Case Summary and Outcome

The Allahabad High Court partly quashed a First Information Report (FIR) against journalist Mohammed Zubair, removing the charges levelled against him for endangering the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India, while allowing investigations to continue under other criminal procedure provisions. The case arose after Zubair’s tweets in early October 2024—criticizing the State’s inaction against hate speech by Yati Narsinghanand Giri (Hindu Priest and Religious Leader)—which the complainant alleged incited an attack on the Dasna Devi Temple. The Court held that any act which endangers the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India requires a high threshold of deliberate intent to excite secession, armed rebellion, or subversive activity, which Zubair’s posts did not meet, as they largely reproduced Giri’s speeches and expressed disapproval. Thus, the Court found no prima facie material to link the tweets to national security threats, cautioned against equating criticism with incitement, and stressed the need to protect political and journalistic expression from misuse of penal law.

Facts

Mohammed Zubair, an Indian journalist and co-founder of ALT News, tweeted a series of posts between October 3 and October 5, 2024. On October 3, 2024, at 9:30 PM, he uploaded a video clip of Mahamandaleshwar Yati Narsinghanand Giri (Hindu Priest and Religious Leader), along with comments that criticized the content of Giri’s speech, which Zubair described as hateful and derogatory. He followed this post with several more tweets on October 4 and 5, amplifying older videos and statements made by Giri and expressing concern about the lack of meaningful State action against such hate speech. Zubair also criticized the government for allegedly shielding Giri despite repeated instances of inflammatory rhetoric and misogynistic remarks. His tweets included links to videos and images, forming a thread that drew significant attention on social media.

On October 7, 2024, a First Information Report (FIR) was lodged against Zubair at a Police Station in Uttar Pradesh. The FIR, registered as Case Crime No. 992 of 2024, initially invoked Sections 196 (Promoting enmity between different groups), 228 (intentional insult), 299 (culpable homicide), 356(3) (defamation), and 351(2) (criminial intimation) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and was later amended to include Section 152 (acts endangering sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India) of the BNS and Section 66 of the Information Technology Act (IT Act) (pertaining to computer-related offences). The complaint was filed by Dr. Udita Tyagi, who alleged that Zubair’s tweets incited violence and led to an attack on the Dasna Devi Temple on October 4, 2024. She claimed that both she and Giri were present at the temple during the incident and narrowly escaped harm.

According to the FIR, Zubair’s tweets were not isolated statements but formed a chain of communication that allegedly stirred public sentiment, provoked hostile reactions, and contributed to the unlawful assembly that attacked the temple. The FIR also mentioned that Zubair exaggerated the extent of inaction against Giri and falsely represented the situation as one of State complicity. The FIR referenced Zubair’s previous tweets about the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) spokesperson, Nupur Sharma, and claimed that such posts had similarly provoked unrest and violence, resulting in casualties. It further noted that Zubair had a significant following and that his tweets had a wide reach, ranging from thousands to over half a million views.

Zubair challenged the FIR before the Allahabad High Court, seeking its quashing. He argued that his tweets merely amplified publicly available information, highlighted the failure of the State to take timely action against repeated hate speech, and maintained that the FIR was an attempt to target him for his journalistic work and silence his critical voice.

Decision Overview

Justice Siddhartha Varma and Justice Dr. Y. K. Srivastava of the Allahabad High Court delivered the decision. The primary issue before the Court was whether the FIR lodged against Mohammed Zubair, after he published tweets criticizing the speech of another person, disclosed the commission of any cognizable offence, which dealt with acts endangering the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India, and whether such a FIR should be quashed as an abuse of legal process. 

Mohammed Zubair contended that the FIR filed against him was a misuse of legal provisions intended to silence dissent and punish him for his role as a journalist and fact-checker. He argued that his tweets merely reproduced and criticized publicly available hate speeches made by Giri, and expressed disapproval of the State’s inaction against such inflammatory content. Zubair emphasized that his posts did not incite violence, nor did they promote secessionist or subversive activities under Section 152 of the BNS. He claimed the tweets were constitutionally protected expressions under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Zubair maintained that his intention was not to provoke unrest but to demand accountability, and pointed out that the real trigger for the Dasna temple incident was Giri’s provocative speech, not his tweets. He also highlighted that the investigating authorities had no new material evidence when they added Section 152 of the BNS to the FIR, and thus, the inclusion of such a grave offence was arbitrary and unwarranted.

The State opposed the writ petition and argued that Zubair’s tweets had a significant and dangerous impact due to his wide reach as the co-founder of a popular fact-checking platform, ALT News. The State claimed that by repeatedly tweeting and resharing content that criticized religious leaders and allegedly exaggerated State inaction, Zubair created a provocative narrative. According to the State, this narrative incited a group of individuals to attack the Dasna temple on October 4, 2024, thereby endangering public order and national unity. The Additional Advocate General emphasized that the tweets were not isolated expressions but a deliberate attempt to stir emotions and excite subversive activities. The State contended that Zubair falsely claimed that no action had been taken against Giri, despite the fact that several FIRs and charge sheets had been filed against him. Citing judgments on the limits of free speech, the State argued that Zubair’s conduct crossed the line from dissent to incitement, justifying a thorough investigation under sections 152 of the BNS and 66 of the IT Act.

The High Court examined the tweets in question and carefully evaluated whether Zubair’s actions could reasonably be construed as falling within the ambit of Section 152 of the BNS, which penalizes acts attempting to excite secession, armed rebellion, or subversive activities that threaten India’s sovereignty and integrity. The Court began by highlighting the seriousness of the offence under Section 152 BNS, noting that it carries the possibility of life imprisonment and thus requires a very high threshold of mens rea or deliberate intent. It held that the provision is aimed at protecting the State from genuine threats to national security, not curbing political dissent or public criticism. Referring to the explanation appended to Section 152 BNS, the Court held that comments made to disapprove of government action, if made to seek lawful reform, would not amount to an offence under this section. Considering this, it noted that Zubair’s tweets largely reproduced the hate speech of Giri and were followed by expressions of disapproval over the State’s failure to act. While referring to Tejender Pal Singh @ Timma v. State of Rajasthan, the High Court reiterated that critical expression, even if uncomfortable to the State, must be constitutionally protected unless it clearly crosses into incitement of violence or rebellion. 

The High Court also referred to Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, where the Supreme Court of India concluded that a statement must be judged by its general impact on a reasonable section of society, not by how a few individuals may react irrationally. Applying that test, the Court concluded that merely because some followers of Zubair’s posts may have responded aggressively does not, by itself, criminalize the act of tweeting. It observed that “it would not be sufficient to say that the petitioner had attempted to excite or had even excited a secession or armed rebellion in the entire country or even in a part of it”. [para. 16]

Additionally, the High Court referred to the Bhajan Lal principles established in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal—regarding the circumstances under which a FIR can be quashed when the allegations, even if assumed to be true, do not constitute a cognizable offence. It held that the FIR, as drafted and subsequently amended to include Section 152 of the BNS, failed to meet this threshold. The Court also found merit in Zubair’s contention that no new evidence or material was brought on record between the filing of the original FIR and the addition of Section 152 BNS. Importantly, the Court cautioned against equating criticism with incitement and affirmed that the democratic ethos of India permits disapproval of governmental action as long as it remains within legal bounds. It emphasized that courts must remain vigilant to prevent the misuse of penal provisions to silence political or journalistic expression—citing Lovely Salhotra v. State of NCT Delhi to underscore that FIRs can be partially quashed when certain offences are not established from the record. 

The High Court concluded that the FIR, insofar as it pertained to Section 152 of the BNS and Section 66 of the IT Act, failed to disclose any prima facie offence and was liable to be quashed. However, it allowed the investigation to proceed on other sections mentioned in the original FIR, specifically, Sections 196, 228, 299, 356(3), and 351(2) of the BNS. Thus, the writ petition was partly allowed. The Court reiterated that “a person of such meagre followings […] could not, by any means, be said that he could have any intention of exciting secession/armed rebellion” [para. 15], and concluded that the threshold to attract Section 152 of the BNS had not been met in this case.