Case Summary and Outcome

The U.S. Supreme Court held that public figures cannot recover damages for a publication’s infliction of emotional distress without showing that it contains a false statement of fact made with actual malice. Jerry Falwell, a well-known minister and political commentator, sued Hustler Magazine for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentionally causing emotional distress by publishing an advertisement “parody” depicting him in an incestuous drunken rendezvous with his mother. Reversing the Court of Appeals judgement which had affirmed the minister’s award of damages, the Court restated the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions at the center of the First of Amendment and said that the sort of expression complained of did not come within any of the exceptions to First Amendment protection.

Facts

The inside front cover of the November 1983 Hustler magazine featured a satirical advertisement for a liqueur brand, displaying the name and picture of Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister, with a title that read: “Jerry Falwell talks about his first time.” The use of the phrase “first time” referred to the liqueur brand’s advertisements  in which various celebrities were interviewed about their first time trying the product. The magazine published an alleged interview with Falwell in which he discussed that his “first time” was during a drunken, incestuous relationship with his mother. Indeed, the advertisement, in its entirety, tried to portray the minister as a hypocrite who would preach only when he was drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the advertisement contained the disclaimer, “ad parody—not to be taken seriously.” The magazine’s table of contents also listed the ad as “Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.”

Falwell brought a lawsuit against Hustler and its publisher in Federal court to recover damages for three tortious actions: invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The judge directed a verdict against Falwell on the invasion of privacy claim. The jury subsequently found against the respondent on the libel claim, specifically finding that the parody could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts . . . or events,” but ruled in his favor on the emotional distress claim, stating that he should be awarded compensatory and punitive damages.  Falwell was awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 punitive damages from each defendant.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in its entirety.  It agreed that the defendants were entitled to the same level of First Amendment protections on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress that they were afforded on the defamation claim but said that this does not mean a literal application of the “actual malice” rule laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan is appropriate in the context of an emotional distress claim. The court reasoned that the standard was met in the present case by the state law requirement, and the jury’s finding, that the defendants had acted intentionally or recklessly to inflict emotional distress.

The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to review the appeal court’s decision because it involved a novel question about the First Amendment limitations on free speech in order to protect citizens from intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Decision Overview

Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion of the Court.

The main issue for the Court was whether the award for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in this case was consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. More specifically, the Court addressed whether “a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most.” [p. 49]

The Court first reiterated the fundamentals of the First Amendment on free speech, stating that at the heart of this constitutional protection is “the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.” [p. 51] The Court reasoned that the exchange of ideas and expressions without government interference is bound to “produce speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those public figures who are ‘intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.’” [p. 51] The Court, however, stressed that not every speech against a public figure is protected under the First Amendment, as established by New York Times v. Sullivan which recognized that a public figure may recover for damages to his or her reputation caused by a defamatory expression made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” [p. 52]

In this case, Falwell argued that a different standard should be applied in his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the interest at stake was remedying the severe emotional distress he suffered as a result of an offensive publication rather than a reputational damage caused by a defamatory statement. Further, and as accepted by the Court of Appeals, Falwell argued that so long as the required elements of the emotional distress claim were met, namely, that the utterance was intended to inflict emotional distress, was outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it was not necessary for the court to address whether the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false.

The Supreme Court disagreed. Whilst acknowledging that each state jurisdiction may legislate its own parameters for what may amount to  “outrageous” conduct sufficient to inflict serious emotional distress, the Court reaffirmed its position that “in the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment.” [p. 53] The Court said that the bad motives giving rise to tort liability in other areas of the law were not applicable in the area of public debate about public figures.  Unless a higher level of culpability applied when expression involved public figures, political commentators and cartoonists would be subjected to damages awards without evidence that their work falsely defamed public figures. The Court referred to the long history of political satire about leaders and statesmen in the U.S. to illustrate how “graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate.” [p. 55] It rejected Falwell’s claim that the magazine’s satirical ad about him was so “outrageous” that it had to be distinguished from the traditional political cartoons.  The Court said that the application of an “outrageous standard” or any other standard less that what is articulated under New Times v. Sullivan in the area of political and social discourse has “an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression and cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages for conduct such as that involved here.”

Reversing the Court of Appeals ruling, the Supreme Court held that “public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.” [p. 56]