Case Summary and Outcome

The Supreme Court of India quashed a criminal case against Member of Parliament Imran Pratapgarhi for sharing a video of a wedding event that featured a recitation of an Urdu poem, holding that the poem was a protected artistic expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The case began when a complaint alleged the poem’s verses promoted disharmony and offended religious sentiments, leading to the registration of a First Information Report (FIR). The Court found that the poem’s plain meaning and context did not target any religion or community, nor did it incite violence or hatred. It stressed that police must exercise their discretion under Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (2023 Code of Criminal Procedure) to avoid mechanically registering FIRs in speech-related matters, as failure to do so chills free expression. Reaffirming that dissent and artistic expression enjoy constitutional protection unless they explicitly incite hatred, the Court held the FIR baseless, criticized the High Court for not safeguarding free speech, and emphasized that democracy depends on protecting such expressions.

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Facts

The appellant, Imran Pratapgadhi, a sitting Member of the Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament), was invited as a guest to a mass wedding ceremony at Sanjari Education and Charitable Trust in Jamnagar, Gujarat, on December 29, 2024. Following the event, he posted a video on the social media platform ‘X’ from his verified account. The video featured a background recitation of an Urdu poem titled “Ae khoon ke pyase baat suno” (“O bloodthirsty ones, listen”). The poem’s themes were abstract, dealing with concepts of oppression, resistance, and sacrifice, using metaphors such as a candle’s flame and a throne. The English translation of the poem is:

“Those who are bloodthirsty, listen to us. 

If the fight for our rights is met with injustice, 

We will meet that injustice with love.

If the drops flowing from a candle are like a flame, 

We will use it to light up all paths. 

If the bodies of our loved ones are a threat to your throne, 

We swear by God that we will bury our loved ones happily. 

Those who are blood thirsty, listen to us.”

A private individual filed a complaint against Imran Pratapgarhi, alleging that the poem’s lyrics incited hatred between communities, provoked communal disharmony, hurt religious sentiments, and threatened national unity. Acting on this complaint, the Jamnagar police registered an FIR against Pratapgadhi. The charges were filed under several sections of the newly enacted Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which replaced the Indian Penal Code of 1860. The specific provisions invoked were:

• Section 196: Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste, or community.
• Section 197(1): Making imputations or assertions prejudicial to national integration.
• Section 299: Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.
• Section 302: Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person.
• Section 57: Abetting the commission of an offence by the public or by more than ten persons.

Pratapgadhi approached the Gujarat High Court under its writ jurisdiction, seeking to quash the FIR on the grounds that it was frivolous and violated his fundamental right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

The High Court dismissed his petition, holding that the “tenor” of the poem and the nature of public responses to the social media post indicated a potential for disturbing social harmony. The Court also remarked that as a Member of Parliament, Pratapgadhi was expected to exercise greater responsibility. The High Court declined to interfere, citing the precedent in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra that courts should be hesitant to intervene when an investigation is at a “nascent stage.”

This dismissal led Pratapgarhi to appeal to the Supreme Court.

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Decision Overview

Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan delivered the decision. The primary issue before the Court was whether the registration and continuation of the FIR, based solely on the poem, constituted an unjustified infringement of the appellant’s right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.

Pratapgarhi contended that a plain reading of the poem and the FIR revealed no prima facie case for any of the alleged offences. He argued that the poem was a piece of artistic expression with a message of non-violence and sacrifice, containing no direct or indirect reference to any religion or community. He asserted that the FIR was a gross abuse of the legal process and that the police and the High Court had failed in their constitutional duty to protect fundamental rights. The State, represented by the Solicitor General of India, adopted a neutral stance, leaving the matter to the Court’s discretion, but maintained that the police were obligated to register the FIR based on the complaint’s contents.

The Court first observed that a plain reading of the poem revealed no reference to any religion, community, or caste, nor did it incite hatred or promote enmity between groups. Instead, it conveyed a symbolic and non-violent message encouraging people to face injustice with love, even through personal sacrifice. The references to a “throne” were metaphorical, aimed at critiquing oppressive power structures in general, and not targeted at any specific authority. Thus, the Court found no basis for claims that the poem harmed national integration, sovereignty, or public harmony.

The Court then applied this interpretation to each penal provision cited in the FIR. It held that none of the essential ingredients of the offences were satisfied. For an offence under Section 196 BNS, the Court emphasized that the promotion of enmity must be on specific grounds like religion or caste, which were entirely absent. It stated, “On a plain reading of the poem, we find that the same has nothing to do with any religion, caste, community or any particular group.” [para. 14] Regarding the charges of outraging religious feelings (Sections 299 and 302 BNS), the Court found the allegations baseless, noting the poem was not concerned with any religion.

The Court also interpreted the procedural obligations of the police under the new Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). It performed a comparative analysis of Section 173 BNSS and the old Section 154 CrPC. It highlighted that Section 173(3) BNSS introduces a critical safeguard: for cognizable offences punishable by three to seven years of imprisonment, a police officer may, with prior permission from a superior, conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists before registering an FIR. The Court contrasted this with the law laid down in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., where under the CrPC, a preliminary inquiry was permitted only when the information did not clearly disclose a cognizable offence. The Court held that for cases involving freedom of speech, exercising this option under Section 173(3) BNSS is “always appropriate” to prevent the chilling of legitimate expression. [para. 29] The failure to conduct such an inquiry in this case was a key procedural flaw.

The Court emphasized that police officers, as part of the “State” under Article 12 and as citizens, have a fundamental duty under Article 51-A(a) of the Constitution to “abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals,” which include the “liberty of thought [and] expression” enshrined in the Preamble. [para. 29] It criticized the “insensitivity” of the police and the High Court’s failure to act as a vigilant protector of fundamental rights. It stated that courts must be “at the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of the citizens,” even when judges personally dislike the speech in question. [paras. 38-39]

In determining the legal standard for judging the impact of speech, the Court revived and applied the test formulated by Justice Vivian Bose in Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government (1946). It held that the effect of words must be judged from the standards of “reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view.” [para. 32] This standard was used to reject a hypersensitive interpretation of the poem. The judgment underlined that mere criticism of government actions is protected under Article 19(1)(a) and does not, in itself, amount to inciting hatred or violence. [para. 34]

Furthermore, the Court relied on precedents like Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra and Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya to reinforce that mens rea, or the intention to promote enmity or cause disorder, is an essential ingredient for offences like the one under Section 196 BNS, and was conspicuously absent here. It clarified that the mere expression of dissent through artistic forms does not attract penal provisions unless it is clearly directed at promoting hatred or disrupting public order.

The Supreme Court concluded that the registration of the FIR was a “mechanical exercise” and a “clear abuse of the process of law” that “virtually borders on perversity.” [para. 36] Criticizing the High Court’s refusal to quash the FIR, the Supreme Court underscored that constitutional courts have a duty to protect fundamental rights even at the preliminary stage of an investigation. The Court emphasized that artistic or critical expressions are essential to democracy and cannot be stifled merely because they provoke discomfort.

Ultimately, the Court set aside the Gujarat High Court’s order and quashed the FIR and all consequent proceedings against the appellant.

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