Case Summary and Outcome

 The Supreme Court of the United States held that a state may enact a statute banning the act of cross burning only if there is an intention to intimidate others. The State of Virginia convicted three individuals for violating a statute that banned cross burning in public spaces or on the property of others with the intent to intimidate. However the statute viewed the physical act of burning a cross as sufficient evidence of intimidation. The Court found that acts of cross burning often involved intimidation, and thus statutes banning cross burning do not run afoul of the First Amendment, which permits content-based restriction of true threats. However, the Court also ruled that the State of Virginia’s statute was facially unconstitutional because it treated any act of cross burning as a prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.

Facts

This case arises out of the criminal conviction of three defendants for violation of a statute of Virginia State banning cross burning in the property of another or public places with intent to intimidate or place others in fear of bodily harm.  Under the statute’s prima facie evidence provision, the physical act of burning a cross was seen as sufficient evidence for the jury to find an intent to intimidate others.

Upon their convictions, each defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, contending that that statute was facially unconstitutional.

The Court later declared the statute as unconstitutional because its prima facie evidence provision posed the risk of prosecuting legitimate exercise of symbolic expressions.

The State of Virginia petitioned the decision to Supreme Court of the United States.

Decision Overview

Justice O’Connor delivered the Court’s majority opinion.

The underlying issue for the Court was whether the Virginia’s statute violated the First Amendment right to free speech because of its prima facie evidence provision.

The Court first recalled that the First Amendment “affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”  [p. 358]  According to the Court, however, the importance of public interest in order and morality may restrict the content of speech in a few limited areas.  [p. 358]  For example, the First Amendment permits states to ban true threats, defined by the Court as “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”  [p. 359]   Relevant to the case in hand, the Court regarded intimidation as a type of true threat “where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”  [p. 360]  The Court found that the act of cross burning often involves intimidation by creating fear in victims that they are a target of violence.

Furthermore, based its reasoning in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the Court found that the statute as it banned cross burning with intent to intimidate did not run afoul of the First Amendment because it imposed content-based restriction on a particular class of speech likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.

However, the Court ruled the the prima facie evidence provision rendered the statute as facially unconstitutional because it would create an unacceptable risk of suppressing the act of cross burning as part a legitimate form of symbolic speech protected under the First Amendment, such as a statement of ideology or a symbol of group solidarity.  [p. 366-367]

Accordingly, the Court concluded that because of the interpretation  of the prima facie evidence provision given by the jury instruction, the  provision made the statute facially unconstitutional.

The Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia as to its interpretation on the prima facie evidence provision.