The Court applied the above mentioned principles to the facts of the instant case and made the following observations:

First, regarding the events held on December 4 and 6, 2011, the Court observed that those “performances” were not notified in advance to the competent authority since they were “genuinely spontaneous reaction to the alleged violations committed during the election to the State Duma on 4 December 2011” [p. 86]. However, mere participation in a non-notified demonstration without uttering any threats, engaging in reprehensible conduct or causing any harm, according to the court, did not justify an interference with participant’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly under either Article 11 of the Convention [p. 83-84]. The Court observed that the national courts didn’t consider the spontaneous nature of the protest, didn’t show any degree of tolerance or afford the applicant any opportunity to express his views and therefore, failed to properly ascertain whether the conviction for applicant’s failure to disperse was justified as “necessary in a democratic society” [p. 85-88]. While referring to Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, no. 76204/11, the court also reiterated that Russian law had an unusually long, automatic and inflexible ten-day period requirement for prior notification under the Public Events Act without any exceptions for special circumstances without being “necessary in a democratic society”, which itself amounted to an interference without justification under Article 11 [p. 86]. All these factors led the Court to rule that applicant’s eleven day detention was disproportionate [p. 88].

Second, while deciding the legality of detention in respect to demonstrations organised on December 31, 2012 and April 5, 2013, the Court ruled that the Russians courts had failed to conclusively prove that the the applicant’s actions had caused any major disruption to ordinary life to a significant extent [p. 90]. According to the court, Russian judges did not clearly establish that the police had given any specific order to disperse, and even if they did, the Russian courts didn’t establish that applicant’s failure to leave the venue despite the police announcements had serious risks to public safety [p. 91]. Further, the Court opined that even if conviction for the failure to disperse could be justified as “necessary in a democratic society” in certain circumstances, the Russian courts’ perfunctory reasoning made it impossible for the Court to ascertain that they adequately established the relevant facts and applied the principles under Article 11 of the Convention [p. 95]. In the Court’s view, the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant therefore, was a disproportionate penalty vis-à-vis the applicant’s exercise of freedom of assembly as an ordinary demonstrator who didn’t cause any damage [p. 93].

Third, in relation to “performances” on November 26, 2012 and June 27, 2013, wherein the applicant held posters and uttered slogans against the migration law [p. 97-98], they contended that those events were a form of artistic expression and didn’t fall within the ambit of “public events” under the Public Events Act, and therefore, they could not be prosecuted for participating in a non-notified “public event” [p. 61]. The court observed that there was wide discretion exercised by the Russian authorities in determining what constituted an assembly (gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, processions, pickets or a combination) under the Act which could be subject to restrictions like prior official approval [p. 100-101]. According to the Court, “the Russian courts did not provide any justification for treating the event on November 26, 2012 as an “assembly” subject to prior approval and did not even specify which type of that regulated assembly it was. They did not adduce sufficient reasons for convicting the applicant for merely engaging, in a peaceful and non-disruptive manner in the public space, in political expression together with several other people” [p. 105]. In the Court’s view, the applicant was merely punished by the domestic courts due to his failure to comply with prior notification requirement, which was insufficient to justify the requirements under Article 10 and 11 of the Convention [p. 107].

To conclude, the Court held that there had been an “interference” with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression on account of his conviction in relation to the “performances” on November 26, 2012 and June 27, 2013, and his right to freedom of peaceful assembly on account of his conviction in relation to the rallies on December 4 and 6  2011, December 31, 2012 and April 5, 2013 [p. 65]. The decision was not unanimous as the Court (five votes to two), (four votes to three) and (five votes to two) held that there was violation of Article 10 of the Convention in relation to November 26, 2012, June 27, 2013 protests and all other events respectively.

Judge Zund remarked that detention for June 27, 2013 events was not illegal as the applicant climbed a public building from the outside using a ladder, shouted slogans and unfolded a flag which could be seen as an intentionally disruptive act clearly exceeding the level of minor disturbance [p. 28]. Judges Elosegui and Lobov opined that the majority had indiscriminately criticised national judicial decisions and failed to “balance between the interest of the applicant in participating in unauthorised or unannounced rallies and those of society in ensuring compliance with the law on public assemblies in the context of each incident involved” [p. 29-30].