Case Summary and Outcome

The Supreme Court of Canada determined that an employee’s request for information regarding employee sign-in logs had to be disclosed. Michael Dagg sought information from the Department of Finance on the sign-in logs of employees on weekends in order to help the union bargaining process. The Minister of Finance disclosed the information, but deleted the employees’ names, identification numbers, and signatures because it constituted personal information that could be exempted from disclosure. The Court reasoned that the Minister was allowed to delete the employees’ names, but that the information sought by Dagg did not constitute personal information under section 3(j) of the Privacy Act and thus it had to be disclosed.

Facts

Michael Dagg (applicant) is a professional access to information consultant. He filed a request with the Department of Finance for copies of logs signed by employees entering and leaving the workplace on the weekends. The applicant sought the information to determine whether union members were working overtime on weekends without claiming compensation. The applicant intended to present the information to the union in order to help with the collective bargaining process and to increase the likelihood of retaining his services.

The Minister of Finance (respondent) disclosed the logs to the applicant, but deleted the employees’ names, identification numbers, and signatures. The respondent alleged that the information requested by the applicant constituted personal information and was exempted from disclosure in accordance with section 19(1) of the Access to Information Act.

Decision Overview

Justice Cory delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada. He determined that the names in the sign-in logs constituted “personal information” under section 3 of the Privacy Act. However, Cory submitted that the opening words of both section 3(j) and the specific provisions of section 3(j)(iii) of the Privacy Act were sufficiently broad to encompass the information sought by the applicant. [para. 4] Specifically, he contended, “the number of hours spent at the workplace is general information ‘that relates to’ the position or function of the individual and thus falls under the opening words of section 3(j).” [para. 8]

Furthermore, Justice Cory determined that the sign-in logs provides information that allows for a “general assessment” of the amount of work required by each employee. [para. 8] He added that “[a]lthough this information may not disclose anything about the nature of the responsibilities of the position, it does provide a general indication of the extent of those responsibilities.” [para. 9] Finally, Justice Cory determined that because the information sought fell within the opening words of section 3(j) of the Privacy Act, and alternatively, within section 3(j)(iii) of the same Act, the information had to be disclosed.

On the dissenting opinion, Justice La Forest contended that the information sought by the applicant was ‘personal information’ and that under the Privacy Act it should not be disclosed. Moreover, La Forest explained that information relating to the employee’s position is not considered ‘personal information’ under the Privacy Act and it is exempted. He determined that in the present case the information sought did not comprise information regarding the position or function of a specific individual. Justice La Forest understood that it revealed information “about the activities of a specific individual which may or may not be work-related.” [paras. 94–95]