Case Summary and Outcome

The Supreme Court of the Philippines issued a Writ of Amparo – an interim remedy to protect life and security – in favor of an activist and politician on the grounds that there was a substantial chance his life was in danger. The activist submitted that he had been “red-tagged” – a practice where the army alleges that individuals were involved in serious crimes which then leads to risks to that individual. The Trial Court rejected the application for the writ on the grounds that his allegations were baseless. The Supreme Court disagreed and found that there was sufficient evidence to find a prima facie threat to life and security and remanded the case back to the lower court.

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Facts

On October 22, 2020, Siegfred Deduro, an activist from Iloilo, the Philippines and a former party-list representative, filed a petition for Writ of Amparo. He contended that military officers under the command of Major General Eric C. Vinoya, commanding officer of the Third Infantry Division (3rd ID) of the Philippine Army, had red-tagged him and accused him of being a ranking member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). The Writ of Amparo was an application for interim relief before the Regional Trial Court.

“Red-tagging” or “Red-baiting” is the phenomenon of implicating civil group leaders in heinous crimes. In the Philippines, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Task Force to End Local Terrorist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) label or identify human rights lawyers, judges, civil organization leaders, union & student leaders, journalists, political leaders, publishers and activists as “terrorists” or “communists.” Once these human rights defenders are red-tagged as “terrorists”, they are denounced as potential targets and many are killed or injured by unknown actors followed by restrictions on disinformation concerning the victims and the circumstances surrounding their deaths. (for a detailed analysis of Red-Tagging and freedom of expression, see our analysis here)

In the petition, Deduro referred to several instances to support his claim: on June 19, 2020, during a meeting of the Iloilo Provincial Peace and Order Council (‘PPOC’), military officers from the 3rd ID gave a presentation identifying Deduro as part of the CPP-NPA hierarchy in Panay and this information was subsequently publicized by local media outlets; in December 2017 and March 2019, posters appeared in Iloilo City featuring his photographs alongside other activists, lawyers, and NGO members, labeling them as criminals, terrorists, and members of the CPP-NPA-NDF, and similar posters were put up again in August 2020; on January 23, 2019, Dedur claimed he and his companions were followed by unidentified men after a meeting with human rights activists; in August 2019, during a symposium at the University of St. La Salle in Bacolod City, military officers reportedly labeled various organizations, including the petitioners, as supporters of the CPP-NPA-NDF.

Dedur noted the violent deaths of two individuals whose photos had appeared alongside his in the posters – Jose Reynaldo C. Porquia and Zara R. Alvarez – and that both were shot and killed by unidentified gunmen in separate incidents in 2020. He also noted the deaths of two other individuals, Atty. Benjamin Ramos and Hon. Bernardino Patigas, whose photos had appeared in similar tarpaulins in Negros Occidental. The term “tarpaulins” here refers to large banners or posters displayed in public spaces.

In his petition, Dedur sought the issuance of a Writ of Amparo, the production of all records about him held by Major General Vinoya, and an injunction against further red-tagging and harassment. He also requested that the court direct Major General Vinoya to destroy any information or records about him that had been collected or kept by the military.

On October 26, 2020, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Deduro’s petition for a Writ of Amparo. It found Deduro’s allegations of red-tagging to be baseless, unsupported by evidence, and insufficient for granting the extraordinary Writ. The Court emphasized that the Writ of Amparo is a remedy for violations or threats to a person’s right to life, liberty, and security, specifically addressing extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and that to be entitled to the Writ, an applicant must establish that their rights are being threatened by the respondent’s acts. The Court found Deduro’s contention that being red-tagged or labeled as part of the CPP-NPA hierarchy constituted a threat to his right to life, liberty, and security to be “totally untenable.” It referred to Tapuz v. Del Rosario, (2008) and highlighted that the Writ of Amparo requires justifying allegations of fact and is not issued on amorphous or uncertain grounds. The Court found that the alleged red-tagging by military officials and the incident of being followed by unidentified men were insufficient to constitute threats to Deduro’s rights as defined by law, and noted that other contentions made by Deduro, such as his photograph appearing on posters, the death of a Bayan Muna coordinator, and being red-tagged on social media, were “purely baseless and not supported by evidence.” The Court concluded that Deduro’s allegations lacked the substantial evidence required for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and denied the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and dismissed Deduro’s petition.

Deduro filed an Appeal via petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court of Philippines, seeking to reverse and set aside the Trial Court order.

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Decision Overview

Justice Rodhil Zalameda wrote the majority opinion along with Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, Associate Justice Alfredo Caguioa, Ramon Hernando, Amy Lazaro-Javier, Henri Inting, Mario Lopez, Samuel Gaerlan, Richard Rosario, Jhosep Lopez, Japar Dimaampao, Jose Marquez, Antonio Kho Jr and Maria Singh. Associate Justice Marvic Leonen (Acting Chief Justice) wrote a separate concurring opinion. The primary issues before the Court were whether Deduro was entitled to the relief he sought in his petition for a Writ of Amparo, and whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing the petition outright without requiring Major General Vinoya to file a return or conducting a hearing.

Deduro argued that he was entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Amparo based on the initial evidence attached to his petition before the Trial Court. He submitted that this evidence established a prima facie case sufficient to support the issuance of the Writ and detailed the nature of the threat to his life, liberty, and security, which he claimed was directly connected to the red tagging carried out by the 3rd Infantry Division and others. He submitted that similar to habeas corpus proceedings, the allegations in his petition should have been sufficient to grant the protective Writ of Amparo even before conducting an actual hearing. Deduro maintained that the Trial Court should have ordered Major General Vinoya to comment on his petition instead of dismissing it outright. He submitted that if the Trial Court doubted the veracity of his allegations and the credibility of his evidence, it could have conducted a summary hearing according to law (Section 6 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC). Deduro emphasized that red-tagging poses a serious threat to the lives, freedoms, and rights of activists and should not be summarily ignored by the courts and submitted that the public labeling of activists as supposed members of the CPP-NPA-NDF often precedes attacks against them, such as extrajudicial killings and other human rights violations. Deduro argued that Major General Vinoya’s evasiveness and dismissive attitude highlighted the error in the Trial Court’s dismissal order and undermined the effectiveness of the Writ of Amparo.

Major General Vinoya, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the trial Court committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition and denying the issuance of the Writ of Amparo for lack of merit. He submitted that the petition failed to establish by substantial evidence that he, or any agents or subordinates under his command, threatened Deduro’s right to life, liberty, and security and that there were no specific allegations that he or his subordinates participated in, authorized, or sanctioned the perceived threats to Deduro’s rights. Major General Vinoya questioned the veracity of the evidence presented by Deduro and argued that the slides presented during the June 19, 2020 event with a red-tagging list did not indicate that they were official and genuine documents produced by him or any of his military personnel. Major General Vinoya submitted that the posters mentioned by Deduro were not sponsored by the military but by other organizations and that there was no evidence presented to prove the purported surveillance on January 23, 2019, noting that the blotter report was made by one of  Deduro’s companions. Major General Vinoya maintained that Deduro failed to show a concrete link between the military and the alleged red-tagging of NGOs during the August 24, 2019 symposium and that the supposed red-tagging on Facebook was allegedly done by a third party and not by the military.

The Court characterized the Writ of Amparo as a rapid judicial relief to address cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, requiring only substantial evidence to make appropriate reliefs available to a petitioner. It highlighted the purpose and scope of the Writ of Amparo, as well as the procedural considerations involved in its issuance and traced its origins to the 1987 Constitution and its eventual promulgation in 2007 under the leadership of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, and emphasized that the crucial distinction in the Amparo process is the issuance of the Writ versus the granting of its privilege. The Court stressed that the initial issuance of the Writ, governed by Section 6 of the Rule, requires only that the petition shows on its face that the Writ ought to be issued whereas, in contrast, the granting of the privilege, governed by Section 18, comes after the issuance of the Writ, filing of the return, and conduct of a summary hearing. This distinction was highlighted in the case of De Lima v. Gatdula, (2013), where the Supreme Court had clarified that the privilege includes the entire procedure outlined in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Regarding the coverage of the Writ of Amparo, the Court emphasized its limited application to extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of such action. It referred to the deliberations of the Committee that formulated the Rule, showing the intent to focus on these specific human rights violations rather than encompassing all constitutional rights. The Court then traced the evolution of the legal definition of enforced or involuntary disappearance, referencing Republic Act No. 9851 and Republic Act No. 10353, and outlined the elements of this offense based on these laws and the case of Navia v. Pardico, (2012).

The Court examined the concept of “threats” under the Rule, and referred to the seminal case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, (2008). The Court explained that in the context of the Amparo Rule, the right to security is actually the “freedom from threat,” and referred to several international cases to support this interpretation, including Delgado Paez v. Colombia, (1990), where the United Nations Human Rights Committee held that the right to security can exist independently of the right to liberty and European Court of Human Rights cases, particularly Kurt v. Turkey, (1988), which established that states have a positive duty to protect individuals from known threats to their life or personal security.

The Court analyzed the concept of “red-tagging” and its implications within the context of the Writ of Amparo. It acknowledged that red-tagging has been recognized by international organizations, including the United Nations Human Rights Council, as a form of harassment and intimidation and noted that the practice of labeling certain groups or individuals as communists or terrorists often preceded surveillance, harassment, and in some cases, even killings. It also referred to the United Nations Human Rights Council’s 2007 observation of the practice in the Philippines, where groups on the left of the political spectrum were characterized as front organizations for anti-democratic groups. The Court noted that this practice – also referred to as “vilification” or “labeling” – had evolved to include online platforms like Facebook. It referenced a 2020 report by the OHCHR, which highlighted that red-tagging often came with surveillance, direct harassment, and even death threats.

The Court referred to the case of Zarate v. Aquino, (2015), where Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen described “red-baiting”  as a form of McCarthyism that made the lives and liberties of targeted individuals vulnerable and had emphasized that the Writ of Amparo was designed as a remedy for situations that, while legally ambiguous, created vulnerabilities that could lead to a person’s harassment, disappearance, or death. The Court cited its own recent actions in response to red-tagging incidents, such as its statement issued on March 23, 2021, regarding the public labeling of Judge Monique Quisumbing-Ignacio, and recognized such incidents as threats to judges and lawyers that warranted investigation and public response. 

The Court evaluated the Trial Court Order using the standards established by the Rule and its framers. It noted that the Trial Court cited Section 1 and Section 5 of the Rule to define the petition for a Writ of Amparo and listed the necessary allegations and had found Deduro’s claims insufficient to constitute threats to life, liberty, and security, drawing its conclusion from alleged red-tagging and surveillance, and the fact that the report came from his companion. Consequently, the Trial Court did not require the respondent to file a return.

The Court affirmed the Trial Court’s classification of Deduro’s allegations as “threats to life, liberty, and security,” acknowledging that he was not a current subject of extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance but felt threatened due to various circumstances. It noted that Deduro perceived his life, liberty, and security to be under threat due to a combination of circumstances, including red-tagging and surveillance.

The Court found that the petition and its allegations merited the issuance of a Writ – contrary to the Trial Court’s finding. The Court cited the Manalo case, which established that the right to security of a person can exist independently of the right to liberty which meant that even without actual deprivation of liberty, Deduro could invoke his right to security. The Court emphasized that the quantum of evidence required for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo is merely prima facie and found that the Petition contained sufficient allegations upon which the Trial Court could grant the issuance of the Writ. The Court noted that the alleged meeting on June 19, 2020, where Deduro and other activists were identified by military officers when viewed in conjunction with the killing of some of these identified persons, could justify the issuance of the extraordinary Writ if proven true. 

The Court distinguished the present case from Ladaga v. Mapagu, (2012), where it had previously affirmed the denial of a Writ of Amparo. In Ladaga, the Court had held that mere inclusion in a military’s order of battle was not sufficient to constitute an actual threat. In the present case, the Court considered the totality of Deduro’s circumstances, including the public display of posters linking him to communist groups and drew parallels between his situation and the case of Judge Quisumbing-Ignacio, where a tarpaulin linking the judge to the Communist Party of the Philippines was considered a threat. The Court declared that it viewed the lives of civilians as equally precious as those of lawyers and judges, and thus considered similar tarpaulins targeting civilians as threats.

The Court found that the Trial Court erred in dismissing the case without requiring Major General Vinoya to file a return. It emphasized that the covert nature of red-tagging/red-baiting necessitated careful consideration of petitions, and when there was a substantial likelihood that labeling someone as subversive might result in abduction or killing, the nature and purpose of the Writ justified its preliminary issuance. 

The Court ordered Deduro to include additional respondents, namely the private organizations (Alliance of Victims of the CPP-NPA-NDF and Western Visayas Alliance of Victims of the CPP-NPA-NDF) which were allegedly responsible for circulating the red-tagging tarpaulins and posters. 

Accordingly, the Court reversed the Trial Court’s order of dismissal of the case and directed a summary hearing to fully address Deduro’s claims and Major General Vinoya’s defense, emphasizing that it was not ruling on the merits of the Writ of Amparo. The Court held that the Trial Court must evaluate the evidence and circumstances to ensure protection under the Writ. Thus, a Writ of Amparo was issued in favor of Deduro. 

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