Case Summary and Outcome

The Hungarian Constitutional Court confirmed lower courts’ rulings that a political thriller film, based on real events, was sufficiently fictional that the depiction of a person in that film could not constitute an infringement of that person’s reputation. After the film was released and an accompanying communication was published by the film production company, a public official filed a complaint that the film’s depiction of a character closely resembling him was an infringement of his reputation. The lower court found that there had been an infringement and awarded damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeal emphasized that a reasonable viewer of a film would understand that it does not attempt to portray the true facts and so that the depiction of individuals would not be perceived as being factually accurate and set aside the lower court’s decision in its entirety. The matter had then gone on review to the Curia which found that the film depicted events closely connected to a political‑historical background familiar to a broad segment of Hungarian society – events in which the individual concerned, as part of matters of wider public concern, had played a more active role than others – and that, in respect of his public activities, his personality rights may be restricted without infringing human dignity. The Constitutional Court accepted the lower courts’ reasoning and found the constitutional complaint brought by the public official to be unfounded and dismissed it.

Facts

In October 2021, a well-known Hungarian film producer released a film, Elkúrtuk (“We F*cked Up”), based on real events involving the circumstances and political background of the Budapest riots (mass protests and police excesses) in autumn 2006. On October 20, the production company published a press release, titled “Ministers, criminals and advisers – but which opposition politician is still active today?”, on its website, which listed the important characters – political, public or otherwise – who appeared in the film.

The head of a public opinion research company was one of the real-life characters in the film, and he was identified by name – Endre (the research company head’s first name) – and image in the press release. The research company head believed that the film producer had misrepresented him because in the communication he was described as one of the characters in the movie who had played a significant role in the political decisions of the then-coalition government in the autumn of 2006 in relation to the riots and was personally present at the time of some important political decisions. The communication said that, as an opinion pollster and head of a well-known opinion and market research institute, he had manipulated polls to show that the support for the then-ruling coalition government was higher than it actually was, and that the support for the largest opposition party, Fidesz, was lower than it actually was. It also said that he was an important participant in the political decisions of the government and the parties of the then-ruling government coalition, and was personally present when decisions were made, and so was in constant contact with the minister without portfolio in charge of civilian intelligence services. The communication claimed that the research company head was involved in the leaking of the Balatonőszöd speech of then-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, which caused a political storm and ultimately led to the protests, and that he himself prepared the communications of the political response to the leaking. The production company’s communication added that the research company head had participated in taking the decision to use unlawful police violence on October 23, 2006.

The research company head submitted that the production company, by misrepresenting true facts, had violated Section 2:45 (2) of Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code. The section concerns “[a] violation of reputation means, in particular, if a person states or spreads untrue facts concerning another person and insulting that person, or misrepresents a true fact.”

The Metropolitan Court of Budapest, as the court of first instance, found that the film production company’s communication – going beyond the level of artistic representation – was not a criticism of the research company head’s public opinion research activities. It found that his role in 2006 was not conveyed to the press and the wider public as a fictional, possible (fictitious) storyline, but instead that the film was based on real events, and that the character in the film was the research company head. The Court found that the research company head was not linked to this character in the movie on any factual basis; there is no evidence that he had any contact with politicians, that he was involved in the decision-making process at the time, that he provided polling data during that period, or that he carried out polling activities used as a basis for political decisions. The Court held that the research company head was not obliged to tolerate this depiction and there was no public interest in the production company conveying a factually unfounded connection between the research company head and the character in the film to the public. Accordingly, the Court held that the company infringed the research company head’s right to reputation, and ordered the company to refrain from further infringement and to pay aggravated damages (compensation for injury to feelings) in the amount of HUF 1 500 000 (approx. US$4500 in 2025).

Both the production company and the research company head appealed against the judgment of the court of first instance.

The Court of Appeal altered the judgment of the court of first instance and dismissed the action in its entirety (the “final judgment”). It found that the film is a feature film, that it does not present actual reality to the average informed viewer, and that the fictional story conceptually precludes the possibility of evaluating the factual statement against the actual reality. It held that the film cannot be considered a set of facts, and therefore the real facts could not be misrepresented. The acts in the film do not depict the research company head’s private sphere, which is protected even as a public figure, but shows fictitious opinion polling and related political consultancy activities, and the research company head must tolerate such expression of opinion in view of his duty of higher tolerance.

The research company head brought a petition for review against the final judgment.

The Curia, acting as the court of review, concurred with the reasoning of the final judgment concerning the public‐life connections in this case, and held that, since the business company managed by the research company head conducted public opinion polling at the behest of a government body, its activity must be regarded as closely linked to matters of wider public concern. It held that it would be clear to the audience that, by virtue of the generic conventions of this cinematographic work, the deliberately fantastical depiction of certain plot elements, and the pronounced presence of fictional components, the film was to be regarded as a work of fiction. Based on the combined assessment of the work of art and the communication, the Curia held that it is obvious to the average informed viewer that the behaviour of the characters in the film, which can be linked to real persons, does not contain strictly authentic but fictitious elements, therefore there can be no misrepresentation of real facts.

Accordingly, the Curia upheld the final judgment.

The research company head lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court.

Decision Overview

The Constitutional Court delivered its judgment on the constitutional complaint. The central issue for the Court’s determination was whether the lower courts were correct that the research company head was not entitled to compensation for damage to his reputation.

The Constitutional Court assessed whether the lower courts had interpreted the relationship between the right to human dignity and freedom of expression in accordance with Hungary’s Fundamental Law, and examined whether the interpretation of the law applied by the courts had extended the protective scope of freedom of expression beyond constitutionally justifiable limits. [para. 60] The Court endorsed the reasoning of the Budapest Court of Appeal and the Curia to the effect that the depictions in the film did not affect the research company head’s private and family life, and that the manner of portrayal did not infringe the inviolable core of human dignity. It observed that, in reaching its decision, the Curia had “articulated the pertinent criteria of review drawn from Constitutional Court practice as constitutional‑law considerations. Thus, the balancing exercise on the inalienable core of human dignity led to a result in conformity with the constitution.” [para. 61]

The Court examined whether the production company’s conduct could be regarded as an opinion expressed in a public debate, and consequently whether it fell within the high level of constitutional protection afforded to the discussion of matters of public concern. It referred back to its position expressed in a previous decision that “public debate does not only mean political debate in the narrow sense, but also the discussion of all issues of social importance. From a constitutional standpoint, the inquiry is whether the communication in question (that is the publication of the media content) bears any connection to a specific public debate or to public engagement (…). The enhanced protection afforded by Article IX of the Fundamental Law is not confined to portrayals of those exercising public authority; the free discussion of public affairs may also be enriched by the conduct of individuals who do not themselves hold public office”. [Constitutional Court decision 26/2019 (VII . 23.), paras. 27 and 31]

In applying that constitutional test  to the present case, the Court explained that the “media content (public opinion polls) produced by the business company managed by the applicant (a person known to the public at large), which are fundamentally intended to gauge political relations and the evaluative explanations formulated by the applicant in connection therewith address issues of public life, typically political in nature, which play a significant opinion‑forming role in society and are therefore capable of influencing both political decision‑making and the course of state affairs”. [para. 62] Accordingly, the Court held that the Curia had properly assessed the constitutional parameters of freedom of expression when it concluded that the limits of the research company head’s right to personality protection may be judged analogously to those applicable to persons exercising public authority.

The Court assessed whether the lower courts were justified in deciding whether the production company’s opinion constituted a statement of fact or a value judgment, given the fundamental rights at stake. It stated that the lower courts had examined the challenged communications “with regard to the constitutional content of freedom of expression and with consideration of the distinctive nature of the artistic work, also giving importance to the freedom of artistic creation (…)”. [para. 67] In relation to the cinematographic representation in question, both courts “took into account the specific context of the particularities of the cinematographic work, the fact that the respondent did not define the work as a documentary but as a political thriller, and the fact that the cinematographic work does not present the actual reality to the average viewer”. [para. 67] The Court referred to the Curia’s reasoning that, given the film’s subject matter, the average informed viewer would interpret the actions of the characters as fiction, and the communication displayed prior to the film’s screening was intended solely to identify the characters with real persons. It held that “[i]n view of the film’s narrative framework, the Curia held that it is evident to the average informed viewer that the on-screen conduct of characters linked to real persons is not depicted with strict fidelity but incorporates fictional elements; accordingly, no claim of presenting actual facts in a false light can arise”. [para. 67]

The Court found that the lower courts made their decision in recognition of the fundamental rights relevance of the case, taking into account the designated constitutional interpretation range, and supported by a sufficiently reasoned statement of reasons.

The Court – relying on the final judgment and the Curia’s reasoning – ultimately observed that nothing in the courts’ rulings permits the inference that the depictions in the film are exempt from personality‑rights scrutiny as false statements injurious to reputation. Referring to the principle laid down in the Curia’s decision, the Court noted that “[i]n deciding whether a cinematographic work infringes the personality right to reputation, one must assess the extent to which, in accordance with prevailing public perception, the viewer perceives particular narrative contexts as allusions to reality. The more the work reflects reality for the viewer, the more justified the priority given to the protection of the personality right”. [para. [71]

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the constitutional complaint.