Case Summary and Outcome

The Supreme Court of India agreed with a petition asserting that powers granted under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 enabled the State to unconstitutionally restrict free expression. Romesh Thappar filed a petition challenging a decision by the State of Madras banning the entry and circulation of his leftist journal, Cross Roads, arguing that the State’s justification for the ban on the basis of “public safety” was too broad. The Court noted that such expansive restrictions were unconstitutional and that only narrow restrictions on freedom of expression were permitted.

Facts

The petitioner was the the printer, publisher and editor of a journal in English called Cross Roads printed and published in Bombay. Under Section 9 (1-A) of the the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, the entry and circulation of the journal was banned in the erstwhile State of Madras. In response to the ban, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court, averring that the powers under the Act were an excessive restriction on freedom of expression under Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
In response, it was considered on behalf of the respondent State, that the restriction was for the purpose of public safety and public order. This could be equated with security of the State, which is considered a reasonable restriction on freedom of expression under Article 19(2).

Decision Overview

J. Patanjali Sastri (per KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.):

Security of the State is a reasonable restriction under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. However, the words used in the impugned section of the Act are ‘public safety and public order’. The Court considered that the 2 terms have to be read together. The purpose for which restrictions were allowed under the Act for the wider purpose of public order. It drew parallels with the Indian Penal Code and other texts to show that public order has a very wide interpretation- including acts like rash driving. On the other hand, security of the State referred to extreme acts of violence that would threaten to overthrow the State. Therefore, the restriction under the Act was wider than what was Constitutionally permissible as a restriction on freedom of expression.
Further, where an Act may be used within the constitutional limits as well as outside the scope of these limits, it must be considered void. The impugned section was accordingly considered to be void for unconstitutionality, because it gave the State wide powers to restrict freedom of expression. The Court also quashed the order of the Government whereby the newspaper was banned.

J. Fazl, dissenting-
He concluded that the maintenance of peace and tranquility was a part of maintaining security of the State. Therefore, he disagreed with the majority opinion and asserted that the Act imposed reasonable restrictions on freedom of expression and must be upheld as valid.