Case Summary and Outcome

The European Court of Human Rights held that Russia violated the applicants’ rights to private life (Article 8), freedom of expression (Article 10), and freedom of assembly (Article 11) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case arose after ten opposition activists, linked to Aleksey Navalnyy’s movement, were barred from running in the 2021 Berdsk municipal elections because authorities alleged they were “involved” with organizations later declared extremist. The Court found that the Russian government unlawfully collected and stored the applicants’ sensitive political data without a clear legal basis or safeguards, and then used this information to justify their disqualification. Critically, the Court ruled that applying the electoral ban retroactively to punish activities that were lawful when conducted, such as peaceful protest, campaign volunteering, and social media posts, was not foreseeable and placed an impossible burden on individuals. The vague concept of “involvement” was also found to be open to arbitrary application, creating a chilling effect on political participation. Consequently, the Court found violations of Articles 8, 10, and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Facts

The applicants, ten Russian nationals including Irina Selishcheva, were opposition activists. They sought to run as independent candidates in the 2021 Berdsk municipal elections, many as part of a coalition linked to Aleksey Navalnyy’s movement.

The legal trigger for the case was an amendment to Russia’s electoral legislation. On June 4, 2021, Federal Law No. 157-FZ entered into force, adding paragraph 3.6 to Section 4 of the Electoral Rights Act. This new provision stated that individuals who had been “involved in the activities” of an organization later designated as extremist would be barred from standing in elections announced after the law’s entry into force. Shortly thereafter, on June 9, 2021, the Moscow City Court declared three organizations associated with Navalnyy (e.g., the Navalnyy Campaign Headquarters (HQ), the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), and the Foundation for the Protection of Civil Rights) to be extremist organizations, with immediate effect.

In July 2021, the applicants successfully submitted their nomination documents and the required supporting signatures. However, between July 29 and August 5, 2021, the district electoral commissions refused to register them as candidates. The refusals were based on letters from the Ministry of Justice, which relied on information from the Police Centre for Combating Extremism. The police reports alleged the applicants’ “involvement” with three organizations (e.g., the Navalnyy Campaign Headquarters, the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), and the Foundation for the Protection of Civil Rights) that had been later declared extremist by a Russian court on June 9, 2021. The evidence of “involvement” included their participation in unauthorized protests in January 2021 against Navalnyy’s imprisonment, providing legal aid to detainees, supporting the Novosibirsk Coalition 2020, assistance to a former Navalnyy Campaign coordinator during his election campaign, social media activity promoting FBK materials or Navalnyy-related content, and receiving payments from the organizations.

The applicants challenged the refusals before the Berdsk City Court, arguing that their activities predated the extremist designation and that no judicial decision had established their personal involvement. The court, however, upheld the refusals, finding that Section 4 § 3.6 of the Electoral Rights Act applied and that the information from the Centre for Combating Extremism was sufficient evidence. This decision was subsequently upheld by the Novosibirsk Regional Court and, ultimately, the Supreme Court of Russia.

Aggrieved, Selishcheva and other Applicants filed applications before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), claiming that the refusal to register them as candidates on the basis of alleged links to extremist organizations unlawfully deprived them of their electoral rights.

Decision Overview

The Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights delivered a unanimous judgment. The primary issue before the court was whether the refusal to register the applicants as electoral candidates, based on the retroactive application of a law concerning “involvement” with extremist organizations, violated their Convention rights, particularly Article 8 (private life) and Articles 10 and 11 (freedom of expression and assembly).

The applicants contended that the state’s collection and storage of their personal data revealing political opinions lacked a proper legal basis and safeguards, constituting unlawful interference with their private lives. Regarding their electoral rights, they argued that disqualifying them for past lawful activities was a retroactive penalty that violated their freedoms of expression and assembly and had a severe chilling effect on political participation. The Russian Government did not participate in the proceedings or submit any arguments in defense. The Court noted that Russia’s cessation of membership in the Council of Europe did not release it from responsibility for facts predating September 16, 2022, and its non-engagement could not obstruct the Court’s examination of the case.

The Court first considered the alleged violation of Article 8. It confirmed that the systematic collection, storage, and disclosure of data about an individual’s political opinions and participation in peaceful protests constitutes an interference with the right to respect for private life. It cited precedent, including Catt v. the United Kingdom and S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, to affirm that the mere retention of such sensitive data falls within the scope of Article 8. In the present case, the police compiled detailed dossiers on the applicants’ political activities, which were then shared with electoral commissions to justify the refusal of their candidacies.

The Court then assessed whether this interference was “in accordance with the law.” It emphasized that this requirement demands not only a basis in domestic law but also that the law must be accessible, foreseeable, and afford protection against arbitrariness. The Court found the Russian legal framework deficient on all counts. There were no clear rules governing the scope of data collection, its duration, usage, or effective mechanism of independent review. The Court was particularly concerned that the applicants had no means of knowing what data was held about them or the grounds for collection, no right to access it, and no procedure to challenge its accuracy. It observed that the indiscriminate and open-ended collection of sensitive political data was “likely to have a ‘chilling effect’ on the exercise of their Convention rights.” [para. 35] Importantly, it noted that the data was collected when the organizations in question were operating legally and not as part of any specific criminal inquiry. It concluded that the interference was not “in accordance with the law” and, given its indiscriminate and chilling nature, could not be considered “necessary in a democratic society.”

Afterwards, the Court moved to entertain the alleged violations of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. The Court held that disqualifying the applicants from elections constituted an interference with their rights under Articles 10 and 11. Although not a direct ban on speech or assembly, it was a severe sanction imposed for their prior legitimate exercise of these rights. Such a sanction, the Court warned, “can have a serious chilling effect” by deterring individuals from engaging in political activities for fear of future repercussions. [para. 43]

The Court identified two fundamental flaws. First, the retroactive application of the restriction was not foreseeable. The applicants could not have predicted that their lawful activities would later be reclassified as grounds for disqualification under a law that did not exist at the time. The Court drew a direct parallel to Andrey Rylkov Foundation and Others v. Russia, where it held that requiring individuals to anticipate future legal categorizations is an “impossible and unreasonable burden.” [para. 46]

Second, the core concept of “involvement” was impermissibly vague. The Court found that the term was so broad that it could cover “virtually any connection, however tenuous, to Mr Navalnyy’s political movement.” [para. 47] Referencing its Grand Chamber judgment in Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2), the Court criticized the domestic courts for accepting weak evidence and equating lawful political opposition with support for extremism. In the present case, Russian courts accepted police reports at face value, treating simple acts such as following social media accounts or collecting signatures as sufficient grounds for disqualification, without any demonstration of genuine extremist engagement. The Court emphasized that protecting democratic institutions from extremism may, in principle, be a legitimate aim, but in this case, the authorities penalized lawful political conduct retrospectively, with no meaningful proportionality assessment between the applicants’ specific actions and the aim of protecting democratic institutions and no pressing social need. Consequently, the interference was neither “prescribed by law” nor “necessary in a democratic society.”

In conclusion, the Court unanimously held that Russia violated Articles 8, 10, and 11 of the Convention, and awarded each applicant EUR 10,000 (approx. USD 11,706) in non-pecuniary damages, plus any applicable tax and interest.