Case Summary and Outcome

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that Russia violated the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association, and privacy by designating, through legislation, organizations and individuals as “foreign agents” and imposing professional, economic, and public participation restrictions on them. The 107 applicants–non-governmental organizations, media outlets, and individuals designated as “foreign agents” by the Russian authorities–complained that the designation, along with the associated requirements and sanctions it imposed, violated their rights under the European Convention of Human Rights. The Court found that Russia’s current “foreign agent” legislation, which has evolved since 2012 to become considerably more restricting, was stigmatizing and had a chilling effect on Russian civil society. The Court ruled that the law and its application were arbitrary and contributed to the shrinking of Russia’s democratic space.

Facts

One hundred and seven applicants—individuals and organizations—lodged complaints against the Russian Federation contesting the legislation designating them as “foreign agents.” The applicants argued that the legislation and its application violated their rights to freedom of expression, association, and respect for private life.  

“Foreign-Agent” NGOs

In 2012, Russian lawmakers amended the country’s legislation concerning NGOs by adding new requirements: Organizations that engaged in “political activity” and obtained “foreign funding” had to register as “foreign agents.” Failure to do so entailed administrative and criminal sanctions. Such organizations were also subjected to additional requirements: For example, they had to label any materials they published with the “foreign agent” notice, disclose information about their activities online, and provide extensive accounting reports. 

The first group of applicants included NGOs that were fined for failing to register as “foreign agents.” Among them, for instance, were the Kolsky Environmental Centre and the Russian Lorry Drivers Association. Some directors and chairpersons were fined individually, like the director of the domestic-violence-awareness organization Nasiliyu.Net, among others. Even though this group of applicants argued they did not engage in “political activity,” and tried to avoid foreign funding, Russian authorities imposed fines under the aforementioned legislation. 

The second group of applicants included NGOs—and their staff—that were fined for allegedly failing to label the content they produced with the “foreign agent” notice. Among them, for instance, was applicant Yuriy Shirokov—who shared two international conference reports on an ecology website without labeling them. Shirokov’s fine amounted to RUB 50,000 (around EUR 750). Another example was Yekaterinburg Memorial. It was fined RUB 300,000 (around EUR 3,300) for the alleged absence of labels on banners and information stands. 

Russian authorities imposed larger fines for repeated violations of labeling obligations. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty received the largest fines: Their total amounted to RUB 948.8 million (around EUR 16 million) for 1,044 cases of alleged labeling violations.

In certain cases, repeated violations of labeling obligations even served as a pretext to dissolve NGOs. Applicants International Memorial and Memorial Human Rights Centre—Russia’s most prominent human rights organizations—were liquidated in December 2021. The Moscow City Court and Russia’s Supreme Court sided with the prosecution and found that by failing repeatedly to label their materials with the “foreign agent” notice, the organizations concealed their status, obstructed public scrutiny, and violated “the right of citizens to receive reliable information about [their] activities.” [para. 7] 

“Foreign-Agent” Media Organizations and Individuals

Since 2017, after the legislative creation of a new media category—“foreign-agent media organization”—, the Ministry of Justice was allowed to designate any media outlet as a “foreign agent,” if it received foreign funding directly or indirectly. Thus, media organizations could be subject to the same obligations imposed on designated NGOs (labeling obligations and extensive financial reporting). Among the first media outlets designated as “foreign agents” were Voice of America, the Current Time TV, and RFE/RL. 

A 2019 amendment allowed authorities to designate individuals as “foreign agents” and expanded the grounds for designation: If individuals disseminated any content produced by a “foreign agent” media outlet or took part in creating that content while receiving foreign funds, directly or indirectly, they could be recognized as “foreign agents.” This resulted in the designation of journalists, bloggers, and human rights defenders, as “foreign agents.” They had to label all the messages and materials they disseminated and report back on their activities and financial expenditures—including personal ones. The 2019 amendment also included a new requirement for “foreign agent” organizations and individuals to “establish a Russian legal entity within one month of their designation.” [para. 19]

A 2020 amendment further expanded the grounds for “foreign agent” designations by including “political activities” in the definition. The expansion resulted in the designation of more than one hundred individuals as “foreign agents,” thirty of whom—journalists, editors, and media managers engaged in political or investigative journalism—were applicants in this case. 

A dozen independent election monitors and regional coordinators of the Golos [Vote] movement make a distinct group of applicants—their activities were considered “political.” Among other applicants are lawyers, rights advocates, an art collector, a political scientist, and a playwright. 

Codification and Extension of “Foreign-Agent” Restrictions

A new 2022 law amended the existing “foreign agent” framework, which applied to all the aforementioned organizations and individuals. Lawmakers expanded the definitions of “foreign agent,” “foreign influence,” and “foreign support.” The public register of “foreign agents,” maintained by the Ministry of Justice, now included the designated individuals’ “full names, pseudonyms, previous names, dates of birth, taxpayer identification numbers, social security numbers and the grounds for their inclusion in the register.” [para. 27] 

The 2022 law imposed new restrictions on the public, professional, and economic lives of “foreign agents” by introducing bans on 1) holding public office in any role or taking part in any public commission or committee, 2) supporting or financing any election campaign, 3) financing or organizing public events or demonstrations, 4) investing in or operating critical information infrastructures, 5) being eligible for simplified tax filing; 6) having access to jobs that involve state secrets, 7) providing expert opinions on environmental issues, 8) teaching in state/municipal institutions, and 9) teaching minors. Additionally, the law required that any books written by designated entities and individuals “be sold in opaque packaging marked with ‘18+’ age restriction label.” [para. 16] Adding to the ineligibility of “foreign agents” from receiving state financial support, the new legislation prohibited their participation in public procurement. Finally, the law banned all public and private entities, operating under Russian jurisdiction, from advertising in content created by “foreign agents.”

The new law also introduced heftier fines for failing to comply with it: RUB 30,000 to 50,000 for individuals, RUB 100,000 to 300,000 for public officials, and RUB 300,000 to 500,000 for legal entities. Criminal sanctions for repeated violations included a maximum two-year prison sentence. In the case of persons who collected information regarding Russia’s military for foreign sources, which “could be used against the safety of the Russian Federation” [para. 37], the maximum punishment could amount to a five-year prison sentence.  

All the individuals and organizations mentioned above, along with others (see the judgement’s appendix for the full list), submitted 107 applications before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), arguing that their rights to freedom of expression, association, and respect for private life, had been breached. The Court examined all the applications jointly and determined that, despite Russia’s withdrawal from the Convention on September 16, 2022, it had jurisdiction to examine them because the facts took place before the withdrawal.

Decision Overview

The Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision on this matter on 22 October 2024. The main issue the ECtHR had to analyze was whether Russia violated the applicants’ rights to freedom of expression,  association, and privacy by issuing laws designating organizations and individuals as “foreign agents” and imposing professional, economic, and public participation restrictions on them. 

Parties’ Arguments

The applicants argued that the obligations imposed by the “foreign agent” legislation, along with its practical application, comprised “unforeseeable and excessive restrictions on their freedom of expression and association.” [para. 59] Among the restrictions that the applicants listed was the imposition of considerable administrative and financial burdens due to scores of additional accounting and reporting obligations, inspections, and fines. Additionally, the applicants highlighted the obligation to label all their materials, which forced them to spread false information about their activities. For them, the labeling also carried with it the stigma of being a “foreign agent”—a term often associated with spies and traitors. The applicants argued the labeling obligation was disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society. 

The applicants also submitted that the authorities applied the criterion of “foreign funding” arbitrarily and the definition of “political activity” was so broad that it could encompass any activity that attempts to influence public opinion or policy. They complained that the fines imposed for non-compliance were disproportionately high: For instance, media outlet Novyye Vremena [New Times] received a fine that equaled 99.7% of its annual income. Furthermore, the applicants argued that the restrictions added to the Russian authorities’ systematic campaign to undermine the work of independent rights and media organizations, which had “a chilling effect on Russian civil society as a whole and discouraged participation in public debate and human-rights advocacy.” [para. 61]

Additionally, the applicants designated as “foreign agents” individually submitted that the imposed status and the associated requirements violated their right to privacy. The individual applicants argued that they were forced to disclose personal financial details through reporting obligations and to constantly disclose their political views through labeling requirements. Moreover, they complained that the “foreign agent” register violated their privacy as it was publicly available and the Ministry of Justice published their personal details on its website. The individual applicants argued that the sweeping bans on public participation and the professional prohibitions also violated Article 8 of the Convention. They held that the Russian authorities unjustly targeted individuals in light of their civil work and political views.  

Government Submission

The Government of Russia referred to the US Foreign Agents Registration Act, and to other comparable laws from other jurisdictions, to argue that the Russian “foreign agent” legislation fit within a generally recognized practice of regulating foreign-funded entities. The Government also referred to other jurisdictions’ legislative frameworks to underscore that the auditing and reporting obligations that the Russian law imposed were not excessively burdensome. 

The Government submitted that the term “foreign agent” was not “synonymous with the concept of a ‘spy.’” [para. 62] It argued that the overall framework, public register, and labeling requirements, followed public demands and responded to the State’s national security concerns and the need for enhanced transparency. 

Finally, the Government argued that the State’s financial support of social projects has grown significantly, which meant that receiving foreign funds did not prevent receiving domestic ones. The Government submitted that non-compliance fines were “clear, predictable and proportionate to the severity of the offences.” [para. 64]

Interventions

The Latvian Government intervened on behalf of two media outlets registered in Latvia–The Insider and iStories–arguing that the Russian “foreign agent” framework facilitated censorship and demanded “heightened scrutiny by the Court regarding what constitutes a ‘pressing social need’ in cases concerning the freedom of the press.” [para. 65]

ARTICLE 19 submitted that the “foreign agent” legislation has been one of the many tools used by the Russian government to erode free speech and press freedom in the country over the last few years. Written in a vague and broad manner, the NGO opined, the law served the purpose of preventing public watchdogs from challenging the State. 

Alleged Violation of articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of association) of the ECHR

The Court began by reiterating that freedom of expression and association were closely linked. Citing Ecodefence v. Russia, the ECtHR emphasized that freedom of association sought to protect opinions and the freedom to express them. As the Court noted, the applicants in the Ecodefence case were NGOs, along with their directors or presidents. Back then, the ECtHR examined their complaints exclusively under Article 11 of the Convention. In the present case, considering it also involved private individuals, the Court decided to analyze the complaints under articles 10 and 11, “whose guarantees overlap in this context.” [para. 54]  

Examining the existence of any interference with the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly, the Court highlighted several measures imposed upon organizations and individuals, such as 1) the attachment of the “foreign agent” label—stigmatizing in its nature—, which provoked additional obligations and a wide range of restrictions; and 2) sanctions such as fines and forced dissolution. To the Court, those measures hindered the applicants’ activities significantly and “restricted their capacity for expressive conduct.” [para. 67]

Upon examining the interferences, the Court explained that several conditions had to be met for them to be justified. They need to be “prescribed by law,” pursue a legitimate aim, and be “necessary in a democratic society.” [para. 68] After acknowledging that the restrictions were codified in Domestic Law with the aim of protecting public order,  referring again to the Ecodefence case, the Court chose to focus on the “necessity in a democratic society” prong of the three-part test.  

The ECtHR held that its findings regarding the applicant NGOs in the Ecodefence case remained relevant to the applicant NGOs in the present case. Namely, the Court found that the “foreign agent” term was too broad and allowed authorities to assume that any foreign funding resulted in foreign control—an assumption that rendered any evidence to the contrary irrelevant. 

Considering this, the ECtHR held that the “foreign agent” designation was “not only unjustified and prejudicial to the [organizations’] activities but was also likely to have a significant deterrent and stigmatising effect.” [para. 71] The Court concluded that Russian authorities failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for the introduction of the “foreign agent” status. Moreover, they also failed to show how the measures and restrictions associated with such status increased transparency. 

Subsequently, the ECtHR underscored that the “foreign agent” legal framework had evolved considerably since its 2022 Ecodefence ruling. The framework now affected not only NGOs but also media organizations and individuals: Anyone who engaged in “political activities,” received “support,” or was “under foreign influence” (including through “organisational assistance” and “methodological guidance”) could now be designated as a “foreign agent.” [para. 73] The Court held that the listed amendments distanced the framework even further away from the standards of the Convention.

To it, the “foreign agent” designation was stigmatizing. Quoting the Ecodefence case yet again—along with the 2021 Opinion of the Venice Commission on the legislation and the opinion polls submitted by the applicants—, the Court stressed that the new amendments reinforced the negative connotations associated with the “foreign agent” status, which the public perceived as threatening. Furthermore, the ECtHR emphasized that the “foreign agent” designation was misleading since it assumed an agency relationship with a foreign entity or individual without any evidence of it. This fundamental flaw, the Court argued, “created a distorted perception of dependence and foreign interference where none had been shown to exist, thereby undermining, rather than enhancing, transparency.” [para. 76]

One of the most telling examples of the legislation’s misuse, as told by the Court, concerns the League of Voters Foundation—which was liquidated because of a EUR 3 donation from a source that was impossible to verify as foreign. The ECtHR emphasized that in no case Russian authorities managed to prove that the applicants were under foreign control. Thus, the Court concluded there were “no ‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons for applying the stigmatising and misleading ‘foreign agents’ label to the applicants.” [para. 78]

Citing Gorzelik and Others v. Poland and Ecodefence, the Court examined whether the requirements imposed by the “foreign agent” status pursued a “pressing social need.” To it, the extra auditing and reporting obligations, the frequent inspections, and the ban on simplified book-keeping, did not just fail to foster transparency but amounted to “an excessive financial and organisational burden.” [para. 80] 

Next, the ECtHR addressed another distinct feature of the Russian “foreign agent” legislation (the labeling and public disclosure obligations) which expanded over the years and eventually ended up affecting all the public communications of those designated. The Court noted that Russian authorities banned all mentions of designated organizations and individuals unless their status was explicitly indicated. The ECtHR also noted that “[r]eposting or sharing materials produced by ‘foreign agents’ was elevated to an independent ground for ‘foreign agents’ designation.” [para. 81] Referring to Perinçek v. Switzerland, the Court held that the indiscriminate application of the “foreign agent” labeling requirement, which disregarded both content and context, was “incompatible with the standards of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, which require[d] a context-based assessment.” [para. 82]

Turning to the example of International Memorial, which was fined multiple times for failing to label certain materials—including the online database of victims of Soviet state-sanctioned terror, among others—, the ECtHR considered that adding a “foreign agent” label to such materials could have evoked distrust and thus undermined an important public debate. Additionally, the Court noted that Russian authorities also applied sanctions to content not directly produced by designated organizations—which signaled punitive purposes not related to increasing transparency. 

The ECtHR held that the labeling obligations limited the applicants’ expressive conduct. Citing Gillberg v. Sweden, the Court stressed that the practice violated the applicants’ negative right to freedom of expression because it obliged them to disseminate information they disagreed with: “A holistic protection of the freedom of expression,” the Court argued, “necessarily encompasses both the right to express ideas and the right to remain silent.” [para. 84]

The ECtHR considered that the labeling obligations resembled the “discriminatory and segregationist” labeling measures of certain groups from past authoritarian regimes and hindered the work and communications of the designated organizations and individuals considerably. It also held that the labeling obligations did not serve the purpose of increasing transparency; rather they created “an environment of forced self-stigmatisation.” [para. 86] Citing Ecodefence, the Court reiterated that labeling requirements created a “chilling effect on public discourse and civic engagement,” which was “fundamentally at odds with the notion of a democratic society.” [para. 86] The ECtHR added that the expanded “foreign agent” legislation, considered in the present case, bore “the hallmarks of a totalitarian regime.” [para. 86]

Subsequently, the Court assessed the proportionality of the sanctions imposed on the applicants. Referring to Hurbain v. Belgium, the ECtHR explained the requirements for penalties to be compatible with the ECHR: 1) they should not amount to censorship, and 2) they should not hinder the work of NGOs, media outlets, and journalists from playing the role of public watchdogs. Recalling the restrictions automatically imposed on designated organizations and individuals (listed above), as well as other non-compliance penalties (fines, blocking of websites, and liquidation), the Court examined whether the stated need for more transparency justified the severity of the sanctions. 

First, the ECtHR found that the blanket and indiscriminate prohibitions on public participation, immediately triggered by the designation, were disproportionate and undermined the applicants’ ability to take part in public affairs. Second, the Court found that the professional restrictions isolated the designated organizations and individuals further by banning them from participating in educational and cultural activities. Finally, it found that the economic restrictions significantly undermined the applicants’ funding possibilities, especially in light of the chilling effect that the “foreign agent” label provoked on potential donors. 

Referring to Ecodefence, the Court reiterated that the non-compliance penalties were disproportionately severe. The applicants’ cases illustrated this point further. The ECtHR held that by imposing fines that threatened the entire financial standing of NGOs, Russian courts failed to consider the scale of the violations, the content of the unmarked materials, and the possible negative consequences for the public. To illustrate the disproportionate nature of the imposed fines, the Court referred to Novyye Vremena: Not a designated “foreign agent” itself, the media outlet received a fine amounting to 99.7% of its total budget in the preceding year for failing to report that it had obtained funds from another “foreign agent” NGO. The ECtHR underscored that such offenses should be “merely regulatory in nature,” and that the penalties constituted an “excessive burden” and “a form of censorship intended to discourage criticism and undermine the organisation’s contribution to public debate,” creating “a chilling effect on freedom of expression” in the country. [para. 94]

Examining the most significant penalty under the “foreign agent” legislation —the forced dissolution of an organization—, the Court cited Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan and Yefimov and Youth Human Rights Group v. Russia, to argue that, since this severe penalty could provoke a chilling effect on civil society, it should take place only under exceptional circumstances. Referring to the forced dissolution of two of Russia’s oldest human rights organizations (International Memorial and Memorial Human Rights Center), the ECtHR highlighted the minor and formal nature of their offenses to which the Russian authorities responded by removing them from the register of legal entities—thus breaching the Court’s interim measure in the Ecodefence case and effectively silencing the two organizations. Ultimately, the Court considered that the dissolution decisions were not justified. 

The ECtHR held that Russia’s “foreign agent” legislation was “arbitrary” and not “necessary in a democratic society.” To it, the legislation provoked “suspicion and mistrust towards civil society actors and independent voices, thereby undermining the very foundation of a democracy.” [para. 29] Considering the aforementioned arguments, the Court held that Russia violated the applicants’ rights to freedom of expression and association as outlined by articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR.

Alleged Violation of Article 8 of the Convention

Regarding Article 8 of the ECHR (right to privacy), the Court began by saying that the broad term “private life” could not be defined exhaustively. Citing S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR stressed that Article 8 encompassed “the right to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships with others and the outside world.” [para. 103] The Court underscored the particular importance of personal data protection and, citing Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, highlighted “the right to a form of informational self-determination” [para. 103] under Article 8 with regard to the collection, processing, and dissemination of data. Citing Mateescu v. Romania, it held that the right to a “private life” also encompassed one’s professional activities. Referring to Denisov v. Ukraine, the Court noted that limitations to employment access could engage Article 8 too. 

Next, the ECtHR referred to the consequences of the “foreign agent” designation on individual applicants’ private and professional lives. Following the precedent laid out in L.B. v. Hungary, the Court considered that the publication of the applicants’ personal details, along with the “foreign agent” label, on the website of the Ministry of Justice, interfered with the right to private life. It also argued that the applicants’ obligation to submit reports on all incomes and expenses, including those regarding private matters, interfered with the aforementioned right. Referring to Bigaeva v. Greece and Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, the Court stated that professional employment restrictions, along with the prohibition on advertising with “foreign agents,” constituted an interference with Article 8. 

Upon examining the justification for the interferences, the Court assumed it “pursued the stated legitimate aims of protecting national security and preventing disorder by increasing public awareness.” [para. 110]

When analyzing the necessity of the interferences, the Court underscored the applicants’ argument that the “foreign agent” designation forced them to experience significant distress and bear the burden of a stigma that went beyond their reputations, affecting their private lives. Considering this, the ECtHR held that since “the ‘foreign agent’ designation [did] not require evidence of any actions undertaken in the interests of foreign entities,” it could not “be considered necessary for achieving the declared aim of enhancing national security or increasing transparency.” [paras. 112-113] Referring to the public register of “foreign agents,” the Court noted that the Russian Government failed to show how it guaranteed the protection of personal data. Regarding the obligation to submit detailed reports on personal expenses, the Court described it as excessive and disproportionate: The “degree of scrutiny far exceeded what could, even in theory, be considered necessary to ensure transparency, and appeared to serve no purpose other than to burden and intimidate the applicants.” [para. 114] Finally, referring to restrictions on public participation and professional employment, the ECtHR found that they far exceeded similar measures considered in previous cases (Ādamsons v. Latvia, Polyakh, and Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania) and could not be justified in a democracy. 

In light of the above arguments, the Court concluded that Russia violated the individual applicants’ right to private life as enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR.

The Court awarded “EUR 10,000 to each applicant or such smaller amount as was actually claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 850 per application or such smaller amount as was actually claimed in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.” [para. 121]