Case Summary and Outcome

A United States District Court granted a habeas corpus motion for an individual arrested immediately after completing his immigration naturalization interview. The arrest appeared to be in retaliation for his peaceful political speech in student protests criticizing Israel’s war on Gaza and thus raised substantial questions under the First Amendment (free speech rights) and Fifth Amendment (due process) of the U.S. Constitution. The individual had lived in the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident for more than 10 years and was detained by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, based on a determination made by the Secretary of State that his presence posed serious adverse foreign-policy consequences. The Court found that the individual’s core political expression was protected, that his detention served no legitimate regulatory purpose, and that extraordinary circumstances of the risk of irreparable chilling of free speech warranted bail. Finding no flight risk or danger to the community, the Court ordered his immediate release on personal recognizance, subject to conditions ensuring his residence, travel limitations, and attendance at all future proceedings.

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Facts

On March 27, 2025, Mohsen Mahdawi, a 34-year-old lawful permanent resident of the United States for over a decade, was notified that his naturalization interview – the final step before taking the Oath of Allegiance – had been scheduled for April 14, 2025, at the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) office in Colchester, Vermont. Mahdawi is a Palestinian student and resident of White River Junction, Vermont. He owns a small cabin in Vershire and was an undergraduate philosophy student at Columbia University, and had recently been accepted into the university’s master’s program. Following Israel’s military operations in Gaza in late 2023, Mahdawi became an outspoken critic of the war, participating in campus demonstrations and giving public statements in support of international law, a ceasefire, and a peaceful resolution. He repeatedly emphasized the importance of human rights and condemned violence on all sides.

Mahdawi was aware of increasing hostility around immigration in the U.S. and suspected the government might use the naturalization interview as a pretext to target him and so he decided to attend in person.

On April 14, 2025, after successfully completing the interview, passing the civics exam, and affirming his intent to take the Oath, the interviewing officer stepped out. Shortly after, three masked agents from Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and their supervisor entered the room and placed Mahdawi under arrest. They did not present a warrant or any legal documentation as a basis for his arrest. He was separated from his attorney, shackled, and transported in an unmarked black van.

During processing at another USCIS office, Mahdawi was issued a Notice to Appear (NTA). The NTA cited the Secretary of State’s determination that Mahdawi’s continued presence in the U.S. posed “serious adverse foreign policy consequences” and threatened a “compelling U.S. foreign policy interest.” This determination is based on the same legal basis previously used for Mahmoud Khalil’s deportation order. Mahdawi was ordered to appear before an immigration judge in South Louisiana on May 1, 2025.

An attempt to fly Mahdawi to Louisiana on the evening of April 14 failed due to a missed flight. Instead, he was taken first to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) field office in St. Albans, Vermont, then to the Northwest State Correctional Facility in Swanton, Vermont.

That same day, Mahdawi’s legal counsel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, challenging the legality of the arrest and detention. Habeas corpus is a legal procedure that allows an individual to petition a court to review the legality of their detention or imprisonment, and Mahdawi’s petition described his seizure as retaliatory, punitive, and a violation of his constitutional rights, including the First Amendment right against government retaliation for protected political speech and the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections under the U.S. Constitution. The petition included a request for his immediate release on bail.

On April 22, 2025, Mahdawi filed a formal motion for release. After the government filed its response and Mahdawi submitted a reply, a hearing was held on April 30, 2025.

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Decision Overview

Judge Geoffrey W. Crawford delivered the order for the Court. The main issue before the Court was whether Mahdawi, satisfied the legal standard for release pending the adjudication of his habeas corpus petition.

Mahdawi submitted that he met the standard for release, which requires demonstrating that the habeas petition raises substantial claims and that extraordinary circumstances exist making the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective. He argued that his detention by immigration authorities was unconstitutional, in violation of both his First and Fifth Amendment rights. He maintained that his speech – criticizing U.S. foreign policy and expressing solidarity with Palestine – was core political expression, fully protected under the First Amendment. His arrest, which occurred immediately after attending a naturalization interview, he argued, was retaliatory and intended to silence dissent and emphasized that his statements during peaceful campus protests neither constituted incitement nor threats and were instead aimed at encouraging political dialogue on pressing global issues. Mahdawi cited public statements and Executive Orders from the Trump administration (such as Executive Orders 14161 and 14188) which, he argued, openly targeted pro-Palestinian voices for punitive immigration actions, confirming a government policy of viewpoint discrimination. These facts, he claimed, provided strong evidence that his speech was the real reason for his detention, not any legitimate immigration violation.

In addition to his First Amendment claims, Mahdawi argued that his ongoing detention violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment because it served no valid regulatory purpose and was instead punitive. He stressed that he had no criminal charges pending, posed no flight risk, and had deep ties to the U.S., including being a homeowner, a full-time student at Columbia, and an active community member. He voluntarily appeared for his naturalization interview, knowing the risk of detention, which demonstrated his good faith. He further asserted that his continued confinement chilled his speech and that of others, especially where the detention was a direct response to protected expression. Mahdawi concluded that his release was necessary not only to restore his own rights but to prevent irreparable harm to public discourse and uphold constitutional principles.

The Government challenged the District Court’s authority to entertain Mahdawi’s habeas petition and release motion, invoking the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA) jurisdiction-stripping provisions in section 1252(g), which bars district-court review of decisions “to commence proceedings” or “to remove an alien,” and section 1226(e), which precludes setting aside detention decisions. Relying on Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Government argued that Mahdawi’s challenge to his removability determination and detention “arises from” the initiation and execution of removal proceedings and therefore must be heard, if at all, in the courts of appeals in terms of the INA. The Government submitted that, even if the Court did have jurisdiction, Mahdawi could not satisfy the demanding standard for bail in a habeas case, set out in Mapp v. Reno, because he had not demonstrated either substantial questions going to the merits or the extraordinary circumstances necessary to render the habeas remedy effective. It argued that Mahdawi’s continued detention was well within Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s statutory authority to secure his appearance and protect the community pending removal. To rebut any claim of non-punitiveness or lack of flight risk, it highlighted three prior incidents: a summer 2015 report that Mahdawi allegedly expressed interest in high-powered firearms and made antisemitic threats (investigated by the FBI without charges); a January 2019 border stop for prescription drugs that resulted only in diversion and expunction; and a 2018 domestic dispute during which a firearm was surrendered for safekeeping. The Government also cited Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s memorandum, accusing Mahdawi of “threatening rhetoric and intimidation of pro-Israeli bystanders” at a protest, as authorizing adverse foreign-policy-based removals. It argued these factors illustrated both a legitimate concern for safety and a foreign-policy justification for detention.

The Court rejected the Government’s jurisdictional challenge under the INA’s “jurisdiction-stripping” provisions. It explained that the Supreme Court has confined the scope of section 1252(g), in Reno v. AADC, which held that the bar applies “only to three discrete actions” by the Attorney General—“to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” Mahdawi’s claim – that he was arrested in retaliation for constitutionally protected speech – does not arise from any of those three actions, and so section 1252(g) does not strip jurisdiction. It added that section 1226(e) does not explicitly bar habeas review of constitutional detention challenges, and sections 1252(a)(5) and (b)(9) govern only direct challenges to removal orders and not collateral attacks on arrest and detention. Accordingly, the Court “found a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to proceed to the issue of release or detention”. [p. 15]

The Court applied the Mapp standard for bail in habeas cases and reiterated that a petitioner must demonstrate (1) that the habeas petition raises “substantial questions going to the merits,” and (2) that “extraordinary circumstances” make bail “necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.” It noted that the burden rests on the petitioner to prove both elements. [p. 16]

The Court found that Mahdawi had raised substantial questions regarding potential constitutional violations. With respect to the First Amendment, which safeguards freedom of speech, it noted that, as a matter of uncontested fact, Mahdawi’s arrest was a result of his speech during campus protests at Columbia criticizing Israel’s war on Gaza and held that “[n]oncitizen residents like Mr. Mahdawi enjoy First Amendment rights in this country to the same extent as United States citizens” including the right to be “free from retaliation” for political speech. [p. 17] It subsequently applied the elements of a retaliation that violates the First Amendment, as set forth in Demarest v. Town of Underhill: “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” [p. 18]

The Court found that Mahdawi’s remarks, which promoted a peaceful approach to the situation in Gaza and criticized Israel’s military actions, were indisputably protected speech and explained that this form of expression, addressing governmental policy and international conflict, is accorded the most robust protection under the First Amendment. It added that the content of his remarks did not implicate any of the narrowly defined categories of unprotected speech such as incitement, defamation, obscenity, or true threats.

The Court held that Mahdawi’s arrest immediately after completing his naturalization interview constituted an adverse action. By removing him from his family, community, and educational pursuits, the Government imposed a penalty that “would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity.” [p. 19, quoting Bello-Rayes v. Gaynor]]

Pertaining to the final factor, the Court determined that the timing and context of the arrest, coupled with EOs 14161 and 14188 – threatening to deport “Hamas sympathizers” and punish “anti-Jewish racism” – and campaign statements to “set that movement back 25 or 30 years,” furnished a sufficient evidentiary basis to infer retaliatory motive at this stage. [p. 20] These public pronouncements satisfied the requirement that Mahdawi show a plausible link between his protected speech and the Government’s adverse action. Consequently, the Court concluded that Mahdawi has raised a “substantial claim” of First Amendment retaliation. [p. 20]

The Court examined the due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, and referred to the Zadvydas v. Davis case which had held that due process is afforded to “all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” [p. 21] It highlighted that immigration detention must serve the regulatory goals of ensuring appearance at proceedings and protecting community safety and “can never be punitive, either by design or effect.” [p.22] The Court found that the same evidence suggesting that detention was punishment for speech or intended to deter others also supported a due process violation, relating it to the First amendment claim: “[i]f the Government detained Mr. Mahdawi as punishment for his speech, that purpose is not legitimate” noting that Mahdawi’s alleged constitutional violations raised were of sufficient seriousness to meet the “substantial questions” threshold outlined in Mapp. [p.22]

The Court examined whether “extraordinary circumstances” supported baiI, typically under conditions ensuring the detainee’s return. It first addressed standard bail criteria: flight risk and danger to the community. The Court found “no risk of flight,” given Mahdawi’s permanent home and cabin in Vermont, his Columbia University student status and graduate school acceptance, his voluntary attendance at the interview despite suspecting detention, and his deep ties to local professors, neighbors, and faith-community members. [p.23] It also found “no danger to the community,” deeming unsubstantiated the evidence brought by the Government concerning Mahdawi’s 2015 firearms allegations – especially since the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ (FDI) examination concluded with no charges – and giving little weight to the minor 2018 domestic dispute and 2019 drug-diversion incident. [p. 23]

The Court characterized the broader setting as “extraordinary”, likening it to historical periods, observing that “[l]egal residents – not charged with crimes or misconduct – are being arrested and threatened with deportation for stating their views on the political issues of the day. Our nation has seen times like this before, especially during the Red Scare and Palmer Raids of 1919-1920 that led to the deportation of hundreds of people suspected of anarchist or communist views.” [p. 24] The Court stated that this case “calls upon the ancient remedy of habeas to address a persistent modern wrong.” [p. 25] The unique context – detaining a lawful permanent resident for exercising political speech – amplified the extraordinary nature of the circumstances.

Lastly, the Court held that release was necessary to render habeas relief meaningful and quoted Ozturk in reiterating that continued detention would “broadly chill protected speech, among not only activists subject to final orders of deportation but also those citizens and other residents who would fear retaliation against others.” [p. 25] The Court found that release was essential not only for Mahdawi’s personal vindication but to protect the speech rights of others.

The Court found that all factors weighed in favor of Mahdawi’s immediate release. It determined there was a likelihood of success on the merits, as the substantial constitutional questions raised—particularly under the First Amendment—satisfied the Mapp standard. The Government failed to show otherwise. The Court also found no risk of flight or danger to the community, concluding that Mr. Mahdawi’s release would not undermine the integrity of his removal proceedings. In contrast, the ongoing deprivation of liberty, infringement of First Amendment rights, and interference with his ability to complete his undergraduate education amounted to clear and irreparable harm. Citing Elrod v. Burns, the Court reaffirmed that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)

The public interest, the Court emphasized, strongly favored release. Mahdawi’s “continued detention … would likely have a chilling effect on protected speech,” – a result “squarely against the public interest.” [p. 28] Moreover, the Court found no benefit to the public in continued confinement, given that Mahdawi is neither a flight risk nor a danger. On the contrary, the Court recognized that “Mahdawi’s release will benefit his community, which appears to deeply cherish and value him.” [p. 28] Accordingly, the Court denied the Government’s request for a stay and ordered his immediate release.

In sum, after concluding that it possessed jurisdiction to hear Mahdawi’s claims, the Court found that he had raised substantial First and Fifth Amendment questions—demonstrating protected speech, adverse action, and a causal link, as well as a punitive detention without legitimate regulatory purpose—and that extraordinary circumstances and the necessity of rendering habeas relief effective weighed decisively in favor of his release. The Court further determined that Mahdawi posed neither a flight risk nor a danger, that continued detention would inflict irreparable harm by chilling core political speech, and that release served the public interest. Accordingly, the Court granted Mahdawi’s motion for release on personal recognizance—without requiring the posting of bail—imposed certain conditions, denied the Government’s request for a stay, and ordered his immediate release. His release is subject to residence in Vermont, travel limited to educational and legal obligations, and mandatory attendance at all future immigration and habeas proceedings.

Following the District Court’s decision, the case is now under review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

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