Case Summary and Outcome

The Karnataka High Court held that the Indian Government acted lawfully in allowing its ministries, departments, and police agencies to issue online content removal orders under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and in creating the “Sahyog Portal” for coordination with social media companies. X Corp. (formerly Twitter) had challenged these actions, arguing that Section 79 only provided legal protection to intermediaries and did not give the Government power to block content, which could be done only under Section 69A and the 2009 Blocking Rules. The Court rejected this argument, ruling that Section 79(3)(b) allowed authorities to act against unlawful content and that intermediaries must comply or lose their legal immunity. It also noted that X Corp., being a U.S. company, could not claim rights under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. The Court emphasized that freedom of speech is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) and that “law cannot be honored in one jurisdiction and flouted in another.” Upholding the legality of Rule 3(1)(d) of the 2021 Intermediary Rules and the Sahyog Portal, the Court concluded that the system was “an instrument of public good,” ensuring accountability in the digital space, and dismissed X Corp.’s petition.

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Facts

X Corp., formerly known as Twitter Inc., is a social media company incorporated in the United States of America, having its registered headquarters in Bastrop, Texas, and its physical contact address in India at The Estate, Dickenson Road, Bengaluru.

On October 31, 2023, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) issued an Office Memorandum authorizing multiple ministries and departments of the Government of India to issue online content takedown directions under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The memorandum also circulated a Template Blocking Order for uniform use by such authorities.

Following this, between November 2023 and March 2025, several ministries, including the Ministries of Defence, Finance, Railways, Heavy Industries, and Rural Development, issued notifications empowering their respective officers to act under Section 79(3)(b). State and Union Territory police departments were similarly notified to issue takedown orders to intermediaries.

On March 13, 2024, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) designated the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) as the agency to perform functions under Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act. Later that year, the MHA began developing an online coordination platform called “Sahyog.” 

On October 28, 2024, in Shabana v. Government of NCT of Delhi, the High Court of Delhi emphasized the need for enhanced coordination between social media intermediaries and law enforcement agencies. Subsequently, on December 11, 2024, the MHA informed the Delhi High Court that it had created the “Sahyog Portal” to facilitate such coordination between government agencies and intermediaries.

On March 5, 2025, X Corp. filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, challenging the Union Government of India’s actions authorizing various ministries, departments, and police agencies to issue online content takedown orders under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”). X Corp. also challenged the Sahyog portal, characterizing it as an unauthorized “censorship portal” functioning without statutory authority. It alleged that the portal permitted multiple governmental and law enforcement bodies, including ministries, state departments, and police officials, to issue takedown orders independently, circumventing the legal procedures mandated under Section 69A.

After the filing of X Corp.’s Writ Petition, several individuals and organizations sought to intervene, requesting permission to assist the Court as intervening applicants. Their applications were formally filed and were considered by the High Court.

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Decision Overview

Justice M. Nagaprasanna delivered the opinion. The primary issue before the Court concerned the legality of the Government of India’s actions in authorizing various ministries, departments, and law enforcement agencies to issue online content takedown directions under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and the establishment of the “Sahyog Portal” by the Ministry of Home Affairs. 

X Corp. contended that the Union Government had acted without legal authority in issuing takedown directions under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and that such powers could only be exercised under Section 69A read with the Blocking Rules, 2009. The petitioner maintained that Section 79 was designed solely as a “safe harbor” provision granting intermediaries exemption from liability for third-party content and not as a “source of executive power to censor information”. [para. 4.1–4.2] It asserted that the Union Government had “converted an exemption clause into an enforcement mechanism,” thereby creating a parallel and unlawful system of content removal.

X Corp. emphasized that the Government’s interpretation of Section 79(3)(b) allowed “thousands of authorized executive officers or police officers in every State and Union Territory” to direct intermediaries to block information from public access, without a statutory basis or judicial oversight. [para. 4.2–4.3] It argued that such practice violated the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, where the Court had held that only blocking orders issued under Section 69A, and in compliance with the procedural safeguards of the 2009 Rules, were valid. According to X Corp., the present framework effectively revived the unconstitutional censorship model struck down in Shreya Singhal. 

Further, X Corp. submitted that the impugned notifications and Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, were ultra vires the parent statute and contrary to Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. [para. 4.4–4.5] The petitioner described the resulting system as one that empowered officials to issue takedown orders “at their whim and fancy,” without transparency, accountability, or recourse. It asserted that this interpretation of law “gave right to illegal actions through the Nodal Officer” [para. 4.5], undermining due process and threatening both the intermediary’s operational integrity and users’ freedom of speech.

The Applicants supported the X Corp. and argued that the Government’s actions under Section 79(3)(b) and the creation of the Sahyog Portal directly infringed upon the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. They submitted that the challenged framework “took away the right of the content creator by the stroke of a pen” [para. 5.2], depriving individuals of any opportunity to defend their speech before it was censored. The interveners emphasized that there existed “no parameter as to which information is lawful” and that the authorities were issuing takedown orders without procedural safeguards or defined standards. [para. 5.2] They contended that such unrestricted power in the hands of executive officers led to “unconstitutional censorship” and violated Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Their participation aimed to assist the Court in highlighting how the impugned actions endangered not merely the platform’s operational rights but also the public’s access to lawful expression and discourse.

On the other hand, the Union of India, represented by the Solicitor General of India, Mr. Tushar Mehta, refuted the petitioner’s claims and defended the legality of the government’s actions. The Solicitor General argued that the information ecosystem had evolved dramatically since the Supreme Court’s decision in Shreya Singhal. They submitted that the internet subscriber base in India had expanded from “25 crores in 2014 to 98 crores in 2025” [para. 6.1], and the average data consumption per user had reached “20.6 GB.” Given this exponential growth, they contended that the context in which the earlier judgment was rendered no longer reflected the current digital realities, and the State’s regulatory powers had to be interpreted in light of these new challenges.

The government asserted that Section 79(3)(b) was a legitimate provision enabling authorities to act when intermediaries failed to remove unlawful content after being notified. The Solicitor General argued that the safe harbor protection under Section 79 was conditional and that if intermediaries failed to act upon information about illegal content, “they would lose the safe harbor.” [para. 6.3] He maintained that such a framework did not constitute censorship but rather a statutory obligation to prevent the dissemination of unlawful or harmful material, especially content that could threaten public order, national security, or social harmony. He emphasized that “law must prevail over the rights.” [para. 6.6]

Furthermore, the Solicitor General also raised a jurisdictional objection, contending that X Corp., being an American company without a registered office in India, could not invoke Article 19 protections, since “Article 19 is citizen-centric.” [para. 6.4] He alleged that the petitioner had “set up intervening applicants to project that their fundamental right is put to jeopardy” [para. 6.4], thereby indirectly asserting rights unavailable to it. Furthermore, he submitted that the Indian constitutional framework should not import American jurisprudence, stating that “merely because India has borrowed fundamental rights from the Bill of Rights of the American Constitution, it does not mean that India is governed by what American Courts would lay down.” [para. 6.5] He relied on several judgments to argue that India’s free speech jurisprudence must evolve according to its own social and constitutional context. The government further defended the appointment of Nodal Officers and the issuance of takedown orders, asserting that these actions were statutorily authorized and necessary for national security and public order. It contended that the officers acted strictly within the limits of law and that “what is unlawful is already defined under the statute.” [para. 6.6] Accordingly, the Solicitor General urged that the writ petition be dismissed, as the impugned actions represented a lawful exercise of executive power in response to the challenges posed by the contemporary digital landscape.

The Court began its analysis by observing that the petition raised profound questions on the interplay between constitutional freedoms and technological regulation, particularly the limits of free speech in the digital sphere. It noted that while Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, this right was expressly subject to “reasonable restrictions” under Article 19(2). The Court emphasized that no fundamental right, however noble, could exist in a constitutional vacuum devoid of responsibility or regulation. [para. 346(3)] It reiterated that every technological advancement, from the postal age to platforms like WhatsApp and X (formerly Twitter), has always been accompanied by corresponding regulatory oversight. [para. 346(2)]

The Court next addressed the petitioner’s contention that the Intermediary Rules and the “take down” regime were unconstitutional, contending that the rules violated free expression and were arbitrary. Rejecting this, the Court held that “law cannot be honored in one jurisdiction and flouted in another.” [para. 345] The Court criticized the petitioner, X Corp, for its selective compliance, noting that it had obeyed similar obligations under the “Take It Down Act” in the United States but refused to do so in India. This inconsistency, the Court held, undermined the petitioner’s claim of good faith. The Court remarked that the balance between “the sacred liberty of free expression and the corrosive menace of misuse” must be maintained, as freedom cannot become a shield for disorder or harm. [para. 345]

Delving into constitutional principles, the Court held that Article 19 rights are “citizen-centric” and cannot be invoked by foreign corporations or non-citizens. [para. 257] Relying on precedents such as State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. CTO, Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, and Indian Social Action Forum v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that a company, especially one incorporated abroad, cannot claim fundamental rights under Article 19. The Court stated that while Articles 14 and 21 extend to all persons, Article 19 remains confined to citizens. Therefore, X Corp could not seek constitutional protection under the guise of equality or procedural fairness when its grievance effectively concerned free speech. [para. 257–266]

The Court further considered the applicability of American free speech jurisprudence, especially in light of Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, TikTok Inc. v. Merrick B. Garland, and Free Speech Coalition Inc. v. Paxton. It held that while these cases mark important developments, “American judicial thought cannot be transplanted into the soil of Indian Constitutional thought.” [para. 346(4)] The Court recalled that even U.S. courts have evolved towards permitting reasonable content-neutral regulation, as shown in TikTok v. Garland, where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld restrictions as “not substantially broader than necessary” to achieve legitimate government interests. [para. 175] Thus, the Court concluded that India’s framework under the IT Act and the 2021 Rules reflected a global consensus rather than exceptionalism.

On the challenge to Rule 3(1)(d) of the Intermediary Guidelines, the Court upheld its validity. It reasoned that the Rule, which requires intermediaries to remove content prohibited under any law , was neither vague nor arbitrary. “Public order has not sprung from air,” the Court declared, but from the text of Article 19(2) itself. [para. 246] The Court found no constitutional infirmity in empowering nodal officers to issue takedown directives, provided such orders were tethered to existing laws. The Court referred to Benilal v. State of Maharashtra, and affirmed that undefined legislative terms do not render a statute void for vagueness when the object and intent are clear. [para. 244–246] While examining the X Corp’s reliance on Shreya Singhal, the Court clarified that the precedent did not render all takedown regimes unconstitutional. Shreya Singhal had merely read down Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act to require court or government orders before intermediaries were obligated to act, while affirming the validity of Section 69A and the 2009 Blocking Rules. [para. 213] The present framework, the Court held, was fully consistent with those principles, being grounded in statutory authority and judicially reviewable safeguards.

The Court also examined global jurisprudence and regulatory responses to similar challenges, including decisions from Brazil (X Corp v. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court) and the European Union under the Digital Services Act. These developments demonstrated that intermediaries worldwide were being held accountable for systemic failures in content moderation and were not immune to regulatory control. [para. 342–343] Accordingly, India’s approach under Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d) was “neither anomalous nor excessive.”

In conclusion, the Court upheld the constitutional validity of the challenged provisions, declaring that the “Sahyog Portal,” created under Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(1)(d), was “an instrument of public good,” designed to enable cooperation between the State, citizens, and intermediaries in combating cybercrime. [para. 346(7)] It dismissed the writ petition, holding that the challenge “was without merit,” reaffirming that the right to free expression must coexist with the duty to prevent misuse of technology. 

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