Case Summary and Outcome

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California held that California Assembly Bill 2839 was unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement because it violated the First Amendment and related constitutional free speech protections. The case arose from challenges brought by political satirists and content creators who argued that the statute impermissibly restricted and compelled political expression by prohibiting the distribution of “materially deceptive” election-related media, including satire and parody created using artificial intelligence, based on speculative harms to candidates’ reputations, electoral prospects, or public confidence in elections. The central issue before the Court was whether the State could regulate digitally altered political speech through content-based prohibitions and mandatory disclaimers without infringing constitutionally protected freedom of expression. In resolving this issue, the Court reasoned that AB 2839 imposed content, viewpoint, and speaker-based restrictions on core political speech, and failed strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interest in election integrity. The Court further held that it impermissibly compelled speech through burdensome disclaimer requirements, and relied on vague standards that chilled lawful expression. In its concluding remarks, the Court characterized AB 2839 as suffering from “a compendium of traditional First Amendment infirmities” and emphasized that while deepfakes posed real challenges, “the antidote is not prematurely stifling content creation” but encouraging “counter speech, rigorous fact-checking, and the uninhibited flow of democratic discourse.”

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Facts

In 2024, the State of California enacted two election-related statutes aimed at regulating digitally altered and artificial intelligence-generated media in the context of political campaigns. On May 22, 2024, the California State Assembly passed Assembly Bill 2655, formally titled the Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024, which was codified at California Elections Code section 20510. On September 17, 2024, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 2839, titled “Elections: deceptive media in advertisements,” which was codified at California Elections Code section 20012. Both statutes were enacted in response to concerns that “deepfake” technology could be used to mislead voters, damage candidates’ reputations, or undermine public confidence in election outcomes.

Assembly Bill 2839 regulated the distribution of election-related media that was “materially deceptive.” The statute defined “materially deceptive content” as audio, visual, or audiovisual media that had been digitally created or modified in a manner that would falsely appear to a reasonable person to be an authentic record of the content depicted. The law prohibited any person, committee, or entity from knowingly and maliciously distributing such content if it portrayed a political candidate as saying or doing something the candidate did not say or do, and if the content was reasonably likely to harm the candidate’s reputation or electoral prospects. The statute also prohibited the distribution of materially deceptive content that was reasonably likely to falsely undermine confidence in the outcome of an election. These prohibitions applied during the 120 days preceding an election and, for certain categories of content, up to 60 days after an election. Although the statute contained exemptions for satire and parody, those exemptions required that the media include a disclosure in text no smaller than the largest font size appearing in the media for the duration of the content.

Assembly Bill 2655 imposed obligations on “large online platforms,” defined as social media services meeting specified size and usage thresholds. The statute required covered platforms to block or label materially deceptive election-related content during designated pre- and post-election periods. It further required platforms to establish procedures allowing users to report content alleged to be materially deceptive and authorized candidates, election officials, the California Attorney General, and local prosecutors to seek injunctive relief compelling platform compliance. Unlike AB 2839, AB 2655 regulated the conduct of online intermediaries rather than individual speakers.

One of the plaintiffs affected by these enactments was Christopher Kohls, a United States–based political content creator who published online under the name “Mr Reagan.” On July 26, 2024, Kohls uploaded a video to multiple social media platforms, including YouTube, Facebook, and X (formerly Twitter), that parodied then–presidential candidate Kamala Harris. The video used artificial intelligence technology to generate an audio track mimicking Harris’s voice and combined it with edited clips from actual campaign footage. The video explicitly described itself as a parody and included a disclaimer stating that its sound or visuals had been digitally generated or significantly edited. The content mocked Harris’s candidacy, her speaking style, and recent political events, including a presidential debate held on June 27, 2024.

The video received widespread public attention after it was reposted on July 27, 2024, by Elon Musk on X, where it accumulated tens of millions of views. On July 28, 2024, California Governor Gavin Newsom publicly criticized the video by posting a photograph of a news article about the repost and stating that manipulating a candidate’s voice in an advertisement should be illegal. These events occurred several weeks before the enactment of AB 2839

On September 17, 2024, the same day AB 2839 was enacted, Kohl filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California against the California Attorney General, Rob Bonta, in his official capacity. Kohl’s sought a preliminary injunction, a temporary court order preventing enforcement of AB 2839 while the litigation proceeded. He asserted that the statute exposed him to civil liability for publishing parody and satire during election periods and that the mandatory disclosure requirements interfered with his ability to communicate through video media

Separately, X Corp., the operator of the social media platform X, filed its own lawsuit in the same federal court challenging AB 2655. X Corp alleged that the statute required platforms to censor or label political content based on state determinations of deception, compelled the creation of reporting systems subject to government oversight, and exposed platforms to injunctive actions by public officials and political candidates. The company asserted that these obligations applied during defined election-related periods and affected the platform’s handling of user-generated political speech.

In addition, The Babylon Bee, LLC, a satirical media organization known for publishing intentionally false but humorous political content, filed a separate action challenging both AB 2839 and AB 2655. The Babylon Bee regularly published digitally altered images, headlines, and videos parodying political candidates and government officials, and alleged that the statutes restricted its ability to publish satire during election periods. Kelly Chang Rickert, a California attorney and political commentator who published commentary through blogs and social media, joined the lawsuit as an individual plaintiff.

On October 2, 2024, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a preliminary injunction in Christopher Kohls v. Bonta, preventing California officials from enforcing most provisions of AB 2839 while the case remained pending. On October 25, 2024, the Court ordered that The Babylon Bee, LLC v. Bonta be consolidated with Kohls v. Bonta, finding that both cases challenged the same statutes and involved overlapping factual and legal issues. In a subsequent order dated January 3, 2025, the Court directed the State of California to halt enforcement of AB 2655 in its entirety pending further proceedings. The consolidated litigation continued before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

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Decision Overview

Judge John A. Mendez of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California delivered the decision. The primary issue before the Court was whether California Assembly Bill 2839, codified at California Elections Code section 20012, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution by restricting and compelling election-related political speech, including satire and parody created using digitally altered or artificial intelligence–generated media.

Christopher Kohls, The Babylon Bee, LLC, and Kelly Chang Rickert contended that California Assembly Bill 2839 imposed an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of expression by regulating core political speech protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the free speech clause of the California Constitution. They argued that the statute targeted expressive activity at the heart of democratic discourse, namely political commentary, satire, and parody concerning candidates for public office. According to the petitioners, AB 2839 functioned as a content-based restriction because it applied only to election-related speech and conditioned legality on the government’s assessment of whether speech was “materially deceptive” and “reasonably likely” to harm a candidate’s reputation or electoral prospects. They asserted that such standards were inherently subjective and required speakers to predict how audiences might interpret political expression, thereby chilling lawful speech to avoid liability. The petitioners maintained that the First Amendment traditionally protected even false or exaggerated statements about public officials, particularly when conveyed through satire or parody, and that the statute departed from this protection by penalizing speech before any concrete harm occurred.

The petitioners further argued that AB 2839 impermissibly compelled speech by requiring creators of parody or satirical content to include prominent disclaimers stating that their media had been digitally manipulated. They asserted that this mandate forced speakers to convey a government-prescribed message that altered the form and impact of their expression, regardless of whether viewers already understood the content as satire. In their view, compelled disclaimers interfered with editorial and artistic judgment and diluted the expressive message, particularly in audiovisual media where large text overlays could dominate the screen. The petitioners also emphasized that the statute authorized enforcement by a broad range of actors, including government officials and private recipients of the content, which they claimed increased the risk of selective enforcement and self-censorship. Taken together, they contended that AB 2839 transformed the State into an arbiter of political truth and imposed prior restraints on speech during election periods, contrary to established constitutional principles that entrusted voters, rather than the government, with evaluating political ideas and claims.

The Attorney General of the State of California contended that Assembly Bill 2839 did not violate freedom of expression because it regulated only a narrow category of knowingly false and materially deceptive election-related speech that fell outside the core protections of the First Amendment. The Attorney General argued that the Constitution did not provide absolute protection for false statements, particularly where such statements threatened concrete and legally cognizable harms to democratic processes. Relying on United States Supreme Court precedent, including United States v. Alvarez, the Attorney General maintained that while some false speech remained protected, the Constitution permitted regulation of lies that caused tangible harm or posed a serious risk to important governmental interests. He asserted that AB 2839 addressed such harms by targeting digitally manipulated media that falsely portrayed candidates or election officials in ways reasonably likely to damage reputations, distort electoral prospects, or undermine public confidence in election outcomes. According to the Attorney General, the statute therefore fit within recognized exceptions allowing the State to regulate deceptive practices that threatened election integrity without suppressing legitimate political debate.

The Attorney General further contended that AB 2839 was consistent with constitutional free speech principles because it was narrowly tailored to serve California’s compelling interest in protecting free and fair elections. He argued that the law did not impose a blanket ban on political expression but instead included explicit safe harbor provisions for satire and parody, provided that such content included clear disclosures indicating that it had been digitally manipulated. In his view, these disclosure requirements did not suppress speech but instead promoted transparency by ensuring that voters were not misled about the authenticity of election-related media. He characterized the disclosure obligations as reasonable and limited to measures that informed viewers while still allowing speakers to convey their messages. The Attorney General also emphasized that the statute was content-neutral in purpose, asserting that it regulated deceptive techniques rather than viewpoints or political ideas, and that any incidental burden on expression was justified by the State’s responsibility to safeguard electoral integrity in light of emerging risks posed by artificial intelligence and deepfake technologies.

The Court framed the case as raising “a challenge of first impression” involving political satire and parody created through artificial intelligence and digitally manipulated media, but emphasized that the novelty of the technology did not diminish the applicability of long-standing constitutional protections for political expression. [pp. 1–2] The Court reiterated that the plaintiffs’ content, although “demonstrably false, exaggerated, and hyperbolic,” fell within a “long-held American tradition of ridiculing and criticizing candidates and elected officials across the political spectrum.” [pp. 1]

The Court first addressed the nature of AB 2839 and determined that it imposed facially content-based, viewpoint-based, and speaker-based restrictions on speech. It observed that the statute prohibited “materially deceptive” election-related media portraying candidates or election officials in a manner “reasonably likely” to harm reputations, electoral prospects, or confidence in election outcomes, while leaving untouched content that portrayed candidates positively or bolstered confidence in elections. [pp. 5-6] The Court held that this asymmetry constituted “the essence of viewpoint discrimination” because the law punished speech based on whether it harmed or benefited a candidate. [p. 6] While referring to Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Court emphasized that a law was content-based when it applied “because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed,” and found that AB 2839 met that definition on its face. [p. 5] The Court further concluded that the statute engaged in speaker-based discrimination by imposing different obligations on candidates, broadcasters, internet platforms, and ordinary speakers, thereby subjecting some speakers to liability while granting others exemptions. [p. 6]

Having found that AB 2839 regulated core political speech, the Court applied strict scrutiny, the most demanding standard of constitutional review. It acknowledged that California had asserted a compelling interest in preserving election integrity and protecting voters from deception, noting Supreme Court precedent recognizing that states had “a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of [their] election process” (Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee) and in protecting voters from confusion (Burson v. Freeman). [pp. 9–10] However, the Court emphasized that even compelling interests could not justify restrictions on political speech unless the law was narrowly tailored and used the least restrictive means available. The Court stressed that “restricting speech should be the government’s tool of last resort” and that the availability of less speech-restrictive alternatives rendered a law overinclusive and unconstitutional. [p. 11]

In evaluating narrow tailoring, the Court concluded that AB 2839 swept far beyond historically recognized exceptions to First Amendment protection, such as defamation or fraud. It explained that, unlike defamation law, the statute did not require proof of actual harm and instead relied on speculative standards such as content “reasonably likely” to cause reputational or electoral injury. The Court rejected the Attorney General’s reliance on United States v. Alvarez, explaining that even “deliberate lies” remained protected absent a showing of legally cognizable harm, and that AB 2839 impermissibly attempted to suppress speech before harm occurred. Quoting Alvarez, the Court warned that there were “broad areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize purportedly false speech would present a grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech.” [p. 7] The Court concluded that AB 2839 represented precisely such a danger because it deputized “almost any recipient” of speech to seek damages or injunctive relief, thereby creating a “real risk” of chilling protected expression (Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus). [p. 8]

The Court next addressed the statute’s safe harbor for satire and parody and found that it failed to cure the constitutional defects. It held that the mandatory disclaimer requirement compelled speakers to convey a government-prescribed message and “drown[ed] out Plaintiffs’ message,” particularly in audiovisual media where the required text could occupy much of the screen. Relying on Riley v. National Federation of the Blind and National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, the Court reiterated that compelled speech was presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny even when framed as a transparency or disclosure measure. The Court memorably stated that, in the context of political satire, “a mandatory disclaimer for parody or satire would kill the joke.” [p. 15]

The Court also sustained the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment vagueness challenge, concluding that the statute’s operative terms, such as “reasonably likely to harm electoral prospects” and “reasonably likely to undermine confidence,” were inherently subjective and failed to provide clear notice of prohibited conduct. The Court observed that whether speech harmed or helped a candidate depended entirely on the audience and political context, rendering compliance “nebulous and intangible at best.” [p. 20] It found it particularly telling that the State declined to take a position on whether the viral parody video that triggered the litigation would have violated the statute, demonstrating the law’s indeterminate scope.

Finally, the Court rejected the State’s severability arguments and held that no portion of AB 2839 could be salvaged. It concluded that even the potentially severable provisions remained underinclusive and failed strict scrutiny because they singled out particular speakers or types of expression without advancing the State’s asserted interests coherently. In its concluding remarks, the Court characterized AB 2839 as suffering from “a compendium of traditional First Amendment infirmities” (Washington Post v. McManus) and emphasized that while deepfakes posed real challenges, “the antidote is not prematurely stifling content creation” but encouraging “counter speech, rigorous fact-checking, and the uninhibited flow of democratic discourse.” [p. 23] The Court reaffirmed that political satire occupied “the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values” (NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.) and declared that California could not “pre-emptively sterilize political content” without violating the Constitution. [p. 24]

Thus, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California held that California Assembly Bill 2839 was unconstitutional.

 

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