Case Summary and Outcome

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that Russia violated the right to freedom of expression by restricting, through legislation and prosecution, peaceful and nonviolent speech concerning the invasion of Ukraine. 161 applicants—including newspaper Novaya Gazeta, television channel Dozhd TV [Rain TV], and other individual applicants, among them many journalists—complained that the shutdown of media organizations and imposition of administrative and criminal sanctions against them in connection with their reporting on the Russian military, and statements calling for peace, violated their rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The Court found that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression was unjustified, while the penalties were disproportionate, pointing to a broader campaign of silencing any criticism of Russia’s war against Ukraine. In addition to the violation of Article 10 of the ECHR (freedom of expression), the Court ruled that Russia breached the right to prohibition of torture or inhumane and degrading treatment under Article 3, the right to liberty and security under Article 5, the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and Article 34 by obstructing the exercise of the right to application and failing to comply with the Court’s interim measures.

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Facts

One hundred sixty-one applicants—individuals and media organizations—lodged complaints against the Russian Federation before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), contesting its administrative and criminal prosecution and the closure of media organizations based on new laws prohibiting the “discreditation” of the Russian army and the dissemination of “fake news” about it. All applicants argued that those actions violated their right to freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 

Reporting Restrictions

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which the Kremlin referred to as a “special military operation.” Roskomnadzor (Russia’s Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media) followed by warning media outlets that “only Russian official information sources [had] reliable and up-to-date information” [para. 3] and that the dissemination of anything false would be met with blocking. Two days later, the Prosecutor’s General Office ordered Roskomnadzor to restrict access to media reports that diverged from the Kremlin’s official records about the Russian army’s actions.

On March 4, 2022, Russia’s two parliamentary chambers passed laws, which the President signed, on speech about Russia’s armed forces, introducing administrative and criminal sanctions. Among the new amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses, Article 13.15(9) imposed liability for the “​​dissemination of knowingly false information of public significance presented as reliable reports” that threatened citizens or their property, public order and safety, or the operations of critical infrastructure. [para. 69] Part 1 of Article 20.3.3 outlawed “public actions aimed at discrediting the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” including “public calls to obstruct [their] deployment.” [para. 70] Part 2 of the same Article imposed more severe fines when “discreditation” actions were also accompanied by calls for public assemblies. Article 20.3.4 punished calls for “a foreign State or a group of States to implement restrictive measures, such as […] political or economic sanctions” against Russia. [para. 72] The amendments established fines up to RUB 100,000 for individuals, RUB 300,000 for officials, and RUB 1,000,000 for legal entities. 

Among the new amendments to the Criminal Code, Article 207.3 imposed liability for the “public dissemination of knowingly false information, presented as reliable reports, about the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” [para. 67] Para. 2 of this Article prescribed more severe penalties for the aggravated forms of the offense, including “for reasons of political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious hate.” [para. 68] The amendments imposed imprisonment penalties of up to ten years. 

On March 6, 2022, Roskomnadzor began blocking the websites of independent media outlets for their reporting on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On March 16, 2022, Russia ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe. 

Shutdown of Media Organizations

Novaya Gazeta

In the first days of the full-scale war, between February 26 and March 2, 2022, Roskomnadzor and the Prosecutor’s General Office sent take-down requests to Novaya Gazeta, one of Russia’s most prominent independent newspapers, whose editor-in-chief, Dmitri Muratov, is the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize awardee. The content in question ranged from the newspaper’s statements against the war to publications about Russia’s shelling of Ukrainian cities. Russian courts dismissed judicial challenges, presented by the newspaper, against the take-down requests. On March 4, facing the new laws and threats of criminal prosecution, Novaya Gazeta ended its coverage of the Russian army’s hostilities in Ukraine.

On March 8, 2022, the European Court of Human Rights granted Novaya Gazeta’s request for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, noting the exceptional context and urging Russia “to abstain until further notice from actions and decisions aimed at fully blocking and terminating the activities of Novaya Gazeta, and from other actions that, in the current circumstances, could deprive Novaya Gazeta of the enjoyment of its rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.” [para. 12]

On March 28, 2022, citing new reporting restrictions, Novaya Gazeta announced a temporary suspension of its print and online editions. In May 2022, Roskomnadzor charged the newspaper with the “dissemination of knowingly false information” under Article 13.15(9) of the Administrative Code. One of the materials in question, which led to the inquiry, was the reporting of journalist Elena Kostyuchenko, who witnessed the Russian army’s atrocities in Kherson. A Moscow district Court found Novaya Gazeta guilty and imposed fines between 300,000 and 350,000 RUB. In July 2022, Roskomnadzor blocked the newspaper’s websites, arguing it repeatedly “discredited” the Russian authorities. Moscow courts upheld the blocking measures as lawful.

On September 5, 2022, a Moscow district court ordered the suspension of Novaya Gazeta’s publishing license due to the newspaper’s failure to “submit a copy of the editorial office’s charter twenty years ago.” [para. 16] The Moscow City Court dismissed Novaya Gazeta’s appeal. 

Following Roskomnadzor’s application, Russia’s Supreme Court ruled to terminate the newspaper’s online edition on September 15, 2022; the Supreme Court’s appellate board dismissed the newspaper’s appeal on December 22, 2022.  

Dozhd TV

Between February 26 and March 1, 2022, Roskomnadzor also sent content take-down requests against Dozhd TV [Rain TV], Russia’s most prominent independent TV channel, concerning its reporting on the shelling of Ukrainian cities and civilian casualties. On March 1, 2022, Roskomnadzor blocked the channel’s website. Two days later, the police entered Dozhd TV’s offices with two warnings from the Moscow City Prosecutor, which accused the channel of spreading “public calls for extremist and terrorist activities, violence against citizens, and incitement to hatred and enmity, including on the basis of ethnic origin.” [para. 21] The following day, Roskomnadzor started sending notices to satellite and cable companies to stop transmitting the channel. Dozhd TV’s editorial office decided to cease producing content due to the impossibility of broadcasting and fears of prosecution of its staff. Moscow courts upheld the website-blocking measure. 

Prosecution of Individual Applicants 

Criminal Proceedings

Vladimir Kara-Murza, an opposition politician and journalist, was arrested in Moscow on April 11, 2022, charged with disobedience of police orders (he quickened his step and refused to show his ID), and sentenced to fifteen days of detention. The following day, investigators opened a case against Kara-Murza under Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code, alleging that he disseminated “knowingly false information” about the Russian army in the aggravated forms of the offense (“for pecuniary gain and for motives of ‘political hate’” [para. 26]). According to the investigators, for this action, he received a fee from an organization designated as “undesirable” in Russia. The charges referred to a speech Kara-Murza delivered before the Arizona State House of Representatives on March 15, 2022, listing Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine. 

On April 22, 2022, Russian authorities designated Kara-Murza as a “foreign agent,” and a Moscow district court granted his detention on remand, extending it over the following months. In July 2022, another criminal charge was filed against Kara-Murza—this time for his involvement with the Free Russia Foundation (FRF), an organization designated as “undesirable.” In August 2022, Kara-Murza was charged with the third and most severe offense: high treason under Article 275 of the Criminal Code. The third charge was based on Kara-Murza’s position on the FRF board of directors and his three high-level speeches before NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and the US Helsinki Commission, in which he criticized domestic authorities and Russia’s war against Ukraine. 

On April 17, 2023, the Moscow City Court found Kara-Murza guilty of all three charges, citing a document from the Russian army’s General Staff, which stated that “Russia was not at war with Ukraine.” [para. 30] Kara-Murza was sentenced to twenty-five years in a strict-security prison. An appellate court upheld the conviction. 

Dmytro Gordon, a notable Ukrainian journalist, gave an interview to a Ukrainian news channel on March 16, 2022, in which he said, “Russians need to be beaten—not the ordinary people, but Putin’s State and those bastards who invaded our land. […] No pity—kill them all without mercy, get to Putin and kill him.” In response to the interview, Russia’s Investigations Committee opened a criminal investigation against Gordon. The charges alleged that Gordon had 1) called for an armed attack against Russia (an offense under Article 354 of the Criminal Code), 2) committed a hate speech crime against Russian citizens (under Article 282 of the Criminal Code), and 3) spread false information about the actions of the Russian army in Ukraine for reasons of “political hate” (an offense under Para. 2 of Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code).

In April 2022, based on the charges of “extremist” offenses, the Russian financial monitor placed Gordon on the List of Terrorists and Extremists. In July 2022, a Moscow district court granted an arrest warrant against Gordon. In September, Gordon received the “foreign agent” designation. In July 2024, Moscow’s Second Western Circuit Military Court sentenced the journalist in absentia to fourteen years in prison. (Gordon never received any documentation of the proceedings against him.)

On March 30, 2022, Aleksandra Skochilenko, an artist and musician, spread news about the war’s casualties, as well as calls for peace, by replacing five price tags with her own messages in a supermarket in St. Petersburg. Less than two weeks later, Skochilenko was arrested and charged with disseminating false information about the Russian army out of “political hate” (under Para. 2 of Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code). A district court in St. Petersburg issued a detention order. The St. Petersburg City Court denied an appeal against the order. The district court extended Skochilenko’s detention nine times, each subsequently upheld by the appellate court. In November 2023, Skochilenko was sentenced to seven years in prison. 

Mikhail Afanasyev, the editor-in-chief of digital media Novyy Fokus, published a story on April 4, 2022, about Russian National Guard officers who refused to join the war against Ukraine. That same month, he was charged—under Para. 2 of Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code—with disseminating false information using his professional position. The investigators searched three of Afanasyev’s residences and seized his devices and materials, including those with information about confidential journalistic sources. Afanasyev’s appeals against the searches were dismissed. In September 2023, a city court in the Republic of Khakassia sentenced Afanasyev to five years and six months in prison, additionally banning him from “journalistic, editorial or publishing jobs for two and a half years after release.” [para. 44]

Olga Smirnova, a civil society activist, posted anti-war messages in a social media group in early March 2022. One of her posts promoted an anti-war demonstration. In May 2022, Smirnova was charged with spreading false information out of “political hate” under Para. 2 of Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code and put in pre-trial detention. In August 2023, a district court in St. Petersburg sentenced her to six years in prison and banned her from administering web pages for four years.

On March 5, 2022, Maikl Sidney Naki, a YouTuber with more than a million followers, released a video summarizing reports about Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. That same month, Naki and his YouTube co-host were charged with disseminating false information about the Russian army by “fabricating evidence to support accusations.” [para. 48] In May 2022, an international warrant was issued for Naki’s arrest, and a Moscow district court granted a prosecutor’s request “to attach Mr Naki’s bank accounts for up to RUB 5,000,000, described as an amount ‘commensurate to the damage caused by the offence.’” [para. 50] An appeal against the order was dismissed. In September 2022, Naki and his co-host received “foreign agent” designations. In August 2023, a Moscow district court sentenced both persons in absentia to eleven years in prison. Their appeal against the conviction was dismissed. 

Vsevolod Korolev, a documentary filmmaker, published social media posts in March-April 2022 about civilian deaths in Mariupol, the Russian army’s use of cluster munitions in Donetsk, and its perpetration of massacres in Bucha and Borodyanka. In July 2022, Korolev was charged with spreading false information under Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code and placed in detention, which a district court in St. Petersburg extended two times. In March 2024, that court sentenced him to three years in prison. In July 2024, on appeal, the St. Petersburg City Court changed the sentence to seven years of imprisonment. 

Administrative Proceedings

All the other individual applicants were charged with the offense of “discrediting” the Russian armed forces and thus convicted under Article 20.3.3 of the Administrative Code. 

Around one-third of the applicants’ cases concerned the “NO TO WAR” message expressed on signs, posters, clothes, stickers, pictures, or hashtags and posts online. The phrase became so widespread that even a masked replication of it incurred penalties. Artem Kallas, for example, received a fine for a car sticker with three asterisks followed by five, which matched “НЕТ ВОЙНЕ [NO TO WAR]” in Russian. Russian courts regarded the word “war”—as opposed to the official term “special military operation”—as damaging to the social standing of the Russian armed forces. 

Expressions in support of peace without the use of the word “war” invoked sanctions as well. For example, white-dove images and the phrase “I stand for peace” were met with fines. Similarly, expressions of solidarity with Ukraine, such as the use of the colors of the Ukrainian national flag, incurred penalties. Local authorities prosecuted people for pictures, signs, and clothes with blue and yellow colors. 

A few applicants received fines for sullying the “Z” symbol, which became a signifier of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as well as for comparing that symbol to Nazi insignia. Furthermore, the applicants who drew parallels between the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine faced punishments. 

Those who used their professional positions and audience reach to spread anti-war statements also received fines. Among the applicants are an Orthodox priest, a newspaper editor, a Crimean Tatar teacher, the head of a municipal district in Moscow, and municipal councilors in St. Petersburg. Most of the applicants called for the end of hostilities in traditional forms of protest—a few did so creatively. For example, Darya Kulikovskaya stamped a banknote with an anti-war message before depositing it in an ATM; Pavel Mitrofanov imitated a cigarette pack with the following text: “Common sense warning: special military operation kills;” Yevgeniya Isayeva splashed red paint all over herself and shouted, “My heart is bleeding.”

Even anti-war expressions in non-public spaces—such as a private conversation—resulted in punishments: Among the applicants is Marina Chernyakevich, whose husband reported her to the police because of the anti-war content she shared in the privacy of their family; Aleksandr Shabanov, who showed anti-war videos to his colleagues, who then denounced him; and Vladislav Arinichev, who uploaded a single video to his YouTube channel with a single follower, in which he expressed his support to sanctions against Russia in light of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

All the individuals and organizations mentioned above, along with others (see the judgment’s appendix for the full list), submitted 161 applications before the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that their rights to freedom of expression were breached. Some applicants argued that Russia also violated their rights to the prohibition of torture, liberty and security, respect for private and family life, and the rules of the Court’s indication of interim measures.

The Court examined all the applications jointly and determined that, despite Russia’s withdrawal from the Convention on September 16, 2022, it had jurisdiction to examine them because the facts took place before the withdrawal.

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Decision Overview

The Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision on this matter on February 11, 2025. The main issue the ECtHR had to analyze was whether Russia violated the applicants’ rights to freedom of expression by shutting down media outlets and prosecuting applicants based on their war coverage, pro-peace statements, and anti-war expressions. 

Parties’ Arguments

The media outlets argued that the swift passage of new laws punishing any war reporting that diverged from the “official information” created “a significant chilling effect, leading to self-censorship and the eventual suspension of both printed and online media outlets.” [para. 83] The organizations also argued that the new “discreditation” provision allowed the authorities to target criticism of Russia’s armed forces without any kind of “facts” at all. Referring to Novaya Gazeta’s alleged failure to file an updated charter—a failure which led to the revocation of the newspaper’s registration—the applicants emphasized that domestic courts failed to clarify which rights were being protected through this restriction and if the measure was proportionate. 

The applicants convicted in criminal proceedings submitted that their prosecution under Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code (“dissemination of knowingly false information”)—along with other oppressive Russian laws, such as those concerning “foreign agents” and “extremists”—“created a de facto situation of ‘military censorship.’” [para. 85] They also submitted that, by targeting any information that diverged from the “official” reports, the Russian government aimed to establish total control of the war narrative.

Additionally, the individual applicants convicted in both criminal and administrative proceedings submitted that the laws on “false information” and “discreditation of the armed forces” lacked clarity in their definitions and thus enabled subjectivity and arbitrariness in their enforcement. For contrast, on the definition of “false information,” the applicants referred to the US case law on actual malice (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan) and the criteria of wrongdoing in France’s Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No. 2018-773-DC (2018). The applicants also argued that, in their pattern of prosecuting pacifists and critics, Russian authorities demonstrated that the new laws’ only purpose was to silence dissent. Moreover, the applicants underscored that domestic authorities and courts failed to provide and assess evidence of the harm and rights violations that the applicants’ anti-war expressions had allegedly caused. 

Novaya Gazeta argued that the Russian government violated Article 34 of the Convention by breaching the conditions of the Court’s interim measures. Some individual applicants argued that Russia violated the right to the prohibition of torture under Article 3, the right to liberty and security under Article 5, and the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. 

Government Submission

The Government of Russia did not take part in the proceedings. 

Interventions

The Ukrainian Government intervened on behalf of three applicants—Ukrainian nationals—arguing that their prosecution added to the “widespread and systematic administrative practice by Russia” [para. 91] in silencing dissent, including opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Referencing the Court’s decision in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), the Ukrainian Government emphasized the reiterative nature of Russia’s human rights violations.  

The applicants agreed with the Ukrainian Government’s observations and stressed the particular need to address the state of violations affecting Ukrainian citizens in occupied Crimea.

Alleged Violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the ECHR

The Court began by saying that a State’s interference with the right to freedom of expression may occur through a range of measures: a “formality, condition, restriction or penalty,” as determined in Wille v. Liechtenstein. [para. 93] Even though seven of the applicants were convicted after Russia’s withdrawal from the Convention, the Court reasoned that the arrest and detention of five of them and the prosecution of two (who avoided arrest due to being outside Russia)—before withdrawal—still amounted to interferences with the right to freedom of expression—as said in Nedim Şener v. Turkey, Döner and Others v. Turkey, and Yefimov and Youth Human Rights Group v. Russia. Regarding the administrative proceedings, the ECtHR determined, referencing Pivkina and Others v. Russia, that the convictions took place before Russia’s withdrawal and interfered with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression. 

Examining the existence of interferences concerning the two applicant media organizations, the Court held that the blocking of their content and the prosecution and revocation of Novaya Gazeta’s license took place before the termination date for Russia and interfered with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression. 

After determining that Russia interfered with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression, the Court examined whether the aforementioned interferences were justified. For this, the ECtHR applied a three-part test which analyzed whether the restrictive measures were prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim, and were necessary in a democratic society. 

Focusing on the first prong of the three-part test and beginning with the two applicants convicted by “Russian courts” in Crimea, the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine, the Court reiterated that “Russian law cannot be regarded as ‘law’ within the meaning of the Convention” in Crimea, as laid out in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea). [para. 98] Thus, the Court found that the interference with applicants’ freedom of expression could not be lawful.

Examining other applications based on Russia’s newly amended Administrative and Criminal codes, the Court underscored that the “prescribed by law” criterion required more than a domestic legal prescription: The law had to be “foreseeable in its consequences and compatible with the rule of law.” [para. 99] Citing Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, the Court stressed that to be “lawful,” domestic law had to protect against arbitrariness and be reasonably clear. 

Taking into account the applicants’ arguments concerning the lack of clarity of the laws, which allowed for their broad interpretation by national courts, the ECtHR expressed “serious doubts as to whether the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression was ‘prescribed by law’ within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.” [para. 101] However, the Court did not consider it necessary to come to a conclusive point here, in light of its findings on the necessity prong of the test.  

Focusing on the second prong of the three-part test, the Court stated that Russia’s courts and officials cited national security, territorial integrity, and public safety as ostensibly legitimate aims for their measures. Referring to Stoll v. Switzerland, the ECtHR reiterated that the application and interpretation of these concepts demanded restraint, restriction, and proven necessity. The Court observed that the penalties were applied indiscriminately, finding it “difficult to discern how expressions of pacifism or independent reporting could pose a genuine threat.” On this point, it was not satisfied that the existing interferences followed the aims cited. [para. 104] 

Examining whether the measures in question were “necessary in a democratic society,” the Court began by reiterating the general principles outlined in its case law. Citing Handyside v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR emphasized how integral “pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness” were to a democratic society, even with regard to expressions that “offend[ed], shock[ed] or disturb[ed].” [para. 106] For an interference to be “necessary,” the Court argued, there had to be a “pressing social need,” which it was empowered to evaluate, as in Bédat v. Switzerland. [para. 107] 

Referring to Perinçek v. Switzerland, the ECtHR further explained its task at hand: Examining the interference in the case as a whole, the Court had to decide whether it was proportionate to the stated aim and whether the reasons behind it were relevant and sufficient. Subsequently, the Court emphasized the strong protections in favor of political speech and/or expression on matters of public interest (Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) and Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom) and the importance of public scrutiny of authorities’ actions (Castells v. Spain), even if the criticism in question was harsh, “provided that it [did] not incite to violence or hatred” (Perinçek v. Switzerland and Özgür Gündem v. Turkey). [para. 109]

Considering these principles, the ECtHR laid its assessment. Turning to the various categories of expression sanctioned—from peaceful protests to general criticism of the authorities’ actions—, the Court observed that all of them concerned a matter of special public significance: “an unprovoked military aggression against a neighboring State, leading to a major international armed conflict with profound implications for both European and global security.” [para. 112] Citing Feldek v. Slovakia and Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, the ECtHR stressed that restrictions on political expression required substantial reasons—and even in the case of a national emergency, all possible efforts had to be undertaken to protect democracy. 

Individual Applicants

Examining the content of the individual applicants’ statements, the Court found there were no calls to violence, incitement of hatred, discrimination, or anything else that could have been deemed unlawful. The ECtHR referred to Erdoğdu v. Turkey to argue that the mere use of the word “war” could not justify an interference with freedom of expression. The Court said that the Russian government’s insistence on the term “special military operation” instead “appeared to be a semantic choice intended to diminish the perceived scale and nature of the hostilities, portraying the conflict as limited and justified rather than as large-scale aggression.” [para. 113] It further held that the prosecution of individuals disagreeing with the official narrative—solely for using the word “war”—constituted “a misuse of legal mechanisms to enforce ideological conformity and suppress legitimate public debate.” [para. 113]

Regarding the applicants’ expressions of solidarity with Ukraine, the ECtHR quoted Fáber v. Hungary to state that the display of foreign national symbols constituted a form of protected expression—although within specific historical and contemporary contexts, bans on certain symbols (those closely linked to aggression or occupation) could be justified, as concluded in Borzykh v. Ukraine. 

The Court determined that the applicants’ expressions of solidarity with Ukraine and its people “[did] not inherently threaten national security or public order, nor [did they] imply endorsement of any extremist ideology.” [para. 114] To it, Russian authorities pursued “a policy aimed at suppressing and stigmatising any sentiment perceived as sympathetic to Ukraine, thereby imposing a one-sided Russia-dominated reading of the conflict” and “demonstrated a level of intolerance towards dissenting views that [was] fundamentally incompatible with the pluralism and open debate essential to a democratic society.” [para. 114]

Turning to the applicants’ anti-war expressions through satire, the ECtHR cited Handzhiyski v. Bulgaria, in which it determined that “exaggeration and distortion of reality [were] naturally intended to provoke and agitate.” [para. 115] Thus, the Court found that the applicants’ satirical and creative forms of expression enriched public debate.

The Court also examined the applicants’ use of provocative imagery, such as Nazi symbols, to emphasize parallels with the present-day events. In doing so, it referred to Hans Burkhard Nix v. Germany and RID Novaya Gazeta and ZAO Novaya Gazeta v. Russia. The Court found that, unlike in Nix, the applicants in this case “sought to transfer the stigma attached to Nazi imagery onto contemporary symbols of aggression.” [para. 116] Acknowledging that such parallels could offend, the ECtHR stressed that “they represented a powerful method of political criticism, intended to provoke reflection on the nature of the conflict.” [para. 116]

With regard to those applicants who shared widely reported information, the Court underscored the public’s right to be informed, citing Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey. It also emphasized that while the authorities had to be on the lookout to prevent violence (Erdoğdu v. Turkey), conversations about war crimes and crimes against humanity had to occur freely (Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan). Observing that Russian authorities branded any information outside the official narrative as “fake news,” the Court considered that “[r]estricting the dissemination of reports about alleged atrocities serve[ed] only to shield potential wrongdoing from scrutiny and undermine accountability, while blanket prohibitions on discussing alleged war crimes [were] incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention.” [para. 117]

Summarizing its observations, the Court identified “a systemic and widespread pattern of unjustified restrictions on expression related to the war in Ukraine,” which appeared to constitute “a broader campaign to stifle criticism or dissent concerning military actions in Ukraine.” [para. 118] The ECtHR considered that the new legislation in question enabled broad interpretations, facilitating the prosecution of any anti-war statement without justification. Citing Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, the Court found that Russia’s measures exerted “a chilling effect on freedom of expression, intimidating civil society and silencing dissenting voices.” [para. 118] It also held that by relying exclusively on official statements and making no effort to assess the truthfulness of the applicants’ statements, Russian courts “effectively criminali[zed] the reporting of any information that contradicted the official narrative.” [para. 119]

Separately, the Court expressed concern over the prosecution of applicants who posted statements online before the enactment of the new laws in March 2022. Citing Andrey Rylkov Foundation and Others v. Russia, the ECtHR concluded that the applicants’ statements did not violate any material law whatsoever at the time, underscoring that the authorities’ expectation for the individuals to anticipate legislative amendments or remove earlier-uploaded content comprised “an unreasonable and disproportionate burden, resulting in a ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression.” [para. 122]

The Case of Dmytro Gordon

The Court noted that the case of Ukrainian journalist Dmytro Gordon, whose statements could have been perceived as calls for violence against Russian officials, required its specific attention. Referring to Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) and  Gözel and Özer v. Turkey, the ECtHR said that even though expressions that glorify violence are concerning, States have a broad margin of appreciation on this issue—in which domestic courts are obliged to examine the content and context thoroughly. 

The Court admitted that the content of Gordon’s statements was violent. It also considered that Russian courts failed to analyze their context, which made clear that Gordon directed them at the Russian army personnel in active combat and the officials responsible for the invasion, not against Russian civilians. Citing Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey, the ECtHR opined that  domestic courts failed to evaluate whether “the statements were capable of directly inciting unlawful acts of violence, or whether they were actually instead expressions of emotional support for Ukraine’s legitimate right to self-defence under international law.” [para. 121] Thus, citing Karataş v. Turkey, the Court reasoned that the prosecution of Gordon was rather aimed at silencing criticism.

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Since the ECtHR found no justification for the prosecution of the applicants within the context of a democratic society, a separate assessment of the proportionality of the sanctions was not necessary. However, the Court stressed how exceptionally severe the disproportionate penalties were, recalling the lengthy prison sentences—twenty-five years in the case of Vladimir Kara-Murza—and fines amounting to months and years of income (Ecodefence and Others v. Russia). The ECtHR considered that such severity was intended “to send a clear and intimidating message to society at large, thereby stifling public debate on matters of vital public interest.” [para. 123] Referring to Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania and Morice v. France, the Court concluded that such an approach created an environment of self-censorship. 

Media Outlets

Examining the shutdown of media outlets, the ECtHR referred to Mukhin v. Russia, in which it ruled that if the termination of an outlet’s registration was “based solely on the formal issuance of warnings, without any assessment of its necessity and proportionality,” such a penalty failed to meet the Convention’s standards. [para. 124] Similarly, in the present case, the Court found that no judicial assessment to justify such a drastic measure took place. It stated that “[t]he blocking of the websites of Dozhd TV and Novaya Gazeta and the revocation of the latter’s publishing licence effectively silenced important independent voices in Russian society, significantly restricting the public’s access to diverse sources of information on matters of crucial public interest.” [para. 124] Citing Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, the Court emphasized the crucial role of the press as a “public watchdog.” 

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The ECtHR held that Russia’s unjustified prosecution of the applicants for their reporting and statements about the war in Ukraine was not “necessary in a democratic society.” To it, the high number of similar cases indicated that “they were part of a broader campaign to suppress dissent regarding the military action in Ukraine.” [para. 125]

Considering the aforementioned arguments, the Court held that Russia violated the applicants’ rights to Freedom of Expression as outlined in Article 10 of the ECHR.

Other Violations of the Convention

The Court examined Novaya Gazeta’s complaint that Russia failed to comply with its interim measures, issued on March 8, 2022, which ordered Russian authorities to abstain from blocking or closing the media outlet. 

On this point, the ECtHR held that the Russian government “deliberately disregarded the Court’s interim measure and deprived it of its purpose and effect,” thus breaching Article 34 of the ECHR. [para. 132]

Evaluating several applicants’ complaints that Russia violated their rights to liberty and security under Article 5 of the Convention, the Court cited Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey to argue that, in light of the applicants’ expressions being non-violent, domestic courts failed to justify the exceptional measure of a pre-trial detention, thus violating Para 3 of Article 5 of the ECHR. Examining the case of Vladimir Kara-Murza, the ECtHR found that his arrest and the timing of the charges against him “strongly suggest[ed] that these measures were employed as a pretext to silence his expression of critical opinions, indicating bad faith” in breach of Para. 1 of Article 5 of the Convention. [para. 136] 

Considering other complaints, the Court referred to relevant case law on placement in metal cages or in small, poorly ventilated glass boxes during hearings; substantial delays in rulings on detention appeals; and unjustified searches of journalists’ residences (citing Ernst and Others v. Belgium here), and held that Russia breached the rights to prohibition of torture or inhumane and degrading treatment under Article 3, to liberty and security under Article 5, and to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. 

The Court awarded “the amounts claimed as per the appendix in respect of pecuniary damage, 7,500 euros (EUR) each or such smaller amount as was actually claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 850 each or such smaller amount as was actually claimed, per applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.” [para. 141]

Concurring Opinion of Judge Pavli

In his concurring opinion, Judge Darian Pavli, who sat in dozens of cases concerning Russia over the past several years, stressed that the present case was “among the most discouraging in respect of any State during [his] time on this bench.” [para. 2] Agreeing with the Chamber’s decision in full, Judge Pavli interrogated the Court’s role as “a watchdog of democracy” by raising the following questions: “Has the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights taken proper notice of the trajectory followed by the Russian Federation? And could it have done something (more) about it?” [para. 2]

Judge Pavli argued that the ECtHR’s case law regarding contemporary Russia amounted to “a sad chronicle of the incremental but systematic shrinking of democratic spaces.” [para. 7] To Judge Pavli, the Court failed to “take stock” of the state of Russian democracy as a whole. To illustrate the argument, he turned to a forest fire metaphor: “Presumably, it makes little sense, from a prophylactic perspective, to focus on the health of individual trees if a fire is raging in the forest.” [para. 6]

Judge Pavli underscored one disturbing pattern that the case law on Russia revealed: the elaborate legal frameworks that the Russian authorities put in place to facilitate sweeping restrictions on political freedoms. To Judge Pavli, Russia’s drastic democratic decline required a “bird’s eye view.” According to him, the country’s “massive legal edifice of ‘rule by law’ – of gradual suffocation through a thousand regulations devised and tightened over time to control every inch of Russian political space and much of the personal space of ordinary Russians – is hard to gauge by focusing exclusively on individual cases.” [para. 12]

In conclusion, Judge Pavli emphasized that he did not advocate for the Court to rule on which States could be called democracies and which could not—he deemed that an exercise of “an obvious political dimension.” [para. 16] And yet, to Judge Pavli, it was still possible for the ECtHR to adopt an approach of “sounding the alarm” with regard to political systems in erosion.

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