Case Summary and Outcome

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that Russia violated articles 10 and 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) by convicting Mariya Avagyan under Article 13.15(9) of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) for publishing comments about COVID-19 on her Instagram account. While the Court accepted that the interference was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public health, it found that the restriction was not “necessary in a democratic society.” The domestic courts had ignored the limited dissemination of the applicant’s comments, failed to assess her intent, and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto her. The Court also found that the absence of a prosecuting party rendered the administrative proceedings unfair, violating Article 6(1) of the Convention.

Facts

Mariya Avagyan, a Russian national residing in Krasnodar, owned a small nail salon and primarily used her Instagram account for business purposes. On 13 May 2020, she posted comments suggesting that there were no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Krasnodar and that doctors were being paid to list COVID-19 as the cause of death. Her post, made to approximately 2,600 followers, received minimal engagement, one like and one comment contradicting her statements.

On 18 May 2020, the Krasnodar police printed her comments and initiated administrative proceedings under Article 13.15(9) of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO), which penalizes the dissemination of “socially important information known to be untrue” presented as reliable reports, creating risks to life or public order.

At trial, Avagyan argued that her comments were based on publicly available media reports, expressed skepticism rather than factual assertions, and could not be considered “known to be untrue” because authorities had not disclosed reliable local statistics. On 8 June 2020, the Justice of the Peace of the Krasnodar District convicted her, reasoning that she had “failed to put forward any evidence to disprove the existence of coronavirus infection in the Krasnodar region,” and imposed a fine of 30,000 roubles (approx. EUR 390).

Avagyan appealed, contending that the trial court had shifted the burden of proof, failed to require the prosecution to establish falsity, and disregarded her freedom of expression. The Krasnodar District Court dismissed her appeal on 8 July 2020, citing regional COVID-19 decrees as proof that her statements were false.

Decision Overview

Judge Huseynov delivered the judgment for the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on 29 April 2025. The main issues for the Court were whether Avagyan’s conviction under Article 13.15(9) CAO was compatible with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or “the Convention”) and whether the absence of a prosecuting party breached Article 6(1) of the aforementioned treaty.

The applicant argued that her comments formed part of an important public debate concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. She emphasized that she was a private individual rather than a journalist or media professional and that her Instagram account, with approximately 2,600 followers, primarily promoted her small business. Her post received only one like and one reply, which immediately contradicted her statements. She maintained that her remarks drew on reports from established media sources and amounted to skepticism and criticism of the authorities’ lack of transparency rather than the dissemination of factual assertions. The applicant contended that Article 13.15(9) of the Code of Administrative Offenses lacked clarity and foreseeability, as it provided no criteria for determining what constituted information “known to be untrue.” She further argued that the domestic courts had unlawfully shifted the burden of proof by requiring her to establish the truth of her statements. Finally, she asserted that the fine of 30,000 rubles was disproportionate to her circumstances as a single mother and small business owner and that the proceedings were structurally unfair because no prosecuting party had participated.

The Government of Russia argued that the applicant’s statements were presented as factual assertions and publicly disseminated as reliable information. It maintained that the statements directly contradicted official measures adopted to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and had the potential to cause public alarm, undermine trust in public institutions, and create health and safety risks during a pandemic. The Government contended that Article 13.15(9) of the Code of Administrative Offenses required both an objective element of public dissemination of socially significant information and a subjective element of knowledge of falsity, and that the applicant’s liability had been properly established under these criteria. It further emphasized that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public health and safety, and that the fine imposed represented the statutory minimum, reflecting consideration of mitigating factors such as the applicant’s personal circumstances.

The Court began by arguing that the applicant’s conviction and fine constituted an interference with her right to freedom of expression. Regarding the requirement that such interference be “prescribed by law,” the Court accepted that Article 13.15(9) of the Code of Administrative Offenses provided a legal basis but questioned the quality of the law’s application.

Recalling that the expression “prescribed by law” in Article 10(2) of the ECHR refers not only to the existence of a legal basis but also to the quality of the law, the Court stressed the importance of accessibility and foreseeability, as established in Delfi AS v. Estonia. It observed that the provision contained several cumulative safeguards: the information must be false, socially significant, presented as reliable reports, and capable of creating concrete risks to health, safety, or infrastructure. These elements reflected the legislature’s intention to limit liability to the most serious cases of harmful disinformation.

However, the ECtHR held that the domestic courts failed to apply these safeguards. It was particularly concerned that the Justice of the Peace convicted Avagyan because she “failed to put forward any evidence to disprove the existence of coronavirus infection in Krasnodar and the Krasnodar region.” [para. 33] The Court considered that this approach amounted to imposing strict liability for unproven statements, disregarding the applicant’s intent and her reliance on information published by other media outlets. The domestic courts, it maintained, had taken a perfunctory approach to the “prescribed by law” requirement, effectively reversing the burden of proof.

On the legitimate aim prong of the three-part test, the Court accepted that combating the spread of false information during a pandemic may, in principle, serve to protect public health and safety under Article 10(2). However, it emphasized that “sanctioning individuals for expressing skepticism about official information or calling for greater transparency does not advance this aim.” [para. 37]

Turning to the necessity and proportionality requirements, the ECtHR underscored that the applicant was not a professional journalist but a small business owner posting from a personal account. Her comments, made at the early stages of the pandemic, expressed criticism and skepticism regarding the authorities’ transparency rather than purporting to convey verified factual information. Imposing on her the same verification duties as professional media would place an unreasonable burden on citizens engaging in public debate. The Court also noted that her remarks addressed issues of obvious public interest, such as the accuracy of official COVID-19 data and the adequacy of the government’s response, which constitute protected expression under Article 10 of the ECHR.

The ECtHR highlighted the limited dissemination of the applicant’s comments, posted on an account primarily used for advertising her nail salon, which received minimal engagement and were promptly contradicted by another user. It further emphasized the absence of a prosecuting party during proceedings, which undermined their adversarial nature and compromised impartiality, referring to its earlier findings in Karelin v. Russia, Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, and Figurka v. Ukraine. The Court found that this procedural defect effectively shifted the burden of proof to the applicant, contrary to Article 6(1) ECHR.

Finally, assessing the proportionality of the sanction, the Court observed that although the fine imposed was at the statutory minimum, it was not negligible. Given the applicant’s circumstances as a small business owner and single mother, the fine represented a substantial financial burden and was capable of having a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of expression.

The Court concluded that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society and that Russia violated Article 10 of the Convention. It further found a violation of Article 6(1), reiterating its established case law that the absence of a prosecuting party in administrative proceedings is incompatible with the requirement of impartiality. Under Article 41, the Court awarded the applicant EUR 350 in pecuniary damages, EUR 10,000 in non-pecuniary damages, and EUR 2,008 for costs and expenses.