Case Summary and Outcome

The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica held that certain expressions used by President Rodrigo Chaves Robles, and then Minister of Health Joselyn Chacón Madrigal, during the January 9, 2023, press conference violated journalist Jason Ureña’s freedom of expression. During the press conference, the officials referred indirectly to Ureña and other journalists using derogatory terms, portraying him as a member “of a band of criminals and political hitmen,” and using terms such as “damned,” “political hitmen,” “paid assassins,” “gang,” and “a pack of wolves,” while also characterizing journalists as “gossipy people who do not do investigative work.” Ureña filed an amparo action, arguing that this stigmatizing language—disseminated on an official platform in response to reporting that scrutinized the Minister’s performance in office—constituted an indirect restriction on press freedom because it produced an intimidating, self-censoring effect. While the Court recognized that public officials may respond, even vehemently, to criticism—and concluded that a large portion of the challenged remarks did not amount to direct or indirect censorship—, it found that certain offensive labels exceeded the bounds of democratic debate, discredited journalistic work, and constituted a reproachable use of official speech that injured freedom of the press and adversely affected access to public information. Accordingly, the Court partially granted the amparo as it did not award monetary compensation at this instance. Nonetheless, it expressly preserved Ureña’s right to pursue claims for damages through ordinary judicial proceedings.

Facts

On January 9, 2023, Costa Rican President Rodrigo Chaves Robles and the former Minister of Health Joselyn Chacón Madrigal held a joint press conference to address allegations against the Minister. The allegations claimed that she had hired a group of “trolls”—individuals allegedly engaged in coordinated online activities intended to discredit others—to undermine journalist Jason Ureña. Ureña had been closely and repeatedly covering Chacón’s actions as Minister of Health, as well as those of officials within that ministry, in the course of his journalistic work for the media outlet CR.HOY. During the press conference, the officials referred indirectly to Ureña and other journalists using derogatory terms, portraying him as a member “of a band of criminals and political hitmen,” [p. 73] and using terms such as “damned,” “political hitmen,” “paid assassins,” “gang,” and “a pack of wolves,” while also characterizing journalists as “gossipy people who do not do investigative work.” [p. 73]

On January 17, 2023, Jason Ureña filed an amparo petition—a mechanism for the specific, individual, and particular protection of constitutional rights—before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. He explained that his journalistic work included reporting on matters of public interest related to the administration of President Chaves and the management of the Ministry of Health. He submitted links to 21 articles published between May and October 2022. Ureña argued that the president and the minister violated his right to freedom of expression, in both its individual and social dimensions. The plaintiff further argued that, as public officials, they had breached their heightened duties to respect and guarantee freedom of expression. He maintained that the offensive statements, insults, and discrediting of his journalistic investigative work produced an intimidating effect and fostered self-censorship, amounting to an indirect restriction on freedom of expression under Article 13(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). [p. 49]

Decision Overview

The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice issued its decision on May 23, 2023. The main issue before the Court was whether the derogatory language used by President Chaves and then Minister of Health Joselyn Chacón toward journalist Jason Ureña violated his freedom of expression and breached their heightened duties to respect and guarantee that right. The Court also assessed whether the remarks had a chilling effect on those seeking to express criticism of the government.

Ureña argued that the derogatory adjectives and insults used by President Chaves and then Minister of Health Chacón during the January 9 press conference—convened to address allegations that the minister had hired “trolls” to target him—violated his freedom of expression. He maintained that, as a journalist covering matters of public interest related to public health, he had published reporting and criticism concerning the actions of the minister and the president without resorting to personal attacks. According to Ureña, the language employed by the officials did not constitute a legitimate political response but constituted an indirect form of censorship, producing an intimidating and chilling effect that induced self-censorship among him and other journalists seeking to express critical views of the government. Ureña further contended that such conduct exceeded the bounds of democratic debate and was incompatible with the heightened obligations of public officials to respect and guarantee freedom of expression.

The defendants explained that the statements made during the press conference were not an attack on, or a restriction of, the plaintiff’s freedom of expression. They argued that the remarks were protected speech, as they largely reflected opinions expressed in the context of a public debate and were not directed at any journalist in particular. They further maintained that their remarks reflected their opinions about the allegedly false information contained in certain news reports, and did not amount to censorship or intimidation. In addition, they contended that the remarks should be understood against a background in which the minister had been subjected to criticism she experienced as personal—including commentaries about her gender, physical appearance, and intellectual capacity. The defendants also emphasized that the press conference did not undermine press freedom, noting that journalists were able to ask questions freely and that the plaintiff continued publishing news through the outlet for which he worked, without any administrative restriction or prohibition. Finally, they rejected the existence of any chilling effect, arguing that any negative public reaction or personal impact alleged by the plaintiff stemmed from ordinary public scrutiny in democratic debate, rather than from State interference with the right to freedom of expression.

The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice began by addressing the tensions arising from the language used by the public officials during an official press conference held in the exercise of their functions, and its potential impact on Ureña’s honor and dignity. Building on that framework, the Court structured its analysis of the specific case through four main sections. These addressed: (i) the language used by the president and the minister during the press conference; (ii) the duties of public officials in the face of press criticism; (iii) the duties of public officials to safeguard the general interest; and (iv) the social responsibility of mass media outlets.

First, the Court examined the language used by President Chaves and then Minister of Health Chacón during the January 9, 2023, press conference. As a general matter, the Court acknowledged that, in abstract terms, the facts revealed that “offensive qualifiers and adjectives were used, portraying [Ureña] as part of a band of criminals and political hitmen, and discrediting [his] investigative work.” [p. 73] The Court further noted that the speech challenged by the plaintiff exceeded the limits of democratic debate and evidenced an attack on freedom of expression in its individual and social dimensions, insofar as they produced “an intimidating and fear-inducing effect that ultimately causes self-censorship among media outlets that do not adhere to an informational or editorial line favored by the government.” [p. 73] The use of such language reflected a strategy “of intimidation, offense, and delegitimization of the journalistic work of certain professionals and media outlets, undermining the regime of freedom and democracy itself.” [pp. 73-74]

However, after examining each of the statements challenged by Ureña, the Court concluded that “a large portion of the expressions used by the President of the Republic and the Minister [did] not constitute a direct or indirect violation of freedom of the press.” [p. 95] Nonetheless, it held that, even if not all the statements produced a censorial effect, the conduct was “reproachable,” failed to contribute to democratic debate, and did not serve to clarify the matters of public interest that gave rise to the press conference. It ultimately found that the use of “disrespectful and offensive language against journalists [constituted] an injury to freedom of the press” [p. 102] and adversely affected access to public information.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court examined the duties of public officials in the face of press criticism. As a general matter, the Court reiterated that public officials are “subject to more intense criticism than the rest of the population” [p. 95] by the media and the public. At the same time, it argued—responding to arguments raised by the defendants—that heightened scrutiny does not require officials to “assume a passive position or remain silent.” [p. 95] The Court held that public officials, even while exercising their functions, do not have to forfeit their fundamental rights. However, considering their interventions “contribute to shaping public opinion regarding the matter under discussion,” [p. 95] their exercise of freedom of expression is subject to specific constraints.

On this point, the Court held that public officials must not use their constitutional or convention rights to promote harassment of the press or actions that could endanger journalists’ physical integrity, lives, or the property of media outlets—nor may they adopt measures that prevent journalists or media organizations from continuing their work, such as denying access to press conferences or restricting accreditations for events of public interest. At the same time, the Court recognized that public officials may express themselves vehemently, provided that such expressions do not amount to direct or indirect censorship, do not encourage actions against journalists or media property, and do not obstruct the exercise of free and independent journalism in a democratic society. In support of this reasoning, the Court cited the Colombian Constitutional Court’s Judgment T-155 of 2019, noting that since public officials’ speech carries greater weight in the collective imagination—given the trust and credibility generally afforded to those who hold public office—it is justified to require a higher degree of diligence from them than from private individuals when expressing their opinions.

Next, the Court examined the duties of public officials to safeguard the general interest and to preserve governmental cohesion as a condition for democratic governance. At a general level, it emphasized that the Constitution of Costa Rica imposes affirmative obligations on the president and ministers to design, adopt, and implement public policies aimed at objectively satisfying collective interests and addressing social problems effectively. The Court further highlighted that the president bears a constitutional duty to maintain the unity of the cabinet—considering executive power is exercised jointly with ministers and governmental cohesion strengthens democratic governance, enhances institutional legitimacy, and contributes to the stability of the republican system.

Within this framework, the Court considered that the principles of transparency and accountability are linked to a corresponding duty of public communication, noting that these principles entail “the duty to communicate to the population, in a clear, precise, and timely manner, the government’s intentions and policies.” [p. 101] In the context of a participatory democracy, characterized by constant public dialogue and the wide circulation of information through traditional and digital media, the Court explained that government authorities are required to engage actively in public debate. This includes explaining their actions, omissions, and policies, as well as responding to criticism directed at them. According to the Court, in certain circumstances—particularly when criticism lacks factual support, pursues a pernicious aim, or seeks to destabilize the government—public officials are not only permitted but constitutionally required to act promptly, firmly, and, where appropriate, decisively in order to clarify and provide information to the public.

Lastly, turning to the issue of the social responsibility of mass media outlets within a democratic society, the Court said that, collectively, the media “exercises enormous influence over the formation of public opinion,” [p. 101] which entails a corresponding responsibility to operate “in the service of the values and principles that inform a democratic society.” [p. 101] Considering this, it stressed that the exercise of journalism carries a heightened duty to seek, receive, and disseminate information freely but responsibly, particularly in light of the risks posed by misinformation in contemporary digital environments. It underscored that, in a democratic context, audiences are entitled to receive information that is truthful and objective, or, where this is not fully attainable, at least balanced (presenting multiple versions of the same event). Moreover, it argued that journalistic activities should contribute to strengthening democratic institutions and avoid excesses that may undermine their foundations. Within these parameters, it reasoned that when media coverage causes discomfort to public officials, their responses should be oriented toward presenting an alternative version of events in a respectful manner, particularly where journalists have not previously sought the official’s perspective or have failed to incorporate it adequately in the reporting.

In view of the foregoing, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice partially granted the amparo petition. While the Court recognized that public officials are entitled—and in some circumstances required—to respond to media criticism, it found that certain expressions used by President Chaves and then Minister of Health Chacón were unjustified and excessive, as they employed stigmatizing and offensive language that could foster harassment against journalists and undermine freedom of the press. The Court stressed that, even when officials perceive media coverage as unfair or inaccurate, responses must aim to clarify matters of public interest through respectful debate rather than through value judgments or derogatory labels that detract from democratic discourse. It concluded that the use of disrespectful and offensive language against journalists constituted an infringement of freedom of expression and adversely affected access to public information. Hence, the Court granted the amparo for declaratory and indemnification purposes only, without ordering monetary compensation. Nonetheless, it expressly preserved the plaintiff’s right to pursue any claims for damages through ordinary judicial proceedings, should he consider the statements were injurious, defamatory, or slanderous.