President and Fellows of Harvard College v. the Department of Health and Human Services

Closed Expands Expression

Key Details

  • Mode of Expression
    Non-verbal Expression
  • Date of Decision
    September 3, 2025
  • Outcome
    Judgment in Favor of Petitioner
  • Case Number
    Civil Action No. 25-cv-11048-ADB
  • Region & Country
    United States, North America
  • Judicial Body
    First Instance Court
  • Type of Law
    Civil Law
  • Themes
    Academic Freedom
  • Tags
    Content-Based Restriction, Viewpoint Discrimination

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Case Analysis

Case Summary and Outcome

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that multiple federal agencies unlawfully froze and terminated over $2 billion in federal grants awarded to a prominent research university. A federal multi-agency task force, tasked with combating antisemitism, issued letters to the university conditioning continued funding on sweeping governance reforms, increased “viewpoint diversity,” and the elimination of certain diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives. The university rejected these demands and the agencies then imposed grant freezes and issued termination letters. The Court found that the agencies’ actions violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which protects freedoms such as speech and academic expression, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination, and were also arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Court held that these actions constituted unconstitutional retaliation for the university’s refusal to accept viewpoint-based conditions and for filing litigation to defend its academic freedom, characterizing the government’s invocation of antisemitism as a pretext for an ideologically driven campaign. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Freeze Orders and Termination Letters and permanently enjoined the agencies from reimposing the measures or taking any future funding actions in retaliation for protected speech or without adherence to Title VI.


Facts

On January 29, 2025, U.S. president Donald Trump signed Executive Order (EO) 14188, “Additional Measures to Combat Anti-Semitism”. The order directed executive agencies to identify available authorities to curb antisemitism and to assess complaints lodged against institutions of higher education concerning incidents of campus antisemitism and referred to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance) as the means to combat antisemitism. The order was issued in the context of increased activism on university campuses following the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas against Israel and the subsequent Israeli war against Gaza. Harvard experienced heightened tensions and acts of hostility directed at members of its Jewish community and, in January 2024, Harvard President Alan Garber had established the Presidential Task Force on Combatting Antisemitism and Anti-Israeli Bias (Harvard Task Force), mandated to investigate the causes of such bias-based conduct and to recommend appropriate measures. Harvard also implemented a series of policy and programmatic reforms, including the imposition of disciplinary action on students and faculty, the expansion of programs addressing bias, the adoption of new accountability mechanisms, the prohibition of unauthorized campus encampments and displays, and the refinement of misconduct reporting procedures.

On February 3, 2025, in terms of EO 14188, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the establishment of a multi-agency Task Force to Combat Antisemitism (Federal Task Force), to be led by Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Leo Terrell.

On March 31, 2025, Harvard received correspondence from the Federal Task Force (March 31 Letter) advising it of a “review” of more than $8.7 billion in federal funding, associating such funding with allegations of antisemitism occurring on Harvard’s campus. The HHS, the DoE, and the General Services Administration (GSA) publicly announced their review of Harvard’s federal funding on grounds of its alleged failure to adequately address antisemitism.

On April 3, 2025, the Federal Task Force issued an official notice (April 3 Letter) setting out the pre-conditions for Harvard’s continued eligibility for federal funding, including governance reforms, oversight mechanisms for allegedly biased programs, measures to enhance viewpoint diversity, and the termination of diversity, equality and inclusion (DEI) initiatives. Relying on Title VI, the Federal Task Force alleged that Harvard had failed to adequately protect students and faculty from antisemitic conduct and demanded immediate cooperation as a condition for maintaining federal financial support. The notice did not acknowledge measures Harvard had already undertaken, nor did it cite particular incidents of antisemitism or explain the manner in which Title VI had been violated. An annexure imposed further requirements, including changes in departmental leadership and the creation of a senior secured lien over Harvard’s assets as security for compliance.

On April 11, 2025, the GSA, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Education (DoE) issued a second notice (April 11 Letter), expressly superseding the April 3 Letter. The April 11 Letter alleged that Harvard had failed to comply with civil rights obligations and imposed additional conditions for continued federal funding. These included commissioning an independent audit on viewpoint diversity, eliminating ideological criteria in admissions and hiring, recruiting a significant number of faculty and students to ensure balance of perspectives, restructuring governance to diminish the influence of students and untenured faculty, and terminating all DEI programs. The Government also reserved authority to conduct compliance audits up until 2028. As with the prior notice, the April 11 Letter neither credited Harvard’s prior reforms nor identified specific incidents of antisemitism, and did not explain how Title VI had been breached.

As of April 14, 2025, Harvard University, recognized as the oldest institution of higher education in the United States and a leading research university, was the recipient of ongoing federal grant funding from multiple agencies, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the HHS, the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the National Endowment of the Arts, the Office of Personnel Management, the DoE, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Energy (Energy) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). These grants support essential research initiatives that cultivate future leaders and contribute to discoveries of significant societal impact.

On April 14, 2025, Harvard issued a letter rejecting the terms proposed by the Government. In its response, Harvard reaffirmed its commitment to addressing antisemitism and identified “substantial policy and programmatic measures” already undertaken. [p. 10] Harvard stated that the demands contained in the April 11 Letter disregarded its prior efforts and infringed upon “university freedoms long recognized by the Supreme Court” and that it would not accept conditions it viewed as exceeding the lawful authority of the federal Government. [p. 10] President Garber released a public statement reiterating Harvard’s position, emphasizing that the bulk of the Government’s requirements amounted to direct regulation of the intellectual environment of the university, and underscoring that decisions concerning curriculum, admissions, and faculty appointments must remain within the university’s discretion rather than be subjected to Governmental control.

On the same day of Harvard’s rejection, the Federal Task Force issued an order “announc[ing] a freeze on $2.2 billion in multi-year grants and $60M in multi-year contract value” (April 14 Freeze Order). That order cited “Harvard’s statement today,” “the harassment of Jewish students,” and a “troubling entitlement mindset” within universities. [p. 11] It did not, however, acknowledge Harvard’s prior communication regarding reforms, identify specific instances of antisemitism, or specify the manner in which Harvard had violated Title VI. The order was issued without hearing or a report to Congress.

Immediately following the April 14 Freeze Order, stop-work orders were disseminated for multiple projects. HHS suspended payments on NIH grants totaling $2.172 billion across 658 awards. DHS terminated two grants exceeding $2.7 million. NIH officials were instructed not to engage in communications with affected institutions regarding the freezes. NSF terminated six awards valued at $3.287 million. The Freeze Order was accompanied by an intensifying campaign of public criticism from President Trump, who declared on social media that Harvard should lose its tax-exempt status if it continued “pushing political, ideological, and terrorist inspired/supporting ‘Sickness?’” [p. 12] President Trump criticized Harvard for “hiring almost all woke, Radical Left, idiots,” and asserted that it “should no longer receive Federal Funds.” [p. 12]

On April 29, 2025, the Harvard Task Force released its final report, comprising 311 pages, which acknowledged the existence of an “alienating and hostile atmosphere” for many Jewish and Israeli students, and found that certain administrators and faculty had failed to uphold principles of open inquiry. [p. 12] The report recommended comprehensive reforms to “campus culture and student experience” and to governance, including the creation of a dedicated leadership role addressing antisemitism, the expansion of educational opportunities concerning Jewish history and antisemitism, the establishment of grievance channels, the assurance of consistent disciplinary procedures, and increased oversight of educational programs by tenured faculty. [p. 13] It stressed that such reforms should originate internally, cautioning that external compulsion would impair Harvard’s capacity for self-correction. President Garber publicly committed the university to implementing the report’s recommendations and Harvard subsequently took steps to centralize and strengthen disciplinary procedures, and its academic council has advanced new recommendations.

On May 5, 2025, the Secretary of Education, Linda McMahon, transmitted a further order (May 5 Freeze Order), stating that Harvard had “failed to abide by its legal obligations” and declaring that Harvard “should no longer seek GRANTS from the Government, since none will be provided,” thereby effectively precluding the issuance of new federal grants. [p. 14] The May 5 Freeze Order reiterated earlier demands on Harvard, including concerns regarding viewpoint imbalances in Harvard’s governance, and confirmed that “[t]he Administration’s priorities have not changed.” [p. 14] The May 5 Freeze Order, like its predecessors, neither credited Harvard’s reforms nor identified particular incidents of antisemitism, and did not articulate a violation of Title VI. The order was again issued without hearing or report to Congress.

The GSO coordinated efforts to identify and terminate Harvard’s grants and circulated templates described as “the form the [White House – the U.S. executive authority] wants to see it in.” [p. 16] Harvard subsequently received termination notices (Termination Letters) from NIH, USDA, Energy, DoD, NSF, HUD, DoE, Commerce, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. These Termination Letters related to a broad range of medical, scientific, and technological research, including breast cancer detection, biological threat response, antibiotic resistance, and treatments for pediatric cancer survivors and radiation exposure. Most Termination Letters invoked 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a)(4) which specifies a condition for terminating a federal grant where “changed program goals or agency priorities” occur, while further referencing “recent events at Harvard University involving antisemitic action,” “Harvard’s ongoing inaction,” and its “refus[al] to take appropriate action … or implement necessary reforms.” [p. 17] With one exception, none of the letters identified specific antisemitic incidents, established a violation of Title VI, or demonstrated compliance with Title VI procedural requirements.

On May 13, 2025, the Federal Task Force issued a press release alleging that Harvard had consistently failed to address widespread race discrimination and antisemitic harassment, and endorsed the suspension of federal funding. The Government did not acknowledge Harvard’s prior reforms or its compliance with Title VI procedures.

Among the projects terminated as a result of the Government’s actions were research on tuberculosis, development of advanced chip technology to mitigate radiation risks for NASA astronauts, studies on Lou Gehrig’s disease, and predictive modeling for suicide prevention among veterans. The Assured Microbial Preservation in Harsh or Remote Areas (AMPHORA) Program, a DoD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)-led initiative on emerging biological threats, was also discontinued notwithstanding DARPA’s own assessment that Harvard’s team had been the top performer and that its technology constituted a significant advancement. Despite the termination order, DARPA staff maintained engagement with Harvard researchers, and Harvard ultimately received full compensation from DARPA for work completed after the termination notice.

The campaign of reductions persisted. On May 20, 2025, HHS suspended an additional $60 million in grants, and on May 27, 2025, GSA targeted $100 million in contracts. In total, more than 950 federal research projects were terminated. President Trump publicly proposed diverting “$Three Billion Dollars” from “a very antisemitic Harvard” to fund “TRADE SCHOOLS.” [p. 21] Secretary McMahon acknowledged that the legal action that Harvard was taking was the catalyst for internal Government discussions, while President Trump declared that Harvard was “hurting [itself]” by “fighting,” and was losing money “every time” it resisted. [p. 21]

On April 11, 2025, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the AAUP–Harvard Faculty Chapter (AAUP-Harvard), the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), the Harvard Graduate Students Union (HGSU–UAW), and Harvard Academic Workers (HAW–UAW) (collectively the Organizational Plaintiffs), had initiated action by filing a complaint and a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). Subsequently, the President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard) filed its own action on April 21, 2025. These two related lawsuits, brought against various federal agencies and agency heads, challenged the decision to freeze and ultimately terminate nearly $2.2 billion in federal grants to Harvard.

The Organizational Plaintiffs later withdrew their motion for a TRO on April 15, 2025, and filed two amended complaints on May 5 and May 20, 2025. Harvard filed its amended complaint on May 13, 2025. A status conference was held on April 28, 2025, during which the parties elected to proceed directly to summary judgment (a ruling granted without trial when the court determines there are no material factual disputes and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). The plaintiffs filed their motions for summary judgment on June 2, 2025; the Government filed their opposition and cross-motions on June 16, 2025; the plaintiffs submitted their replies on June 30, 2025; and the Government filed their final replies on July 14, 2025. The hearing on this matter was held following the completion of briefing on July 14, 2025. On September 3, 2025, the Court issued its memorandum and order.


Decision Overview

Judge Burroughs of the United States District of Massachusetts delivered the memorandum and order. The central issue before the Court was whether the Government’s decision to freeze and ultimately terminate federal grants to Harvard violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (the constitutional provision protecting freedoms such as speech and academic expression).

Harvard argued that the Government violated its First Amendment rights in two ways: first, by retaliating against Harvard’s protected expression, and second, by imposing content- and viewpoint-based conditions on funding unrelated to any legitimate interest in combating antisemitism. Harvard sought to have the Freeze Orders and Termination Letters vacated, and any similar future actions permanently enjoined. The Organizational Plaintiffs advanced the same two arguments and added a third, asserting unconstitutional coercion which, as set out in NRA v. Vullo, holds that “a government official cannot directly or indirectly coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf”. [p. 59] They argued their members suffered direct harms from halted research projects and imminent funding losses, while also experiencing a chilling effect on academic freedom and protected speech and submitted that avoiding certain research topics or moderating expression to preserve funding undermined their organizational mission of safeguarding academic freedom and shared governance.

On Title VI, both groups of plaintiffs argued that the Government had failed to follow the statute’s explicit procedural requirements before freezing or terminating funding, which entitled them to summary judgment. They argued that the Freeze Orders and Termination Letters were arbitrary and capricious as the Government gave no reasoned explanation for halting Harvard’s funding, failed to weigh whether any purported benefits outweighed the costs of terminating vital research, and disregarded serious reliance interests (an expectation of continued funding) built up over decades.

Neither group of plaintiffs made strong arguments on their ultra vires claims (alleging that an authority acted beyond the scope of its lawful powers. On the due process argument, the Organizational Plaintiffs opposed the Government’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they had a protected liberty interest rooted in the First Amendment. On separation of powers (alleging that the Executive Branch exceeded its constitutional authority and encroached on powers reserved to Congress or the Judiciary) and spending clause claims (challenges to conditions Congress or the Executive place on federal funding, arguing they exceed constitutional limits or coerce recipients), they argued that the Executive Branch lacked express or implied authority to unilaterally terminate individual grants.

The Government argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the claims belonged in the Court of Federal Claims (a federal court that adjudicates monetary claims against the United States) pursuant to the Tucker Act (a statute conferring the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over certain monetary claims against the United States), accusing the Plaintiffs of “artful pleading” to recast contract-like money claims as constitutional or statutory violations. [p. 25] On the merits of the First Amendment theories, the Government argued that Harvard, by virtue of receiving federal grants, should be treated as a government, that Harvard’s rejection of the April 11 Letter was a non-express “legal act extinguishing the original offer,” and that Harvard’s speech was not a substantial or motivating factor in the terminations as the Government contended they were non-retaliatory and undertaken to combat antisemitism. [p. 50]

On the Title VI and administrative law claims, the Government argued that it was not required to follow Title VI’s procedures and lawfully terminated awards under 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a)(4). In submitted that it had not been arbitrary and capricious as the freezes followed a comprehensive review, it had considered research costs, and that as financial awards are discretionary there are limited reasons to rely on continued funding. Finally, on the separation of powers and spending clause claims, the Government argued that there was express and implied executive authority to terminate individual grants. It did not contest that loss of First Amendment freedoms can be irreparable but opposed the breadth of the plaintiffs’ requested relief.

The Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter. It held that, while some of the issues involved monetary or contract-like decisions properly within the Court of Federal Claims’ province (such as the questions around the Termination Letters), it retained jurisdiction over the First Amendment and Title VI claims, as the Tucker Act does not confer jurisdiction over non-“money-mandating” First Amendment claims, and Title VI expressly authorizes judicial review. It also found the Freeze Orders to be “final agency action” and so reviewable in the district court under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. As a single ruling on the First Amendment or Title VI issues could invalidate the Government’s actions, the Court heard those challenges and limited the arbitrary and capricious review to the Freeze Orders.

The Court held that the Organizational Plaintiffs satisfied the Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission associational-standing test as the members suffered concrete injuries as research was halted, there were imminent funding shortfalls and a loss of federal peer-reviewed grants (which bear on tenure and reputation), and there was a chilling effect on academic freedom and speech which was fairly traceable to the Government’s actions. The Court found the interests were relevant to the organizations’ missions and that the broad injunctive and declaratory relief sought did not require individualized member participation.

On the merits of the First Amendment claims, the Court granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on the three grounds of retaliation, unconstitutional conditions and unconstitutional coercion. In determining whether the Government’s conduct constituted retaliation, the Court rejected the Government’s argument that Harvard should be treated as a “government contractor” under Pickering v. Board of Education, describing the “additional constitutional interests” of academic freedom. [p. 47] Instead, relying on Berge v. School Committee of Gloucester and D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, the Court applied the standard for private citizens, requiring that Harvard establish that (i) it “engaged in First Amendment-protected conduct,” (ii) “it suffered an adverse action,” (iii) and a “substantial or motivating” causal link. [p. 48] The Court noted that Harvard engaged in protected conduct by refusing the terms of the April 11 Letter, which sought to control viewpoints and overhaul its governance, hiring, and academic programs to comport with the government’s ideology, and by filing the lawsuit itself. It found that Harvard’s rejection of the Government’s conditions was an “unequivocal expression of core First Amendment values” against government overreach, stating that “[t]he university will not surrender its independence or relinquish its constitutional rights.” [p. 51] The Court found a clear causal link noting the April 14 Freeze Order came hours after Harvard’s rejection and explicitly referenced “Harvard’s statement today” [p. 52].

The Court found that the Government’s purported non-retaliatory purpose of “opposing antisemitism” was rebutted by the record, which showed the April 11 Letter containing only one antisemitism-related demand among six ideological or pedagogical ones, and that the Government acted without gathering data on antisemitism at Harvard or considering Harvard’s ongoing efforts. The Court highlighted that “[t]he fact that [the Government’s] swift and sudden decision to terminate funding, ostensibly motivated by antisemitism, was made before they learned anything about antisemitism on campus or what was being done in response, leads the Court to conclude that the sudden focus on antisemitism was, at best … arbitrary and, at worst, pretextual.” [p. 54] The Court noted the public statements by President Trump stating that “Harvard is ‘a JOKE’ that ‘should no longer receive Federal Funds’” and that Government officials further corroborated a retaliatory motive, linking funding cuts to Harvard’s decision to “fight” and its perceived ideological stance. [p. 55]

On the question of the Government imposing the unconstitutional content- and viewpoint-based conditions on continued funding, the Court stressed that the Government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes … his interest in freedom of speech.” [p. 57] For Harvard, the conditions were “particularly concerning” because they were based on Harvard’s “particular beliefs” and sought to dictate the “content of speech.” [p. 58] The Court found that the Government impermissibly imposed conditions on Harvard’s funding. In respect of the argument on unconstitutional coercion, the Court found the Vello case to be “instructive on this issue, if not determinative.” [p. 59] It confirmed that government officials “cannot directly or indirectly coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf.” [p. 59] The Government here, like the official in Vullo, sought to force Harvard to align with the Government’s favored worldview through hiring and curricula choices, thereby suppressing the views of professors and researchers.

Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgement to the Plaintiffs on all grounds concerning their First Amendment claim.

Regarding the Title VI claims, the Court also granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs. It was undisputed that the Government failed to follow Title VI’s explicit procedural requirements, such as advising of noncompliance, attempting voluntary compliance, holding a hearing, and reporting to Congress, before issuing the Freeze Orders or Termination Letters. The Court rejected the Government’s post-hoc invocation of 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a)(4) as a basis for termination, as it had not been cited in the Freeze Orders and would “wholly nullify an explicit statutory scheme” designed for discrimination claims. [p. 64] The Court, citing Bowman v. EPA emphasized that Title VI’s procedures were designed to ensure that “people and entities receiving federal funding are shielded against being labeled with the “irreversible stigma” of “discriminator” until a certain level of agency process has determined that there was misconduct that warranted termination”. [p. 64]

On the arbitrary and capricious claims, the Court granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs regarding the Freeze Orders. It noted that an agency action is arbitrary or capricious if not “reasonable and reasonably explained,” requiring a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” [p. 66] The Court found no reasoned explanation for how freezing funding would advance the goal of combating antisemitism, noting the lack of evidence of any actual review or weighing of research value against this goal before the Freeze Orders were issued. The Court stated that the Government has “not pointed to a single document, nor has the Court’s review of the record located one, that indicates that they weighed the value of the research funded by a particular grant against the goal of combating antisemitism at Harvard.” [p. 67] It added that the Government had “essentially no information about the prevalence of antisemitism at Harvard” before the freezes, and relied on the Harvard Task Force Report that was released after the April 14 Freeze Order, constituting an impermissible post-hoc rationalization. [p. 68] The Government had also failed to acknowledge or consider Harvard’s substantial efforts to address antisemitism, and to consider the immense “societal costs” of freezing critical research, from military research to cancer treatments, without evaluating less restrictive alternatives, potentially harming the very people they claimed to protect. [p. 71] The “decades of reliance interests” of scientists compounded this problem, necessitating a more detailed justification from the Government. [p. 72] The Court concluded “it is that rational connection between the grant terminations and the fight against antisemitism that is wholly lacking here.” [p. 73]

With regard to the ultra vires claims, the Court observed that a review in this regard is “strictly limited” and unavailable if “a statutory review scheme provides aggrieved persons with a meaningful and adequate opportunity for judicial review.” [p. 74] Since the Plaintiffs had succeeded on their APA claims before the Court, an alternative path to judicial review existed and so the Court granted the Government’s motions for summary judgment on the ultra vires claims.

On the Organizational Plaintiffs’ due process claims, the Court denied the Government’s motion for summary judgment on the APA claim, finding that the Government’s arguments largely disregarded Plaintiffs’ arguments (here, that their First Amendment rights created a protected liberty, rather than a property, interest).

Similarly, the Court denied the Government’s motion for summary judgment on the Organizational Plaintiffs’ APA separation of powers claims, because the Government failed to establish legal authority for terminating individual grants, and the terminations were inconsistent with the First Amendment and Title VI.

The Court granted the Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction as they had prevailed on their First Amendment and Title VI claims. The Government had not disputed that the loss of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable harm, nor that the balancing of harms and public interest weighed in favor of injunctive relief. The Court emphasized that the standard for permanent injunctive relief mirrors that for a preliminary injunction, except that the movant must demonstrate actual success on the merits rather than a likelihood of success. In addition to showing actual success, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had also satisfied the remaining elements: (i) irreparable injury absent relief; (ii) that the harm to them outweighed any harm to the Government; and (iii) that the public interest would not be disserved. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the Plaintiffs that the injunction should bar the Government from reimposing unconstitutional conditions, engaging in further retaliatory or non-Title VI compliant funding actions, or denying future grants on unlawful grounds.

The Court, in its conclusion, stated that “[t]he idea that fighting antisemitism is [the Government’s] true aim is belied by the fact that the majority of the demands they are making of Harvard to restore its research funding are directed, on their face, at Harvard’s governance, staffing and hiring practices, and admissions policies – all of which have little to do with antisemitism and everything to do with [the Government’s] power and political views.” [p. 80] It highlighted the statement of Justice Brandeis of the Supreme Court in Whitney v. California, where he stated that “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence”. [p. 80]


Decision Direction

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Decision Direction indicates whether the decision expands or contracts expression based on an analysis of the case.

Expands Expression

The Court’s decision expands freedom of expression by upholding First Amendment rights in academia in the context of the surrounding orders issued against it, vacating government orders that retaliated against the university for exercising its protected speech, and permanently enjoining the imposition of content- and viewpoint-based funding conditions. This ruling reinforces academic freedom against governmental interference by explicitly rejecting attempts to dictate viewpoints and content in university governance, hiring, admissions, and academic programs. The Court emphasized the importance of zealously guarding the right to free speech as a hallmark of democracy and stated that “combatting antisemitism cannot be accomplished on the back of the First Amendment.”

Global Perspective

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Global Perspective demonstrates how the court’s decision was influenced by standards from one or many regions.

Table of Authorities

National standards, law or jurisprudence

  • U.S., Constitution of the United States (1789), First Amendment.
  • U.S., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964
  • U.S., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
  • U.S., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996)
  • U.S., Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
  • U.S., Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507 (2022)
  • U.S., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
  • U.S., Berge v. Sch. Comm. of Gloucester, 107 F.4th 33 (1st Cir. 2024)
  • U.S., D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2012)
  • U.S., Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004)
  • U.S., McCue v. Bradstreet, 807 F.3d 334 (1st Cir. 2015)
  • U.S., President and Fellows of Harvard College v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Civil Action No. 25-cv-11472-ADB (2025)
  • U.S., Asociación de Educación Privada de P.R., Inc. v. Garcia-Padilla, 490 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007)
  • U.S., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985)
  • U.S., Blasdel v. Nw. Univ., 687 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2012)
  • U.S., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980)
  • U.S., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)
  • U.S., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)
  • U.S., Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 2488 (2011)
  • U.S., Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP v. Exec. Off. of President, No. 25-917, 2025 WL 1502329 (D.D.C. May 27, 2025)
  • U.S., United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
  • U.S., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)
  • U.S., Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D.N.H. 2025)
  • U.S., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)
  • U.S., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. For Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013)
  • U.S., NRA v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175 (2024)
  • U.S., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
  • U.S., Moody v. NetChoice, No. 22–277, 603 U. S. ____ (2024)
  • U.S., Stephens v. Cnty. of Albemarle, No. 04-cv-00081, 2005 WL 3533428 (W.D. Va. Dec. 22, 2005)
  • U.S., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013)
  • U.S., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963)
  • U.S., Best Payphones, Inc. v. Dobrin, 410 F. Supp. 3d 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)
  • U.S., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

Case Significance

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The decision establishes a binding or persuasive precedent within its jurisdiction.

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