Case Summary and Outcome

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of Appeal allowed the government’s appeal and granted an interim injunction prohibiting the broadcasting, performing, printing, publishing, selling, distributing, displaying, or reproducing of the song 願榮光歸香港 or “Glory to Hong Kong” with the intent to incite secession or sedition. The Court accepted the executive’s assessment that the song posed a national security threat and that an injunction was necessary to prevent unlawful activities related to the song, in addition to criminal prosecutions. The ruling emphasized the Court’s duty to safeguard national security while ensuring the injunction did not unjustifiably interfere with freedom of expression through clarity, proportionality, and adherence to the scope of criminal law. The Court also addressed concerns about the injunction’s “contra mundum” effect, stating that safeguards were in place for affected individuals to challenge or seek variations to the order. 

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Facts

In August 2019, during a protest in Hong Kong, a song emerged as a video on YouTube. The song was first described as an ‘Army song’ and the ‘Hong Kong Anthem,’ and was posted on various forums where the discussions concerned the public order in Hong Kong. The song was widely supported by the protestors and was considered to advocate Hong Kong’s separation from the People’s Republic of China. [paras. 3-4]

By September 2019, the song  titled “Glory of Hong Kong” was released on a primary online music streaming platform. Between 2019- 2022, the Song was used by the protestors in approximately 413 public order events, wherein the slogan for Hong Kong’s Independence was raised along with other alleged seditious slogans. Between 2021-2023, the Hong Kong authorities also arrested and prosecuted some people who used the Song during protests following alleged vandalism, unlawful occupation of public roads, and alleged attacks on police officers. Until June 1, 2023, the Song or its variants had been wrongly represented as the “national anthem of Hong Kong” some 887 times, including during international sports events. There were a total of 9 videos of the Song titled “Hong Kong National Anthem” on YouTube which had attracted 6 million views and over 200,000 likes. [para. 5]

On June 5, 2023, the Secretary of Justice filed an Interlocutory Injunction-in-Aid of Criminal Law before the Court of First Instance seeking an injunction and an interim injunction to restrain four classes of acts concerning a song commonly known as “願榮光歸香港” or “Glory to Hong Kong”, contending that the song constitutes serious criminal offenses that undermine “national security” under the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security Law in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (‘NSL’). The 4 acts refer to (a) broadcasting, performing, or reproducing the song in a way that incites secession or with seditious intention; (b) presenting the song in a way that suggests it is Hong Kong’s national anthem; (c) assisting or inciting others to commit acts (a) or (b); and (d) knowingly allowing others to commit acts (a) or (b).

The Secretary of Justice further alleged that the song also violated Section 1o of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200, and Section 7 of the National Anthem Ordinance. The injunction sought a restraining order from broadcasting, performing, printing, publishing, selling, distributing, displaying, or reproducing the song with the intent to incite secession or seditious intention, as defined by NSL and the Crimes Ordinance in Hong Kong. The prayer was extended to prohibiting assistance, procurement, incitement, or authorization of such acts, including any adaptation of the song with substantially similar melody and/or lyrics. [para. 2, 14, 24]

The Court of First Instance (CoFA) Decision 

On July 28, 2023, Justice Anthony Chan of the CoFA delivered the judgment. The primary issue before the Court was to determine whether the exceptional jurisdiction of the Court in granting an interlocutory injunction in aid of criminal law should be exercised, taking into account its far reach. [para. 9] To address the same, the Court framed sub-issues which inter alia include, whether the injunction will be effective or of utility in aid of the criminal law; whether the injunction may conflict with the criminal law for which purpose it is sought to be granted; and whether the injunction is sufficiently certain in its terms and is proportionate due to the potential intrusion to the right to free expression. [para. 10, CoFA]

On the scope of the injunction, the Court noted that it is intended to be contra mundum (against the world) considering that the Defendants were named as “Persons conducting themselves in any of the [4 Acts]” and their address was referred to as “unknown location within Hong Kong.” Thus, the Court noted that if the injunction were granted, it would apply to everyone in Hong Kong. [para. 34-35] The Court acknowledged its authority to grant an injunction contra mundum under Section 21L of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4. However, it emphasized the exceptional nature of such an injunction, as the Court typically operates in personam, and final injunctions usually bind only the parties involved in the proceedings. The Court noted that granting an injunction contra mundum, even if applied to the entire population of Hong Kong, is an extraordinary measure that should be exercised with caution. It highlighted the fundamental principle of justice that individuals must receive proper notice of legal proceedings to ensure their right to be heard. [paras. 36-37, CoFA]

The Court acknowledged the Chief Executive’s binding certification, according to NSL, that the four Acts posed national security threats. Despite the certification, the Court rightly asserted its authority to decide on the injunction, considering the extensive and robust criminal law regime under NSL, the Crimes Ordinance, and the National Anthem Ordinance. Emphasizing Hong Kong’s return to normalcy since the NSL enactment, the Court questioned the necessity of invoking civil jurisdiction to aid criminal law. It referred to Kerr LJ’s discussion in Portsmouth City Council v Brian James Richards,(1989) emphasizing the test of necessity or utility: whether the injunction would have offered greater deterrence than existing criminal law and the ease of enforcement. The Court rejected the notion that it should defer entirely to executives on national security matters, asserting its role in assessing the utility of the injunction for the prevention and suppression of offenses. [paras. 45-51, CoFA]

The Court, recognizing the exceptional power it wielded affecting innocent third parties, underscored its responsibility to scrutinize evidence before deciding. The Court evaluated the Secretary of Justice’s six contentions on the utility of the injunction, expressing skepticism about its effectiveness in reducing the prevalence of the Song and agreeing with the emphasis on education over legal measures for misconceptions. It concluded that much of the Secretary of Justice’s argument rested on effective enforcement and found little evidence supporting how the injunction would assist. [para. 55-60] The Court emphasized that contempt proceedings would have been based on the commission of criminal offenses, making the injunction redundant. It addressed concerns about aiding and abetting in para 1(d) and stressed the need for the Secretary of Justice to prove offenses for enforcement. The Court distinguished the present circumstances from cases involving bye-law breaches in 2019, highlighting the different penalties and dissimilar situations. [MRT Corp Ltd v Unknown Persons (2019); and Airport Authority v Persons Unlawfully and Wilfully Obstructing or Interfering with the Proper Use of the Hong Kong International Airport (2019)] [paras. 61-62, CoFA]

Regarding the misunderstanding in para 56(6), the Court clarified that the injunction targeted the Song’s use for unlawful acts, not its content violation. The Court questioned the necessity of the injunction concerning Internet Platform Operators, asserting that they should be aware of their legal duties and have access to legal advice, casting doubt on the injunction’s contribution to criminal law deterrence. The Court briefly mentioned the technical point on the ease of proving a breach under para 1(d) but asserted that this fine distinction wouldn’t impact the application’s outcome. [paras. 63-64, CoFA]

The Court acknowledged the submission of Mr. Chan (amici curiae) on potential conflicts and inconsistencies between the requirements of the proposed injunction and the substantive and procedural aspects of the NSL regime. Emphasizing the need for the Court to assess the compatibility and workability of the civil enforcement process, the Court outlined key features of the NSL regime, including the requirement for the Secretary of Justice’s written consent to commence a prosecution for NSL offenses, the presumption against bail, specific investigatory powers conferred to the Police National Security Department, the Secretary of Justice’s authority to issue a certificate directing trial procedures, and circumstances where the Office for Safeguarding National Security may directly exercise jurisdiction over a case. [paras. 66-67, CoFA]

The Court expressed uncertainty about how enforcement actions in the civil domain against alleged injunction breaches would align with these NSL requirements and mandated procedures. It highlighted potential conflicts, such as the contradiction with NSL 41, which mandates NSL offenses to be tried on indictment, and the possibility of inconsistency when the Court was asked to determine acts in breach of NSL 20 in its civil jurisdiction, duplicating legal and factual determinations in criminal proceedings. The Court noted another inconsistency concerning prescribed periods for prosecution under specific offenses and the absence of such limitations in contempt proceedings, suggesting a potential override of legislative periods by the proposed injunction. The Court questioned the validity of the Secretary of Justice’s submission that enforcement means could be chosen to protect national security, emphasizing the need to address conflicts if the injunction was enforced with contempt proceedings. [paras. 68-69, CoFA]

The Court noted a potential issue with the Secretary of Justice’s submission on double jeopardy, highlighting the discretionary nature of the Court’s power to stay proceedings compared to the legal rule protecting against double jeopardy. Emphasizing its acceptance of duties under NSL, the Court questioned the utility of deploying the power to grant an interlocutory injunction in preventing or suppressing activities endangering national security. After careful consideration, the Court expressed dissatisfaction with the real utility of the injunction and identified a genuine risk of conflict with the existing criminal law regime regarding enforcement. Given these conclusions, the Court intended to address the remaining main topic more succinctly. [paras. 70-76, CoFA]

The Court acknowledged NSL’s legal duty to safeguard human rights while considering the engagement of the right to freedom of expression under NSL. The Court disagreed with the suggestion that freedom of conscience under Article 32 of the Basic Law was involved, emphasizing that the injunction targeted criminal acts, not conscience. The Court noted, “Freedom of expression is not absolute in nature but is nonetheless a highly important right that cannot be lawfully restricted without the requirements of legal certainty and proportionality being met.”  [para. 77, CoFA]  The Court recognized the freedom of expression’s importance and stressed the need for legal certainty and proportionality, referencing the four-step proportionality test from Hysan Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board, (2015). The Court noted concerns about public understanding of the injunction, given its complexity and inaccurate reports. Regarding the four-step proportionality test, the Court acknowledged a legitimate aim but raised concerns about utility and conflicts with criminal laws. [paras. 78-83, CoFA]  Despite recognizing the fundamental importance of national security, the Court concluded that, with qualifications, the injunction was not necessary and balanced unfavorably against individual rights. Consequently, the Court dismissed the injunction application. [paras. 84-85, CoFA]

The Secretary of Justice filed an Appeal before the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of Appeal against the CoFA’s decision.

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Decision Overview

Chief Justice Jeremy Poon Shiu-chor, Justice Carlye Chu Fun-ling, and Justice Anthea Pang Po-kam of the HKSAR Court of Appeal delivered the decision. This appeal raised three main issues regarding the Court’s approach to injunctions for safeguarding national security. First, it considered the Court’s approach to applications for injunctions in aid of criminal law, specifically the interplay between the Court’s duty under NSL 3 and NSL 8 and its power under section 21L of the High Court Ordinance (HCO). Second, the Court’s role when the executive has made a national security assessment was examined. The issue centered on the weight the Court should give to the executive’s assessment that an injunction is necessary to prevent ongoing acts endangering national security, and whether the Court can form its differing view from that of the executive. Third, the appeal questioned whether there were real and substantial conflicts between contempt proceedings and criminal proceedings that would justify refusing the injunction. [para. 18] 

The Court, in considering an application for an injunction in aid of the criminal law, reflected on its jurisdiction and the principles guiding such injunctions. Section 21L(1) of the HCO affirmed the Court’s authority to grant injunctions in equity, underscoring the basis of its jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that while the jurisdiction is broad, it must be exercised cautiously and following established principles and legal precedents. [para. 19-22] The Court also discussed the cautious approach required when granting injunctions in aid of the criminal law.  The Court referred to cases such as Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers, (1978), and Stoke on Trent City Council v B & Q, (1984), and acknowledged the exceptional nature of this power and the need for caution in its exercise. The Court emphasized that such injunctions must be granted with care, given the potential overlap with criminal penalties and the risk of double jeopardy for offenders. Furthermore, it noted the importance of legislative intent and the effectiveness of criminal proceedings in determining whether such injunctions are warranted. Despite the inherent flexibility of equity, the Court underscored the need for a clear justification for resorting to civil injunctions in aid of criminal law, ensuring they align with the public interest and the objectives of the legislation they seek to support. [paras. 24-27] 

The Court analyzed the injunction sought within the framework of safeguarding national security in the HKSAR, particularly concerning offenses under the NSL and other relevant legislation. It underscored the fundamental purposes of the HKSAR as outlined in the Basic Law, emphasizing the duty to uphold national unity, territorial integrity, and stability. The NSL, enacted to ensure the implementation of the “one country, two systems” policy and to safeguard national security, provides a comprehensive framework for these purposes. The Court highlighted various provisions of the NSL, such as NSL 3(3) and NSL 8, which impose duties on different arms of the government, society, and the judiciary to prevent, suppress, and punish acts endangering national security. In interpreting the NSL’s directives, the Court underscored the judiciary’s role in effectively preventing, suppressing, and punishing acts or activities jeopardizing national security. This duty, as emphasized in Secretary for Justice v Timothy Wynn Owen KC, (2022), necessitated the Court’s full commitment to safeguarding national security whenever such concerns were raised, with due consideration given to the paramount importance of national security considerations, as articulated in Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice, (2022).  Additionally, the Court referenced the case law, including HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney, (2022) and Lai Chee Ying, to contextualize the legislative mandates within the judicial framework. [paras. 33-38]

Furthermore, the Court delineated the criteria for granting injunctions in aid of the criminal law for safeguarding national security. It emphasized the complementary nature of civil injunctions to the criminal regime and stressed that such injunctions should only be granted if they are necessary to assist the criminal law in achieving its purpose of safeguarding national security. The Court rejected a narrow utility-based approach advocated by the Secretary, asserting that necessity, not just utility, should guide the decision to grant an injunction. It argued against setting an excessively high threshold for the necessity of injunctions, advocating for a flexible and context-specific evaluation of circumstances. The Court articulated a necessity test for granting injunctions, evaluating the utility and necessity of injunctions in aiding the criminal law’s public interest purpose of safeguarding national security. This nuanced approach, grounded in equitable principles, aimed to adapt existing legal frameworks to effectively address the unique challenges posed by offenses threatening national security within the HKSAR, as elaborated upon through references to relevant cases such as HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney, (2022) and Secretary for Justice. [paras. 39-42]

The Court also addressed the context-specific nature of necessity, identifying situations where injunctions may be deemed necessary, such as persistent flouting of the law or imminent threats to national security. It emphasized the evolving nature of circumstances and rejected a wholesale displacement of established common law principles, suggesting instead their suitable development to align with the mandates of the NSL. Overall, the Court’s observations emphasized the paramount importance of safeguarding national security and the judiciary’s role in achieving this objective within the framework of the law. [paras. 43-50]

The Court acknowledged the concept of judicial deference to the executive’s assessment of national security, citing established common law principles and relevant case law such as CCSU v Minister for Civil Service,(1984), Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman (2021), and R (Begum) v SIAC, (2021). This deference is rooted in both constitutional and institutional reasons. Constitutionally, the executive is responsible for assessing and addressing national security risks, while the Court’s role is to uphold the rule of law and administer justice independently. Institutionally, the executive possesses the necessary experience, expertise, and access to information to make evaluative judgments on national security matters, unlike the Court, whose expertise lies in interpreting and applying the law. [paras. 51-53]

Regarding the executive’s decision-making process on national security, the Court outlined a two-step approach involving assessment and response. The executive assesses relevant national security considerations and devises measures accordingly, with the nature and extent of risks, available means, and potential dangers all factoring into its decisions. These evaluative judgments, being subjective and policy-based, are considered best left to the executive. The Court referenced Lord Parker of Waddington’s statement in The Zamora, emphasizing that those responsible for national security are the sole judges of what it requires. In the present case, the Chief Executive issued a certificate certifying that certain acts involved national security risks, and subsequently assessed that a civil injunction in aid of the criminal law was necessary to mitigate these risks. The Court also mentioned a similar two-step approach taken by the UK Government in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2004), where measures were devised in response to a public emergency threatening national security. [paras. 55-57]

The Court discussed the appropriate extent of judicial deference to the executive’s decision-making in such matters. It stated that the Court must defer to the executive’s assessment of national security risks, accepting it as binding unless unreasonable, and must also defer to the executive’s judgment on the necessary response to protect national security. However, the Court noted that in certain areas, such as where fundamental rights, fair trial requirements, or issues of open justice are involved, the Court retains the authority to make its own judgments while still giving deference to the executive. This approach ensures that the Court does not overstep its role while upholding its duty to safeguard national security and adhere to the NSL’s mandates. [paras. 58-63]

The Court addressed concerns regarding potential unfairness in contempt proceedings arising from the issuance of an injunction in aid of the criminal law under the NSL. Citing precedents and submissions by Mr. Abraham Chan SC, the amicus curiae, the Court acknowledged the inherent conflict between contempt proceedings and criminal proceedings involving the same facts. However, it disagreed with the conclusion of the Judge regarding the incompatibility of the injunction with the NSL regime. The Court noted that the mere existence of perceived unfairness does not preclude the granting of such injunctions. The Court distinguished the contempt proceedings from criminal proceedings, with the former rooted in the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to enforce its orders and maintain the due administration of justice. Despite arguments suggesting potential conflicts between the injunction and the NSL regime, the Court maintained that contempt proceedings are distinct from criminal prosecution and provide safeguards to ensure a fair trial for alleged contemnors. [paras. 65-69]

The Court emphasized that contempt proceedings should be dealt with swiftly and decisively, with the option to adjourn them pending the outcome of criminal proceedings to avoid prejudice. It was established that punishment for contempt should not result in double jeopardy, and sentences should be commensurate with the severity of the contempt, following principles outlined in Slade v Slade (CA), (2010). Additionally, the Court addressed concerns regarding procedural compatibility between contempt proceedings and the NSL regime, highlighting that seeking compatibility in terms of procedure is impractical as contempt proceedings are governed by different rules and procedures. The focus should instead be on whether contempt proceedings, in substance, work compatibly with the NSL regime for safeguarding national security. [paras. 70-71]

Specific areas of conflict raised by the Judge were addressed, including concerns about double jeopardy, the standard of proof, and risks of inconsistent findings. The Court clarified that previous Court decisions have no relevance in subsequent proceedings, and contempt proceedings should adhere to the criminal standard of proof, as established in Kao Lee & Yip v Donald Koo, (2009)and Secretary for Justice v Cheung Kai Yin, (2016). Furthermore, the absence of time limits in contempt proceedings was justified by the fundamental importance of upholding the rule of law, contrasting with the legislative policy considerations behind time limits in criminal proceedings under the NSL. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Judge’s finding of conflict or inconsistency was not supported, affirming the appropriateness of granting the injunction. [paras. 72-73]

The Court delved into the potential implications of the injunction on the fundamental right to freedom of expression. While acknowledging that the acts targeted by the injunction are not protected under the right to free expression, the Court recognized the possibility of unintended “chilling effects” on expression. Under both the Basic Law and the National Security Law (NSL), the Court has to ensure that the injunction does not unjustifiably interfere with this right. Referring to HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi, (2024) and R (Lord Carlile of Berriew and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2015), the Court outlined the constitutional principles developed to assess measures engaging fundamental rights for national security purposes. Thus, while scrutinizing the injunction’s constitutionality, the Court emphasized clarity, proportionality, and adherence to the scope of criminal law, rather than engaging in a broad hypothetical analysis of all fundamental rights. [paras. 74-75]

The Court disagreed with the Judge’s assessment regarding the utility of the injunction but concurred with his analysis and conclusion regarding proportionality. It was noted that the Secretary’s intention was not to ban the song itself but to target specific acts, as accepted by Mr. Yu. Consequently, the Court recognized the need for exceptions in the injunction to explicitly permit legitimate acts and activities related to the song, ensuring clarity and avoiding unnecessary restriction on freedom of expression. [paras. 76-77]

The Court discussed the contra mundum effect of the injunction, which extends its application to all individuals in Hong Kong, including newcomers who are not parties to the proceedings. Mr. Chan raised concerns about the lack of opportunity for non-parties to be heard before being subject to the injunction and the potential liability for contempt, even without knowing the injunction’s contents. The Court referenced Wolverhampton and Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown, (2020), where the UK Supreme Court clarified the law on newcomer injunctions. The Supreme Court established that newcomer injunctions are a distinct type of injunction with a coercive effect on individuals beyond the named defendants, analogous to other orders binding on the public. [paras. 78-80]

The Court emphasized that newcomer injunctions are neither interim nor final but are essentially ex parte orders, allowing for safeguards for anyone affected to have the injunction varied or discharged. It highlighted that the evaluation of potential injustice in granting such injunctions should consider compliant newcomers, not assuming they would breach the injunction. The Court noted that law-abiding newcomers, once notified of the injunction, are expected to comply and can apply to the Court to vary or set it aside if needed. The Court concluded that with sufficient safeguards, including the right to apply to the Court for variations or clarifications, the contra mundum effect alone is not a reason to deny the injunction. Additionally, the Court agreed with Mr. Yu that the Secretary, as the applicant, should disclose any real points based on available evidence that may affect the Court’s discretion, such as the potential impact on the right to free expression. Overall, the Court found that the authoritative statements of principle adequately addressed concerns about the injunction’s contra mundum effect, ensuring that it does not unjustly impact newcomers or those affected by it. [paras. 81-82]

The Court summarized its approach to the injunction sought in three key points. First, it emphasized the necessity of the civil injunction in aiding the criminal law’s public interest purpose of safeguarding national security. The utility of the injunction, while significant, was not the sole determining factor, and its assistance in preventing specific acts endangering national security was paramount. This approach was informed by legal precedents such as the Director of Public Prosecutions v Tweddell, (2002) and Chu Kong v Sun Min, (2022), which distinguished between contempt proceedings and criminal proceedings. [paras. 83-84]

Secondly, the Court discussed the role of executive assessments in national security matters and its own discretion in granting injunctions as counter-measures. While it deferred to executive assessments or certificates issued by the Chief Executive under NSL 47, it maintained its independent judgment in evaluating the necessity of the injunction. This stance was supported by legal principles outlined in HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi, (2024), and R (Lord Carlile of Berriew and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. (2015), which emphasized the Court’s constitutional duty to safeguard national security. Lastly, the Court underscored the importance of constitutional justification when fundamental rights are engaged by the injunction. It required clarity and certainty in the terms of the injunction, ensuring they were not broader than the criminal law and did not disproportionately encroach upon fundamental rights. Additionally, as a newcomer injunction, clear safeguards were necessary to allow affected individuals to challenge the injunction and make representations. This approach was informed by the principles elucidated in Wolverhampton and Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown, (2020), which established guidelines for newcomer injunctions and emphasized procedural fairness. [para 85-87]

The Court reviewed the District Judge’s refusal to grant the injunction, primarily due to its perceived lack of utility, conflict with criminal law, and concerns over its contra mundum effect. The Court disagreed with the Judge’s reasoning, finding that his exercise of discretion could not be supported. Although they diverged from the Judge’s conclusions, they did not criticize his duty to safeguard national security, acknowledging that he arrived at his decision based on his approach and understanding of the law. [para. 88]

In exercising their discretion afresh, the Court was satisfied that an injunction should be granted. They highlighted the composer’s intention for the Song to be a “weapon,” noting its role in inciting violent protests since 2019. The Song was seen as powerful in arousing emotions and potentially inciting secession and sedition, thereby posing a national security risk. The Chief Executive’s Certificate, which assessed the 4 Acts as endangering national security, was binding on the Court, further reinforcing the need for the injunction. [paras. 89-92] The Court also stressed the immediate need to halt the 4 Acts, as the Song remained prevalent on the internet, contributing to misconceptions about unlawful activities. They accepted the executive’s assessment that prosecutions alone were insufficient and that an injunction was necessary to provide additional deterrence and address public misconceptions. This rationale was supported by Wolverhampton, which discussed the utility of injunctions in similar contexts. [paras. 93-95] Additionally, the Court saw the injunction as necessary to compel Internet Platform Operators (IPOs) to remove problematic content related to the Song. Drawing an analogy to internet blocking orders, the Court noted that injunctions could effectively prevent the facilitation of unlawful acts on the internet. Although the IPOs were not defendants, they had indicated readiness to comply with a Court order, making the injunction a practical solution to the problem. [paras. 96-98]

The Court finally addressed the terms of the injunction, ensuring it was not broader than the criminal law and included necessary exceptions for lawful activities, such as academic and news purposes. They provided provisions for any affected person or newcomer to apply to the Court for variations or clarifications. With these considerations, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Judge’s order, and issued an interim injunction while expressing gratitude to the counsel and amici curiae for their assistance. [paras. 99-106]

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