as, for example, a violent act) [p. 25]. The Court also referred to R. v. Zundel, where it was held that even deliberate lies and falsehoods were protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter [p. 26]. The judges opined that these sections of the Code sought to restrict a limited type of expression that fell within the ambit of protected expression and, therefore, constituted a limit on freedom of expression within the meaning of s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court then deliberated whether these sections violated s. 7 of the Charter. The appellants contended that the defamatory libel provisions were so vague that they infringed s. 7. However, the Court rejected this contention. The Court applied two principles underpinning vagueness: first, a law is vague if it does not provide “an intelligible standard according to which the judiciary must do its work”; second, a vague provision does not provide an adequate basis for legal debate, i.e., for reaching a conclusion as to its meaning through reasoned analysis applying legal criteria [p. 29].

The Court observed that the provisions required alleged publications to be proven as “objectively defamatory,” likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing them to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or designed to insult the person of or concerning whom it is published. Additionally, there must also be proof that the accused knew the defamatory libel was false and intended to defame. Given these requirements, the Court opined that ss. 298 to 300 “provided sufficient indication as to how [prosecutorial] decisions must be reached” and, therefore, did not infringe s. 7 of the Charter [p. 30].

The Court next addressed whether ss. 289, 299, and 300 of the Code could be upheld under s. 1 of the Charter, which allows for reasonable limits prescribed by law. To determine this, the Court applied the three-factor test set out in R. v. Oakes: (i) is the limit on the right prescribed by law?; (ii) is the objective of the legislation sufficiently pressing and important to override a Charter freedom?; and (iii) is there proportionality between the effects of the measures limiting the Charter freedom and the identified objective [p. 31]?

In relation to the third factor, the Court considered: is there a rational connection between the legislation’s objective and the means chosen to achieve it?; do the means chosen minimally impair the right protected by the Charter?; and do the deleterious effects of the restriction outweigh its salutary effects? [p. 32].

The appellants argued that ss. 298, 299, and 300 of the Code were too vague to constitute a limit prescribed by law. However, the Court rejected this, holding that “merely because ss. 298 to 300 may be subject to various shades of interpretation does not mean they are unacceptably vague” and that their scope would be tested under the “minimal impairment” principle. The Court ruled that the goal of the provisions—to protect reputation—was a “pressing and substantial objective in our society.” It emphasised that “the protection of an individual’s reputation from willful and false attack recognises both the innate dignity of the individual and the integral link between reputation and the fruitful participation of an individual in Canadian society.” Preventing harm to reputation caused by criminal libel is a legitimate goal of the criminal law [p. 48].

The Court cited international conventions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights, to highlight the need to protect a person’s honour, dignity, and reputation [p. 50]. The Court further found that s. 300 and its defining provisions had a rational connection with the legislative objective, as Parliament enacted the law to protect individuals from willful and false attacks on their reputations by prohibiting the publication of injurious or insulting statements known to be false [p. 53]. Moreover, the Court noted minimal impairment due to the negligible value of defamatory expression.

The appellants argued that civil law could adequately address the protection of reputation, rendering the use of punitive criminal sanctions unnecessarily impairing. However, this argument was rejected. The Court stated that “it is important that society discourage the intentional publication of lies calculated to expose another individual to hatred and contempt.” It emphasised that the harm caused by criminal libel is so serious that criminal sanctions are appropriate [p. 73].

Lastly, the appellants challenged the phrases “designed to insult,” “is likely to injure,” and “by the person whom it defames” in ss. 298–300, arguing they cast too wide a net to meet the minimal impairment standard. The Court agreed that the provision could be overly intrusive if mere insults constituted a criminal offence. However, it clarified that the provision must be interpreted in the context of its purpose to protect reputation and “as a criminal statute, be interpreted so as to give the accused the greatest protection possible” [p. 79]. While upholding the first two phrases, the Court suggested removing the third, as libel requires publication to a third party, and statements communicated solely to the affected individual cannot injure reputation [p. 85].

The Court concluded that “defamatory libel is far from and indeed inimical to the core values of freedom of expression.” It noted that the provisions’ laudable objective of protecting reputation and their salutary effects outweighed any negative impact on freedom of expression [p. 96].

In applying these principles and analysing the evidence, the Court found that the placards displayed by Mr. and Mrs. Lucas were “likely to injure a person’s reputation.” Evidence presented at trial showed the appellants knew the police officer had not committed the acts implied by the signs, including sexual assault or any “touching problem.” Thus, the Court upheld their convictions under s. 300 of the Code.

In conclusion, the Court upheld the trial court’s decision, dismissing the appeals of Mr. and Mrs. Lucas, with Justices McLachlin and Major dissenting on Mrs. Lucas’s appeal.

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