Case Summary and Outcome

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that an executive order targeting a private law firm was unconstitutional and unenforceable. The order was issued in response to the firm’s representation of political opponents, litigation against the administration, and public endorsement of diversity and inclusion, and it imposed sweeping sanctions including the suspension of all security clearances held by its employees, forced disclosure of client relationships, contract terminations, investigatory directives, and broad access restrictions. The Court found that these measures violated constitutional protections against retaliation for political speech and association and infringed the rights of both the firm and its clients. It also held that the order denied procedural fairness, interfered with the right to legal counsel, and was unconstitutionally vague for failing to define the conduct it prohibited. Concluding that the government’s actions lacked a legitimate basis, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the law firm and permanently blocked the order’s enforcement.

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Facts

On March 6, 2025, U.S. President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 14230 (EO 14230 or the Order), titled “Addressing Risks from Perkins Coie LLP.” Perkins Coie is a large international law firm whose representation of political clients and its internal diversity initiatives became targets of disapproval by President Trump. The Order described the firm’s actions, in a live signing ceremony, as “terrible” and a form of “weaponization” against political opponents that must not be repeated. A White House fact sheet published simultaneously set out the Order’s objectives.

Perkins Coie has more than 2,500 employees and advises a wide array of clients, ranging from corporations to individuals and non‑profits, in federal and state litigation across the U.S. and in various international forums. Consistently ranked among the fifty largest U.S. law firms, Perkins Coie has earned numerous accolades for its work and although many of its attorneys and alumni have held positions under both Republican and Democratic administrations, political involvement is the exception rather than the rule within the firm. The firm’s practices require frequent engagement with federal agencies; every one of its nine practice groups handles matters that intersect with the federal government, and a majority of its clients maintain active or competing bids for government contracts. Perkins Coie also places a strong importance on diversity and inclusion (D&I). Its programs include a “Diversity & Inclusion Fellowship program” open to first‑year law students and, since 2019, voluntary participation in the “Mansfield Rule,” which seeks to ensure that at least thirty percent of candidates considered for leadership positions, senior lateral hires, and promotions are women, lawyers of color, LGBTQ+ attorneys, or lawyers with disabilities.

Since 2016, President Trump has repeatedly criticized Perkins Coie and its former lawyers in public remarks, accusing the firm of conspiring against him, acting dishonestly, improperly influencing elections, and seeking to undermine the presidency.

In 2016, a subset of Perkins Coie lawyers, including Marc Elias, formerly of the firm’s Political Law group and serving as the Democratic Party’s elections counsel, represented Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign. As part of that representation, the firm engaged Fusion GPS to research Donald Trump, producing the Steele dossier which alleged ties between President Trump and Russia. Neither Elias nor Michael Sussmann, who handled cybersecurity matters for the campaign, was employed at Perkins Coie at the time the Order was signed. During the 2020 election cycle, the firm successfully defended clients against then‑candidate Trump’s post‑election challenges and upheld existing voting‑rights protections.

On March 24, 2022, then-former President Trump sued Perkins Coie and other individuals, alleging they had conspired to fabricate a Russian collusion narrative, but that suit was dismissed with prejudice on September 8, 2022, for having “no merit,” and the court subsequently imposed sanctions exceeding $900,000 against Trump and one of his lawyers for filing a baseless case “in order to dishonestly advance a political narrative.”

In September 2023, President Trump warned that those involved in what he called the “Fake Dossier Hoax” would face justice if he returned to office. During the 2024 campaign, he continued to decry widespread election fraud and vowed to prosecute anyone, from attorneys to election officials, engaged in such misconduct.

On February 6, 2025, Perkins Coie filed the pro bono case Shilling v. Trump to challenge Executive Order 14183, which barred transgender individuals from military service and a nationwide injunction against enforcement of that order was entered on March 27, 2025. President Trump’s objections to the firm’s representation of his political opponents and its D&I initiatives surfaced both in public remarks and formal legal actions.

EO 14230 consists of six sections, five of which are under challenge. Section 1 accused Perkins Coie of “dishonest and dangerous activity,” “egregious” conduct, and racial discrimination, and stated that the firm should not be entrusted with federal funds or national secrets. Section 2 directed the suspension of all security clearances held by the firm’s employees pending a “national interest” review and instructed agencies to halt the provision of any federal goods or services to the firm, without limiting this suspension to national security-related matters. Section 3 required all government contractors to disclose any dealings with Perkins Coie and directed agencies to terminate existing contracts with the firm, effectively prohibiting federal funding of entities that work with it. Section 4 ordered the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct a broad investigation into discriminatory practices at major law firms, including Perkins Coie. Section 5 barred Perkins Coie employees from entering federal buildings or engaging with federal officials in their official capacities and prohibited federal agencies from hiring any of the firm’s personnel without a special waiver. Section 6 provided that the Order be implemented “consistent with applicable law,” which the government later interpreted to include any court decision invalidating parts of the Order.

The firm immediately faced substantial disruption to its client relationships following the issuance of EO 14230. Within hours, a long-standing client with several active matters ended the firm’s representation in a federal agency dispute. Another client, for whom Perkins Coie had performed over $1 million in legal work, retained new counsel after firm attorneys were denied entry to a scheduled meeting. A government contractor client of 35 years reassigned two matters to different firms, and another long-term client terminated all engagements. A group of four clients jointly withdrew their matters, citing the need for unimpeded interaction with federal agencies.

On March 11, 2025, Perkins Coie filed this lawsuit, five days after the Order’s release. It sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to halt the enforcement of Sections 1, 3, and 5, which was granted by the court on March 12, 2025 after a hearing. The parties agreed to maintain the TRO through final judgment and to fast-track the case by skipping discovery and going straight to written arguments for a final ruling.

On March 17, 2025, the Acting Chair of the EEOC sent an 11-page letter to Perkins Coie expressing “concern” about the firm’s hiring practices, citing “public statements” and “court filings” as the basis for inquiry. The letter requested extensive documentation covering a ten-year period and was sent not only to Perkins Coie but also publicly disclosed as having been issued to nineteen other law firms.

The Order’s impact on Perkins Coie drew nationwide attention and spurred an extraordinary number of amicus curiae submissions (filings by nonparties seeking to assist the Court with expert legal arguments or broader perspectives). These submissions came from over eight hundred law firms, several hundred law professors and former judges, and twenty states including Washington, California, and New York. Bar associations and civil society organizations also filed amicus briefs.

The broader context of the case includes parallel actions by President Trump against other major law firms, which Perkins Coie characterized as part of a larger “campaign of retribution.” On February 25, 2025, a presidential memorandum directed the suspension of security clearances for a named partner at the firm Covington & Burling LLP, as well as all employees who had assisted former Special Counsel Jack Smith, who had investigated and brought charges against then-former President Trump in 2023.

Eight days after issuing EO 14230 against Perkins Coie, President Trump signed EO 14237 on March 14, 2025, targeting Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP (Paul Weiss). That order contained provisions nearly identical to those challenged in this case but was revoked on March 21, 2025, after Paul, Weiss agreed to a resolution involving commitments to political neutrality in client and hiring practices, merit-based recruitment, pro bono work for a range of political causes, and $40 million in pro bono legal services. Similar agreements followed with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP on March 28, and Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP on April 1. On April 9, 2025, EO 14263 was issued against Susman Godfrey LLP. President Trump later commented that several firms had committed substantial resources to avoid similar orders, and his Deputy White House Chief of Staff estimated the total value of pro bono services pledged at nearly $700 million and predicted it would soon approach $1 billion.

The government filed a motion to disqualify the presiding judge, Beryl Howell, citing alleged impartiality based on her prior rulings against President Trump. The motion was denied on March 26, 2025. Both parties then submitted their dispositive motions, which are requests for the court to resolve the case without a full trial, along with evidentiary records.

A hearing on the motions was held on April 23, 2025, and following its conclusion, the matter was deemed ripe for decision.

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Decision Overview

Judge Beryl A. Howell delivered the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The central issue before the Court was the constitutionality of EO 14230, and whether the Order’s findings and directives constituted unlawful retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, deprivation of due process, interference with the right to counsel, and unequal treatment under the law.

Perkins Coie, brought four primary constitutional claims challenging Sections 1 through 5 of EO 14230, arguing that both the intent and impact of the Order rendered it unlawful. It submitted that EO 14230 targeted the firm because of its political associations, prior client representations, and internal policy commitments, in violation of several constitutional protections. Perkins Coie’s central argument was that the Order infringed on its rights under the First Amendment and the firm maintained that it was penalized for representing clients linked to political opposition to President Trump in the 2016 and 2020 elections. The Order, it argued, improperly imputed the views and actions of those clients to the firm and imposed retaliatory measures based on that attribution. The firm argued that its public support for D&I efforts, which the administration portrayed as questionable, was protected political and social expression under the First Amendment.

The firm challenged Section 3 of the Order as a violation of constitutional protections against compelled disclosure as it required all government contractors to disclose any business relationships with Perkins Coie, regardless of whether those relationships were related to government work. The firm argued that this compelled disclosure infringed not only on its own associational rights, but also on those of its clients, who were effectively forced to choose between maintaining government contracts and retaining their legal representation. It submitted that such compelled exposure of affiliation chilled protected association and placed unconstitutional burdens on the right to choose legal counsel freely.

Perkins Coie also raised claims under the Fifth Amendment, arguing that EO 14230 violated its right to procedural due process by imposing penalties without prior notice or an opportunity to respond. The firm maintained that this deprivation was particularly serious because it stemmed from its involvement in litigation against the government and its advocacy on politically sensitive matters which are core components of the constitutional right to petition the government and therefore constitute a protected liberty interest. Perkins Coie argued that the Order violated the equal protection guarantee by singling it out among similarly situated law firms; while other prominent firms had adopted D&I initiatives and engaged in similar high-profile legal work, only Perkins Coie was subjected to punitive government action. The firm argued that this selective targeting lacked any rational basis and was arbitrary.

Perkins Coie argued that EO 14230 was impermissibly vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause as it imposed sanctions based on Perkins Coie’s alleged involvement in inappropriate “diversity, equity, and inclusion” practices but failed to define what conduct was considered unlawful. Without clear standards, the firm submitted that it was left uncertain about which of its actions might trigger further penalties and this uncertainty created a chilling effect and exemplified the type of indeterminate enforcement the vagueness doctrine is intended to prevent.

Perkins Coie argued that the Order infringed on its clients’ Sixth Amendment rights as Section 5(a) instructed government agencies to limit contact with firm personnel, while Section 3 discouraged other entities from doing business with the firm under threat of losing government contracts. Together, these measures restricted Perkins Coie’s ability to deliver legal services, particularly in criminal cases where clients are guaranteed the right to choose their own counsel. The firm argued that the Order interfered with the attorney-client relationship by dissuading clients from retaining its services and limiting its access to government officials and facilities necessary for effective representation.

To address these alleged constitutional violations, Perkins Coie moved for summary judgment (a procedure allowing the court to rule in its favor without a full trial where the law clearly supports one side), on its claims and requested both declaratory relief (a court statement that the executive order is unlawful) and permanent injunctive relief (a court order barring the government from enforcing the order in the future) to prohibit enforcement of EO 14230. The firm argued that it was continuing to suffer harm to its constitutional rights and that only prompt and lasting judicial action could prevent additional injury.

The Government moved to dismiss all of Perkins Coie’s claims and argued that EO 14230 was not punitive in nature and did not constitute a sanction, but rather was a lawful exercise of executive authority. The Government emphasized that the Order was grounded in matters of “public record” and “undisputed” facts and represented an appropriate expression of the Executive Branch’s discretion in administering federal employment and contracting. It argued that decisions outlined in the Order were made in furtherance of the public interest, not as retaliation for political or legal disagreements. The Government submitted that Section 1 merely reflected presidential opinion and was therefore not subject to judicial review and described the statements in Section 1 as part of a non-binding preamble articulating the President’s concerns with Perkins Coie’s conduct, which amounted to protected executive speech rather than enforceable legal action. Consequently, the government argued that Perkins Coie had no constitutional basis to suppress or challenge the content of this section, regardless of any political implications.

The Government maintained that the case against Section 2, which suspended and called for review of the firm’s security clearances, was categorically nonjusticiable under binding D.C. Circuit precedent, which generally bars courts from reviewing security clearance determinations. It also argued that the claim was premature because the provision had not resulted in any final or permanent action; as no clearance had yet been revoked, the Government submitted that Perkins Coie could not demonstrate the kind of concrete and particularized injury required for standing. The Government argued that Perkins Coie lacked standing to challenge the contracting restrictions in Section 3 because the firm was not a direct party to any existing government contract and had not alleged an active or pending bid and that indirect connections to contractors were insufficient to establish a legally cognizable injury. It raised similar objections in relation to Section 4, which called for a review of potential discriminatory practices at law firms, and the Government argued that the EEOC’s investigative authority existed independently under statutory law and was not created by EO 14230. It also cited another executive directive, referred to as the “Anti-DEI EO,” as a separate and sufficient basis for the EEOC’s actions which broke the causal chain between EO 14230 and any alleged harm to Perkins Coie. The Government argued that the matter was not ripe for adjudication on Section 5, which instructed agencies to prepare guidance restricting the firm’s access to federal buildings and officials, because no such guidance had yet been finalized, and any anticipated injury remained speculative.

One set of amici described the Order as “an unconstitutional attempt to punish Perkins Coie for its protected advocacy” and warned that its “sweeping and draconian sanctions,” such as barring access to federal buildings and officials, suspending security clearances, and effectively blacklisting the firm from federal contracting, posed a serious threat. [ACLU et al amicus brief p. 6] That amicus brief stated that such measures “threaten to destroy Perkins Coie and would chill any law firm from participating in similar advocacy against the Trump Administration or its officials.” [ACLU amicus brief p. 14]

An amicus brief submitted by 363 law professors cautioned that the Order places firms in the position of having to decide whether they are willing to risk being “placed on the President’s target list” and potentially lose business as a result, including clients to whom they owe ongoing ethical obligations. The brief emphasized the importance of judicial independence, stating that “[t]hat anchor of our constitutional system cannot function when one person – regardless of his position – is empowered to threaten and punish lawyers for zealously representing their clients in court.” [Law Professors amicus brief pp. 4, 5]

Similarly, 346 former federal and state judges submitted an amicus brief warning that the Order “undermines the rule of law by threatening the independence of lawyers and litigants to petition courts to redress their grievances.” [Judges’ amicus brief p. 3] They stressed that litigation conducted by “zealous and ethical advocates, and presided over by neutral and independent judges,” is essential to the functioning of the legal system. [Judges’ amicus brief p. 3] They added that “[f]or courts and judges to fulfill their constitutional role, lawyers must be free to represent their clients without fear of governmental retribution on political grounds,” and that it is “for courts, not parties or another branch of government, to assess the merits of claims and the conduct of lawyers before a tribunal” [Judges’ amicus brief 8].

Amici law firms described the “looming threat” that “any representation challenging actions of the current administration (or even causes it disfavors) now brings with it the risk of devastating retaliation”. [Law firms’ amicus brief p. 2] They asserted, regarding the Order, that “the rule of law cannot long endure in the climate of fear that such actions create.” [Law firms’ amicus brief p. 2]

The Court remarked that “[n]o American President has ever before issued executive orders like the one at issue.” [p. 1] Drawing on Shakespeare’s Henry VI, in which a rebel leader proclaims, “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers,” the Court adapted the line to the present case, observing that EO 14230 instead takes the form of: “Let’s kill all the lawyers I don’t like.” [p. 3]

The Court examined the government’s motion to dismiss and found the government’s characterization of Section 1 of EO 14230 as merely presenting “undisputed” statements incorrect. It found the statements in Section 1, which outline the “Purpose” of the Order, to be highly relevant to evaluating the constitutional claims which could not be regarded as “straightforwardly legal.” [p. 34] In response to the government’s second argument that Section 1 constituted only “government speech” or a non-binding “preamble,” the Court called this framing “subterfuge.” [p. 35] The Court emphasized that Perkins Coie was not challenging the President’s right to express opinions but was instead contesting the “use of governmental power” that relied on those statements. [p. 35] Moreover, the government itself had acknowledged that the statements in Section 1 served as “findings” that supplied the “Purpose” and informed the operative directives that followed in the Order. The TRO had accordingly enjoined the government from “using the statements” in Section 1, not from the President making them.

The Court rejected the government’s other arguments for dismissal, which were based on justiciability, standing, and ripeness. The Court held that the challenge to Section 2 was ripe because the stated “threats of coercion” in the Order, tied to protected speech, created immediate and non-speculative harm, finding that judicial review is appropriate where a general policy discriminates against a class of individuals without individual assessments or legitimate national security grounds, relying instead on a vague “national interest” justification. The Court rejected the government’s argument that Perkins Coie lacked standing to challenge Section 3, referring to allegations in the Amended Complaint that clients had terminated their legal representation with the firm due to the Order, establishing traceable injury. The Court found this government’s argument, in respect of Section 4, that any EEOC reviews were independent and routine, and not linked to EO 14230, flawed, stating that it “only highlights [its] … logical fallacy,” given that Section 4 specifically targets Perkins Coie and circumvents statutory requirements for initiating EEOC investigations, thereby supporting standing and traceability. [p. 46] The Court disagreed with the government’s argument that claims related to Section 5 were unripe, noting that Section 5(b), which restricts hiring, was effective immediately, and Section 5(a), which limits access, had already caused identifiable harm as shown in the Order’s text, the accompanying fact sheet, and the reactions of clients. Based on these findings, the Court denied the government’s motion to dismiss in full.

With respect to Perkins Coie’s entitlement to summary judgment, the Court rejected the government’s primary argument that EO 14230 constituted a lawful use of executive authority over federal contracting and employment. The Court found this reasoning unconvincing, particularly because the government had no direct contractual or employment relationship with Perkins Coie. Rather than regulating any legitimate federal business dealings, the Order, in the Court’s view, was designed to punish the firm for representing clients disfavored by the President, participating in litigation that opposed his interests, and publicly embracing values with which he disagreed. The Court emphasized that constitutional protections remain fully applicable even when the government acts in an administrative or managerial role. It determined that the “Trump Administration’s blunt exercise of power in EO 14230 to target Perkins Coie for adverse actions by every Federal agency violates the Constitution […].” [p. 52]

The Court organized its analysis of Perkins Coie’s motion for summary judgment around the four main constitutional claims asserted. These included alleged violations of the First Amendment, specifically unlawful retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, and compelled disclosure; violations of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, both procedural and under the vagueness doctrine; violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of Perkins Coie’s clients to legal counsel; and the unconstitutional denial of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.

The Court addressed the First Amendment retaliation claims, drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in NRA v. Vullo, where it reaffirmed that the government “cannot … use the power of the State to punish or suppress disfavored expression.” [p. 53] The Court outlined the three elements that Perkins Coie must satisfy to prevail on this claim; it must demonstrate that it “engaged in conduct protected under the First Amendment”; it must show that EO 14230 “took some retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness in plaintiff’s position from speaking again;” and it must establish that “there is a causal link between the protected First Amendment activity and the adverse action taken against the firm,” following the standard established in Aref v. Lynch. [p. 54]

The Court determined that EO 14230 was issued in direct response to Perkins Coie’s participation in protected political and expressive activity, thereby satisfying the first element of a First Amendment retaliation claim: that the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected conduct. The firm had represented Hillary Clinton (President Trumps opponent) during the 2016 election, litigated against voter ID laws, and filed lawsuits challenging Trump Administration policies, all of which the Order itself identified as problematic. The Court emphasized that such legal representation, particularly in politically charged matters, as well as public advocacy in support of D&I, fall squarely within the protections of the First Amendment. It concluded that EO 14230 penalized the firm for engaging in these core expressive activities. Citing Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., the Court reaffirmed that “[p]olitical belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment,” quoting Elrod v. Burns. [p. 56] The Court rejected the government’s reliance on a voluntarily dismissed lawsuit and the firm’s involvement in diversity initiatives such as the Mansfield Rule as legitimate grounds for executive action, finding instead that they served as a pretext for retaliation. The government had cited only public statements in support of diversity and provided no evidence of any unlawful conduct.

The Court found the second element, whether the government took adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected activity, satisfied as EO 14230 triggered immediate and substantial harm. It added that Perkins Coie experienced significant client losses and revenue decline, and the chilling effect extended well beyond the firm itself. Other prominent law firms, including Paul, Weiss, Skadden, Willkie Farr, and Susman Godfrey, responded to similar executive actions by negotiating directly with the White House or pledging substantial sums in pro bono work, in some cases exceeding $100 million, in order to avoid being similarly targeted. The Court noted that even firms “with the most talented lawyers in the world” chose silence, and amici representing hundreds of law firms cautioned that these orders “seek to cow every other firm into submission.” [p. 63] The Court found that such an environment clearly chilled protected First Amendment activity.

Examining the third element, causation, the Court found that retaliation was the only plausible explanation for EO 14230 as every justification offered in the Order was linked directly to the President’s disapproval of Perkins Coie’s legal advocacy and affiliations. The Court rejected the government’s argument on national security in respect of Section 2, concluding that it failed to meet even a minimal threshold of credibility. Relying on expert testimony from J. William Leonard, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security, the Court highlighted that a defining feature of the security clearance process is its individualized nature, noting that “Person A is never held accountable for the conduct of Person B, let alone … 2,500 held accountable for the conduct of formerly associated Person 2,501.” [p. 65] EO 14230, however, suspended all clearances held by Perkins Coie employees, despite none of them being involved in the 2016 Fusion GPS engagement, supposedly the cause of the withdrawal of clearance. This constituted what the Court described as unconstitutional punishment by association. Reinforcing this conclusion was a public statement by President Trump on his social media platform, Truth Social, made on the day of the hearing, in which he referred to the Order as targeting “the conduct of a specific member of this firm,” a comment that, according to the Court, “strongly suggests that no firm wide national security concern exists.” [p. 66] The revocation of the virtually identical order issued against Paul, Weiss just seven days after its issuance, despite no changes in underlying facts, further confirmed that retaliation, rather than national security, motivated Section 2.

The Court found that Sections 3 and 4 of EO 14230 served as a pretext for unlawful retaliation. Section 3’s accompanying Fact Sheet openly stated that the contracting prohibitions were imposed because of Perkins Coie’s “partisan lawsuits,” which the Court held was equivalent to retaliation for constitutionally protected expression and the Court noted that this type of motivation is indistinguishable from retaliation “for speaking out,” referencing Hartman v. Moore. [p. 68] It applied the same reasoning to Section 4’s instruction to the EEOC to investigate “large law firms” for alleged discriminatory practices disregarded the procedural framework established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court referenced Shell Oil Co. v. EEOC, in emphasizing that EEOC investigative authority must be anchored in a properly filed charge. However, just six days after this lawsuit was filed, the EEOC issued a public eleven-page information request to Perkins Coie without adhering to the required statutory procedures, bypassing the established safeguards of the charge process.

The Court found Section 5 to be “stunningly” expansive in scope and observed that this provision instructed every federal agency to limit access to federal buildings by Perkins Coie employees and to restrict interaction with the firm’s attorneys where doing so was deemed “inconsistent with the interests of the United States,” according to the language of the EO 14230 Fact Sheet. [pp. 70-71] The Court found the government’s argument that the reach of Section 5 would depend on future implementation guidance unpersuasive; the Order and its Fact Sheet made clear that the intent was to impose broad access restrictions and in addition to limiting physical and professional access, the Order effectively imposed a government-wide hiring freeze on Perkins Coie attorneys, requiring dual waivers for any of the firm’s employees to join federal service. This, the Court concluded, constituted a direct penalty on protected association. Viewed in context with Section 1’s definitive “findings” that deemed the firm untrustworthy, these restrictions on all Perkins Coie personnel were, in the Court’s view, explicable only as unconstitutional retaliation.

The Court pointed to President Trump’s history of public attacks on Perkins Coie dating back to 2017 and his campaign promises of retribution if reelected. These statements, the Court concluded, provided “probative context […] of the retaliatory purpose of the Order as a whole.” [p. 73] Additional executive actions targeting other firms, including Covington & Burling and Jenner & Block, supported Perkins Coie’s assertion of a broader “campaign … [of] retribution.” [p. 77] In light of this evidence, the Court held that Perkins Coie was entitled to summary judgment on its First Amendment retaliation claim.

On the issue of compelled disclosure, the Court held that Section 3(a) of EO 14230 violated both the firm’s and its clients’ First Amendment associational rights. It emphasized the Supreme Court’s reasoning from Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta that quoted NAACP v. Alabama, which stated that “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as [other] forms of governmental action,” and recognized the “vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.” [p. 78] Because Perkins Coie is a law firm that engages in advocacy, and because its clients have a fundamental First Amendment right to speak and associate with their chosen legal counsel, the Order imposed a direct burden on these constitutionally protected relationships. The Court noted that, under exacting scrutiny, the government must show both a “sufficiently important” interest and that the regulation is “narrowly tailored” to advance that interest and found that the government did not satisfy this standard and, in fact, made no attempt to do so. Section 3(a) required all federal contractors to disclose any business with Perkins Coie, regardless of whether it was related to government matters, national security, or even minor transactions and as the Court had already determined that the stated purpose of the Order was unconstitutional retaliation, it concluded that the government had “no legitimate interests” in compelling such disclosures and thus failed to meet the constitutional threshold. The Court accordingly held Section 3 unconstitutional and granted summary judgment on this claim.

Regarding the equal protection claim, the Court found that Perkins Coie had been arbitrarily singled out from among similarly situated law firms. While over 360 major firms had adopted the same diversity policies referenced in the EO, only a small number were subjected to punitive action, and the government failed to offer adequate justification for the differential treatment. The Court concluded that animus (individual motivation), rather than any legitimate policy objective, motivated the decision. Citing established precedent in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, it noted that “some objectives – such as a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular group – are not legitimate state interests,” the Court determined that EO 14230 was intended to punish Perkins Coie for its protected speech and associations, particularly those disfavored by President Trump. [p. 83] It further observed that “settling personal vendettas by targeting a disliked business or individual for punitive government action is not a legitimate use of the powers of the U.S. government or an American President,” and concluded that the Order therefore violated the Fifth Amendment. [pp. 83, 84]

The Court then addressed the constitutional rights of Perkins Coie’s clients under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. It found that EO 14230 violated these rights by interfering with the ability of clients to select and retain legal counsel of their choice. Section 5(a), which directed restrictions on the firm’s access to federal officials and facilities, posed what the Court described as an “existential threat” to criminal defense work. [p. 85] This was particularly evident in the context of plea bargaining, where engagement with government actors is a critical part of effective legal representation. Concurrently, Section 3 placed undue pressure on clients, especially those with government contracts, by effectively requiring them to terminate relationships with Perkins Coie or risk losing federal business. The Court emphasized that, even though EO 14230 did not impose an explicit ban on legal representation, it operated in substance to achieve that result. Clients were forced into a position where they had to choose between their preferred legal counsel and access to the federal government. Quoting from the  Vullo case, the Court reiterated that the government “may [not do] indirectly what [it] is barred from doing directly.” [p. 87] The record showed that clients had already cancelled meetings and hired alternative counsel as a result of the Order, confirming its coercive and chilling effects. These impacts violated not only the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal matters but also the Fifth Amendment right to access legal services in civil cases without government interference. Because EO 14230 unconstitutionally disrupted attorney-client relationships through coercive measures and denial of access, the Court granted summary judgment on both claims.

The Court examined the claim that EO 14230 violated procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment and explained that to succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must show that a protected liberty or property interest was deprived without sufficient procedural safeguards. The Court concluded that Perkins Coie was deprived of its liberty interest in petitioning the government, which includes access to the courts, without being given any notice or opportunity to respond. Citing BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, the Court reiterated that the right to petition is “one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” [p. 90] Because the Order’s findings and restrictions took effect immediately upon issuance, with no procedural safeguard even in the national security context, the Court found that no process had been afforded at all. It therefore concluded that summary judgment was warranted in this respect.

The Court additionally held that EO 14230 was impermissibly vague as it failed to provide adequate notice of what conduct was prohibited which constituted another violation of the Fifth Amendment. Although the Order imposed sanctions based on Perkins Coie’s involvement in D&I policies, it offered no definition of these terms nor any explanation of which specific practices were deemed unlawful. The Court observed that the government’s varying characterizations of the firm’s conduct, ranging from “legally suspect” to “aggressive DEI practices,” only heightened the uncertainty. [p. 97] The Court emphasized that “[a] fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required,” quoting FCC v. Fox Television Station. [p. 93] Because EO 14230 left Perkins Coie uncertain as to which of its actions might prompt government penalties, the Court concluded that the Order lacked a clear and consistent standard, rendering it unconstitutionally vague.

In conclusion, the Court found that EO 14230 was an unconstitutional act of retaliation against Perkins Coie for its protected speech, legal advocacy, and affiliations. It held that the Order violated the First Amendment by punishing the firm for representing disfavored clients, engaging in politically sensitive litigation, and supporting diversity initiatives. The Order’s compelled disclosure provisions further infringed on associational rights, and the government failed to justify them under exacting scrutiny. Under the Fifth Amendment, the Court found that the Order deprived the firm of due process by imposing sanctions without notice or a hearing and was impermissibly vague for failing to define key terms like “diversity, equity, and inclusion.” The Court also held that the firm had been arbitrarily singled out without a rational basis, violating equal protection, and that the Order interfered with Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of Perkins Coie’s clients by restricting their access to legal representation. On these grounds, the Court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, granted summary judgment in favor of the firm and permanently enjoined the Order.

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