Content Regulation / Censorship, Defamation / Reputation, National Security, Political Expression, Press Freedom
Le Ministère Public v. Uwimana Nkusi
Rwanda
Closed Mixed Outcome
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The Contempt Judge of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) found both Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and its Al Akhbar Newspaper’s Editor-in-Chief, Mr. Al Amin, guilty of contempt and obstruction of justice, sentencing both to a fine. This case arose after Al Akhbar Newspaper published two articles in its newspaper and on its websites, revealing the identity and personal information of 32 purported confidential witnesses involved in a high-profile case before the STL. The Judge found that the publication of confidential information knowingly and willfully constituted an interference with the administration of justice, undermining public confidence in the Tribunal. The Judge also emphasized that while Freedom of the Press encompasses the right to disseminate news and express criticisms regarding judicial proceedings of public interest, it remains subject to restrictions when it is necessary to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings.
On January 15, 2013, Akhbar Beirut S.A.L., a company registered in Lebanon, published an article entitled “STL Leaks: The Prosecution’s Surprise Witnesses” (the “15 January Article”) in its newspaper “Al Akhbar” and on its Arabic and English language websites. The article was co-authored by Mr. Ibrahim Mohamed Ali Al Amin, who served as Editor-in-Chief and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Al Akhbar. The 15 January Article disclosed the identities and personal information of 17 purported confidential witnesses involved in the Ayyash et al. case, a high-profile case involving a massive car bombing in Beirut, killing former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 21 others, and injuring over 200 people, which was still ongoing before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
On January 19, 2013, Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. published another article authored by Mr. Al Amin, entitled “The STL List: Why We Published” (the “19 January Article”) in Al Akhbar and on its Arabic language website. On January 20, 2013, the company published the same article on its English language website. The 19 January Article disclosed the identities of an additional 15 purported confidential witnesses in the Ayyash et al. case.
On January 31, 2014, the initial Contempt Judge of the STL issued a redacted decision including an Order in Lieu of Indictment against Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Mr. Al Amin. In March 2014, the Tribunal appointed a new Prosecutor to take over the investigation of the contempt allegations, following the resignation of the previous Prosecutor.
At the initial appearances before the Tribunal, Mr. Al Amin refused to appoint a legal counsel, choosing to represent both himself and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. The Contempt Judge ordered the Head of the Defense Office to assign counsel. On June 30, 2014, the Defense Office assigned Mr. Antonios Abou Kasm as defense counsel.
On February 24, 2016, the case proceeded to trial.
The main issues for the Contempt Judge was to decide whether corporate liability could be applied in the present case, whether the Accused had transgressed their right to Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Expression by knowingly and willfully publishing the 15 and 19 January Articles, and whether the Articles created a substantial risk of undermining public confidence in the Tribunal’s ability to protect witness confidentiality.
The Prosecutor brought contempt charges against Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Mr. Al Amin under Rule 60 bis (A) of the STL’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, alleging both had knowingly interfered with the administration of justice. In presenting the case, he addressed the two essential elements of the offense: actus reus and mens rea (“material element and mental element”).
On the actus reus, the Prosecutor argued that the Accused had published two articles, on 15 and 19 January, revealing sensitive personal information about alleged confidential Tribunal witnesses. This disclosure, he maintained, posed a serious and “objectively likely” risk of undermining public confidence in the STL and interfering with its judicial functions. The manner of publication was particularly damaging because the individuals were portrayed as opponents of Hezbollah in a volatile political context. The articles remained accessible online until February 2016, despite legal orders to remove them, thereby aggravating the risk.
On the mens rea, the Prosecutor advanced four principal arguments to establish intent. First, he claimed the Accused openly admitted their purpose to discredit the STL by using provocative language such as “hidden cards” and “secret witnesses” to imply that the Tribunal could not safeguard its proceedings. Second, he stressed that the Accused published the 19 January article with knowledge of potential legal consequences, having previously received a cease-and-desist order in 2013 and having included a reference to Rule 60 bis in the article itself. Third, he argued that the Accused were well aware of the Tribunal’s confidentiality regime, particularly given their familiarity with the Al Jadeed TV contempt proceedings. Fourth, the publications failed to meet journalistic standards, as they falsely presented 32 individuals as STL witnesses without verification, further evidencing bad faith.
The Prosecutor further contended that freedom of expression could not shield the publications. Citing Article 19 of the ICCPR, Article 10(2) of the ECHR, and Article 13 of the Lebanese Constitution, he argued that while expression is protected, restrictions are legitimate when necessary to protect the rights of others or the integrity of judicial proceedings. In this case, he submitted, Al Akhbar could have criticized the Tribunal without endangering individuals and their families or compromising the Tribunal’s work.
In relation to corporate liability, the Prosecutor maintained that Mr. Al Amin, in his capacity as editor-in-chief, acted on behalf of Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and had final authority over the publication of the contested articles both in print and online.
The Prosecutor finally called several witnesses who testified to the consequences of the publications. Witnesses reported fear, reputational harm, and threats linked to their exposure as alleged STL witnesses. Some described anonymous calls, community warnings, and political intimidation, while others noted professional and personal damage. Although some considered legal action, they refrained due to the political influence of Al Akhbar or lack of trust in the authorities. Screenshots and testimony further confirmed that the articles remained accessible for years after publication, despite judicial orders to remove them.
Mr. Al Amin sought to dismiss the contempt proceedings against himself and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L., challenging the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to prosecute legal entities and arguing that the case should instead be referred to Lebanese authorities. Throughout the trial, the Defense maintained that the proceedings violated the Accused’s right to press freedom. Like the Prosecutor, it framed its submissions around actus reus and mens rea.
On the actus reus, the Defense claimed that the Prosecutor had failed to prove any concrete harm to witnesses as a result of the 15 and 19 January Articles. It highlighted viva voce evidence from two defense witnesses. DT01 acknowledged being surprised at being identified as a confidential witness but confirmed that the disclosure did not undermine his confidence in the Tribunal, nor did he suffer threats or long-term consequences. DT02 similarly testified that, although shocked to see his personal details published, he met with Mr. Al Amin, requested a clarification letter, and had it published in Al Akhbar to counter misconceptions. He stressed that he maintained trust in the STL and went on to testify openly in its proceedings. To the Defense, these testimonies demonstrated that the publications had no lasting effect on witness confidence, particularly given that the Tribunal continued functioning and protective measures remained in place.
The Defense further challenged the credibility of the Prosecutor’s witnesses. It pointed to inconsistencies in AP06’s testimony about the alleged business impact of the articles, questioned AP07’s reliability as he was already a public figure, and argued that AP09 failed to establish any link between the threatening calls he received and the publications. The Defense also undermined AP15’s credibility by noting that he had received undisclosed compensation for monitoring Al Akhbar’s websites.
On the mens rea, the Defense insisted that the Prosecutor had not established that the Accused knowingly and willfully intended to obstruct justice. He stressed that contempt under Rule 60 bis had never previously been prosecuted by an international tribunal and was not clarified until the Al Jadeed TV case, which occurred after the publication of the contested articles. Accordingly, the Accused could not have foreseen liability at the time. To support this, the Defense relied on the testimony of Elias Aoun, President of the Order of Lebanese Press Editors, who stated that Lebanese journalists had never been informed of Rule 60 bis and viewed it as an undue restriction on press freedom. His report emphasized that the articles served the public interest by informing the Lebanese people and criticizing the Tribunal’s secrecy—legitimate journalistic functions that should not constitute contempt.
The Defense stressed selective enforcement, pointing out that other international outlets had published confidential material about the Ayyash et al. case without facing contempt charges, reinforcing the Accused’s belief that their actions were lawful. He also argued that the cease-and-desist communications cited by the Prosecutor lacked legal effect. The Registrar’s letter, he claimed, was not binding under Lebanese law and had not been served personally on Mr. Al Amin. A formal cease order was only issued in January 2016, at which point the Accused promptly complied and removed sensitive details about the witnesses from the online articles. This three-year delay, the Defense argued, showed the Tribunal itself did not initially treat the articles as an immediate threat.
The Defense ultimately argued that prosecuting journalists for criticizing the STL raised grave freedom of expression concerns. He invoked international and national standards requiring a balance between press freedom and the administration of justice, citing jurisprudence recognizing that criticism of judicial bodies does not in itself amount to contempt unless it directly undermines justice. He concluded that the Accused acted within their rights, and that responsibility for protecting confidentiality lay with the Tribunal itself. On the issue of corporate liability, the Defense maintained that the Prosecutor had not proven that Mr. Al Amin, acting on behalf of Akhbar Beirut S.A.L., had the requisite intent to commit contempt. Bylaws of the company placed ultimate responsibility on the Board, with the Chairman tasked with legal compliance, and in any event, Mr. Al Amin’s actions were rooted in press freedom rather than criminal intent.
The Contempt Judge initially ruled that the STL lacked jurisdiction over legal entities, but this was overturned by the Appeals Panel in STL, Prosecution v. Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. and Al Amin (2015), which confirmed that corporations could be held liable for contempt. Applying Lebanese law, the Judge clarified that establishing corporate liability required proof that an individual, acting in an official capacity for the company, committed the offense on its behalf or with its resources. He also acknowledged the Defense’s freedom of the press argument, noting that press rights would prevail unless the Prosecutor proved both actus reus and mens rea beyond reasonable doubt. Drawing from ICTY precedents (Jovic and Marijacic & Rebic), he affirmed that expression does not protect conduct that intentionally interferes with justice.
On actus reus, the Judge applied the test from the Al Jadeed judgment: the Prosecutor had to prove that the Accused published information on purported confidential witnesses, that these individuals were reasonably identifiable, and that the disclosure created an objective likelihood of undermining public confidence in the STL’s witness protection regime. The evidence was undisputed that Al Akhbar published two articles on 15 and 19 January 2013, authored by Mr. Al Amin, which listed 32 alleged witnesses in the Ayyash et al. case. These articles included names, addresses, family details, occupations, and photographs, and were disseminated both in print and online in Arabic, with translations available on the English website.
The Judge assessed witness testimony. Prosecution witnesses demonstrated varying degrees of fear, reputational damage, and concern. AP06 linked his loss of business directly to being publicly identified; AP07 and AP09’s cases showed broader societal concerns and negative discourse surrounding the Tribunal; and AP15 confirmed the continued online availability of the articles. Although some testimony, such as AP09’s inconsistent account of threatening calls, was less persuasive, the Judge found that the overall evidence reflected serious risks to safety and public trust. By contrast, Defense witnesses DT01 and DT02 attempted to minimize harm but were found evasive, with DT02’s clarification letter confirming reputational damage and fear of political association. Expert witness Mr. Aoun was found unqualified and biased, as his testimony lacked neutrality and focused on personal disagreement with the Tribunal, though parts of his account corroborating public criticism were admitted as factual evidence.
In evaluating the evidence, the Judge stressed that actual harm was not required; it was sufficient to show an objective likelihood of undermining public confidence, supported by concrete proof rather than assumptions. He found that the articles were written in an accusatory tone, portraying the STL as a political enemy and labeling witnesses as collaborators against Hezbollah. Publishing such personal information without journalistic necessity, in Lebanon’s volatile environment, significantly increased the risk of harm. This conclusion was reinforced by Lebanese law (Legislative Decree No. 104/1977; Article 420 of the Criminal Code) and international standards (Article 8 ECHR), which prohibit disclosing the identities of witnesses in judicial proceedings.
Ultimately, the Judge held that the 15 and 19 January Articles, along with related publications, interfered with the administration of justice by creating a serious risk to witnesses and undermining confidence in the STL’s ability to protect confidentiality. He therefore concluded, beyond reasonable doubt, that the actus reus of contempt was satisfied, in line with the European Court of Human Rights’ reasoning in Worm v. Austria (1997), which upheld restrictions on expression where necessary to safeguard judicial integrity.
The Judge then considered whether the mens rea requirement was met, namely whether the Accused (1) deliberately published the information and (2) knew that their conduct was likely to undermine public confidence in the Tribunal. He clarified that “willful blindness,” which is the intentional avoidance of the truth, was equivalent to actual knowledge, citing the ICTY’s decision in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (2001). Thus, it was sufficient for the Prosecutor to show that the Accused suspected wrongdoing yet consciously avoided confirming it to escape responsibility.
On the issue of deliberate publication, the Judge found clear evidence that Mr. Al Amin authored, approved, and published the 15 and 19 January Articles, a fact he himself confirmed in interview. He knowingly disclosed photographs, names, and personal details of purported confidential witnesses, and further reinforced the intentionality of his conduct by admitting that Al Akhbar had always published, and intended to continue publishing, confidential material.
Regarding knowledge of the likely consequences, the Judge dismissed the Defense’s argument that the STL had previously tolerated similar disclosures, noting that no evidence or examples were provided. He also rejected claims of ambiguity in Rule 60 bis (A), affirming that the Rule covers all knowing and willful interference with justice, not only the acts explicitly listed. Relying on ICTY precedents (Hartmann, 2009; Haxiu, 2008), he reiterated that misunderstanding the law does not excuse violations of it.
The Judge further emphasized that Mr. Al Amin was aware of the risks: he admitted that Al Akhbar received questions from influential figures about the purpose and legality of the articles, and conceded that publishing the material could endanger lives. Additional evidence included an article by Omar Nashabe in Al Akhbar (19 January 2013), which expressly explained Rule 60 bis and its prohibition on publishing confidential information. As Editor-in-Chief, Al Amin’s sole authority over STL-related content left no doubt that he was aware of both the rule and the illegality of his actions.
The Judge also assessed journalistic standards under Lebanese and international law, finding that the articles lacked neutrality, presented alleged witnesses in a negative light as opponents of Hezbollah, and were politically motivated rather than objectively reported. This indicated not only a lack of journalistic good faith but also an intent to damage the STL’s integrity.
On this basis, the Judge concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the Prosecutor had proven the second element of contempt, establishing that the Accused deliberately interfered with the administration of justice with knowledge of the likely consequences.
Having established that both the actus reus and mens rea elements of contempt were proven, the Judge examined whether the Accused could rely on the right to Freedom of Expression as a defense. He emphasized that neither press freedom nor freedom of expression is absolute, as both must be balanced against competing interests in democratic societies. Relying on international standards, including Article 19 ICCPR and the UNHRC’s decision in Morais v. Angola (2005), as well as Article 10(2) ECHR for interpretive guidance, he affirmed that restrictions on expression are permissible when necessary and proportionate to protect judicial integrity and witness safety. The Judge also noted that Lebanese journalistic standards align with these principles, as even defense witness Mr. Aoun conceded, and admitted supporting evidence, including a transcript of an April 2013 Al Jadeed broadcast, reinforcing this position.
On this basis, the Judge held that publishing the personal data and photographs of potential witnesses constituted a serious breach of journalistic standards, both in Lebanon and internationally, and could not be justified as free expression. While acknowledging that freedom of expression includes the right to inform the public, he rejected the Defense’s claim that the 15 and 19 January Articles were merely informative. He found that although media outlets may report on and criticize the Tribunal, this freedom does not extend to revealing the identities of 32 purported confidential witnesses, a limitation explicitly reflected in Rule 60 bis (vii). Protecting such information was essential to safeguard public confidence in the justice system. The publications, however, fueled negative public discourse and triggered significant criticism, particularly in Lebanon.
The Judge further dismissed the characterization of the articles as investigative journalism, pointing to three deficiencies: the Defense failed to show that the Accused verified the source of the alleged leaks; witness testimony (including DT02) showed that designating individuals as witnesses against Hezbollah was inaccurate; and key witnesses confirmed that Al Akhbar never sought their verification or consent prior to publication. Accordingly, the Judge found that the Accused did not adhere to basic standards of investigative journalism, rendering the Defense’s arguments irrelevant. He concluded that restricting such disclosures was a justified and necessary limitation on press freedom, aimed at protecting judicial integrity and the safety of witnesses.
Turning to corporate liability, the Judge applied Lebanese law requiring proof that a specific individual committed the offense, held a qualifying position within the company, and acted on its behalf or using its resources. Since Mr. Al Amin had already been found guilty of contempt, the first requirement was satisfied. His positions as Editor-in-Chief, General Manager, and Chairman of the Board satisfied the second requirement, while the fact that the 15 and 19 January Articles were published using Al Akhbar’s resources satisfied the third. Accordingly, the Judge concluded that Akhbar Beirut S.A.L., the corporate Accused, was likewise guilty of contempt.
In conclusion, pursuant to Rules 60 bis (A), 60 bis (H), and 168 of the STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Judge found both Mr. Al Amin and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L. guilty of contempt.
Decision Direction indicates whether the decision expands or contracts expression based on an analysis of the case.
This ruling represents a mixed outcome. The Contempt Judge appropriately constrained expression by holding both the newspaper company and its Editor-in-Chief guilty of contempt, underscoring that freedom of expression carries responsibilities, particularly in sensitive judicial contexts. In doing so, he struck a careful balance between press freedom and the integrity of judicial proceedings, while leaving space for legitimate journalism. Protecting the rule of law and the rights of vulnerable individuals was deemed a legitimate aim that justified the restriction on expression. The ruling is also distinctive, both within the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and in the broader practice of international courts, as it marked the first time an international criminal tribunal convicted a legal entity for contempt, an important development in international law.
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