Case Summary and Outcome

The Supreme Court of the Philippines found a social media commentator in contempt of court for online posts that harshly criticized a judge following the dismissal of a petition related to the designation of a group as a terrorist organization. The posts included statements that insulted the judiciary and threatened violence against judges. The Court found that, although freedom of expression is constitutionally protected, it is not absolute and may be restricted when it endangers judicial independence, incites violence, or undermines public confidence in the courts. Given the commentator’s significant online influence and the violent reactions the posts provoked, the Court determined that the conduct posed an imminent threat to judicial safety and institutional integrity. It imposed a monetary fine and issued a warning that any repetition would attract more severe sanctions, emphasizing that contempt powers exist to safeguard the authority and independence of the judiciary as an institution rather than to protect individual judges from criticism.

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Facts

The factual background involves two consolidated cases: A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC (initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court) and G.R. No. 263384 (filed by petitioners). The petitioners, comprising nine lawyers and law deans including Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Dean Antonio Gabriel M. La Viña, and others, filed an Urgent Petition for Indirect Contempt against respondent Lorraine Marie T. Badoy-Partosa. The controversy stemmed from Judge Marlo A. Magdoza-Malagar of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issuing a Resolution on September 21, 2022, that dismissed the Department of Justice’s petition for the proscription of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) as a terrorist organization under the Human Security Act of 2007.

On September 23, 2022, Badoy-Partosa published a lengthy Facebook post titled “A Judgment Straight from the Bowels of Communist Hell” on her verified public account (with approximately 166,000 followers). In this post, she accused Judge Magdoza-Malagar of weaponizing the court of law and “passionately lawyering” for the CPP-NPA-NDF, claimed the judge based her decision on the “Constitution of the CPP” rather than Philippine law, and described the judge as “unprincipled.” Most critically, she wrote: “So if I kill this judge and I do so out of my political belief that all allies of the CPP NPA NDF must be killed … then please be lenient with me.” [pgs. 3-4]

That same day, Badoy-Partosa published a second post titled “The Judge Marlo Malagar Horror Series” where she stated: “I really reallllly want to build an organization … [whose] members will start bombing the offices of these corrupt judges who are friends of terrorists—even if they kneel before us and beg for their lives.” [pgs. 5-6] On September 24, 2022, she published additional posts questioning the judge’s integrity and alleging, without evidence, that the judge’s husband was a CPP cadre and that the decision was actually written by CPP-NPA-NDF operatives.

These posts went viral, accumulating thousands of reactions, comments, and shares. Badoy-Partosa’s followers responded with supportive comments such as “We are right behind you, Doc Lorraine. Just let us know what to do and we will oblige” and YouTube videos calling the judge biased and shameful and demanding her removal. [pg. 7] Various legal organizations, including HUKOM, Inc., the Philippine Judges Association, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, issued statements condemning Badoy-Partosa’s “malicious and dangerous utterances.” [pg. 7]

When confronted with these criticisms, Badoy-Partosa responded on September 26, 2022, with another Facebook post dismissing the concerns, accusing the judges of parroting “the lines of the CPP NPA NDF,” and stating: “if they believe I had threatened to kill Judge Malagar, then their reading comprehension … is lower than a kid fresh out of nursery.” [pg. 8]

On October 3, 2022, the petitioners filed their Urgent Petition for Indirect Contempt before the Supreme Court, arguing that Badoy-Partosa’s statements undermined judicial independence and threatened the safety of judges. They invoked Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, which defines indirect contempt as including “any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.”

The Supreme Court, acting on its own motion, docketed the matter as A.M. No. 22-09-16-SC on October 4, 2022. It issued a stern warning against those who “continue to incite violence through social media and other means which endanger the lives of judges and their families” and deeming such acts contemptuous. [pg. 8] On October 11, 2022, the Court issued a Show Cause Order requiring Badoy-Partosa to explain why she should not be cited for contempt, specifically asking her to address whether her posts encouraged violent language, constituted incitement, or were protected speech. The Court consolidated both cases on February 14, 2023.

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Decision Overview

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen delivered the judgment for the Supreme Court En Banc, with all fifteen justices concurring. The decision addressed two primary issues: first, whether the petitioners in G.R. No. 263384 possessed legal standing to file the contempt petition, and second, whether respondent Badoy-Partosa should be held liable for indirect contempt.

The petitioners grounded their standing in their status as lawyers and officers of the court, obligated to uphold the Constitution and the Rule of Law. They argued that as “guardians of the rule of law,” they had a material interest in protecting the judiciary from attacks that undermine public confidence and judicial independence. They stressed that Badoy-Partosa’s public posts and threats were a gross attack on the Philippine Judiciary as an institution, with far-reaching consequences for constitutional democracy and judicial independence.  Her statements, they argued, went beyond criticism and amounted to a direct assault on the Bench, justifying the Supreme Court’s use of its contempt powers.

While acknowledging that Rule 71, Section 5 of the Rules of Court generally requires contempt cases to be filed in the affected court, they urged the Supreme Court to assume jurisdiction because of the matter’s transcendental importance. They described Badoy-Partosa’s conduct, and that of her supporters, as threatening, contumacious, and inimical to the orderly administration of justice. Her statements, they concluded, posed a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice, eroding judicial independence and public confidence in the courts, thus warranting the Court’s intervention.

Badoy-Partosa defended her statements as protected “journalistic comments” and “fair comments on a matter of public interest.” [pg. 9] She claimed she only expressed her disappointment with Judge Magdoza-Malagar’s decision, which she said condoned the CPP-NPA-NDF’s “countless atrocities and violence” by treating them as actions motivated by higher ideals. She stressed that her posts merely highlighted “eight palpable errors” in Judge Magdoza-Malagar’s Resolution, including alleged misapplication of the Human Security Act instead of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 and erroneous conclusions about the CPP-NPA’s terrorist nature. She claimed that her references to killing or bombing were rhetorical, designed to mirror the judge’s reasoning about leniency, not literal threats. She asserted that punishing her would create “chilling effects” on freedom of expression and argued her statements caused no actual obstruction of justice.

The Court began its analysis by reaffirming the constitutional primacy of freedom of expression, quoting extensively from Philippine jurisprudence including The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections and United States v. Bustos. The Court noted that the public’s freedom of expression, as a core principle of every democratic government, must be fully respected and protected and that this protection extends to criticism of judicial conduct. However, the Court immediately qualified this principle, stating that these rights must not undermine other equally vital public interests, including the integrity of the courts and the orderly administration of justice.

On the substantive contempt issue, the Court undertook a thorough examination of the balance between free speech and judicial independence. Citing  Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, it noted that freedom of expression must occasionally be balanced against equally important public interests, particularly the preservation of the integrity and proper functioning of the administration of justice. It also emphasized that contemptuous attacks against judges are “not constitutionally protected speech” but are instead punishable to preserve the judiciary’s institutional authority. [p. 23]

The Court systematically applied multiple legal tests to Badoy-Partosa’s statements. Under the “clear and present danger” test, the Court found her posts created an “extremely serious” evil with a “degree of imminence extremely high” given their violent content and wide dissemination. The Court noted her posts constituted “improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice” under Rule 71, Section 3(d). [p. 45] The Court particularly emphasized that her threats to “bomb the offices of these corrupt judges” and her statement about killing Judge Magdoza-Malagar went beyond a trenchant critique of a judicial ruling and crossed into invective and incitement.

Applying the Brandenburg test, the Court found her speech was both “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and “likely to incite or produce such action.” The Court noted her substantial social media influence and the viral nature of her posts, which garnered thousands of violent responses from her followers, including threats, inflammatory videos, and requests for the judge’s address, as evidence of likely imminent harm.

The Court also rejected her “hypothetical syllogism” defense, holding that her posts contained “false and malicious statements” and that “a person’s intent, however good it may be, cannot prevail over the plain import of his speech or writing.” [p. 34] It cited In re De Vera and Zaldivar, stressing that “unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech” and that such expression is “rather … an abuse of such right.” [p. 23] The Court also recalled Bustos, reaffirming that although public officers must endure criticism, “criticism does not authorize defamation” and does not encompass threats of violence. [p. 16]

The Court also analyzed the case through the lens of the sub judice rule, noting that Badoy-Partosa’s posts, which were made while related proceedings continued, prejudged the case, imputed improper motives, and attempted to influence judicial outcomes through public pressure. The Court cited In re Kelly, noting that “any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court … with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision … is contempt of court.” [p. 46]

The Court’s further discussed the ambit of digital speech, recognizing social media as “the fourth class of regulated speech” alongside traditional categories. The Court expressed concern about how “fake news” and disinformation spread through social media can damage judicial legitimacy, noting that “the proliferation of fake news is a very significant threat on the courts’ legitimacy, which is anchored on the public’s confidence in our administration of justice.” [p. 40] The Court held that online influencers with large followings must be held to higher standards due to their greater capacity to cause harm, stating “the more viral online content is … the greater its effect and propensity to affect the public.” [p. 41] Referring contemporary examples of disinformation-fueled violence, including the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol riot and the “Pizzagate” conspiracy, the Court observed that online speech can translate into “offline violence” and that “the imminence is high that it will actually be committed by those so provoked.” [p. 49] It further underscored the role of “echo chambers” and “cheap speech” in undermining the traditional marketplace of ideas, warning that “private individuals could publish their thoughts … purely for clout or for ‘likes,’ and even in disregard of the truth.” [p. 21]

The Court finally highlighted the institutional purpose of contempt proceedings. Citing Regalado v. Go and Garcia, Jr. v. Manrique, it stressed that the power to punish for contempt exists not to protect a judge’s personal reputation but “for the functions that they exercise.” [p. 25] The Court explained that allowing judges to file libel suits against contemnors would compromise their independence and undermine judicial authority, making contempt the only proper and constitutionally sound remedy. It cautioned, however, that this power must be “exercised judiciously and sparingly” to uphold the court’s dignity rather than serve as retaliation. [p. 25] Ultimately, the Court emphasized that its ruling vindicated the institutional integrity of the judiciary, not the personal sentiments of any individual judge.

In conclusion, the Court held that Badoy-Partosa’s statements violated all applicable tests for permissible speech and constituted indirect contempt. The Court imposed a PHP 30,000 fine (approximately USD 515) under Rule 71, Section 7 and warned that repetition would bring “more severe sanction.” [p. 50]

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