Case Summary and Outcome

The First Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that Hungary violated articles 8 and 10 (Privacy and Freedom of Expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by failing to provide adequate procedural safeguards to protect a journalist from secret surveillance. The case involved Klaudia Csikós, a journalist whose phone conversations were allegedly intercepted by Hungarian authorities as part of a criminal investigation aimed at identifying her sources. The Court found that the measures lacked the necessary judicial oversight and procedural safeguards to prevent the unlawful disclosure of journalistic sources. It emphasized the crucial role of protecting journalistic sources to maintain freedom of expression and press freedom. The Court concluded that Hungary’s legal framework did not meet the Convention’s standards to ensure respect for privacy and freedom of expression. Consequently, Hungary was ordered to compensate the applicant for non-pecuniary damages and legal costs.

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Facts

Klaudia Csikós, a Hungarian journalist at Blikk, a daily newspaper in Budapest, alleged that investigative authorities tapped her phone between November 3 and 6, 2015, to identify her journalistic sources.

On 6 November 2015, the Buda Central District Court authorized secret information-gathering measures against police officer T., which included tapping his phone communications. The measures were justified as part of an investigation into active bribery and aiding and abetting abuse of authority under articles 293(1)-(2) and 305(c) of the Hungarian Criminal Code.

On 17 November 2015, Csikós received two phone calls from T., during which they discussed a high-profile murder case. Their conversations were recorded by the authorities. On the same day, Csikós published an article about the murder case on an internet news portal, expanding it the following day.

On 15 December 2015, criminal proceedings were initiated against T. for allegedly sharing confidential information with Csikós. On 4 January 2016, the Budapest Regional Court permitted the use of evidence obtained from the phone tapping in the proceedings against the police officer.

Csikós filed a criminal complaint against the Pest County Police Department, suspecting that her phone records had been unlawfully acquired. She argued that the removal of her contacts within the police from their posts was evidence that her sources had been revealed through the monitoring of her calls. The investigating authority characterized her complaint as an allegation of abuse of power under Article 305 of the Criminal Code. Her complaint was dismissed on 1 February 2016, with the decision noting that call lists could be legitimately requested in ongoing investigations. Csikós’ appeal against this dismissal was also rejected. Authorities stated that the transfer of her police contacts did not constitute sufficient evidence to prove unlawful monitoring.

On 19 May 2016, Csikós lodged a complaint before the National Defence Service, alleging that her phone had been tapped to identify her sources. She claimed that the secret surveillance measures against her had not been subsequently approved by a judge, as required by law, and that her data had not been deleted following the termination of the covert operation. The National Defence Service rejected her complaint on 22 June 2016, stating that secret information gathering could not be challenged under the Police Act and asserting that the conduct of the National Security Services followed the law.

Csikós further pursued her complaint before the Minister of the Interior and the National Security Committee of Parliament under the National Security Act. In his reply, on 13 June 2016, the Minister of the Interior provided general assurances about the lawful functioning of the National Security Services but did not address Csikós’ specific case. The National Security Committee, in its response from 10 October 2016, also found no evidence of unlawful conduct based on the documents provided by the National Defence Service, effectively closing the matter without further investigation.

Seeking transparency, Csikós requested, on 8 May 2017, access to the documents concerning the covert information gathering from the National Defence Service. This request was denied. Authorities cited the protection of classified information and the potential jeopardization of ongoing criminal investigations as reasons for its decision. Csikós then brought an action for judicial review. On 11 September 2017, her case was dismissed by the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court, which upheld the secrecy and lawfulness of the covert operations.

On 25 May 2018, a criminal court acquitted T. of the abuse of authority charge. This acquittal was upheld by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 12 December 2018.

Csikós filed an application before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) arguing that her rights under articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) had been violated by Hungary.

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Decision Overview

On 28 November 2024, the First Section of the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment on this matter. The central question for the ECtHR was whether Hungary’s secret surveillance of journalist Klaudia Csikós, along with the absence of subsequent legitimate procedures and safeguards, violated her rights under articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR—which protect the right to privacy and freedom of expression, respectively.

Csikós claimed that the contested surveillance measures were intended to uncover her journalistic sources, undermining press freedom as protected by Article 10. She argued that her phone had been tapped without judicial authorization and that the measures violated her privacy under Article 8. Csikós emphasized that she was not notified of the surveillance and was denied effective remedies to challenge the measures, which she contended had a chilling effect on her journalistic work.

The Hungarian government maintained that the surveillance had been lawful, necessary, and proportionate, and carried out during an investigation into criminal misconduct by a police officer. It argued that the measures complied with domestic law and that sufficient safeguards were provided. Hungary also claimed that the protection of journalistic sources is not absolute and could be overridden to investigate serious crimes—particularly when sources engage in illegal activities.

The Court examined articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR. Article 8 guarantees the right to private life and correspondence, while Article 10 ensures freedom of expression—which includes the protection of journalistic sources, considering the critical role of the press as a public watchdog—, the ECtHR explained. The Court emphasized that any interference with these rights had to 1. be prescribed by law, 2. pursue a legitimate aim, and 3. be necessary in a democratic society (three-part test).

The Court considered that in this case both articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR were applicable. Citing cases such as Goodwin v. the United Kingdom and Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands, the ECtHR reiterated that telephone conversations are part of an individual’s private life and correspondence under Article 8. It also emphasized that the protection of journalistic sources is a cornerstone of press freedom under Article 10.

Subsequently, the Court highlighted the preventive nature of the safeguards required to protect journalistic sources. It underscored the necessity of independent oversight before authorizing surveillance measures. Particular attention had to be paid, the ECtHR said, to the protection of journalists’ confidential communications. For the Court, the absence of prior judicial authorizations or effective procedural safeguards in Hungary’s legal framework raised significant concerns. Considering the specific case, the ECtHR noted that the applicant was not informed about the surveillance even after its conclusion, which made it nearly impossible for her to seek effective remedies.

Upon evaluating the necessity and proportionality of the interference, the Court examined whether Hungary’s actions met these criteria. According to the ECtHR, the surveillance measures deployed by the government failed to balance the public interest in protecting journalistic sources against the interests protected by the criminal investigation. The Court found no evidence that the authorities had weighed these competing interests or assessed whether less intrusive means could have achieved the same objective.

The ECtHR expressed concerns about the lack of specific safeguards for journalists against covert surveillance in Hungary’s legal framework. It pointed out that the relevant provisions of the Police Act allowed broad discretion to authorities to deploy surveillance measures without establishing safeguards—tailored to journalistic circumstances—requiring judicial oversight. The Court also criticized the absence of procedures to delete irrelevant or unrelated data obtained through surveillance, further compounding the risk of abuse.

Moreover, the ECtHR observed that the Hungarian authorities failed to clarify whether the applicant had been directly subjected to surveillance. This lack of transparency and accountability underscored the inadequacy of the domestic legal framework. To accentuate this point, the Court referenced its decision in Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, which had already identified systemic issues in Hungary’s oversight mechanisms against unlawful secret surveillance—including the lack of independent review and effective remedies.

The Court held that the protection of journalistic sources is not an absolute right. It must be carefully weighed against legitimate public interests, such as preventing crime. Nonetheless, to the ECtHR, the Hungarian authorities did not demonstrate in this case that the surveillance was strictly necessary or proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Failing to address the applicant’s specific circumstances as a journalist—and the lack of procedural safeguards—violated the principles of a democratic society, the Court concluded.

The ECtHR also noted that the circumstances of the case could lead to a chilling effect on freedom of expression. According to it, when journalists fear that their communications can be intercepted without sufficient safeguards, they may be deterred from pursuing stories involving sensitive or controversial matters. This, in turn, undermines the vital role of the press as a public watchdog.

In light of the above, the Court concluded that Hungary violated the applicant’s rights under articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR. It determined that the absence of adequate procedural safeguards and judicial oversight regarding surveillance measures was incompatible with the principles of a democratic society. Thus, the ECtHR awarded Csikós €6,500 in non-pecuniary damages and €7,000 for costs and expenses.

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