Case Summary and Outcome

The High Court of Karnataka held that under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the government has the authority to block entire user accounts, not just specific tweets or content. The case arose when X (formerly Twitter) challenged government blocking orders covering 1,474 accounts and 175 tweets, arguing that the orders exceeded statutory authority and failed procedural requirements. The Court rejected these arguments, holding that a purposive rather than literal interpretation of Section 69A was appropriate given the dynamic nature of cyber technology. It further held that while blocking decisions must be supported by written reasons, these need not always be included in the order itself. The Court also found that X had been afforded adequate procedural fairness through committee meetings. Additionally, the Court ruled that prior notice to affected users before blocking is discretionary, not mandatory. Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, partly because of X’s unjustified delay in complying with the blocking orders.

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Facts

X (formerly Twitter), a company incorporated in the United States with its headquarters in San Francisco, California, operates a global social media platform that serves users in India. The company qualifies as an “intermediary” under Section 2(1)(w) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, as its role is limited to receiving, storing, and transmitting user-generated content.

The Government of India issued various Blocking Orders to X under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act. Under Section 69A of the Act, the Central Government can block public from accessing “any information” on the internet when: (a) the Government believes it is “necessary or expedient”; and (b) it is in the interests of the defence, sovereignty, integrity, or security of India or its relations with foreign states, public order, or the incitement of a cognisable offence relating to these categories. However, such blocking must be based on written reasons and follow prescribed procedures under the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.  The Impugned Blocking Orders covered 1,474 X accounts and 175 tweets. As contended by the X,  the impugned Blocking Orders did not contain reasons recorded in writing and were also not communicated to the users.

In June 2022, X received notice of these orders and complied “under protest.” On June 9, 2022, X submitted a response requesting a post-decisional hearing. The Designated Officer issued a notice on June 27, 2022, directing full compliance with the Impugned Blocking orders and warning of potential consequences, including loss of immunity under Section 79(1) and possible penal action. X replied on June 29, 2022, arguing that some of the blocked content did not meet the criteria specified in Section 69A of the Act.

Accordingly, the Review Committee, constituted under Rule 419-A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, convened on June 30, 2022. X participated in this meeting and sought revocation of 11 account-level Blocking Orders on the grounds that: (a) Section 69A only permitted the Government to block individual tweets and not entire accounts, and (b) the Impugned Blocking orders were issued without giving appropriate hearing to the affected entities, i.e. the users. Subsequently, the respondents revoked 10 of these 11 orders through a notice dated July 1, 2022.

Following the meeting, the government identified an additional 15 X accounts and 12 tweet URLs for blocking. On July 2, 2022, X communicated its compliance “under protest” with the remaining orders while pointing out certain discrepancies. The government acknowledged this compliance via email on July 4, 2022.

X then filed a Writ Petition before the Karnataka High Court challenging the Blocking Orders and the government’s refusal to unblock certain accounts and tweets. The petition specifically contested 39 URLs covered by these orders.

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Decision Overview

Justice Krishna S Dixit delivered the decision. On the matter of jurisdiction, the Court held that the petitioner has locus standi to file this case. The key issues before the Court were:

1. Whether Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, read with the Website Blocking Rules, permits the blocking of entire user accounts or restricts such action to content-specific measures;
2. Whether the blocking orders are invalid due to the non-communication of reasons or the absence of discernible grounds tied to objectionable content;
3. Whether prior notice to affected users, as mandated under Rule 8(1), is compulsory and if its omission renders the orders legally untenable;
4. Whether the blocking orders violate the doctrine of proportionality, warranting their invalidation; and
5. Whether the petitioner’s conduct disqualifies them from seeking discretionary relief or justifies imposing exemplary costs.

The petitioner argued that the blocking orders under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 suffered from substantive and procedural irregularities. Relying on Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015), they contended that the blocking powers under Section 69A are limited to specific information and do not permit preemptive content restrictions. The petitioner challenged the procedural defects in the orders, particularly the absence of prior notice to content creators – a mandatory requirement under established precedent. They further argued that the orders were invalid for failing to provide adequate reasons within the orders themselves, rendering them non-speaking orders. Additionally, the petitioner asserted constitutional violations, claiming the blocking actions were disproportionate and failed to employ the least restrictive means. They argued this violated fundamental rights under Articles 14 (equality before law), 19 (freedom of speech and expression), and 21 (right to life) of the Constitution. The petitioner also contended that the lack of a proper hearing opportunity before the Review Committee constituted a violation of natural justice principles.

The government contended that the petition was not maintainable because a foreign company could not claim protection under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The government maintained that the government had complied with all substantive and procedural requirements under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Website Blocking Rules. They emphasized that the petitioner’s participation in the decision-making process precluded any subsequent claims of denied opportunity. The government further argued that Rule 8(1) of the Website Blocking Rules does not apply to non-citizens and that the petitioner lacked statutory authority to represent the interests of account holders. Since the petitioner held exclusive access to account holder details, authorities could not issue notice to them, nor did the petitioner insist on such notice during proceedings. The government concluded that the procedural fairness afforded met international standards, leaving no grounds for relief.

On Section 69A Scope of Blocking User Accounts

The High Court addressed whether Section 69A of the Information Technology Act permitted the government to block entire user accounts or only specific tweets/posts. The petitioner argued that Section 69A was “tweet-specific,” contending that account-level blocking created an absolute prohibition affecting both existing content and future (potentially lawful) posts. They maintained this exceeded the statutory language authorizing blocking of “any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource.” [pp. 45-46]

The Court rejected the petitioner’s literal interpretation approach, adopting a purposive interpretation instead. It noted that Parliament enacted Section 69A through a 2009 amendment in response to evolving technological needs, observing that cyber law remains at a “nascent stage” with technology changing “every day, if not every hour” (citing the Supreme Court’s observation in Facebook Inc. v. Union of India, (2019)). The Court found literal interpretation unsuitable for such dynamic fields, noting language’s “marked elements of statics.” It supported this view with authorities including Judge Aharon Barak’s Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Prof. Frederick Schauer’s Thinking Like a Lawyer, and several cases including Jones v. Wrotham Park Settled Estates, (1978), New South Wales v. Commonwealth, (2006), Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, (1892), and United States v. American Trucking Association, (1940). [pp. 47-54]

The Court dismissed the petitioner’s contention that the past-tense verb in Section 69A(1) (“generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted”) limited it to existing content. It distinguished earlier cases including Municipal Corporation, Greater Bombay v. Nagpal Printing Mills, (1989) and Giridhar G Yadalam v. CWT, (2015), as concerning simpler statutes on taxation and municipal administration, unlike the IT Act, which carried international implications and constitutional dimensions. The High Court noted that “the rules of grammar cannot jettison the rules of law,” observing that “law is not a slave of the dictionary, nor a captive of grammar.” [pp. 54-59]

Recognizing Section 69A’s dual preventive and punitive intent, the Court analogized to criminal law’s dual function of punishment and deterrence, emphasizing that “preventive and punitive rationales are intertwined.” It rejected comparisons to print media forfeiture powers under Sections 95 & 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code, noting that electronic content “travels like lightning and can reach millions of persons all over the world” (citing the Shreya Singhal case). It further stated that the blocking decisions were not made recklessly, as evidenced by the authorities removing the blockage for 10 out of 11 accounts in a subsequent committee meeting. [pp. 59-63]

Ultimately, the Court held that Section 69A’s blocking power “extends to user accounts in their entirety.” It emphasized that the government’s ability to prevent potential harm to national interests required an interpretation that allowed blocking entire accounts rather than waiting for the damage to occur, metaphorically stating that “a surgeon does not wait till gangrene is developed. A stitch in time saves nine.” [pp. 61, 63]

On Recording of Reasons in Writing for Statutory Orders

The High Court further examined whether authorities were required to communicate reasons for blocking orders issued under Section 69A(1) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which requires “reasons to be recorded in writing.” The petitioner cited the Shreya Singhal case, where the Supreme Court held that “reasons have to be recorded in writing in such blocking order so that they may be assailed in a writ petition.” They also relied on Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1977) to argue that statutory orders must be assessed based on reasons stated in the order itself, not from external sources like files, and that non-disclosure of reasons rendered the orders voidable. The Additional Solicitor General countered that Mohinder Singh was not universally applicable, and the requirement to record reasons didn’t necessarily mean they must be part of the order or invariably communicated. [pp. 64-65]

The Court established that providing reasons is fundamental to natural justice, serving as “living links between the material available on record and the conclusions drawn.” It noted three key functions of reasoned orders: demonstrating application of mind, enabling affected parties to consider legal recourse, and facilitating judicial review. While acknowledging that “good governance warrants giving of reasons for decisions” with civil implications, the Court observed that most statutes only mandate recording reasons, with only three central laws explicitly requiring both recording and communication. [pp. 65-70]

The Court cited relevant precedents addressing, inter alia, communication of reasons, including C.B. Gautam v. Union of India, (1992) (a tax case not involving national security concerns); Haji Md. Vakil v. Commissioner of Police, (1953) (regarding gun license cancellation, where the Calcutta High Court held that while reasons need not be communicated with “minutest details,” the license-holder was entitled to know “broadly why his license had been cancelled”); Ratilal Bhogilal Shah v. State of Gujarat, (1965) (another fiscal matter involving an Indian citizen); and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) (concerning passport impounding, which established that power to refuse disclosure of reasons should be exercised “fairly, sparingly and only when fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation”). The High Court further examined Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985), where a five-judge Supreme Court bench had ruled that while reasons must be recorded in writing under constitutional requirements, “there is no obligation to communicate the reason to the government servant” in departmental inquiry contexts. [pp. 66-71]

The Court synthesized these precedents to conclude that when statutes require “reasons to be recorded in writing,” such reasons should ordinarily form part of the order. However, when recorded separately, they should be communicated to the affected person at least upon request, unless the statute specifically permits withholding reasons. Even when withheld, authorities must justify non-disclosure, with courts retaining power to examine confidential records except in rare cases involving “reasons of State.” [pp. 71-72]

On Non-Communication of Reasons for Blocking Orders

The High Court examined the Petitioner’s contention that the blocking orders were invalid due to non-communication of reasons despite requests. The Additional Solicitor General (ASG) countered this by presenting sealed documents to the Court, which were opened with stakeholders’ consent. These documents contained interim and final blocking orders, notices, compliance records, Committee meeting details, URL information with justifications, and objectionable content. The High Court found that the interim order dated January 31, 2021 (covering 256 URLs and 1 hashtag) stated the content was “spreading fake news and misinformation about ongoing farmer protest” with “potential to imminent violence affecting Public Order” and present “threat to the security of the State.” The final order dated February 2, 2021, added that the Committee agreed that the use of the term “Genocide” was “wilfully misleading, mischievous and was likely to lead the agitating farmers to wrong conclusions about the government’s intentions.” [p. 74]

The Court accepted the ASG’s argument that the tabulated materials showed the Committee’s application of mind. Exhibit R11 contained objectionable material shared with the petitioner during meeting notices, while Exhibit R12 included translations of tweets, grounds under section 69A, evidentiary material with extracts of objectionable tweets, and URL details. The Court noted the petitioner never claimed these details were withheld, and evidence showed some account users were “repeat offenders” with “propensity to repost the objectionable content.” [p. 75]

The Court was convinced that the blocking orders were “reasoned decisions” founded on “stronger footings of law, facts & evidentiary material.” It characterized many of the objectionable tweets as “outrageous,” “treacherous & anti-national,” with “abundant propensity to incite commission of cognizable offences relating to sovereignty & integrity of India, security of the State and public order.” The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the orders lacked reasons, noting that “sufficiency of evidence or reasons belongs to the domain of the authority” and that the reasons had a “thick nexus with the statutory grounds.” The Court emphasized that these were not decisions made by “one single official functionary” but by a statutory committee of “high functionaries of the government” without any allegations of malafide. Even though Rules 8 & 9 designate one high-ranking officer to make the final decision, when that officer agrees with the committee’s recommendation (as in this case), the decision becomes an “institutional decision” rather than an individual one [pp. 76-77].

The Court dismissed the Petitioner’s argument that no reasonable person would conclude it had sufficient opportunity for representation. It characterized X not as “a poor farmer, a menial labourer, a villager or a novice” but as a multinational IT company whose annual revenue generation is about 5 Billion USD with technical teams having expertise in website blocking laws globally. The Court noted that X’s representatives participated in Committee meetings without raising the grievances now being presented in Court, and even acknowledged that authorities had agreed to unblock 10 of 11 user accounts after hearing their submissions. [p. 78]

The Court concluded that while “giving reasons is an aspect of fairness,” the Government had exhibited “processual fairness” in its actions, making “the procedural infirmity of not communicating the reasons in a formal way” insignificant. Therefore, the High Court rejected the contentions regarding the absence of communication of reasons, non-application of mind, and inadequate opportunity for hearing, ultimately finding the impugned orders to be “speaking orders” with a “thick nexus between the orders and reasons assigned” that were disclosed to and discussed with the petitioner in Committee meetings. [pp. 78-79]

On the Requirement of Notice under Rule 8 of the Website Blocking Rules

The High Court examined whether account users must receive notice before blocking under Section 69A. The Petitioner contended that proper procedure required notice to users whose accounts were being blocked. The Additional Solicitor General countered that Rules 8 and 9 only required notice when users were identifiable, and that the petitioner lacked standing to represent non-complaining users. [p. 80]

The Court analyzed the language of Rule 8(1) of the Website Blocking Rules, which requires notice to “the person or intermediary,” holding the disjunctive “or” gave authorities discretion to notify either party, not both. It rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Shreya Singhal’s paragraphs 115 and 121, stating that judicial observations do not override statutory text, citing Union of India v. Major Bahadur Singh, (2005). The Court found the petitioner’s argument that Rule 8(1) imposed a duty to identify account users was “only a half-truth,” noting the rule used the disjunctive “or” and not “both.” The Court distinguished J. Jayalalitha v. Union of India, (1999), which the Petitioner had cited to argue “or” should be read as “and,” finding it supported the government’s discretion to “do either or both.” [pp. 81-85]

The Court accepted the government’s explanation that notices weren’t issued because the objectionable content was anti-India, seditious, and potentially inciting violence, and that alerting such users would only allow them to evade detection and continue harmful activities. The Court referred to the UK Supreme Court case Cartier International AG v. British Sky Broadcasting Limited, (2018), which noted the difficulty of identifying online actors [pp. 85-86].

The Court concluded that while Rule 8(1) may allow the government to hear account users at its discretion, the petitioner as an intermediary had no standing to invoke this rule on behalf of users who hadn’t complained, citing Gorris v. Scott, (1874) and Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, Inc., (2014). [pp. 87-89]

On Proportionality Doctrine

The Court examined whether the blocking orders were invalid under the doctrine of proportionality. The petitioner contended that account-level blocking (rather than tweet-specific action) violated the “thus far and no further” principle, citing Akshay N Patel v. RBI, (2021). The Additional Solicitor General responded that proportionality had limited application here, and highlighted that 10 of 11 blocked accounts had already been reinstated after the Committee review. While analyzing K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) and Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2019), the Court held that the proportionality doctrine as a constitutional safeguard didn’t extend to the petitioner as a foreign entity. [pp. 90-92]

The Court rejected the argument that authorities should have isolated objectionable content instead of blocking entire accounts, finding this “impracticable” because users often mix provocative and innocent content and objectionable content spreads rapidly before intervention. It noted that the petitioner’s own permanent suspension of @realDonaldTrump under its “public interest framework” validated the government’s position that blocking entire accounts could be warranted. [pp. 93-95]

While make reference to the Cartier International case, the Court endorsed robust actions like account blocking to achieve statutory goals, emphasizing deference to executive judgments on national security when due process is followed, especially when such decisions follow normative processes with stakeholder participation [pp. 96-97].

The Court further dismissed the petitioner’s request for time-bound blocking orders because Section 21 of the 1897 Act already permits authorities the power to “add to, amend, vary or rescind” orders. The Court declined to issue guidelines on the periodicity of blocking orders, citing separation of powers as a basic feature of the Constitution, as stipulated in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975), and expressing reluctance to intervene at the behest of “a foreign entity engaged in speculative litigation.” [pp. 98-100]

On Delay, Laches, and Petitioner’s Culpable Conduct

The High Court held that the petition was fatally undermined by the petitioner’s deliberate delay in complying with Section 69A orders despite warnings, with some orders pending for over a year since 2021. The Court emphasized that delayed compliance could amplify the virality of objectionable content, with harm escalating proportionally to the delay. The petitioner’s “tactical delay” demonstrated willful disregard for Indian law, yet offered no justification for its late judicial challenge before the Constitutional Court. [pp. 103-104]

The Court noted the gravity of Section 69A violations, highlighting potential penalties of seven years’ imprisonment and/or fines. Citing State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1987), it reaffirmed that constitutional courts deny relief to parties with “soiled hands” or unexplained “indolence,” as writ jurisdiction is discretionary and not a remedy for “inordinate delay.” [pp. 104-106]

The Court also referenced Facebook Inc v. Union of India, (2019) and Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) to illustrate the harmful potential of unregulated social media content and the distinct characteristics of electronic media. It noted Section 69A’s critical role in cyber regulation, pointing out that the provision employs terminology similar to Article 19(2) of the Constitution, and that its constitutional validity had been upheld in Shreya Singhal. Ultimately, the Court concluded that due to delay, laches, and the petitioner’s culpable conduct, no relief could be granted under the equitable jurisdiction constitutionally vested in Articles 226 & 227. [pp. 100-106]

Ultimately, the Court upheld the validity of the blocking orders, affirming the government’s power to act against content threatening public order, national security, or sovereignty.

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