Case Summary and Outcome

The Supreme Court of Nepal considered that the publication and dissemination of videos by an online platform, uncovering alleged acts of corruption within the judiciary, merited prison sentences for contempt against the publisher, editor, and creator of the contested content, as well as fines against the platform itself. Sidhakura.com, an online media platform, broadcast a series of sting operations that claimed to uncover covert collusion between the judiciary and government officials to dispose of corruption cases pending before the Supreme Court of Nepal. The content, which attracted widespread public attention, was circulated through the platform’s own website, as well as YouTube and other media platforms. The Supreme Court took cognisance of the matter, following which the Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court submitted a report to the Court asserting that the content being disseminated was fabricated and intended to interfere with judicial processes. A full bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal initiated contempt proceedings against Sidhakura.com, along with its publisher (Yubraj Kandel) and editor (Nabin Dhungana)—and the content’s primary source, Raj Kumar Timilsina—for disseminating fabricated content. Relying on the investigation report, as well as submissions made by parties to the case, the Court considered that the content lacked authenticity and was distributed with the intent of obstructing the administration of justice. The defendants were held guilty of contempt and sentenced to imprisonment, and a fine was imposed on Sidhakura.com. Moreover, the Court ordered the takedown of the impugned content from all media platforms and issued a directive to the Government of Nepal mandating registration of online platforms, both foreign and domestic, operating within Nepal, to ensure regulatory oversight over content being published online.

This directive was later implemented by a government order, citing this particular case law. The order later led to the imposition of a ban on a number of mainstream social media platforms, only to be revoked later in the aftermath of public protests within Nepal.

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Facts

In January 2024, Sidhakura.com, an online media platform based in Nepal, published and disseminated a series of audio-visual materials purporting to show collusion between the judiciary and government officials to dispose of corruption cases pending before the Supreme Court of Nepal. The series was broadcast under the title “Sting Operation of the Meeting with the Supreme Court Judge Involved in Dismissing Over Four Hundred Corruption Cases” on the website of the online platform. The content was also made available through YouTube and shared across several other social media platforms, attracting widespread public attention. The content was presented as a series of private recordings that claimed to depict Supreme Court of Nepal judges coordinating with government functionaries with the intention of influencing case outcomes in corruption-related cases.

The Supreme Court of Nepal took cognisance of this case and institutionally required the Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court of Nepal to submit a report on the matter. The registrar’s report considered that the content was fabricated, deliberately produced to obstruct judicial processes, and created with the intention of undermining public confidence in the judiciary—thereby constituting contempt. The Office of the Deputy Registrar, in its submissions before the Court, recommended removing the content from all online platforms and pleaded to initiate contempt proceedings against those involved in publishing and disseminating the content. Accordingly, the publisher and editor of Sidhakura.com (Yubraj Kandel and Nabin Dhungana), along with Raj Kumar Timilsina, who was identified as the primary source of the content, were accused of contempt.

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Decision Overview

The judgement was delivered by a full bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal on September 29, 2024. The main issue before the Court was to examine whether the content created and published by the defendants—uncovering alleged acts of corruption within the Supreme Court itself—constituted contempt of court within the meaning of Art. 128(4) of the Constitution of Nepal and Section 17 of the Administration of Justice Act.

Regarding limits to freedom of speech vis-à-vis contempt proceedings

The Deputy Registrar’s Office argued that the impugned audio-visual content was fabricated, and its dissemination led to the erosion of public confidence in the judiciary, thereby amounting to contempt of court. The report emphasized that the spread of false information and unverified allegations about judges directly attacked the independence and reputation of the judiciary. The report also pointed out that Article 128(4) of the Constitution of Nepal and Section 17(1) of the Administration of Justice Act empowers the Supreme Court to punish acts that lower the authority of the court or bring dishonour to it.

The defendants, on the other hand, argued that publishing the content was an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed press freedom, as enshrined in articles 17 (freedom of expression) and 19 (press freedom) of the Constitution of Nepal. Furthermore, it was argued that the published content was an exercise in investigative journalism, without malicious intent, and therefore must not invite criminal consequences, as that would chill speech, especially when exercised to probe public institutions.

While considering the competing claims, the Court examined whether the rights to press freedom and freedom of expression could save the defendants from contempt proceedings. The judgement reasoned that constitutional rights are subject to reasonable restrictions and can not be exercised in a manner that undermines judicial authority. While outlining the scope of contempt, the Court held that unverified and baseless allegations against judicial authorities, if broadcast or published, may not qualify as protected speech and could amount to contempt of court for breaching the court’s dignity.

Relying on its case law in the case of Advocate Toya Nath Dhungana v. Kantipur Publication Pvt. Ltd. (Case No. 74-CF-0009), the Court reiterated that publications that tend to create distrust against courts, confusion or scandal transgress the prescribed constitutional limits for freedom of speech. It held that criticism of judicial work, by itself, does not constitute contempt. To delineate the differences between healthy criticism and contempt, the bench reiterated its precedent in the case of Thir Prasad Pokharel v. Harihar Birahi (CPN, 2049(c)), which held that “A court or a judge is not an institution or a person that is immune to criticism. A judge may sometimes face a lot of unpleasant criticism, but when the criticism affects the regular flow of justice, unfairly criticizes the judge’s impartiality and ability, and degrades the court in the eyes of the general public, then such an act becomes a matter of contempt of court. If the judiciary is brought to a state where it is unable to provide justice impartially by unreasonably belittling it or by getting involved in controversies and trying to create distrust in the public towards the court, not only the judge or the court but also the entire nation will have to suffer the consequences. Therefore, it is necessary to stop the act of contempt of court to protect the rights and interests of the people who receive justice.” [para. 55]

While dealing with the issue of imposing restrictions on freedom of speech and expression, the judgement also referred to international human rights standards to point out that freedom of the press is not absolute. It held that the rights to freedom of speech and expression in the context of Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) can be restricted to protect reputational rights, national security, public order, etc. The Court also highlighted General Comment No. 34, issued by the UN Human Rights Committee, which explicitly recognised parliamentary privilege and contempt of court as reasonable restrictions on free speech. Moreover, reliance was also placed on Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights to emphasize that the right to free expression is not absolute and carries duties & responsibilities.  Having established contemptuous speech as a reasonable restriction on free speech, the Court proceeded to further outline when media reporting may amount to contempt of court. To establish a threshold for it, the Court examined the role played by media trials and their impact on pending cases.

Media trials, threshold for contempt and consideration of comparative jurisprudence

In its judgement, the Supreme Court extensively discussed the role of media trials and how they impact judicial proceedings. Media trials, as defined by the Bench, refer to publications or broadcasts that take a position on the guilt or innocence of the defendants, sensationalise pending proceedings or otherwise influence the adjudication process. It held that the exercise of press freedom to spread false or misleading information may prejudice fair trial rights. Therefore, such a practice is outside the scope of protected speech. The Court consequently concluded that the threshold for contempt is met where speech, exercised in bad faith or recklessly, spreads false information and undermines public trust in the judiciary.

While considering the issue of contempt, the Supreme Court of Nepal situated its analysis within a comparative constitutional framework, drawing on jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, India and Brazil for doctrinal guidance. Relying on US case law (Sheppard v. Maxwell and Irwin v. Dodd), the Court underscored the tendency of media trials to prejudice the outcomes of pending cases by influencing public opinion. Citing Sheppard, the Court emphasized that media trials created a “hostile atmosphere” around a pending case that tends to undermine due process and impartial adjudication. This imposes a positive obligation on courts to intervene to protect processes from prejudicial outside interference. Further, discussing Irwin, the Bench argued that the constitutional guarantee of the right to a fair trial requires adjudication processes based solely on evidence presented in court, rather than opinions shaped by media narratives.

The Court, similarly, drew from the strict liability approach from the UK—as laid out in the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and the country’s case law. The Court discussed the “substantial risk” test, relying on Attorney General v. MGN Ltd. (Supreme Court of the United Kingdom), where even in the absence of intent, liability for contempt may be contemplated if an impugned publication carries “a substantial risk of serious prejudice to… [the] right to a fair trial.” [para 81] The judgement considered that proof of malice is by itself not a determinative factor when a publication itself poses a risk to judicial authority and fair-trial rights. The Court’s discussion of these cases suggested a preference for an effect-based standard to determine contempt—by examining whether a publication or broadcast tends to undermine judicial proceedings or public confidence in the judicial institutions—rather than an intent-based standard.

The Bench also considered the case of Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Ltd. v. SEBI from the Indian Supreme Court to address the scope of judicial power when restraining publications. To the Court, Sahara affirmed the inherent authority of courts to intervene when media conduct threatens the sanctity of judicial proceedings.

Brazilian jurisprudence was consulted, particularly the case of Jean Wyllys v. Carlos Bolsonaro and Eduardo Bolsonaro—wherein the Court not only considered the right to a fair trial of the accused but also the right of a community to know the truth, especially when adjudication concerns balancing competing interests, i.e., freedom of speech and reputation. [para. 88]

Drawing from comparative jurisprudence, the Court sought to emphasize that its approach was consistent with globally recognised benchmarks for free speech adjudication, particularly in contempt cases. Broadly, the Court highlighted two major takeaways. Firstly, it pointed towards the existence of an effect-oriented standard—which focuses on whether speech materially tends to obstruct justice or undermine public confidence in judicial institutions. Furthermore, the Bench held that fair trial rights constitute a compelling constitutional interest which justifies the imposition of restrictions on speech and expression.

Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court analyzed whether the defendants should be found guilty of contempt of court. To it, they “produced and broadcast the disputed material; spread misleading rumors about the court, the judicial process and the entire judicial system; created confusion and distrust; and undermined the dignity of the court—thereby posing a grave threat to public confidence and faith in the judiciary.” [para. 113] Reliance was also placed on inconsistencies in the content, leading the Court to infer fabrication. The Court relied on the investigation report of the Deputy Inspector General—which, on technical examination of the audio files along with mobile phones, voices of the people present in the contents, as well as consideration of other documents, could not confirm the incident to be true—to conclude the content was false.

The Court also considered whether, in lieu of alternate criminal proceedings pending against the defendants for the same act, the contempt action would amount to double jeopardy. In this regard, the Bench concluded that offences under the Electronic Transactions Act are distinct from contempt of court. As per the Court, “If an act is an offence under more than one law, then one or more cases can be filed for such an offence. In such a case, the doctrine of double jeopardy is not a bar. The principle of double jeopardy prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense, but since the offense of contempt of court and the offense of electronic transactions are different, the principle of double jeopardy does not seem to apply here.” [para. 110]

Considering all of the above, the Court held that the publisher and editor of Sidhakura.com (Yubraj Kandel and Nabin Dhungana), along with Raj Kumar Timilsina, who was identified as the primary source of the content, were liable for spreading false information and committing contempt. The Court sentenced the editor and the publisher to three months of imprisonment for actively circulating false content. It reasoned that since the media personnel did not conduct basic due diligence to verify the factual correctness of the content, and considering the scale of mass dissemination of the online content, creating distrust towards the judiciary, both the editor and the publisher were liable for committing contempt under Section 17(4) of the Administration of Justice Act.

Moreover, the Court sentenced Raj Kumar Timilsina to six months of imprisonment. It noted that the greater punishment was grounded on the gravity of the act and failure on the part of Mr Raj Kumar Timilsina to show any remorse or tender an apology before the Court.

Subsequently, the Court held that if Kandel and Dhungana tender an unconditional apology and provide a written declaration not to commit acts of contempt in the future, their sentence would be reduced to seven days.

Sidhakura.com was fined Rs. 5000 for publishing and disseminating false and fabricated content online. The Court held that the fine would be revoked if the media outlet published a correction to the broadcast

Another key point to note is the Court’s opinion about the defendants’ failure to verify the broadcast’s authenticity.  The Court in its analysis considered the journalist’s Code of Conduct 2016. Under Section 4(14) arises an obligation to verify content being disseminated in online media. The Code also carries an obligation not to disseminate material that adversely impacts the fair hearing of a case or unduly influences a case’s outcome (Section 5(11)). While the Code of Conduct is a binding professional obligation, its breach did not carry any expressed criminal sanctions. However, in considering criminal sanctions for contempt against the defendants, the Court considered this breach of professional obligations as an aggravating factor. [para. 65, 114] The due diligence failure was an explicit consideration in the Court’s reasoning for holding the defendants guilty of contempt as under Section 17(1) and Section 17(4) of the Administration of Justice Act.

Directive to ensure mandatory registration of digital platforms

A significant development in this case was the Supreme Court of Nepal’s expansion of its contempt analysis to consider the broader impact of emerging technologies in disseminating information. The Bench expressed concern about the use of online platforms to circulate fabricated information and falsehoods. To the Court, “[i]t is a matter of basic responsibility and duty of the media to ensure that the news published by the media are true and that the truth of the news should be verified before publication.” [para. 98]

To deal with the spread of false information in the digital space, the Court adopted definitions for the concepts of misinformation, disinformation and malinformation. Misinformation involves the unintentional dissemination of false information. Disinformation, for its part, involves the dissemination of false or fabricated information with the malicious intent of harming the dignity, honour or reputation of someone or misleading people. Malinformation involves distorting or exaggerating an issue in a way that misleads or misinforms the reader or damages someone’s reputation. [para. 89] Linking its contempt findings to the larger issue of risks posed by such malpractices, the Court ordered that online media platforms should be registered before a competent authority, and regulatory mechanisms must be put in place to evaluate and monitor undesirable content. This Court’s order was later implemented by the Government of Nepal, through a government order referencing this case, which became a trigger point for widespread public protests in 2025—now known more famously as the Gen Z protests in mainstream media. The government order required mandatory registration of online media platforms and later banned mainstream platforms, including Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp. The social media ban led to the eruption of protests, ultimately leading to the resignation of key government officials and later withdrawal of the government order itself.

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