Case Summary and Outcome

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a preliminary injunction halting enforcement of a presidential proclamation that barred international students and exchange visitors from entering the United States to study at a prominent U.S. university. The case stemmed from an alleged retaliatory campaign by the U.S. Administration after the university rejected a letter conditioning federal funding on ideological demands, including changes to admissions, elimination of diversity programs, and external departmental audits for viewpoint diversity. In response to the rejection, the Administration froze billions in grant funding, revoked Student Exchange Visitor Program certification, and publicly threatened the university’s tax-exempt status, while senior governmental officials, including the President, made repeated statements linking these actions to the university’s speech and litigation. The Court found a strong likelihood that the proclamation violated Title 8, section 1182(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, noting its unprecedented use to target a domestic institution absent any genuine foreign policy or security rationale. It also concluded that the university was likely to prevail on its First Amendment claims under the U.S. Constitution, which safeguards freedoms such as speech, academic expression, and the right to challenge the government, finding the government’s actions to be retaliatory and rooted in viewpoint discrimination. Determining that enforcement would cause the university irreparable harm by infringing on their constitutional rights and disrupting education and research, the Court granted the preliminary injunction and enjoined the Proclamation.

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Facts

In 2023, 2024 and 2025, on the aftermath of the war in Gaza and Israel’s military operations, universities across the United States, including Harvard University, a prominent U.S. academic institution, experienced sustained campus protests against the war. Amid growing concerns about antisemitism, the U.S. federal government established a Task Force to Combat Anti‑Semitism in early 2025. The Task Force began investigating ten universities and, by late March 2025, notified Harvard of its intent to evaluate approximately $8.7 billion in federal research funding, citing the university’s alleged failure to adequately address antisemitic harassment.

On April 3, 2025, the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Education (DoE) sent a joint letter to Harvard University outlining a set of reforms required to maintain eligibility for federal funding. This letter was superseded on April 11, 2025, by a second communication that imposed specific conditions for continuing Harvard’s financial relationship with the federal government. These conditions included reducing the authority of faculty members identified as promoting activism over scholarship, restructuring the recruitment and admissions process for international students to exclude individuals perceived as “hostile to American values,” mandating external audits across academic departments to assess “viewpoint diversity,” requiring new faculty and students to contribute to such diversity, auditing programs suspected of “ideological capture”, terminating all diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, and revoking recognition of student organizations allegedly involved in anti-Semitic activity. [p. 3-4]

On April 14, 2025, Harvard President Alan Garber issued a public response rejecting the April 11 letter’s demands. He stated that the federal government’s directives exceeded its lawful authority, violated Harvard’s First Amendment rights (the constitutional provision protecting freedoms such as speech, academic expression, and the right to challenge the government), and posed a direct threat to the university’s independence as a private academic institution. Garber emphasized that efforts by the Administration to influence Harvard’s admissions policies, academic curriculum, and campus governance represented an unconstitutional attempt to dictate the internal affairs of the university through the threat of financial penalties.

The President Donald J. Trump Administration responded promptly to President Garber’s public rejection of the April 11 letter and within hours, the Task Force to Combat Anti‑Semitism announced a freeze on billions of dollars in federal research funding allocated to Harvard. The following day, April 15, 2025, President Trump posted on Truth Social, a social media platform, suggesting that Harvard’s tax-exempt status should be revoked.  He said, “Perhaps Harvard should lose its Tax Exempt Status and be Taxed as a Political Entity if it keeps pushing political, ideological, and terrorist inspired/supporting ‘Sickness?’ Remember, Tax Exempt Status is totally contingent on acting in the PUBLIC INTEREST!” [p. 5] On April 16, he made another post, criticizing the university for employing individuals he described as “Radical Left, idiots and ‘birdbrains,’” and asserting that it “should no longer receive Federal Funds.” [p. 5] Later that same day, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem issued a letter to Harvard threatening to revoke its certification under the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) unless the university complied with extensive document demands. The letter was accompanied by a public statement attributing the action to Harvard’s purported “radical ideology” and alignment with “anti-American, pro-Hamas ideology.” [p. 32]

The campaign against Harvard escalated over the following weeks: on April 20, 2025, the Administration threatened to withhold an additional $1 billion in funding; on April 24, President Trump again posted on Truth Social, referring to Harvard as an “Anti-Semitic, Far Left Institution” and “a threat to Democracy” [p. 6]; on April 30, during a Cabinet meeting, President Trump reiterated these criticisms, while Secretary of Education Linda McMahon commented that Harvard had responded to a negotiation offer with litigation, stating, “We’re staying tough with them”; on May 2, President Trump again raised the possibility of stripping Harvard’s tax-exempt status; and on May 5, Secretary McMahon followed with a letter, confirming that Harvard would no longer receive federal grant funding and attributing the university’s position to the influence of a “strongly left-leaning [former president Barack] Obama political appointee”, reaffirming the Administration’s commitment to the reforms outlined in the April 11 letter and questioning whether Harvard was appropriately screening faculty to ensure they were focused on subject matter rather than advancing ideological positions. [p. 7] The Administration’s actions culminated on May 22, 2025, when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a letter revoking Harvard’s certification under the SEVP (the SEVP Revocation Letter), effectively terminating its ability to host international students.

On May 23, 2025, Harvard initiated legal proceedings by filing a complaint and a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to halt enforcement of the SEVP revocation. The Court granted the TRO the same day, preserving the university’s SEVP status pending further review.

In the days that followed, the Administration continued its pressure campaign. On May 26, 2025, President Trump posted twice on Truth Social, referencing the litigation and suggesting an additional $3 billion in federal funding cuts. Media reports indicated that on May 28, the day before the preliminary injunction hearing, officials from nearly a dozen federal agencies gathered to consider further punitive actions against Harvard. That same day, DHS submitted a Notice of Intent to Withdraw (NOIW) the SEVP Revocation Letter and indicated that enforcement would be suspended during the NOIW process. On June 1, 2025, Secretary Noem posted a video on social media platform X, publicly accusing Harvard of fostering “communist and Marxist ideologies” on its campus. [p. 8]

While the NOIW proceedings regarding Harvard’s SEVP certification were still pending, the President issued a Proclamation on June 4, 2025, titled “Enhancing National Security by Addressing Risks at Harvard University” (the Proclamation). The Proclamation suspended the issuance of certain categories (F‑1, M‑1, and J‑1) of visas to any foreign national seeking to study at or participate in exchange programs at Harvard under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically section 1182(f) of Title 8 which states: “Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.” [p. 11] The Proclamation cited alleged increases in crime on Harvard’s campus, the university’s acceptance of funding from China and other foreign governments, and the enrollment of students from “non-egalitarian” countries as justification. [p. 12] An accompanying press release further characterized Harvard as having a “demonstrated history of … radicalism.” [p. 12]

The President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard) filed suit against the DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of State (DoS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the SEVP, and several high-ranking federal officials (collectively, the Government), seeking to enjoin the Proclamation. The Court granted Harvard’s motion for a TRO the same day. Harvard subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction on June 12, and a hearing was held on June 16, 2025.

Harvard argued that the June 4 Proclamation violated the First (protection of free speech) and Fifth (equal protection) rights of the Constitution as it was issued in retaliation for Harvard’s protected speech and institutional autonomy.

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Decision Overview

Judge Allison Burroughs of the United States District of Massachusetts delivered the memorandum and order. The central issue before the Court was whether the presidential proclamation, titled “Enhancing National Security by Addressing Risks at Harvard University,” was lawful under Title 8, section 1182(f) of INA, and whether it violated Harvard’s First Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution through retaliation and viewpoint discrimination, or Harvard’s Fifth Amendment equal protection rights, which require the government to treat entities fairly and without unjustified discrimination.

Harvard filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against the Proclamation, arguing that it exceeded the President’s statutory authority under section 1182(f) and was issued in retaliation for Harvard’s protected speech and institutional autonomy. It asserted that even if the Proclamation fell within the statutory framework, it could not survive because it violated the First and Fifth Amendments. As to its statutory claim, Harvard argued that President Trump had failed to make the required finding that the entry of certain noncitizens would be detrimental to U.S. interests; instead, the Proclamation was aimed at coercing a domestic institution into compliance with government-imposed ideological demands, not addressing any external threat. Harvard emphasized that section 1182(f) has historically been used to regulate foreign nationals based on foreign policy or national security concerns, not to influence internal academic governance. It also challenged the validity of defining an excludable “class” of aliens based solely on their intent to attend a specific U.S. university, a move it argued had no precedent. Further, Harvard contended that the Proclamation conflicted with the established regulatory structure of the SEVP by imposing excessive documentation demands beyond what the law authorizes.

In addition to its statutory arguments, Harvard asserted several constitutional claims. First, it argued that the highly deferential standard of review applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel and Trump v. Hawaii was inapplicable, as the Proclamation targeted a domestic entity rather than foreign actors or conduct abroad. It maintained that the Proclamation was retaliatory, citing its refusal to comply with the April 11 letter, which demanded changes to admissions, curriculum, and campus policy, as protected speech, along with President Garber’s April 14 public statement. Harvard pointed to a coordinated campaign by federal officials, including public statements, funding freezes, threats to its tax-exempt status, and attempts to revoke SEVP certification, as direct responses to its protected conduct. Harvard also raised a Petition Clause claim (which protects the right of individuals or entities to formally request action or relief from the government without fear of retaliation), submitting that the Proclamation was issued to punish it for filing lawsuits challenging prior government actions. Harvard cited the timing of the Proclamation and public comments by officials explicitly referencing the litigation and submitted that there was additional unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, supported by numerous statements from the Administration condemning its perceived ideological stance and “Radical Left” orientation. Harvard brought a “class-of-one” equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment, arguing it was treated differently than other similarly situated institutions without any rational basis, and that this selective enforcement reinforced its broader claims of unlawful retaliation and discrimination.

The Government opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction by arguing that the Proclamation was a lawful exercise of presidential authority under section 1182(f) and did not infringe any constitutional rights. Emphasizing the broad discretion conferred on the Executive by immigration law, particularly as interpreted in Trump v. Hawaii, the Government submitted that the President acted within his statutory powers in suspending visa issuance for individuals intending to study at Harvard. It argued that the statute does not limit how a “class” may be defined, and basing the restriction on a student’s intent to attend a particular institution is consistent with the nature of F‑1, M‑1, and J‑1 visas, which are school-specific. They further argued that section 1182(f) operates independently from SEVP regulations and does not conflict with existing agency frameworks. As to constitutional review, the Government invoked Mandel and Trump v. Hawaii to argue that the Proclamation was facially valid and that the Court should not look beyond its stated justifications to assess underlying motive.

In response to Harvard’s First Amendment retaliation claim, the Government argued that the allegations lacked factual support and that the Administration’s concerns about Harvard’s ability to monitor international students were policy-based and not retaliatory. The Government maintained that Harvard’s rejection of the April 11 letter did not constitute protected speech, and that the seven-week gap between that response and the issuance of the Proclamation undermined any inference of causation. It further asserted that the alleged campaign of retaliation was based on the actions of various independent actors across different agencies, and that inferring a coordinated motive required an unreasonable leap. The Government also urged the Court to apply a presumption of regularity to executive action and noted the absence of direct evidence tying the Proclamation to Harvard’s speech. As to the Petition Clause claim, the Government acknowledged that filing suit is protected activity but argued that judicial review must be limited to the Proclamation itself. Citing Hartman v. Moore, it submitted that Harvard failed to rule out independent, lawful reasons for the Proclamation’s issuance. The Government’s responses to the viewpoint discrimination and equal protection claims echoed its retaliation arguments, arguing that the record lacked evidence of improper intent and it maintained that the Proclamation was a proper exercise of the President’s authority under section 1182(f), rooted in national security concerns.

The Court rejected the Government’s argument that the Proclamation was not subject to judicial review, where it had relied on Fiallo v. Bell to argue that the President’s authority under section 1182(f) is so broad that courts may not second-guess it and the Court distinguished Fiallo as a case concerning Congress’s legislative power over the admission of aliens, not the Executive’s authority. The Court reaffirmed the presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action, stating that “the Court sees no reason why that review cannot include ensuring the Administration’s compliance with the statutory scheme, particularly where the dispute implicates core constitutional concerns distinct from the statutory analysis.” [p. 14]

Having found the case justiciable, the Court then applied the standard for preliminary injunctions set out in Corporate Technologies, Inc. v. Harnett which requires the movant, in this case, Harvard, to establish: (i) a likelihood of success on the merits, (ii) a risk of irreparable harm if relief is denied, (iii) that the balance of hardships favors the movant, and (iv) that an injunction would serve the public interest. As the Government was the opposing party in the present case, the third and fourth factors merged. In light of the constitutional issues raised, the Court focused primarily on the likelihood of success, finding the remaining factors weighed clearly in Harvard’s favor.

In evaluating Harvard’s likelihood of success on the merits, the Court analyzed Harvard’s statutory claim that the President had overstepped the bounds of his authority under section 1182(f) by issuing the Proclamation. While the Government relied on Trump v. Hawaii as controlling precedent, the Court concluded that the circumstances here differed substantially and that Hawaii did not resolve the statutory question at issue. The Court identified several material distinctions between Trump v. Hawaii and the present case. First, in Trump v. Hawaii, the executive action was grounded in concerns over the government’s inability to vet individuals from certain nations prior to entry, based on specific national security risks. Here, by contrast, there was no indication that the students themselves posed any vetting challenges or security threat at the point of entry. Rather, the rationale behind the Proclamation appeared to rest on concerns about Harvard’s internal administrative practices, namely, whether Harvard had complied with post-entry information sharing obligations, rather than on risks associated with the individuals seeking visas. Second, the Court found the definition of the barred “class” under the Proclamation to be markedly different; while the Hawaii policy restricted individuals based on nationality, a traditional and objective criterion that immigration law has long recognized, the present Proclamation excluded noncitizens based on their intended enrollment at a specific U.S. university. The Court questioned whether such a definition, tied not to a person’s identity or origin but to their choice of academic institution, could properly be classified as a “class” within the meaning of section 1182(f). The Court observed that the Proclamation did not identify any tangible threat at the border or any foreign policy or international security concern tied to the students themselves. Instead, the purported harm was attributed entirely to the conduct of a domestic university. That framing placed the focus of executive concern squarely on a U.S. institution’s operations, rather than on any external actor or cross-border threat. The Court also noted that while Trump v. Hawaii involved a comprehensive restriction on entry from specified countries, the Court observed that in the present case, in regard to the students, the “President has arguably (and, very specifically) not found that the entry would be detrimental, given that these students are allowed to enter – provided that they do not attend Harvard.” [p. 17] That conditional framing, the Court suggested, undermined the notion that the students’ entry was inherently detrimental; rather, it pointed to a punitive measure targeted at Harvard itself, implemented by limiting access to visas for prospective students based solely on their intended academic affiliation.

The Court evaluated the Proclamation against the four elements required by section 1182(f): (1) that the President has made a “finding,” (2) concerning the “entry into the United States,” (3) of “any aliens or class of aliens,” and (4) that such entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.” Harvard had challenged the Proclamation on the basis that it lacked the necessary predicate “finding” of detriment, arguing that the President failed to identify any genuine harm arising from the entry of the affected individuals, but the Court, citing Trump v. Hawaii, declined to scrutinize the President’s reasoning in depth, noting that the statute does not define what constitutes a “finding” and that existing precedent discourages courts from second-guessing the Executive’s justification in this context.

Nonetheless, the Court examined how the Proclamation addressed the second and third elements: the entry into the United States of a “class of aliens.” While the measure on its face restricted entry, the Court observed that its actual effect was to allow entry so long as the visa holder did not attend Harvard, noting that the Government’s reading of the provision “seems to be a perversion of the language and purpose of the statute.” [p. 18] This conditional restriction suggested that the Proclamation did not view entry itself as inherently detrimental but rather sought to impose consequences on a particular domestic affiliation, raising questions about whether it genuinely satisfied the statutory requirement that the “entry” be harmful. With regard to the “class of aliens,” the Court acknowledged that the term has been broadly interpreted but emphasized that this instance was without precedent: never before had a Proclamation under section 1182(f) defined a class based solely on the individual’s intent to associate with a specific domestic institution. The Court pointed to the long-standing absence of such an approach, reasoning that had the Executive historically held such power, it would likely have been exercised before.

In regard to the fourth element, detriment to U.S. interests, Harvard had argued that it must be understood in the context of the statute’s broader purpose, which is to safeguard national security or advance foreign policy by regulating external threats but that the Proclamation identified no specific danger posed by the students themselves, and instead attributed the supposed detriment to Harvard’s conduct as a domestic university. The Court, referencing Trump v. Hawaii’s acknowledgment of the President’s authority to act based on foreign policy concerns, noted that other courts have expressed skepticism when section 1182(f) was invoked in the service of domestic policy objectives. In light of these concerns and the unique aspects of the Proclamation, particularly its focus on a single academic institution and the absence of a discernible international risk, the Court voiced serious doubt that this use of section 1182(f) was consistent with the statutory framework.

The Court assessed Harvard’s constitutional claims, which included First Amendment theories based on retaliatory action, both for protected speech and for the Petition Clause claim, as well as a viewpoint discrimination claim and a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge. These arguments largely relied on evidence external to the four corners of the Proclamation. The Government maintained that, under the standards established in Mandel and Trump v. Hawaii, the Court was precluded from considering such evidence so long as the Proclamation offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide” rationale for the exclusion of noncitizens. The Court disagreed with this threshold framing. It reasoned that if the Proclamation itself lacked statutory validity under section 1182(f), the deferential review standard from Trump v. Hawaii and Mandel would not apply. But even if the Proclamation were assumed to be authorized by statute, the Court held that it nonetheless could not survive constitutional scrutiny. According to the Court, the Proclamation fell within the narrow category of executive actions that, regardless of facial legitimacy, could not plausibly be explained by neutral justifications and instead appeared driven by unconstitutional motives. In the Court’s view, the record suggested a pattern of intent that pointed more to animus (political will) than to any defensible governmental objective.

Examining the Proclamation’s justifications, the Court found them to lack credibility. The first rationale cited a supposed spike in criminal activity at Harvard but the Court noted a complete absence of evidence tying international students to any such increase, and pointed out that the Administration appeared to rely on reporting from a student-run newspaper rather than official crime statistics or federal data. As a result, this rationale was deemed disconnected from any legitimate interest. The Proclamation also raised concerns about Harvard’s financial and institutional connections with foreign governments, particularly China and referenced past donations and allegations involving entities linked to the Chinese Communist Party. But the Court found this rationale equally unpersuasive, as the Proclamation did not target Chinese nationals or students affiliated with the named organizations but imposed a sweeping bar on all noncitizens seeking to study at Harvard, a scope the Court found vastly disproportionate to the risks asserted, noting that “[t]his is a textbook example of where the “sheer breadth” of the ban is “discontinuous with the reasons offered for it,” citing Trump v. Hawaii. [p. 25] The third justification involved civil rights concerns, specifically that Harvard enrolled students from countries deemed “non-egalitarian” but the Court found no logic in a policy that prohibited those students from attending Harvard while allowing their enrollment at other institutions. It added that the inconsistency challenges the legitimacy of the stated reasoning and suggested an underlying bias rather than a coherent policy objective.

Unlike the proclamation in Trump v. Hawaii, which was facially neutral, the measure at issue here directly singled out Harvard by name. Moreover, public statements issued alongside the Proclamation referred to Harvard’s “radicalism,” reinforcing the impression that it was motivated not by a neutral concern for national security, but by hostility toward the institution’s perceived ideological stance. Based on the record before it, the Court concluded that “it is difficult, if not impossible to conclude that the reasons offered in support of the Proclamation are anything other than pretextual,” and that the Proclamation was animated by impermissible motives. [p. 27]

The Court found that Harvard was likely to succeed on its First Amendment retaliation claim, and applying the three-part test for a retaliation claim established in Werner v. Therein to the present case, the Court had to determine: (1) whether Harvard engaged in protected activity, (2) whether the Government took adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing that activity, and (3) whether there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. The Court found that Harvard’s refusal to adopt the measures outlined in the April 11 letter, including changes to admissions, curriculum, and campus governance, fell squarely within the scope of protected academic freedom, quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents: “[a]cademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also … on autonomous decision making by the academy itself.” [p. 29] Public statements such as President Garber’s April 14 letter also constituted constitutionally protected expression. The Proclamation, which effectively stripped Harvard of its ability to host international students and scholars, was deemed a clear adverse action, given its far-reaching consequences for research, institutional reputation, and academic operations.

As to causation, the Court rejected the Government’s arguments that the time lapse or involvement of separate agencies undermined Harvard’s claim and found overwhelming evidence of retaliatory intent, pointing to a sustained campaign of pressure by the Administration. This included public criticism by President Trump, threatened and actual freezes on funding, efforts to revoke Harvard’s SEVP certification, and direct references linking Harvard’s noncompliance to punitive measures. The Court declined to extend a presumption of regularity to the Proclamation, noting the unprecedented use of section 1182(f) against a domestic academic institution. Statements from officials, such as the remark that “they’ve taken a very hard line, so we took a hard line back,” confirmed retaliatory motive. [p. 34] In light of this, the Court concluded that Harvard had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on its retaliation claim, noting that “the causal link between the Proclamation and Harvard’s April 14th rejection of the Administration’s April 11 Letter could not be more evident.” [p. 34]

For the Petition Clause claim, the Court, relying on Stepnes v. Tennessen, applied the same elements as the free speech retaliation claim, finding that pursuing litigation against the government is protected activity and the Proclamation is an adverse action. The causal connection was clear, with explicit references to the litigation by the President and a timeline indicating the Proclamation was issued shortly after Harvard filed its initial lawsuit and just before a key court filing. This timing suggested the Proclamation was an “end run” (an American football term referring to an “evasive trick or maneuver”) around the Court’s prior proceedings. Accordingly, the Court found Harvard likely to succeed on this claim as well. [p. 37]

Regarding the viewpoint discrimination claim, the Court focused on the Administration’s perceived discrimination against Harvard due to its ideology. Citing National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo, the Court affirmed that government actors cannot discriminate based on viewpoint or use state power to suppress disfavored speech. The evidence abundantly demonstrated this, with numerous Administration statements explicitly critiquing Harvard’s “left-leaning orientation,” labeling it “woke, Radical Left, idiots,” an “Anti-Semitic, Far Left Institution,” and a “Liberal mess”. The Court concluded that the evidence strongly suggested the Administration was using the power of the state to punish or suppress these disfavored views, making Harvard likely to succeed on its viewpoint discrimination claim.

For the equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment, the Court noted that Harvard’s “class-of-one” claim (alleging it was singled out for unfair treatment without a valid reason) was largely coextensive with its retaliation claims. While reincorporating its prior reasoning, the Court left this specific claim for later proceedings, reiterating that success on any one claim was sufficient for a preliminary injunction.

With respect to the remaining elements of the preliminary injunction standard, the Court found that they strongly supported relief. It held that Harvard would suffer immediate and irreparable harm without an injunction, citing the loss of First Amendment freedoms, disruption to research and academic programs, reputational damage, and uncertainty for incoming international students. The balance of equities and the public interest, which merge when the Government is the opposing party, also weighed in Harvard’s favor. The Court emphasized the broader harm to students, the academic community, and essential research and healthcare services, concluding that protecting constitutional rights and academic integrity serves the public interest.

In conclusion, the Court found that the Government’s attempt to pressure a respected academic institution by targeting its ability to host international students posed a direct threat to fundamental constitutional principles, including freedom of expression, inquiry, and dissent. It emphasized that the Administration appeared to be punishing Harvard for its perceived ideological stance, rather than pursuing a legitimate national interest. As the Court put it, the Government sought to carry out this campaign “on the backs of international students, with little thought to the consequences to them or, ultimately, to our own citizens.” [p. 44] Quoting George Washington, the Court warned that if freedom of speech is taken away, then “dumb and silent we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter.” [p. 44]

On this basis, and given the Court’s finding that Harvard was highly likely to succeed on its statutory claim due to the Proclamation’s unprecedented and distinguishable nature, as well as on its constitutional claims of retaliation for protected speech and litigation, and viewpoint discrimination, the Court granted Harvard’s motion for a preliminary injunction. It enjoined the Government from implementing, enforcing, instituting, maintaining, or giving effect to the Proclamation pending further order of the Court.

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