Case Summary and Outcome

A United States District Court allowed key claims to proceed in a lawsuit brought by associations representing academic professionals challenging a federal policy allegedly designed to identify, punish, and deport non-citizen students and academics for expressing pro-Palestinian or “anti-Israel” views. The plaintiffs argued that following campus protests related to the war in Gaza, senior federal officials launched an enforcement regime that identified speech critical of Israel and subjected flagged individuals to arrest, visa revocation, and deportation. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that immigration law barred judicial review, holding that the plaintiffs were not challenging individual deportation orders but a broader, ideologically motivated policy, and found that both associational and organizational standing were satisfied based on the objectively reasonable chilling effect on non-citizen members and demonstrable harm to the organizations’ scholarly mission. The Court held that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged a content- and viewpoint-based campaign of censorship in violation of the First Amendment and a reviewable final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, given the concrete legal consequences flowing from the alleged policy.

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Facts

On January 20, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 14161, directing the Secretary of State to “vet and screen” all non-citizens “to the maximum degree possible” to ensure they do not “espouse hateful ideology” or “advocate for . . . foreign terrorists.” Shortly thereafter, Executive Order 14188 proclaimed a nationwide campaign “to combat anti-Semitism vigorously,” including recommendations that institutions of higher education monitor and report on non-citizen students and staff whose speech or associations might render them inadmissible or removable under terrorism-related or foreign-policy grounds.

The executive orders appeared to be in response to university campus protests following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks on Israel and Israel’s military operations in Gaza, including a high-profile encampment at Columbia University in April 2024. During his 2024 presidential campaign, President Trump characterized those protests as “pro-Hamas,” “antisemitic,” and “anti-American,” and publicly promised to “throw out of the country” any non-citizen students or faculty who participated.

To implement the executive orders at issue, the Department of State and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement allegedly initiated a social-media surveillance program known as “Catch and Revoke,” which employed artificial intelligence to identify non-citizen students and faculty who have engaged in speech supportive of Palestinian rights or critical of Israeli military conduct. As part of this program, universities were reportedly provided with lists of individuals flagged for enforcement action.

One of the first individuals affected was Mahmoud Khalil, a lawful permanent resident and recent Columbia University graduate, who was arrested at his student housing, had his permanent residence card (green card) revoked, and was issued a notice of deportation under a provision tied to foreign policy. Around the same time, federal authorities revoked the visas or immigration status of at least four other non-citizen academics. These included Yunseo Chung, a Columbia student and lawful permanent resident, whose residence status was revoked after she participated in a pro-Palestinian campus protest; Badar Khan Suri, a Georgetown University postdoctoral fellow, whose student visa was revoked based on social media posts alleged to spread “Hamas propaganda” and attenuated connections to a Hamas-affiliated advisor; Cornell University doctoral candidate Momodou Taal, whose student visa was revoked after he refused to surrender to custody following deportation proceedings resulting from his involvement in pro-Palestine demonstrations; and Tufts University doctoral student Rümeysa Öztürk, who was detained and had her visa revoked following the publication of an op-ed critical of Israel. Additionally, Columbia student and lawful permanent resident Mohsen Mahdawi, who helped organize pro-Palestinian campus demonstrations, was detained by the Department of Homeland Security, which now seeks his deportation.

On March 25, 2025, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and three of its local affiliates (the AAUP-Harvard Faculty Chapter, the AAUP at New York University, the Rutgers AAUP-American Federation of Teachers) and the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) filed an action challenging what they describe as an “ideological-deportation policy” announced and carried out by various federal officials. AAUP is a nationwide nonprofit membership association and labor union of faculty, graduate students, and other academic professionals, whose mission includes advancing academic freedom and shared governance. Its Harvard, NYU, and Rutgers chapters represent faculty at those institutions. MESA is a nonprofit scholarly association dedicated to the study of the Middle East, whose members includes faculty and students whose expertise and research depend on free exchange of ideas across national borders.

In addition to the individuals mentioned above, the complaint referenced a number of anonymous individuals affiliated with the plaintiff organizations who had also been affected by the alleged policy. These include five unnamed AAUP members and two unnamed MESA members, all of whom are lawful permanent resident professors or lecturers, as well as one anonymous student closely associated with an AAUP chapter. While not publicly identified, these individuals are said to have responded to the policy by taking down social media posts and previously published writings, ceasing to assign or teach material related to Palestine and Israel, withdrawing from conference participation, avoiding international travel, and removing professional information from university websites. Several also declined to speak at rallies, protests, or public forums, and chose not to participate in events such as panel discussions or film screenings.

The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Todd Lyons, the Departments of State and Homeland Security, President Trump in his official capacity, and the United States of America (with President Trump and the United States subsequently dismissed as parties to certain claims). The organisations sought declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the policy under which non-citizen students and faculty were targeted for arrest, detention, visa revocation, and removal solely on account of their pro-Palestinian or critical-of-Israel speech and association.

At a hearing on April 23, 2025, the Court, with the parties’ consent, converted the preliminary injunction motion into a full trial on the merits (that is, a complete examination of the facts and legal claims), treated the Government’s opposition as a challenge to the Court’s authority and the adequacy of the complaint, and regarded the organizations’ reply as their response to that challenge.

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Decision Overview

Judge William G. Young of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts delivered the memorandum and order for the Court. The main issues before the Court were whether the so-called “ideological-deportation policy” – under which senior federal officials arrest, detain, revoke visas, and initiate deportation proceedings against non-citizen students and faculty solely on account of their pro-Palestinian or “anti-Israel” political expression – could be challenged in federal court under the First and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and whether those claims were barred by the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) jurisdiction-stripping provisions.

The organizations argued that the federal court had jurisdiction to hear their case despite the government’s invocation of two immigration-specific jurisdictional bars. Section 1252(f) of the INA generally limits the authority of lower courts to issue injunctions that would interfere with how federal deportation laws operate, and the organizations argued that this was not applicable because they were challenging a broad, overarching policy, not specific provisions of the immigration statutes. They added that they were seeking a stay under the APA (a federal statute that allows courts to review and set aside unlawful or arbitrary agency actions) which is a form of non-injunctive relief outside section 1252(f)’s scope. Section 1252(g) of the INA narrowly prohibits court review of certain removal-related decisions made in individual cases (such as whether to initiate or execute a deportation) and the organizations submitted that their lawsuit is brought “neither by nor on behalf of an alien, nor … in relation to a deportation proceeding” but rather to challenge an “unconstitutional, overarching policy” affecting academic and political expression, placing them outside the reach of that jurisdictional bar.  [p. 27]

On their standing to bring the case to court, the organizations asserted associational and organizational standing. Associational standing allows an organization to sue on behalf of its members when those members would have standing to sue individually, the lawsuit relates to the group’s core purpose, and no individual participation is needed. The organizations argued that their noncitizen members faced a pervasive chilling effect on core academic freedoms, such as deleting past writings, declining leadership roles, altering syllabi, and even fleeing their home cities, stemming from the challenged policy and the Government’s “threats” to deport based on protected expression. They also argued that their citizen members suffered related harms to their ability to engage with and learn from noncitizen colleagues. Organizational standing allows an organization to sue in its own right when it has suffered direct injury, such as a diversion of resources caused by the challenged policy. The organizations submitted that their chapters had seen “significantly lower-than-usual registration numbers” at major events, that noncitizen scholars have withdrawn from leadership roles, and that the associations have been forced to divert significant staff time to immigration counseling and legal referrals. [p. 51]

The organizations argued that the ideological-deportation policy itself, specifically targeting pro-Palestinian or “anti-Israel speech,” was an unconstitutional content- and viewpoint-based restriction on political speech and so violated the First Amendment. They added that the accompanying campaign to punish such speech constituted unlawful censorship under the Supreme Court’s prohibition on government-induced chilling of expression. The organizations also argued that executive directives and unwritten guidelines “may be challenged on vagueness grounds” under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution when they deter protected speech, and that the policy’s blur of “pro-Hamas” labels over peaceful human-rights advocacy cannot provide the fair warning required by due process. [p. 62] In challenging the policy under the APA, the organizations invoked the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review,” arguing that “final agency action” – meaning an agency decision that marks the end of its decision-making process and has legal consequences – “need not be in writing,” and emphasized there is “no other adequate remedy” for the systemic chill on noncitizens’ and organizations’ expression because individual removal proceedings cannot address the collective harm to academic discourse and governance. [p. 64]

The Government argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief the organizations sought under the INA because of section 1252(f)’s prohibition of interference with how federal authorities carry out deportation laws and as section 1252(g) removes the Court’s authority to hear cases tied to how immigration officials initiate or carry out deportations. The Government submitted that the organizations’ challenge, even if framed as a broad policy objection, ultimately stems from those individual enforcement decisions. On standing, the Government argued that neither the organizations nor their members had suffered a sufficiently concrete or specific injury that could be clearly linked to the Government’s actions or remedied by the Court. It maintained that no non-citizen member had been directly targeted – no visas or green cards had been revoked – so any claimed chilling effect on speech was speculative and warned that permitting associational standing under such circumstances could allow any academic group to challenge ordinary immigration enforcement based on generalized fears. On organizational standing, the Government argued that the alleged harms, such as lower attendance at events and diverted staff time, were indirect consequences of individual visa holders’ decisions, not injuries directly caused by the challenged policy.

The Government advanced three substantive arguments on the merits. In response to the First Amendment claim, it argued that the organizations had mischaracterized a series of independent enforcement actions and official statements as a unified policy, and that these actions fell within the scope of the Government’s discretion to speak and enforce immigration law. It submitted that the executive orders “address unlawful conduct” – specifically support for terrorism or foreign policy threats – and therefore did not amount to content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on protected expression. [p. 54] On the Fifth Amendment vagueness claim, the Government argued that the vagueness doctrine had never been extended outside the statutory or written-regulation context. Under the APA, it submitted that there was no “final agency action” because the alleged policy had not “determined rights and obligations” or “triggered legal consequences,” and that, in any event, the INA itself precluded APA review of enforcement decisions affecting non-citizens. [p. 63]

The Court confirmed its power to hear the organization’s challenge by rejecting the Government’s jurisdiction-stripping arguments and finding both associational and organizational standing. It emphasized that section 1252(f)(1) of the INA restricts only a narrow category of injunctions, not subject-matter jurisdiction outright and that in Supreme Court in Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez the Supreme Court had held that the provision “deprived” the district court “of jurisdiction to entertain… requests for class-wide injunctive relief” against some provisions of the INA but did not eliminate district courts’ power to issue declaratory relief or adjudicate APA claims. [p. 23] The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm (AADC) and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in NWDC Resistance v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, and found that as the organizations did not seek review of specific removal orders but rather the policy that underlies those decisions, section 1252(g) did not remove the Court’s jurisdiction.

The Court also confirmed that the organizations met both associational and organizational standing requirements. It found that the AAUP and MESA plausibly alleged that non-citizen members faced an “objectively reasonable” chill on their First Amendment rights due to a credible threat of visa revocation or deportation for pro-Palestinian expression, evidenced by actions such as deleting writings, altering syllabi, and avoiding public engagement. These allegations were sufficient for the Court to establish member standing, and thus associational standing, particularly because the relief sought could redress the alleged injuries by targeting government conduct rather than third parties. It also found that MESA sufficiently alleged a demonstrable injury to its activities, including diminished participation in events and disruption to its scholarly mission, along with a diversion of resources and held that MESA’s claims went beyond that threshold. The Court did not decide AAUP’s organizational standing, as one plaintiff’s standing was enough to sustain the case.

In assessing the claims made under the First Amendment, the Court reaffirmed that “noncitizens have at least some First Amendment rights” and that political speech lies “at the core” of those protections. [p. 55] Applying Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan and AADC to underscore that government‐induced threats to private speech can violate the First Amendment, it concluded that the pleaded facts – an unwritten policy to deport non-citizens for pro-Palestinian or critical-Israel expression and a campaign of “thinly veiled threats” – plausibly state both content- and viewpoint-based restrictions and unlawful informal censorship. Adding that “speech code that is unwritten or vague but enforced with harsh penalties would seem more likely to chill broad swaths of speech than one that clearly defines what is forbidden,” the Court held that at this stage it must credit the inference that such a policy exists, and chills protected speech, and therefore declined to dismiss the First Amendment claims at this stage. [p. 60]

The Court rejected the organizations’ Fifth Amendment vagueness claim, holding that the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies only to statutes or, at most, written regulations and not to unwritten executive policies. It emphasized that fairness concerns addressed by the doctrine do not justify a broad constitutional challenge to undefined or informal practices. As the organizations challenged an alleged unwritten policy, the Court found no legal basis for the claim and dismissed this claim.

On the APA claim, the Court reaffirmed the strong presumption in favor of judicial review and rejected the Government’s argument that final agency action must be in writing. Relying on precedents like R.I.L-R. v. Johnson and Amadei v. Nielsen, the Court held that consistent executive statements and practices such as targeting pro-Palestinian advocacy for immigration penalties can constitute final agency action if they determine rights or trigger legal consequences. It held that the organizations had plausibly alleged such action in the present case. Addressing the requirement that no other adequate remedy be available, the Court found that individual removal proceedings could not meaningfully redress the broader harm to academic freedom and organizational missions caused by the alleged policy, stating that “[the Plaintiffs’] harms are not otherwise redressable than through the APA.” [p. 66] Accordingly, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the APA claim.

In conclusion, the Court cleared the way for judicial review of the so-called “ideological-deportation policy” by rejecting the Government’s jurisdictional defenses under sections 1252(f) and 1252(g) of the INA and finding that the organizations had standing to sue. It held that the organizations plausibly alleged a credible and objectively reasonable chill on their noncitizen members’ political expression, supporting associational standing, and that MESA in particular had also suffered concrete harm to its activities, justifying organizational standing. On the substantive claims, the Court allowed the case to proceed on the First Amendment issues, finding sufficient allegations that the Government’s actions amounted to content- and viewpoint-based discrimination and a campaign of coercive threats that chilled protected speech. The Court dismissed the vagueness challenge under the Fifth Amendment, holding that due process protections do not extend to unwritten policies. It permitted the APA claim to move forward, concluding that organizations had plausibly alleged final agency action and that no other adequate remedy was available to address the broader systemic impact on academic expression. The case will continue on the First Amendment and APA grounds, while the vagueness claim has been dismissed.

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