Defamation / Reputation
Afanasyev v. Zlotnikov
Russian Federation
Closed Expands Expression
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The Supreme Court of Iowa (US) affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Richard Bauer’s defamation claim against Bradley Brinkman, holding that Brinkman’s use of “slumlord” on Facebook constituted protected opinion and rhetorical hyperbole rather than a factual assertion. The dispute arose when Brinkman called Bauer, manager of Bauer Apartments, a “slumlord” on Gabbie Lynch’s social media post because Bauer objected to the construction of a neighbouring dog care facility. The Court reasoned that the context surrounding the use of a term must be considered to determine whether it is protected as rhetorical hyperbole. The Court noted that his tone “was pointed, exaggerated, and heavily laden with emotional rhetoric and moral outrage”, thus alerting readers that the statements were expressions of personal judgment. The Court observed that on Lynch’s social media post there was no discussion regarding Bauer’s management of properties. The Court further noted that Brinkman did not attempt to provide any support for the statement that Bauer was a slumlord; therefore, a reader was alerted it was an insult and a “single, excited reference” rather than a factual assertion that he was an unscrupulous landlord.
Richard Bauer, the plaintiff who manages Bauer Apartments in Sloan, Iowa, brought forth a defamation action against Bradley Brinkman, the defendant and a fellow Sloan resident. [p. 1-3] The dispute arose from a Facebook post by Brinkman in which he referred to Bauer as a “Slum Lord.” This post was part of a broader discussion involving concerns raised by Bauer about the construction of a neighboring dog care facility named Pet Perfect LLC. [p. 2]
Bauer was concerned about the issues that would arise from the dogs and their feces due to the construction of the outdoor area. He contacted the Sloan City Council and asked for the city’s zoning ordinances. Bauer also contacted Kathy Lynch about his concerns and offered to buy the parcel of land where she was building the facility. She refused. He ultimately filed suit against the City of Sloan and the city council members, claiming they failed to enforce a zoning ordinance. [p. 2]
Pet Perfect LLC had its own Facebook page that posted about Bauer’s pending lawsuit and the cameras he had installed on the exterior of the apartments. On July 5, 2017, Kathy’s daughter, Gabbie Lynch, published a post on her personal Facebook page complaining about Bauer and his concerns about the dog feces outside at Pet Perfect LLC. She included a photo of a letter his attorney sent to Kathy in her post. Several people commented on the post, including Brinkman. Brinkman’s Facebook comment stated
“It is because of shit like this that I need to run for mayor! [grinning emoji] Mr. Bauer . . . you sir are a PIECE OF SHIT!!! Let’s not sugar coat things here people. Kathy Lynch runs a respectable business in this town! You sir are nothing more than a Slum Lord! Period. I would love to have you walk across the street to the east of your ooh so precious property and discuss this with me!” [p. 3]
On March 12, 2019, Bauer filed suit against Brinkman, claiming he was liable for defamation due to his use of the term slumlord. He asserted claims for libel per se, libel per quod, and libel by implication. Bauer contended that the statement made by Brinkman was a false assertion of fact, portraying him as an unscrupulous landlord of a slum area. [p. 2-3]
The District Court sided with Brinkman, reasoning that the context of Brinkman’s statement indicated an intent to insult Bauer rather than make factual claims about the quality of Bauer Apartments. Therefore, it concluded that Brinkman’s statement was a “constitutionally protected expression of opinion” and dismissed the claim. The Court of Appeals upheld this decision. Bauer, dissatisfied, applied for further review, which was granted, prompting a closer examination of the case by the higher court. [p. 2]
Chief Justice Christensen of the Supreme Court of Iowa delivered this ruling, in which all other justices joined. Before the court, the main issue for consideration was whether Brinkman was liable for defamation or not. The Court was required to determine whether a reasonable reader could conclude that Brinkman’s Facebook comment implied a factual statement that Bauer is a rental property owner or landlord of a slum area. [p. 6]
The Court observed that the prima facie elements a plaintiff must prove in a defamation action are that “the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.” [p. 4]
The Court observed that “defamation is the publication of false statements of fact which tend to harm an individual’s reputation” and that the “statements that cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about a person are not actionable as defamation”. [p. 4-5] The Court used a four-factor test to determine whether the alleged defamatory statements could reasonably be interpreted as alleging actual facts or was a protected expression of opinion, as enumerated in Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 47. First, the Court considered “whether the alleged defamatory statement ‘has a precise core of meaning for which a consensus of understanding exists or, conversely, whether the statement is indefinite and ambiguous’” quoting Yates v. Iowa W. Racing Ass’n, 721 N.W.2d 762, 770. Second, the Court considered to what degree the statement was “objectively capable of proof or disproof.” Third, the Court examined “the context in which the alleged defamatory statement occurred.” Fourth, the Court contemplated “the broader social context” the alleged defamatory statement fits into. [p. 6]
While reviewing legal precedents on the same point, the Court emphasized that “a statement that is precise and easy to verify is more likely a fact than an opinion,” as established in Jones’ case, 440 N.W.2d. [p. 6] For instance, according to the Court, an accusation that a person committed a crime was an instance of a defamatory statement capable of precise meaning and easy verification. Conversely, statements lacking precision or verifiability, such as describing a greyhound racing dog kennel as “substandard and poor performers,” were deemed opinions in Yates, 721 N.W.2d at 773. The Court had previously held that a defamatory statement that a plaintiff reads at a third-grade level was considered precise and specific, making it verifiable [Jones, 440 N.W.2d at 892].
The Court acknowledged that in certain contexts, such as in Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Del. 1998) (en banc), the term “slumlord” could be assigned a precise meaning. In Ramunno, the Delaware Supreme Court observed that the term slumlord had precise meaning as used in the article because it was supported by fact-specific statements. The article stated that the plaintiff owned seventy properties and reprinted allegations that he had “done well through poorly-maintained surface parking lots and rental homes.” [p. 7]
However, the Court noted that a term could not automatically be categorized as an assertion of fact only because it is capable of precise meaning and verification when read in isolation. The court emphasized that the context surrounding the use of a term must be considered to determine whether it is protected as rhetorical hyperbole. [p. 8]
This principle is in line with legal precedents such as Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1071, 1074 (9th. Cir. 2005), where the court determined that the use of the term “pimp” on a webpage with pictures and captions of athletes was not capable of precise meaning and, therefore, protected. Similarly, in Beverly Enters., Inc. v. Trump, the court found that a statement alleging criminality with the phrase “you people at Beverly are all criminals” was merely an insult and not an assertion of fact. The Court also cited Rasky v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., where the use of the term “slumlord” in a news telecast was determined to be capable of an innocent construction. Applying this reasoning to the present case, the Court held that even though Brinkman additionally called Bauer a “piece of shit” in the Facebook comment, the phrase, while capable of precise meaning and objective verification, was evidently intended as name-calling and an insult, rather than a factual assertion. [p. 8]
The Court also reviewed Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, 398 U.S. at 8, 90 S. Ct. at 1538, in which the use of the term “blackmail” to describe a real estate developer, was not considered defamatory by the US Supreme Court. [p. 8] The Court noted that the term was used during a heated debate, and “even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler’s negotiating position extremely unreasonable.” [p. 9]
Emphasizing the above-mentioned legal precedent, the Court asserted that social context and surrounding circumstances need to be examined while adjudging whether a statement is a fact or an opinion. [p. 9] In the instant case, the Court noted that none of the comments on Gabbie Lynch’s social media post discussed the condition of Bauer’s apartments or his managerial abilities, a point conceded by Bauer himself. The court emphasized that for Brinkman’s use of “slumlord” to be construed as a serious factual assertion, it would have been more reasonable if the discussion specifically focused on Bauer’s occupation and Bauer Apartments. However, the Court observed that the Facebook post and comments primarily reflected emotionally charged reactions to Bauer’s actions in relation to Kathy’s business. The court pointed out the overall tone of the thread, citing a comment that preceded Brinkman’s, which included a photo with a text advising Bauer to mind his own business. Drawing parallels to relevant legal precedents, including Greenbelt and Feld v. Conway, the Court concluded that the context of the ongoing heated discussion supported the notion that Brinkman’s speech was more of name-calling and insult rather than a factual assertion. [p. 10]
The Court observed that the context of Brinkman’s comment shows that his statement was rhetorical hyperbole rather than an assertion of facts. The court noted that his tone “was pointed, exaggerated, and heavily laden with emotional rhetoric and moral outrage”, thus alerting readers that the statements were expressions of personal judgment. The court observed that he stated, “It is because of shit like this that I need to run for mayor!” followed by a grinning emoji, and that Bauer is a “PIECE OF SHIT!!!” before calling him a slumlord. [p. 11] Here, the Court referred to Wahrendorf v. City of Oswego, 899 N.Y.S. 502, 503– 04 (App. Div. 2010) where the court determined that statements made on the internet that the plaintiffs were slumlords and sociopaths and their property was a garbage heap and pigpen was name-calling and general insults because the tone was intended to be humorous and sarcastic. [p. 11]
Furthermore, the Court noted that Brinkman did not attempt to provide any support for the statement that Bauer was a slumlord; therefore, a reader was alerted it was an insult and a “single, excited reference” rather than a factual assertion. Here, the Court referred to Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 926–28, where the Court determined that the tweet calling the plaintiff a “total con job” was rhetorical hyperbole in part because it did not provide any support for the statement. [p. 11]
To conclude, the Court held that Brinkman’s comment on Gabbie Lynch’s social media posts was an opinion, rhetorical hyperbole, and name-calling, not a factual assertion. For these reasons, the present court affirmed the District Court’s motion for summary judgment and the decision of the Court of Appeals. [p. 12]
Decision Direction indicates whether the decision expands or contracts expression based on an analysis of the case.
This case reinforces the importance of protecting freedom of expression, particularly in the context of online platforms like social media. The court’s ruling emphasizes the need to consider the context, tone, and intent behind statements made on social media when determining whether they constitute protected expressions of opinion or factual assertions. By acknowledging that certain statements, even if harsh or offensive, may fall under the realm of rhetorical hyperbole and name-calling rather than verifiable facts, the court upholds the principle that individuals should have the freedom to express their opinions, even if they are strongly worded, without facing unwarranted defamation claims. The decision highlights the balancing act between protecting an individual’s right to freedom of expression and addressing potential harm to reputation. It underscores that not all statements made online should be treated as actionable defamation, especially when they are expressed in a manner that signals opinion, emotional rhetoric, or hyperbole.
However, this case carries implications beyond the immediate matter of defamation, touching upon the broader issue of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP). Notably, Randy Evans of the Iowa Freedom of Information Council underscores that individuals can face significant losses even when victorious in court, illustrating the chilling effect of SLAPP suits. The American Civil Liberties Union of Iowa (ACLU) has submitted an amicus brief in this case, recognizing its potential to influence the trajectory of SLAPPs, a rising trend that poses a threat to civil liberties, particularly the freedom of speech. ACLU noted that the absence of an anti-SLAPP statute in Iowa heightens the importance of the Court’s stance, signalling the need for vigilance against frivolous litigation aimed at stifling public criticism. ACLU asserted that the intent of SLAPP suits is not to win but to silence and harass critics by forcing them to spend time and money to defend these meritless suits. ACLU asserted that SLAPPs often target those expressing dissent on public matters, so the Court’s opinion becomes crucial in safeguarding free speech and mitigating the risks associated with such frivolous legal actions. The ACLU contended that without an anti-SLAPP suit, individuals facing SLAPPs in Iowa are left with no alternative but to endure prolonged legal battles, incurring substantial costs. Therefore, the ACLU emphasised an early dismissal of meritless SLAPP cases, like the instant one.
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