Case Summary and Outcome

The Southwark Crown Court (England and Wales) overturned the conviction of a man who burnt a copy of the Koran outside the Turkish Consulate in London. The Court found that his conduct was neither “disorderly” nor “likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress” under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. The Court found that the man’s conduct fell within the scope of political speech, noting that he acted alone outside an embassy, an established venue for protests, protested for only a few minutes, and was empty-handed, all of which made it unlikely to cause harassment or distress to others.

Facts

On February 13, 2025, Hamit Coskun, a Turkish national who had sought asylum in the United Kingdom, travelled to the Turkish Consulate in London to stage a protest. Disapproving of Turkey “becoming more Islamic”, Coskun brought a copy of the Koran, which he set on fire outside the Consulate while shouting phrases such as “Koran is burning,” “Fuck Islam,” and “Islam is the religion of terrorism.” [para. 22]

Shortly after, a man named Moussa Kadri verbally threatened Coskun and then returned armed with a knife. Kadri chased and attacked Coskun, kicking and spitting on him as he fell to the ground. A passing delivery cyclist also assaulted Coskun before riding away.

When the police arrived, Coskun reported that he had been exercising his democratic right to protest and identified Kadri as his attacker. Both men were arrested; Kadri was later convicted of assault and possession of a knife.

During a police interview, Coskun explained that he burned the Koran to protest what he viewed as the book’s incitement to terrorism. He stated that Turkey and Qatar supported “radical Islamist”. [para. 25] He denied any hostility towards Muslims as individuals, stating his actions were directed against religious ideology, not people.

Coskun was convicted in the Magistrates’ Court of the racially aggravated section 5 offence under the Public Order Act 1986. Coskun then appealed to the Crown Court.

Decision Overview

Justice Bennathan of the Southwark Crown Court, sitting with Judges T Guest JP and D Graves JP, delivered the judgment on appeal. The central issue was whether Coskun’s conviction for burning the Koran outside the Turkish Consulate under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, aggravated by sections 28 and 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, was valid.

Section 5(1)(a) criminalises “threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour,…within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby.” [para. 12] Sections 28 and 31 create racially or religiously aggravated forms of section 5, which occur when the offender demonstrates hostility towards a victim based on their race or religion. These sections are not standalone offences.

Coskun argued that his conduct did not reach the level required for “disorderly conduct” and, while it may have upset some people, it did not meet the legal test of being “likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.” He further submitted that, given the political nature of his protest, his actions should be regarded as “reasonable,” and that any hostility expressed was directed at Islam as a faith, not at Muslim individuals.

The prosecution acknowledged that there is no law criminalising blasphemy but contended that the burning of the Koran, together with his shouted comments, was sufficient to establish the aggravated offence. They submitted that people were indeed distressed by Coskun’s conduct and relied on passages from his interview as evidence of general hostility towards Muslims, arguing that his actions were motivated, at least in part, by such hostility.

The Court began by reaffirming key principles of English law that there is no offence of blasphemy in England and Wales. [para. 2] The Court reiterated that freedom of expression includes the right to express views that “offend, shock or disturb”. [para. 2] and that the State should not intervene unless it causes “harassment, alarm or distress”. [para. 4]

The Court cited Campaign against Antisemitism v DPP [2019] EWHC 9 (Admin), where the Court observed that section 5 of the Public Order Act should be read with Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of expression. While citing R v DPP [2006] EWHC 1375 (Admin) and Parkin v Norman (1982) QB 92 , the Court observed that words used in section 5 are strong and should not be read down to include conduct that might cause harassment, but only conduct that has a likelihood it will. The Court cited Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 (Admin), where some of the protestors who directed insults at soldiers were convicted, where their conduct caused distress to families present, but emphasized that a balance needs to be struck between section 5 and Article 10. The Court observed that section 5 does not criminalise merely insulting conduct, as Parliament’s removal of “insulting words or behaviour” from the provision made clear.

Applying it to the present case, the Court held that Coskun’s conduct was not “disorderly” and was not “likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.” [para 42] The Court reiterated that this was a form of “political speech or conduct” and that “insulting conduct” does not suffice to constitute a criminal offence. [para 34]

The Court found that Coskun’s conduct was not directed at any individual but represented a generalised protest. The location of the protest (outside the Turkish Consulate) was considered significant, as such diplomatic premises are established venues for political protests. The Court emphasised that protests at private residences or places of worship might more readily create a sense of vulnerability in observers, but a protest at a consulate carries a different context, one that anticipates a degree of political expression and dissent.

The Court further noted that Coskun acted alone, was empty-handed except for a book, protested during daylight hours, and that the protest lasted only two or three minutes. The Court observed that although the reaction of people present at the location is not determinative of the offence since the offence criminalises the likelihood of causing distress, the passersby did not appear alarmed to move away from the site. The Court accepted that while Kadri and the cyclist may have felt insulted and angered, it is not synonymous with harassment or alarm for the purposes of section 5.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.