Case Summary and Outcome

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) unanimously held that Armenia violated Mr. Hrachya Harutyunyan’s right to freedom of expression since domestic courts convicted him of defamation after he filed a whistleblower report exposing corruption. The case originated when Mr. Harutyunyan, former Head of Security and Administration at Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA), submitted a confidential report through ENA’s designated internal whistleblower channel, denouncing corruption and misuse of resources by a colleague. Despite ENA’s assurances of confidentiality, the report was circulated between ENA officials and was presented to the party accused of corruption. As a result, the accused party sued Mr. Harutyunyan for defamation and insult before domestic courts, claiming that the report damaged his professional reputation. The domestic courts classified the report as a “public” statement, ruling that its circulation within ENA, where individuals beyond the Board of Directors accessed it, amounted to publication and therefore could not be considered confidential. National courts held Mr. Harutyunyan liable for defamation, ordering him to pay damages, which led to the seizure of his assets. After exhausting domestic remedies, Mr. Harutyunyan brought the case before the ECtHR, arguing that the Armenian courts’ treatment of his confidential report disregarded his role as a whistleblower on matters of public interest. The ECtHR found that Armenia failed to balance the applicant’s freedom of expression with the reputational concerns of others, and emphasized the public significance of reporting corruption. Concluding that the Armenian courts’ approach was neither necessary nor proportionate, the Court determined that restricting the applicant’s freedom of expression could have a chilling effect on internal whistleblowing—undermining democratic accountability and public-interest protections.

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Facts

Mr. Hrachya Harutyunyan was the Head of Security and Administration at Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA) from 2008 until his departure in October 2011. ENA, Armenia’s sole electricity supplier and a state-critical infrastructure entity, is owned by the Russian energy firm Inter RAO and holds a prominent role in Armenia’s public utilities. As part of an anti-corruption initiative, ENA established an internal whistleblower mechanism, publicly inviting everyone to report corrupt practices in the company via a dedicated email. This channel, advertised prominently on ENA’s website, assured that any information submitted through it would be confidential and made available only to ENA’s Board of Directors for investigative purposes.

On March 26, 2012, approximately five months after leaving ENA, Mr. Harutyunyan filed a confidential report through this channel. Using his personal email, he anonymously submitted allegations of corruption, outlining purported misconducts by his former colleague V.B., who served as Deputy Director of Security and Control at ENA. Mr. Harutyunyan’s report claimed that V.B. had engaged in embezzlement, nepotism, and other forms of misconduct in the handling of company resources.

He alleged that on 24 October 2007, V.B. orchestrated embezzlement schemes by awarding contracts to Uniforma LLC, a company that lacked the infrastructure and personnel to fulfill the contracted work for ENA. Additionally, Mr. Harutyunyan reported that when he brought a well-founded audit report to V.B., advising against contracting with Uniforma LLC due to their inability to fulfill the contracted obligations, V.B. dismissed his proposal without explanation.

In his whistleblower report, Mr. Harutyunyan detailed allegations of inflated pricing in contracts for security equipment managed by V.B., implying that V.B. received financial “kickbacks” from vendors in exchange for awarding them the contracts. The report also included allegations that V.B. engaged in nepotism by appointing relatives and friends to key positions within ENA’s security department.

After receiving the report, ENA initiated an internal investigation. On July 11, 2012, Y.M., Head of Economic Security and Administration within ENA’s Internal Security Directorate, met with Mr. Harutyunyan, verified his authorship of the report, and requested he sign a copy. Despite being assured of the report’s confidentiality, it was subsequently shared with G.Ma., Head of ENA’s Security and Control Directorate. On July 19, 2012, G.Ma. disclosed the report directly to V.B., the accused, requesting an explanation. An internal investigation ensued over the following month. Although some allegations were found to be substantiated, other claims were dismissed as lacking evidence.

On August 16, 2012, V.B. filed defamation and insult claims against Mr. Harutyunyan, alleging that the report’s content damaged his professional reputation. V.B. sought financial compensation and a public apology. Initial proceedings began in the Shirak Regional Court, where V.B.’s claims were dismissed on July 15, 2013. The court ruled that the statements in Mr. Harutyunyan’s report were not “public” since they were submitted under the confidential reporting mechanism. V.B. subsequently appealed this decision. On November 20, 2013, the Civil Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s ruling. According to the court, the statements of the report were “public” due to their disclosure to other ENA officials. In the court’s view, this qualified as a communication to a third party. The case was remanded to the Shirak Regional Court for reconsideration.

On 3 March 2015, the Shirak Regional Court partially upheld V.B.’s claims, concluding that Harutyunyan’s statements were defamatory. The court reclassified the report as a public statement under Armenian defamation law, holding that its circulation within ENA —where it was seen by officials beyond the Board of Directors—constituted publication and could not be considered confidential. It ordered Harutyunyan to issue a public apology and awarded V.B. damages for 2 million Armenian drams, along with additional legal fees. Following the judgment, enforcement measures were imposed by the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (DEJA), such as the seizure of Harutyunyan’s car and apartment to satisfy the court-ordered damages.

Mr. Harutyunyan lodged a submission before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). He argued that the Armenian courts’ treatment of his whistleblower report as a public statement, rather than a protected disclosure, violated his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The applicant contended that the Armenian courts failed to recognize his role as a whistleblower reporting on matters of public interest and neglected the confidentiality assurances embedded in ENA’s announcement.

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Decision Overview

On 27 August 2024, the Fourth Section of the ECtHR delivered a unanimous decision in this case. The central issue for the ECtHR was whether the Armenian courts’ conviction for defamation—and subsequent imposition of civil damages—of the applicant for reporting alleged acts of corruption, violated his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. To answer this question, the Court examined whether the applicant’s use of an internal reporting mechanism to disclose corruption was protected by Article 10 and whether the Armenian courts had appropriately balanced his freedom of expression with the protection of others’ personal reputation.

The applicant argued that his internal report was submitted through the company’s designated system for reporting employees’ corrupt practices. He claimed the report should be considered protected speech due to the public interest of the information. Mr. Harutyunyan said that he had become aware of these practices during his employment with the ENA, as its Head of the Security and Administration Department, and that he had come forward to report it “in order to alert the company to the alleged corrupt activities of V.B.” [para. 34] Since the report detailed financial irregularities, nepotism, and potential fraud involving his former colleague, the applicant argued that he should benefit from the protection afforded to whistleblowers. To support his claim, Mr. Harutyunyan referred to Recommendation No. CM/Rec(2014)7 on the protection of whistleblowers, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. This recommendation highlights that individuals who report public interest threats, even after leaving their job, should still be protected. Furthermore, protection should not be lost simply because the whistleblower was mistaken about the importance of the information or because the threat to public interest did not materialize, as long as they had reasonable grounds to believe the information was accurate.

 Mr. Harutyunyan further argued that the interference with his right to freedom of expression was not “prescribed by law” since his report did not meet the “public” requirement specified in Article 1087.1 of the Armenian Civil Code. In Armenian law, a public statement is one made in a public context, or one communicated to the public or a third party. He criticized the domestic courts’ interpretation of “public” as excessively broad—by which it applied it to “any statement of which a third party had been made aware.” [para. 35] This interpretation, he argued, was unforeseeable and violated the confidentiality promised by the company, as he could not have reasonably anticipated that he would subsequently be liable for disclosures made through private correspondence—particularly given the company’s express assurance of confidentiality, which encouraged internal reporting.

Mr. Harutyunyan stressed that he had chosen the least harmful reporting method, acting within the company’s internal procedure, and had no intention of making his statements public. The domestic courts, he contended, failed to acknowledge the public interest of his report and instead treated the case as a simple defamation issue, without balancing his right to freedom of expression against the reputational concerns of V.B. Moreover, the applicant argued that the absence of protections for whistleblowers in Armenian law, at the time, raised concerns under Article 10 of the ECHR. He also considered that the courts failed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake, resulting in the disproportionate seizure of his only flat and car—which further exacerbated the harm caused by the interference.

For its part, Armenia argued that whistleblower protections did not apply in this case since the relevant legislation had only been introduced in Armenia in 2017. Additionally, the Government contended that since Harutyunyan was no longer employed by ENA when he made his report, his case fell outside the scope of relevant ECtHR jurisprudence on whistleblowing. They maintained that the interference to the applicant’s freedom of expression was “prescribed by law,” as Armenian law defines a “public statement” as any communication made to a third party, regardless of whether it was initially intended to be private. Once Harutyunyan signed the report in the presence of Y.M., the State said it could no longer be considered confidential, as it was subsequently shared with other employees tasked with investigating the allegations.

The respondent State further argued that Harutyunyan’s accusations targeted V.B. personally, rather than the ENA as an institution, and were motivated by personal animosity rather than public concern. It asserted that the applicant had failed to substantiate his claims, despite the seriousness of the allegations—which could have led to criminal prosecution. Therefore, according to Armenia, domestic courts were justified in awarding damages, as the compensation reflected the severity of the reputational harm inflicted on V.B.

At the outset of its analysis, the ECtHR held that the measures issued by Armenian authorities against the applicant amounted to an interference with Harutyunyan’s freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. Upon examining whether the interference was justified, the Court applied the standard three-part test. It assessed whether the interference was (i) prescribed by law, (ii) pursued a legitimate aim, and (iii) proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.

While the Court acknowledged that the interference was lawful and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of others, it concluded that Armenian domestic courts failed to demonstrate that the interference was proportionate or necessary in a democratic society.

The ECtHR began by acknowledging that the interference with Harutyunyan’s freedom of expression was prescribed by law, as its legal basis was Article 1087.1 of the Armenian Civil Code, which defines the concept of public defamation. However, the Court expressed concerns about the broad interpretation of the term “public” employed by domestic courts—which interpreted it to include communications made to any third party beyond the person making the statement and the one being criticized. The ECtHR observed that this broad definition risked undermining internal reporting mechanisms, as even reports made through confidential channels could potentially be deemed “public” statements, exposing whistleblowers to defamation claims.

The Court also held that the interference pursued a legitimate aim: the protection of V.B.’s reputation and rights under Article 8 of the ECHR (the right to privacy). It emphasized, however, that in cases involving whistleblowing, the public interest must be carefully weighed against the reputational harm caused to individuals.

When assessing whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, the ECtHR conducted a detailed balancing exercise, relying on the criteria outlined in cases such as Guja v. Moldova and Halet v. Luxembourg. Thus, the Court analyzed “(a) whether or not alternative channels for the disclosure were available; (b) the public interest in the disclosed information; (c) the authenticity of the disclosed information; (d) the detriment to the employer; (e) whether the whistle-blower acted in good faith [and]; (f) the severity of the sanction.” [para. 47]

Regarding the availability of alternative channels, the Court noted that Mr. Harutyunyan opted for ENA’s internal reporting mechanism—specifically designed for reporting corruption—rather than publicly disclosing the information to the press or government authorities. By selecting the least harmful channel, Mr. Harutyunyan’s actions aligned with the objectives of confidential whistleblower protections, the ECtHR opined. The Armenian courts’ characterization of the applicant’s communication as “public,” merely due to the report’s internal disclosure to Y.M.—ENA’s Head of Economic Security and Administration—, was deemed overly formalistic and failed to recognize that the appropriate channel was used in this case.

The Court criticized the aforementioned interpretation, highlighting that “the domestic courts took no heed of the overall context of the case.” [para. 52] This formalistic approach, the Court emphasized, could potentially create a “chilling effect,” discouraging employees or former employees from reporting professional misconduct—especially if internal reporting within an organization could be later interpreted as public disclosure. As the Court held, such an interpretation compromised the effectiveness of internal whistleblowing mechanisms.

The Court further determined that the content of the report—allegations of corruption and misuse of resources—was undeniably of public interest. It cited Halet to emphasize that information related to unlawful acts “is of particularly strong public interest.” [para. 54] The ECtHR reiterated that information about professional misconduct, even within private entities, such as ENA— which is not an ordinary private company but a main electricity supplier in Armenia—can be of strong public interest when it concerns accountability and transparency. Therefore, ENA and its employees should be held to a higher level of public scrutiny.

The Court also noted that although some of the applicant’s statements were ultimately dismissed as unsubstantiated, whistleblowers should not lose protection solely because they are unable to fully verify the disclosed information. On this point, the ECtHR referred to Report A/70/361 of 8 September 2015 by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. There, the rapporteur emphasized that what matters is whether the whistleblower reasonably believed the allegations were truthful at the time of reporting. The Court found that this was indeed the case regarding Mr. Harutyunyan.

The Court highlighted, upon analyzing the “detriment to the employer” criterion, that the harm inflicted to ENA, as a consequence of the report, was minimal, considering the allegations stayed within internal channels and did not affect the company’s public reputation. Domestic courts, the ECtHR considered, also failed to explain why Mr. Harutyunyan’s report, submitted confidentially, had to be treated as a public statement capable of damaging V.B.’s reputation.

To the Court, Harutyunyan acted in good faith too, considering that the Government’s allegations that he had made his report out of personal animosity were not discussed nor confirmed by domestic courts. The ECtHR also held that the fact that the applicant chose the company’s internal channels, and did not go public with the information, evidenced his good faith.

Regarding the “severity of the sanction” criterion, the Court found that the penalties imposed on the applicant were excessive and disproportionate. To it, severe financial sanctions, such as the ones issued against Mr. Harutyunyan, could deter other potential whistleblowers from coming forward, creating a chilling effect on internal reporting mechanisms.

In light of the applied criteria, the ECtHR concluded that Armenian courts failed to strike a fair balance between protecting V.B.’s reputation and upholding Harutyunyan’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. The Court underscored that, as a former employee using an internal reporting channel to disclose matters of public interest, Mr. Harutyunyan’s actions warranted whistleblower protections. By characterizing his report as “public” and disregarding both ENA’s confidentiality assurances and the public interest nature of the allegations, domestic courts overlooked crucial factors that should have protected the applicant under Article 10 of the ECHR. The Court also considered that the severe financial penalties seen in this case, including the seizure of Mr.Harutyunyan’s property, risked creating a chilling effect on future whistleblowers—ultimately undermining democratic accountability.

Thus, the ECtHR held that Armenia violated the applicant’s right to freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 of the ECHR. The Court ordered Armenia to pay the applicant EUR 4,500 for non-pecuniary damages and EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses.

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