Case Summary and Outcome

The European Court of Human Rights held that Russia violated Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights in four applications involving freedom of expression and assembly. In the first case, Ms. Dianova was fined for conducting a hunger strike without prior notification, which the Court deemed an unjustified interference with her right to peaceful assembly. In the second case, four other applicants were fined for filming a satirical political video in a park, which the Court found to be an unforeseeable application of public assembly laws to an act of artistic expression. The Court emphasized that while regulations on public gatherings are necessary, their enforcement should not become an end in itself and that satire and political commentary deserve strong protection under the Convention. In both instances, the Court found that the Russian authorities’ actions were not prescribed by law, did not pursue legitimate aims, and were not necessary in a democratic society, thus violating the applicants’ rights to freedom of expression and assembly.

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Facts

On August 2, 2014, a detainee was beaten in a correctional colony in the Sverdlovsk Region of Russia. Three days later, the Applicants, Ms Dianova, and other members of the Public Monitoring Commission (ONK) attempted to visit the facility but were denied entry. [paras. 5-7] In response, on August 6, Ms Dianova and a colleague, Ms Z., began a hunger strike to draw attention to the detainee’s ill-treatment and demand an inquiry. They set up camp beds near a stadium across from the Federal Penitentiary Service building, displaying a banner about their hunger strike. [paras. 8-9]

On the evening of August 11, due to rain, the women set up a tent. Another ONK member, Ms M., joined them. That night, police officers approached and drew up administrative offense records for Ms. Dianova and Ms. Z., but not Ms. M. [paras. 10-11] The record accused Ms. Dianova of failing to comply with police demands to cease participation in an unauthorized public event conducted after 10 p.m. [para. 12]

On August 27, 2014, a Verkh-Isetskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg found Ms. Dianova guilty of breaching the rules of participation in public events. The District Court rejected her argument that the hunger strike did not qualify as a “static demonstration” requiring prior notification. Ms Dianova was fined 10,000 rubles, roughly equivalent to her monthly pension. [paras. 13-16] Her appeal was later rejected by the regional court. [para. 17]

In a separate incident on July 19, 2015, four applicants [Ms. Sheveleva, Mr. Mikhaylov, Ms. Zenyakina, and Mr Roslovtsev] were apprehended in a Moscow park while attempting to create a satirical film.  In the film, one actor, satirically disguised as Vladimir Putin, performed while others expressed exaggerated admiration for him, holding posters with absurd slogans and drenching each other in melted chocolate. Police reports alleged they were participating in an unauthorized public event. The applicants maintained they were engaged in filmmaking, not political action. [paras. 19-24]

On July 24, 2015, the Nikulinskiy District Court found all four applicants guilty of participating in an unauthorized meeting and fined each 10,000 rubles. The hearings were conducted in the applicants’ absence, despite their claims of needing to receive proper notification or their requests for postponement being ignored. [paras. 25-29] On the same day, the Nikulinskiy Court issued nearly identical two‑page judgments for each applicant, differing mainly in rejecting Ms. Sheveleva’s and Mr. Mikhaylov’s arguments that the filming was not a “public event.” The court found all applicants guilty under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO and fined each RUB 10,000. Ms. Sheveleva, Mr. Mikhaylov, and Ms. Zenyakina filed an appeal against the District Court before the Appellate Court.

On September 10th, 2015 the Moscow City Court summarily rejected the appeals of Ms Sheveleva and Mr Mikhaylov and upheld the judgments in their respect. On October 22, 2015, the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment in respect of Ms Zenyakina. [para. 30] On September 16th, 2015 the Moscow City Court quashed the judgment in respect of Mr Roslovtsev and ordered a retrial. 

On 28 October 2015, the Nikulinskiy Court found Mr Roslovtsev guilty under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO and fined him RUB 10,000. On December 16th, 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment on appeal.

All the Applicants filed an Application before the ECtHR, alleging a violation of freedom of expression under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

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Decision Overview

Justices Pere Pastor Vilanova, Jolien Schukking, Georgios A. Serghides, Darian Pavli, Peeter Roosma, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, and Diana Kovatcheva delivered a unanimous ruling. The primary issue before the Court was to determine whether the State action violated Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. 

The Applicant, Ms. Dianova, contended that Russian law did not contain provisions concerning hunger strikes, except for those related to detainees. She contended that her behavior was similar to a solo demonstrator and should not have been classified as a “public event” requiring prior notification. Ms. Dianova emphasized the lack of clarity in domestic legislation and court practices in distinguishing between public events and other forms of public expression. She asserted that the application of the Public Events Act and the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) in her case was not foreseeable and fell short of the “quality of law” requirement. [paras. 43-45] Ms Dianova further argued that even if her hunger strike was considered a “public event,” it was peaceful, caused no disruption, and concerned a matter of public interest. She claimed that the domestic courts focused solely on her failure to comply with the notification requirement without considering the public interest and individual rights. She contended that the fine imposed was disproportionately severe given her low income, concluding that the interference was not “necessary in a democratic society”. [para 46]

The other Applicants (Ms. Sheveleva, Mr. Mikhaylov, Mr. Roslovtsev, and Ms. Zenyakina) similarly argued that the interference with their rights was based on an arbitrary and unforeseeable interpretation of the Public Events Act. They disputed the classification of their filmmaking activity as a “meeting” and challenged the Government’s claims about unidentified persons contacting the police and the content of their banners. The applicants concluded that there was no pressing social need to justify the interference with their rights and that the reasons given by the domestic courts were neither relevant nor sufficient. [paras. 47-48]

The Government contended that Ms. Dianova and Ms. Z.’s protest action constituted a ‘static demonstration’ requiring prior approval, given its aim to draw public attention and its involvement of two individuals displaying a common banner. They argued that Ms Dianova, as a human rights activist, should have been aware of the regulations governing public events. The Government further asserted that the hunger strike occurred in a public setting, with active engagement with passers-by, and eventually involved seven people and a tent. They justified the termination of the protest on the grounds of a ‘pressing social need’ due to obstruction of pedestrian traffic and concerns for Ms Z.’s health. The Government maintained that the authorities had initially tolerated the situation and intervened only when health concerns arose, concluding that there was no violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. (paras 49-51)

The Government acknowledged the interference with the other applicant’s rights to freedom of expression and assembly but argued that it was lawful and necessary in a democratic society. They contended that the applicants’ gathering was correctly classified as a “meeting” under the Public Events Act due to its political and social nature and that it breached the law by not obtaining prior approval from municipal authorities. [para. 53] The Government maintained that the Public Events Act was accessible, clear, and predictable, meeting the “quality of law” criteria, and provided examples of court judgments to support this claim. [para 54] They argued that the notification procedure was designed to ensure public order and security and that sanctions for violations were necessary. The Government also asserted that the applicants, as civic activists, should have been aware of the notification requirement and that the domestic courts had applied Convention standards and imposed proportionate penalties. [para. 55]

The Institute for Law and Public Politics (ILPP), intervening in Ms Dianova’s case, highlighted several issues with Russian law and its application. They pointed out that the Public Events Act and the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) lacked clear guidelines for distinguishing between “public events” and other forms of public expression, leading to inconsistent court rulings. [para. 57] The ILPP noted that while hunger strikes were specifically addressed in penitentiary legislation, recent judicial practice had extended this interpretation to static demonstrations outside the penal context, resulting in prosecutions under the CAO. [para. 58] They concluded that Russian practices did not clearly differentiate between public expressions qualifying as public events under the Public Events Act and those falling solely under freedom of expression. This lack of clear reasoning made it difficult to predict which legal provisions would be applied to similar forms of expression, and the domestic application of these distinctions did not align with the criteria established by the ECtHR. [para. 59]

On the Dianova’s Application 

The Court emphasized the close link between freedom of assembly (Article 11) and freedom of expression (Article 10), with Article 11 being considered a lex specialis to Article 10’s lex generalis. The Court noted that it had refrained from providing an exhaustive definition of an assembly, considering it an autonomous concept that covers both private and public meetings, whether static or in the form of a procession. [paras. 61-62] In examining Ms Dianova’s case, the Court determined that her five-day hunger strike, conducted alongside others in a public space to protest against detainee ill-treatment, fell within the notion of “peaceful assembly” under Article 11 of the Convention. [para. 63]

The Court decided to examine Ms. Dianova’s complaint in light of the general principles applicable to freedom of peaceful assembly, as summarized in Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania and Navalnyy v. Russia. It acknowledged that Article 11 must be considered in light of Article 10 when the assembly aims to express personal opinions and secure a forum for public debate. [para. 64] The Court recognized that the police officers’ actions to end Ms Dianova’s hunger strike and the subsequent administrative sanctions constituted an interference with her right to freedom of peaceful assembly. It then outlined the need to assess whether this interference was “prescribed by law,” pursued legitimate aims under Article 11(2), and was “necessary in a democratic society”. [para. 65]

The Court questioned whether the interference with Ms. Dianova’s protest pursued any legitimate aims as set out in Article 11(2), given that her hunger strike was peaceful and caused minimal disruption. However, the Court did not conclude this point, as it found that interference was not “necessary in a democratic society”. [para. 69] The Court reiterated that while rules governing public assemblies are essential, their enforcement should not become an end in itself, citing Bukta and Others v. Hungary. It found that the Government’s reasons for ending the hunger strike – obstruction of circulation and health concerns – were not sufficiently justified. The Court while referencing Laguna Guzman v. Spain, noted that the protest did not exceed the level of minor disturbance inherent to peaceful assembly in public places. It also found no evidence that the hunger strike had become non-peaceful or violent, warranting its dispersal. [paras. 70-71]

Regarding Ms Dianova’s conviction, the Court found it was based on purely formal grounds without addressing the public interest aspect of her actions. The Court referred to Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary and emphasized that questions of public interest enjoy privileged protection under the Convention. The Court also recalled its stance from Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania and Navalnyy v. Russia that sanctions for participating in peaceful assemblies require particular justification. It concluded that the reasons put forward by the Government did not correspond to a pressing social need and were not sufficient to justify the measures as “necessary in a democratic society,” thus finding a violation of Article 11 of the Convention. [paras. 72-73]

On the Other Applicant’s Application

The Court reasoned that freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention extends beyond spoken or written words to include non-verbal means of expression and conduct. In determining whether an act falls within Article 10’s scope, the Court considered both the objective expressive nature of the act and the intention of those performing it. The Court noted that the applicants’ gathering to make a political satirical film constituted an act of expression, regardless of how authorities characterized it. The Court emphasized that satire is protected as a form of artistic expression and social commentary, given its inherent features of exaggeration and provocation. [paras. 74-76]

Applying these principles, the Court determined that the applicants’ actions fell within the scope of Article 10, to be interpreted in light of Article 11. The Court referenced cases such as Oberschlick v. Austria, Karuyev v. Russia, and Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria to support its reasoning that there was an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, which would constitute a breach of Article 10 unless it met certain criteria: being prescribed by law, pursuing legitimate aims, and being necessary in a democratic society. [paras. 77-78]

The Court examined whether the interference with the Applicants’ freedom of expression was “prescribed by law” as required by Article 10(2) of the Convention. It emphasized that this concept not only required a legal basis in domestic law but also referred to the quality of the law, which should be accessible and foreseeable. The Court noted that a law must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable individuals to regulate their conduct and foresee the consequences of their actions. However, it acknowledged that some degree of vagueness in laws is inevitable and that interpretation is primarily the task of national authorities. [para. 79]

The main issue in this case was whether the Public Events Act applied to the making of a satirical film. The Court questioned whether applying the concept of a “mass gathering” to a group of six individuals filming in a remote part of a public park was foreseeable. It distinguished between the nature of filmmaking and public assemblies, noting that filmmaking is a preparatory activity with delayed communication of ideas, unlike assemblies which involve direct communication with an on-site audience. The Court referenced cases such as Tatár and Fáber v. Hungary and Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania to held that applying notification requirements from the Public Events Act to filmmaking constituted an undue prior restraint, potentially infringing on freedom of expression. It emphasized that filmmaking is distinct from public assemblies and should not be subject to the same regulations. Content-neutral rules for public space use may apply, but no such violations were raised by the authorities in this case. [para. 81]

The Court concluded that the application of the Public Events Act and Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO to the film creators was not “foreseeable as to its effects.” It found that the broad definition of a “meeting” in the Public Events Act allowed for an expansive interpretation by domestic authorities, potentially leading to sanctions for any public expressive conduct regardless of its nature, scale, timing, or location. As a result, the Court determined that the legal basis for the interference with the Applicant’s right to freedom of expression did not meet the “quality of law” requirements. The Court referred to Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) in deciding that this conclusion made it unnecessary to examine whether the interference pursued legitimate aims or was “necessary in a democratic society”. [paras. 83-84]

The Court found that the additional complaints raised by Ms. Sheveleva, Mr. Mikhaylov, Mr. Roslovtsev, and Ms Zenyakina under Articles 5(1)[Right to liberty and security], 6(1) [Right to a fair trial], and 13[Right to an effective remedy] of the Convention were admissible. Upon examination, the Court determined that there had been a violation of the Applicant’s right to liberty under Article 5(1), citing the case of Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia. It also found a breach of their right to a fair trial due to the absence of a prosecuting party in the proceedings, referencing Karelin v. Russia. Given these findings, the Court deemed it unnecessary to examine the remaining complaints under Articles 6(1) and 13. This approach was consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania. [paras. 85-87]

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