Case Summary and Outcome

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) ruled that the United Kingdom had not violated its obligations to hold free and fair elections under the European Convention on Human Rights. The case was brought by three former Members of Parliament who claimed the government had failed to adequately investigate Russian interference in the country’s democratic processes and to create effective laws to protect against such threats. The Court recognised that disinformation and foreign influence campaigns pose a significant threat to democracy and that states have a positive duty to protect their electoral systems. However, it found that the United Kingdom enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in deciding how to counter these threats. The Court concluded that, despite initial shortcomings, the UK had taken sufficient measures through parliamentary inquiries, new legislation, and the establishment of specialised government units, thereby acting within its discretion.

On 22 October 2025, the applicants referred the case to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights.

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Facts

The applicants, Ben Bradshaw, Caroline Lucas, and Alyn Smith, were former Members of Parliament in the United Kingdom. They relied on two parliamentary reports published in 2019 and 2020 by the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (DCMS) and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC). These reports highlighted evidence of Russian disinformation campaigns and political influence operations targeting UK democratic processes, including referendums and general elections.

Relying on these findings, the applicants alleged that Russia had engaged in widespread interference in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the 2016 EU membership referendum, and the 2019 general election. Together with other individuals, they sought judicial review in the domestic courts, arguing that the Prime Minister’s failure to commission an independent investigation into Russian electoral interference, coupled with the absence of an effective legal framework to address such interference, violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). This article provides that: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”

The High Court refused permission for judicial review in April 2021 and again in June 2021. The court held that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 did not impose a duty on the Prime Minister to order an investigation and that the challenge to the legal framework concerned political judgment, not legal obligations, falling within the state’s wide margin of appreciation. The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal in September 2021, finding the claim had no real prospect of success.

The applicants subsequently lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights on 22 March 2022.

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Decision Overview

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) delivered a judgment presided over by President Chanturia. The central issue before the Court was whether the United Kingdom had violated its positive obligations under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention by failing to investigate allegations of Russian electoral interference and to establish an effective legal framework to protect the integrity of its elections.

The applicants argued that the government’s inaction left the electoral system exposed to foreign disinformation campaigns, distorting public discourse and undermining the free expression of the opinion of the people. They further maintained that the UK Government had failed to conduct a comprehensive investigation into allegations of Russian interference in its electoral processes and that the existing domestic framework was fragmented and insufficient.

The government, by contrast, contended that addressing disinformation is inherently complex and must be balanced against freedom of expression. It argued that the UK had established an adequate legal and institutional framework, pointing to measures such as the Elections Act 2022, the National Security Act 2023, and the work of specialised bodies including the Counter Disinformation Unit.

The European Information Society Institute (EISI), intervening as a third party, emphasised that “digital advertising [is] crucial for modern politics and the transparency of how politicians talk to voters [is] the defining problem of our times.” [para. 157] EISI stressed that voters must know who is addressing them in the run-up to elections and that credible allegations of manipulation should be subject to independent post-election investigation, as transparency is essential for preserving public trust in democratic processes.

The Court began by recognising the growing threat that disinformation and influence campaigns pose to democratic processes. It noted that such campaigns, carried out by both State and non-State actors, can “distort the communication ecosystem to the point where voters might be seriously encumbered in their decisions by misleading, manipulative and false information designed to influence their votes.” [para. 147] While new technologies and social media platforms enable political actors to communicate directly with voters, they have also allowed hostile actors to spread disinformation “at a scale and with a speed never seen before.” [para. 134]

The Court referred to assessments by international bodies underscoring the gravity of the problem. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has warned that widespread disinformation can undermine the right to free and genuine elections, while the UN Human Rights Council has highlighted its potential to suppress political engagement, erode trust in democratic institutions, and hinder informed participation. The Venice Commission similarly described a “new era of information disorder” in which false and manipulative content has distorted public debate. [para. 135]

In this context, the Court accepted that there was credible evidence of foreign interference in the United Kingdom’s democratic processes of sufficient intensity to impair “the very essence” of the right to elections that ensure the free expression of the will of the people. [para. 147] It referred in particular to findings of the UK National Cyber Security Centre, which stated that it was “no secret” that Russia sought to weaken adversaries through disinformation and cyberattacks, as well as reports by the Council of the European Union and public acknowledgements by the UK and US of Russian attempts to interfere in their elections. [para. 134]

The Court then conducted a detailed analysis of the applicable principles under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. It reaffirmed that this provision guarantees not only individual rights to vote and stand for election but also a general right to “benefit[] from legislative elections” held under conditions ensuring the free expression of the people’s opinion. [para. 118] It stated that states have a positive obligation to adopt measures to organise elections that meet this standard. The core test is whether the conditions in which electoral rights are exercised impair their “very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness.” [para. 119]

The Court then addressed the novel legal question of external threats. While its previous jurisprudence dealt mostly with domestic interference, the Court held that the object and purpose of the Convention required its provisions to be practical and effective. It found that “if there was a real risk that as a consequence of interference by a hostile State the rights of electors within a member State would be curtailed to such an extent as to impair their very essence…, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 may require that State to adopt positive measures to protect the integrity of its electoral processes.” [para. 136]

The Court, however, rejected the applicants’ argument for a freestanding procedural duty to investigate under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, analogous to the obligations under Articles 2 and 3. It distinguished electoral interference cases from those involving grave interferences with physical integrity, where such a duty is well established. The Court reasoned that a separate investigative obligation was not appropriate in the electoral context. However, it crucially added that “a flagrant failure by a State to investigate credible allegations of interference in its elections could raise an issue under that Article if it impeded its ability to take positive measures.” [para. 138] Therefore, the failure to investigate is not a standalone violation but is subsumed within the assessment of whether the state has fulfilled its broader positive duty to protect the electoral process.

The Court further noted the profound difficulty in assessing the impact of disinformation on electoral outcomes and the current lack of a clear international consensus on the precise countermeasures required. It also underscored that any state action must be carefully balanced against the right to freedom of expression under Article 10, recalling its decision in Bowman v the United Kingdom that “it is particularly important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to circulate freely.” [para. 161] The Court warned that heavy-handed responses, such as certain “foreign agent” laws, could “shrin[k] democratic space,” and thus states must be afforded wide latitude in choosing their approach. [para. 161]

Applying these principles, the Court found that the UK had acted within its margin of appreciation. It acknowledged initial shortcomings, referencing the ISC’s criticism that the government had “not seen or sought evidence of successful interference.” [para. 164] However, it determined that the UK had subsequently taken adequate and sufficient measures. It highlighted the two comprehensive parliamentary inquiries (DCMS and ISC) as substantive investigative efforts. It also detailed post-application legislative reforms: the Elections Act 2022 introduced digital imprints for online campaign material; the National Security Act 2023 created new offences for foreign interference and a Foreign Influence Registration Scheme; and the Online Safety Act 2023 regulated online platforms. The Court also noted the operational roles of the Counter Disinformation Unit and the Defending Democracy Taskforce.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the essence of the applicants’ electoral rights had not been impaired and found no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.

Concurring Opinion

Judge Jakab, while concurring with the majority’s conclusion that there had been no violation of the Convention, wrote separately to express concern that the Court had missed a crucial opportunity to articulate a more comprehensive and forward-looking framework for addressing foreign electoral interference. His opinion calls for the Court to adapt its jurisprudence to the unprecedented challenges posed by digital disinformation.

He begins by situating the case within what he considers the core mission of the Court. The Convention, in his view, is not only a human rights instrument but a broader “peace project” intended to safeguard liberal democracies grounded in the rule of law. Protecting the institutional functioning of democratic systems is therefore essential, since their erosion would inevitably weaken the protection of all other rights. Electoral integrity is central to this mission, as democratic accountability is a precondition for an effective human rights system.

Judge Jakab argues that the Court’s existing standards under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are insufficiently developed for the modern threat landscape. He regards the case as “complex, consequential, and extremely timely,” yet finds the majority’s analysis too limited to guide states meaningfully. He urges the Court to favour interpretations of the Convention that enhance democratic resilience against foreign subversion.

To that end, he proposes a clearer framework for understanding state measures to counter foreign interference. Some measures are prohibited outright under the Convention—for example, legislation that stigmatises civil society as “foreign agents.” Others are permissible but not required, provided they remain proportionate. Finally, certain measures should be treated as positive obligations flowing from Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Judge Jakab criticises the majority for treating the United Kingdom’s post facto reforms as mere “good practices,” rather than identifying which of them may form part of the minimum duties states must fulfill.

A key doctrinal contribution in his opinion is the argument that the origin of the interference should matter for proportionality analysis. He draws a line between interference by non-democratic states, which reject the Council of Europe’s foundational values, and interference by democratic states that share those principles. Interference from non-democratic states, he argues, is especially dangerous and justifies stronger defensive measures. To assess the democratic quality of the interfering state, he suggests relying on tools such as democracy indices and data on the execution of the Court’s judgments.

He also rejects the idea that combating disinformation under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 necessarily conflicts with freedom of expression under Article 10. Rather, he sees the two as complementary. In his view, mass digital disinformation can generate so much “noise” that it undermines the public’s ability to receive information, thereby itself infringing Article 10. Measures aimed at reducing that noise are therefore not only permissible restrictions on speech but may constitute positive obligations necessary to make the right to receive information practical and effective.

Moving from principle to practice, Judge Jakab offers a catalogue of potential regulatory responses. These include clearer account categorisation and transparency on social media, default chronological feeds, measures to slow virality, restrictions on micro-targeted political advertising, regulation of covert influence via online personalities, the use of blockchain for content provenance, guaranteed data access for researchers, and safeguards against AI chatbots being exploited for disinformation. He emphasises that states must select such measures through a transparent and careful process, but maintains that this menu of options is relevant to defining their positive obligations.

Finally, he proposes rethinking the Court’s approach to victim status in cases of electoral interference. Drawing an analogy to secret surveillance cases, he argues that the covert nature of such interference makes it nearly impossible for individuals to demonstrate concrete harm. If the Court maintains a high threshold for proving substantive impact on the vote, it must correspondingly strengthen the procedural obligation to investigate. Without such an approach, he warns, the guarantees of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 risk becoming hollow, as individuals lack the means to uncover foreign state-backed operations on their own.

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