Case Summary and Outcome

The Supreme Court of India set aside an ex-parte interim injunction granted by a lower court and affirmed by the Delhi High Court against Bloomberg Television for publishing an article on alleged financial irregularities at Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. Zee had sought the injunction on defamation grounds, claiming the article was unsubstantiated. Although the Supreme Court did not express comments on the merits of the case, it found that the lower court’s order lacked a detailed assessment of the three-fold test required in the grant of interim injunctions. The Court found that pre-trial injunctions against publications can negatively impact the right to free speech and citizens’ right to know and could become a “death sentence” to the material sought to be published. The Court described how ad-interim injunctions could be misused in defamation and/or SLAPP suits to prevent free speech and stifle public participation. The Court ruled that an interim injunction should be issued very carefully in cases only where the content is demonstrably “malicious” or “patently false.”

Facts

On February 21, 2024, Bloomberg Television published an article titled “India Regulator Uncovers $241 Million Accounting Issue at Zee“. The article alleged that the Security and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) – the principal regulator controlling the securities market in India found financial irregularities in the accounts of Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, an Indian media conglomerate.

Zee filed a suit for injunction against Bloomberg before the Additional District Judge (ADJ) of South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi alleging defamation. They requested the Court to pass an ex-parte ad interim injunction restraining Bloomberg, its editors and journalists from “making any further unverified, unsubstantiated, and defamatory statements“.

On March 1, 2024, the Additional District Judge passed an ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favour of Zee. The Court observed that the contents of the article were per se defamatory. The Court concluded that Zee had made out a prima facie case, demonstrated that the balance of convenience tipped in its favour and showed irreparable loss and injury. The Court directed Bloomberg to remove the article from its online platform within one week and restrained it from publishing the article until the next hearing.

Bloomberg filed an appeal against this order to the High Court of Delhi. They argued that the article was based on proper research and reliable resources. While highlighting that they approached Zee for a comment, they contended that they maintained high “standards of integrity and fair speech”. They placed reliance on Tata Sons v. Greenpeace and Ms Crop Care Federation of India v. Rajasthan Patrika (Pvt) Ltd. They argued that the present case was a Strategic Litigation against Public Participation (SLAPP) suit filed to “intimidate and silence the appellants by burdening them with the cost of litigation until the appellants abandon their right to free and fair speech”. They argued that the Additional District Judge did not provide them an opportunity to rebut Zee’s case and once the article was taken down, there was nothing left for the Additional District Judge to adjudicate in the pending trial.

On March 14, 2024, the Delhi High Court dismissed their appeal and affirmed the Additional District Judge’s order. They observed that the Additional District Judge had “applied his mind to the facts of this case and satisfied himself that prima facie there was enough material” to grant the injunction.

Bloomberg filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of India.

Decision Overview

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court D.Y.Chandrachud delivered the opinion of the three-judge bench of the Supreme Court comprising himself, Justice J.B.Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra. The central issue for the Court’s consideration was whether the Additional District Judge was correct in granting an ex-parte ad interim injunction against Bloomberg.

The Court examined the jurisprudence regarding the grant of injunctions. The court observed that the three-fold test – (i) establishing a prima facie case, (ii) assessing the balance of convenience, and (iii) determining irreparable harm – is a well-established standard for granting interim relief. [para. 5] It was the Court’s view that this test also applies to interim injunctions in defamation cases. The Court observed that this test should not be applied mechanically as in cases involving journalistic pieces, it could cause detriment to the public. The Court underlined that “courts must tread cautiously while granting pre-trial interim injunctions” in defamation cases against media and journalists. [para. 7] The Court noted that the fundamental right to free speech must be carefully balanced against rights to reputation and privacy.

The Court cited the standard devised in Bonnard v Perryman, (1891) 95 All ER 965 which requires “exceptional caution” while granting an injunction in free speech cases. [para. 7] The Court referred to Fraser v Evans, [1969] 1 Q.B. 349 which held that “the Court will not restrain the publication of an article, even though it is defamatory, when the defendant says he intends to justify it or to make fair comment on a matter of public interest”. [para. 7]

The Court concluded that granting a pre-trial injunction against the publication can have “severe ramifications on the right to freedom of speech of the author and the public’s right to know”. [para. 9] The Court observed that ex-parte injunctions should be issued only where the content is demonstrably “malicious” or “patently false.” [para. 9] The Court emphasized that issuing such injunctions “in a cavalier manner results in the stifling of public debate”. [para. 9] In the Court’s view, ex-parte injunctions should only be granted in exceptional cases where the respondent’s defence is bound to fail at trial. In all other instances, the Court held that such injunctions should be considered only after a full trial or, at the very least, after hearing the respondent’s submissions.

The Court described how ad-interim injunctions could be misused in defamation suits to prolong litigation and to prevent free speech and public participation. The Court acknowledged the increasing recognition of “SLAPP suits” by statutes and courts in different jurisdictions. While citing an article by Fiona J.L.Donson, the Court described SLAPP suits as referring to “litigation predominantly initiated by entities that wield immense economic power against members of the media or civil society, to prevent the public from knowing about or participating in important affairs in the public interest”. [para. 10] The Court emphasized the necessity to consider this, noting that an interim injunction, granted before trial, “often acts as a ‘death sentence’ to the material sought to be published, well before the allegations have been proven”. [para. 10]

The Court emphasized that the courts must provide detailed reasoning, analyzing how the three-fold test is satisfied while granting injunctions. In the Court’s opinion, merely listing submissions and precedents is insufficient; the deciding court must explicitly demonstrate how the test is satisfied. [para. 5] The Court observed that the Additional District Judge, in the instant case, did not “discuss, even cursorily, the prima facie strength of the plaintiff’s case, nor does it deal with the balance of convenience or the irreparable hardship that is caused”. [para. 11] The Court noted that the trial Judge did not analyse the necessity behind granting an ex parte injunction, engage with facts or relevant precedents but merely stated that “the court has ‘gone through the record available as on date’”. [para. 11] As per the Court, this order “amounted to unreasoned censorship”. [para. 11]

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the orders passed by the Additional District Judge and the single judge of the Delhi High Court. The Court did not express comments on the merits of the case. The Court gave liberty to both parties to renew their applications requesting/contesting injunction, upon which the trial Judge would pass fresh orders after hearing both parties and considering observations in the instant order.