***Case Title:*** Tuleya v. Poland

**Case Analysis**

***Meta-Data*:**

* **Case Number**: Applications nos. 21181/19 and 51751/20
* **Date of decision**: July 6, 2023 [07.06.2023]
* **Featured case**: N/A
* **Region**: Europe and Central Asia
* **Country**: Poland
* **Type of expression**: Public Speech
* **Judicial Body**: European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
* **Type of law**: Constitutional Law, International/Regional Human Rights Law
* **Main Themes**: Privacy, Defamation / Reputation, Political Expression
* **Outcome**: Article 6 Violation, Article 8 Violation, Article 10 Violation
* **Status**: Closed
* **Tags**: Judicial censorship, Public Figures

***Analysis:***

* **Summary and Outcome**:

In July 2023, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the measures taken by the authorities against Igor Tuleya, a judge recognized by civil society as a defender of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary during the Polish constitutional crisis, violated Article 10. The impugned measures in the relevant case were a number of preliminary inquiries initiated by the disciplinary officer; and the resolution of the Disciplinary Chamber of 18 November 2020 to lift the applicant's immunity and suspend him from judicial office. According to the Court, the measures taken by the authorities against Mr Tuleya were in response to his critical statements and constituted a disguised sanction. The ECtHR found that the interference was not "prescribed by law". Additionally, the Court considered it important to provide reasons why the interference did not pursue one of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10(2). The ECtHR unanimously held that there had been a violation of Article 10.

* **Facts**:

The applicant, Mr Tuleya, is known in Polish society as an active figure in the context of the Polish constitutional crisis, opposing reforms of political power and defending the independence of the judiciary. He is an activist of the Polish judges' association "Iustitia". At the material time, Mr Tuleya was a judge at the Warsaw Regional Court, sitting in the criminal division.

NOTE: In October 2023, the political force that had ruled Poland since 2015 lost the elections and another political grouping took over the state, taking a different approach to the justice system.

In addition to Article 10, the provisions of the Convention challenged by Mr Tuleya included Article 6(1), Article 8 and Article 13. As regards freedom of expression, the case concerned the following measures: (1) a number of preliminary inquiries initiated by the disciplinary officer; and (2) the resolution of the Disciplinary Chamber of 18 November 2020 to lift the applicant’s immunity and suspend him from judicial office.

As far as preliminary inquiries (*czynności wyjaśniajace*) are concerned, they were governed by section 114(1) of the Act of 27 July 2001 on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts (hereinafter: "the 2001 Act").The relevant instrument was to be initiated by the disciplinary officer for ordinary court judges (*Rzecznik Dyscyplinarny Sędziów Sądów Powszechnych*, hereinafter: "the disciplinary officer").

In connection with the applicant's alleged disregard for the limits of judicial independence, five sets of preliminary inquiries were initiated against him. The cases were conducted by the deputy disciplinary officers, Judges M. Lasota and P.W. Radzik. The following three were relevant to the Article 10 issues:

– the inquiry related to the applicant's interview on the TVN24 television news channel (17 July 2018) – particularly relevant were statements on the National Council of the Judiciary and the administration of justice;

– the inquiry concerning the applicant's participation in a public meeting in Gdańsk (28 September 2018), which took place at the European Solidarity Centre. It was organised by the Polish Judges' Association Iustitia, the Gdańsk Bar Council and the Gdańsk Council of Attorneys-at-Law, and the topics included the Constitution, freedom and the role of courts in a democratic society;

– the inquiry concerning the applicant's participation in public meeting in Lublin (30 September 2018).

In each case, the deputy disciplinary officers had not found sufficient grounds for bringing disciplinary proceedings. Despite this, Mr Tuleya claimed that he had not been informed of the termination of the preliminary inquiries.

As regards the resolution of the Disciplinary Chamber of 18 November 2020 to lift the applicant's immunity and to suspend him from his judicial office, Mr Tuleya's decision of 18 December 2017 was concerned. Mr Tuleya, sitting as a single judge in the Warsaw Regional Court, ruled on a controversial political issue concerning irregularities in the adoption of the 2017 Budget Act. Some opposition MPs claimed that they had not been allowed to take part in the parliamentary debate. The Warsaw Regional Prosecutor discontinued the investigation and four people filed an interlocutory appeal (*zażalenie*), which was considered by the applicant. Journalists requested permission to record the court session and Mr Tuleya, after consultation and no objections from the representatives of the MPs and the prosecutor, decided to hold the court session in public and to allow media representatives to record the court session in accordance with Article 357(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As for the settlement of this case, the applicant allowed the interlocutory appeal and ordered the prosecutor to continue the investigation.

Following the decision to allow the media to record the session of 18 December 2017 (including the delivery of the decision in the case and the oral reasons for it), on 10 January 2018 the Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation into the possible unauthorized disclosure of information from the pre-trial proceedings by the applicant. It took more than two years before one of the prosecutors applied, on 17 February 2020, to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court to issue a decision allowing the applicant to be held criminally liable. The prosecutor argued that the applicant had failed to fulfill his duties under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Criminal Code by disclosing to unauthorized persons information from the investigation conducted by the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor Office.

On 9 June 2020, the Disciplinary Chamber adopted a resolution (*uchwała*) rejecting the application to allow Mr Tuleya to be held criminally liable. The Disciplinary Chamber, sitting as a court of first instance in this case, found that there was no reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the criminal offense in question. In short, in the opinion of this body, Mr Tuleya was acting on the basis of the powers conferred on him by the law. On 16 June 2020 an interlocutory appeal was lodged by a prosecutor. On this occasion, the Disciplinary Chamber, sitting as a court of second instance, decided on 18 November 2020 to lift the applicant's immunity and to allow him to be held criminally liable in regard to the charge under Article 241(1) of the Criminal Code. Pursuant to section 129(2) and (3) of the 2001 Act, the applicant was also suspended from his judicial duties and his salary was reduced by 25% for the duration of the suspension. The judgment generally criticized the interpretation of Article 241(1) of the Criminal Code adopted in the first instance judgment. The last few minutes of the applicant's oral argument, in which he was to reveal previously unknown material from the pre-trial proceedings, were also considered crucial to the case.

The applicant was summoned three times, on 20 January, 10 February and 12 March 2021, to appear before the prosecutor conducting the investigation in order to be presented with the charges. However, Mr Tuleya did not appear; instead, on each of the three dates mentioned above, he took part in a demonstration in front of the State Prosecutor's Office building, challenging the legality of the Disciplinary Chamber's resolution of 18 November 2020.

Consequently, the prosecutor of the State Prosecutor's Office applied to the Disciplinary Chamber for leave to have the applicant arrested (*zatrzymanie i przymusowe doprowadzenie*) with a view to charging him under Article 241(1) of the Criminal Code and questioning him as a suspect. This application was dismissed by the Disciplinary Chamber on 22 April 2021, which again considered whether there were reasonable grounds to suspect that an offense had been committed and made findings that were generally favourable to the applicant. Importantly, the Disciplinary Chamber noted that the prosecutor did not specify the information allegedly disclosed by the applicant.

The interlocutory appeal lodged by the prosecutor against this decision was considered on 29 November 2022 by the body that replaced the Disciplinary Chamber - the Chamber of Professional Liability. The new disciplinary body upheld the Disciplinary Chamber's decision of 22 April 2021, considering the interlocutory appeal to be manifestly ill-founded. Secondly, the Chamber of Professional Liability set aside of its own motion the Disciplinary Chamber's resolution of 18 November 2020 in so far as it concerned the applicant's suspension from judicial duties and the reduction of his salary for the duration of that suspension.

Somewhat earlier, in November 2020, the Warsaw Regional Court, sitting in a panel composed of the applicant, stayed the criminal proceedings as a result of a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The prosecutor filed an interlocutory appeal against the decision to stay the proceedings, which was dismissed by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 24 February 2021. The applicant later relied on this judgment, which undermined the status of the Disciplinary Chamber as a court, and in light of this, Mr Tuleya remained an ordinary judge with immunity and the right to adjudicate.

The events described above have provoked a reaction from civil society, including international legal institutions. The institutions concerned – the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the International Association of Judges, the Bar Council of England and Wales, the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights and Amnesty International – have essentially pointed to a threat to the independence of the judiciary in Poland in the context of the conduct of the political authorities towards the applicant. On the other hand, the events in question were accompanied by statements from people linked to the Polish ruling camp, positioning Mr Tuleya as a political activist.

The allegation of a violation of Article 10 was raised by the applicant in his second application (no. 51751/20), which was combined with the earlier application (no. 21181/19). According to the Government, the remedies available under domestic law had not been exhausted. In particular, they referred to a civil action for the protection of personal rights under Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code. However, Mr Tuleya denied that a civil action could be an effective remedy in the context of the systematic violations of his rights committed by the State in this case. The applicant also pointed out that, despite the successful judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 24 February 2021, he was not allowed to resume his judicial duties (which should be taken as a suggestion that even formally obtained remedies under domestic law may not be enforced).

The Court first noted that three preliminary inquiries initiated by the Disciplinary Officer and the decision of the Disciplinary Chamber of 18 November 2020 lifting his immunity and suspending him from judicial duties were relevant to the allegation of a violation of Article 10. The ECtHR agreed with the applicant that the remedies referred to by the Government could not be regarded as effective and that domestic remedies must therefore be considered exhausted. The Court also held that the application was neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any of the other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. The complaint was therefore deemed admissible.

In his submission, the applicant described his position as a so-called "civic judge" and defender of the rule of law during the Polish constitutional crisis. He gave examples of how his position had been appreciated by civil society and expert bodies. In his opinion, the challenged measures were consequences of his public activity. According to Mr. Tuleya, it is important to see his case in the context of the crisis of the rule of law and the threat to the independence of the judiciary. In his view, "the true aim of all the measures taken against him by the authorities was to produce a «chilling effect» with a view to discouraging him and other judges from taking a position on the Government’s actions against the judiciary" (para. 464).

According to the applicant, none of the requirements of the tripartite test had been met. First, the interference was not "prescribed by law" because the Disciplinary Chamber applied the provisions of the 2001 Act in an arbitrary manner in order to deprive him of his judicial immunity. Moreover, his judicial immunity had not been lawfully lifted, which was recognized by the decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 24 February 2021. Secondly, the interference in question did not pursue any legitimate aim. The applicant claimed that his activity served to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. He referred to two resolutions of the Disciplinary Chamber (dated 9 June 2020 and 22 April 2021) in which it was found that there was no reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offense under Article 241(1) of the Criminal Code. Thirdly, according to Mr Tuleya the measure in question was not necessary in a democratic society. He argued that the exercise of his judicial functions and his participation in public debate could not justify the interference with his freedom of expression.

With regard to the Government's position, they submitted that there had been no interference with the applicant's freedom of expression. As to the preliminary inquiries, they had not led to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and no sanction had been imposed on Mr. Tuleya as a result. The Government also pointed out that the measures in question had not stopped the applicant's activity in the public sphere. On the contrary, the applicant continued his public activities. In these two aspects - the absence of sanctions and the actual chilling effect - the present case is said to differ from *Baka v. Hungary* and *Kudeshkina v. Russia*. According to the Government, the applicant violated the judicial duty of discretion derived from the Polish Constitution, statutes and the Collection of Principles of Judges' Professional Ethics. As to the Disciplinary Chamber's resolution of November 18, 2020, according to the Government, this act was not related to Mr. Tuleya's statements and views expressed in the context of public debate on the Polish judicial system, but to the applicant's professional activity during the session held on December 18, 2017. They also stated that lifting the applicant's immunity had not been a sanction. Again, the Government pointed out that Mr. Tuleya had continued his activities after the relevant resolution.

In the event that the Court found that the impugned measures constituted an interference with the applicant's freedom of expression, the Government argued that the interference was justified in the light of the tripartite test of Article 10(2). They submitted that the "prescribed by law" criterion was met, as the preliminary inquiries had a legal foundation and the resolution of the Disciplinary Chamber of 18 November 2020 was taken on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant might have committed an offense, as provided for in Article 241(1) of the Criminal Code. With regard to the legitimate aims, the Government listed the following: the prevention of crime and the protection of the reputation of others, as well as the prevention of the disclosure of information received in confidence and the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Finally, the Government argued that the interference was necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. In view of the applicant's numerous activities in which he openly criticized the Polish judicial system, the competent authorities were obliged to verify that the requirements of impartiality and independence had not been violated. With regard to the resolution of the Disciplinary Chamber, it was noted, *inter alia*, that the applicant may have failed to exercise caution by allowing the media to record the court session of December 18, 2017.

The following third-party interveners submitted briefs in the case: the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Poland; Judges for Judges Foundation and Professor L. Pech; Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists; Polish Judges' Association Iustitia; and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. All third-party interveners generally supported the applicant's position, essentially pointing to the importance of judicial speech in protecting the independence of the judiciary. The specific context of the rule of law crisis in Poland and its impact on the case was also a frequently raised issue.

* **Decision Overview**:

Firstly, the Court had to decide whether there has been interference in the case at hand. The Court acknowledged that Article 10 does apply to civil servants, and that it has previously held that, in cases involving disciplinary proceedings against judges or their removal or appointment, it must determine whether the measure constitutes an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression, or whether it merely affects the exercise of the right to hold a public post in the administration of justice. Article 10 only applies if the right to freedom of expression has been infringed, and not if the ability to perform professional duties is affected. This can only be determined by analyzing the scope of the measure in the context of the facts of the case and the relevant legislation, including reasons given by the authorities, the arguments put forward in the context of subsequent appeal proceedings and the submissions of the parties. The Court stressed the importance of *prima facie* evidence supporting the version of events submitted by an applicant which may indicate the existence of a causal link between the measures complained of and freedom of expression as this would be sufficient to conclude that the State must then prove that the measures were taken for other reasons.

NOTE: The above reasoning (paras. 515-518) is a repetition of the Court's position in *Żurek v. Poland* (paras. 201-204).

According to the applicant, the following measures should be taken into account as constituting interference: various preliminary inquiries instituted by the disciplinary officer (1) and the Disciplinary Chamber's resolution of 18 November 2020 lifting his immunity and suspending him from judicial duties (2). As for the first issue (preliminary inquiries), the Court found three of the five raised by Mr. Tuleya to be relevant for the purposes of its examination under Article 10:

– the inquiry related to the applicant's interview on the TVN24 television news channel (17 July 2018);

– the inquiry concerning the applicant's participation in public meeting in Gdańsk (28 September 2018);

– the inquiry concerning the applicant's participation in public meeting in Lublin (30 September 2018).

As noted above, the said inquiries were terminated on an unspecified dates without any disciplinary charges being brought and without the applicant being informed of this fact.

The ECtHR recognized that the applicant, in his capacity as a judge and a member of the Polish Judges' Association "Iustitia", had actively participated in discussions concerning changes to the judiciary introduced by legislation, expressing critical views. It was subject to verification that the applicant's position, to which the Government objected, was correct that the measures taken against him by the authorities were in response to his critical statements. In line with the need to take into account the broad context of the case, the Court drew attention to the finding, initiated in the *Grzęda v. Poland*, that the successive judicial reforms of the ruling camp were aimed at weakening the independence of the judiciary. The Court also noted that in light of the CJEU's judgment of 15 July 2021 in *Commission v. Poland* (Disciplinary regime for judges, C-791/19) the new disciplinary regime for Polish judges was not compatible with EU law.

Regarding the preliminary inquiries initiated by the disciplinary officer, the Court found it evident that they were primarily a result of the applicant's exercise of his freedom of expression. This is because they related to statements made by Mr. Tuleya on television and at public meetings.

As for the Disciplinary Chamber's resolution of 18 November 2020, the Court noted the following facts as relevant to the background of this issue. Firstly, five preliminary inquiries were initiated. As the Court stated despite the fact that none of those inquiries led to disciplinary charges against Mr Tuleya, they were nevertheless conducted with the objective of constructing a negative narrative and maintaining him in a state of uncertainty. The ECtHR subsequently noted that the actions to lift the applicant's immunity were accompanied by statements of politicians from the ruling camp, including the Minister of Justice/Prosecutor General, who suggested that the applicant had committed a criminal offense. The Court also drew attention to the fact that the measures leading to the lifting of the applicant's immunity and his suspension were initiated by prosecutors subordinate to the Prosecutor General and that the final decision itself was taken by the Disciplinary Chamber, a body which, in the light of previous ECtHR case-law, does not satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1) of the Convention. Moreover, the Court expressed doubts as to the decision of the Disciplinary Chamber that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offense referred to in Article 241(1) of the Criminal Code.

On the basis of the above, the ECtHR concluded that the measures leading to the lifting of the applicant's immunity could be regarded as a disguised sanction and that there is *prima facie* evidence of a causal link between the applicant's exercise of his freedom of expression and the decision of the Disciplinary Chamber of 18 November 2020. The Court also considered relevant the existence of numerous documents indicating a widespread perception that such a causal link existed.

The Court found that the measures in question were prompted by the views and criticisms which Mr Tuleya had publicly expressed in his professional capacity. In those circumstances, it remained to be considered whether the interference was justified under Article 10(2), i.e. whether it was "prescribed by law", pursued a "legitimate aim" and was "necessary in a democratic society" to achieve that aim or aims.

As regards the condition "prescribed by law", the ECtHR addressed separately three relevant preliminary inquiries and the Disciplinary Chamber’s resolution of 18 November 2020. With regard to the former, as noted above, they related to the applicant's statements in the media which allegedly disregarded the limits of judicial independence. The legal basis for the inquiries in question was section 114(1) of the 2001 Act. However, the Court found that there was a lack of minimum procedural safeguards, in particular the right to be informed of the termination of a preliminary inquiry. In such a case, an inquiry may be used as a form of interference with the judge's freedom of expression. In view of this, the Court found that the "quality of the law" requirements (which form part of the analysis under the "prescribed by law" condition) were not met in this case. With regard to the decision of the Disciplinary Chamber lifting the applicant's immunity and suspending Mr Tuleya from judicial duties, the ECtHR stated that the decision in question was not taken by a "court" for the purposes of the Convention, although under Articles 181 and 180(2) of the Polish Constitution such a decision must be taken by a court. In view of the above, the impugned measure was recognized not "prescribed by law".

Notwithstanding the fact that the first criterion of the tripartite test was not met, the Court also considered it important to present the reasoning concerning the second criterion, i.e. whether the interference pursued one of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10(2). According to the Government, the impugned measures pursued the legitimate aims of the prevention of crime and the protection of the reputation of others as well as preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence and maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. For its part, the Court pointed to the role of Mr Tuleya as one of the most emblematic defenders of the rule of law in Poland, whose statements presented strictly professional perspective. According to the ECtHR: "Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, it appears that the measures taken by the authorities could be characterised as a strategy aimed at intimidating (or even silencing) the applicant in connection with the views that he had expressed in defence of the rule of law and judicial independence. The Court considers that the impugned measures undoubtedly had a «chilling effect» in that they must have discouraged not only the applicant but also other judges from participating in public debate on legislative reforms affecting the judiciary and more generally on issues concerning the independence of the judiciary (see Baka, § 173; Kövesi, § 209; and Żurek, § 227, all cited above)" (para. 544). Additionally, the Court stressed that the Disciplinary Chamber’s resolution of 18 November 2020 was made in connection with an act intrinsically linked to the exercise of judicial functions (i.e. adjudication), which undermines the role of judges in a democratic society. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, in addition to failing to meet the requirement of being "prescribed by law", the contested measure did not pursue any of the legitimate aims permitted. The ECtHR held, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 10.

Judge Wojtyczek issued a partly dissenting opinion. Although he challenged the majority opinion on the allegations relating to Article 6 and Article 8, not Article 10, his position provides some insights into freedom of expression. According to Judge Wojtyczek, the foreseeability of interference with freedom of expression was indeed one of the main problems in this case. However, the author of the partly dissenting opinion also noted that Article 7 and the paremia *nullum crimen sine lege* were highly relevant. In his view: "Given the specific circumstances of the case, instead of relying separately on Article 8 and Article 10 in the assessment of the same problem, it would have been preferable to address the relevant issues under Article 10 read in the light of Article 7. The Court could also have decided to reclassify the applicant’s complaints as being under Article 7 taken alone" (para. 6.2.).

***Direction:***

* **Outcome**:

Expands Expression

* **Explanation for why and how it contracts or expands expression or has a mixed outcome.**

The judgment underlines the importance of protecting the broad freedom of expression of the judiciary in the context of safeguarding the independence of judges. It also sends a strong signal about the need to protect members of the judiciary from measures that could have a chilling effect on them.

***Perspective***:

* **Related International and/or regional laws or jurisprudence**:

CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Disciplinary regime for judges), C-791/19, EU:C:2021:596 (2021)

CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Independence and private life of judges), C-204/21, EU:C:2023:442 (2023)

ECtHR, Vogt v. Germany, App. No. 17851/91 (1995)

ECtHR, Wille v. Liechtenstein, App. No. 28396/95 (1999)

ECtHR, Harabin v. Slovakia (dec.), App. No. 62584/00 (2004)

ECtHR, Guja v. Moldova [GC], App. No. 14277/04 (2008)

ECtHR, Kayasu v. Turkey, App. Nos. 64119/00 and 76292/01 (2008)

ECtHR, Kudeshkina v. Russia, App. No. 29492/05 (2009)

ECtHR, Poyraz v. Turkey, App. No. 15966/06 (2010)

ECtHR, Harabin v. Slovakia, App. No. 58688/11 (2012)

ECtHR, Nenkova-Lalova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 35745/05 (2012)

ECtHR, Baka v. Hungary [GC], App. No. 20261/12 (2016)

ECtHR, Simić v. Bosnia-Herzegovina (dec.), App. No. 75255/10 (2016)

ECtHR, Köseoğlu v. Turkey (dec.), App. No. 24067/05 (2018)

ECtHR, Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary [GC], App. No. 201/17 (2020)

ECtHR, Kövesi v. Romania, App. No. 3594/19 (2020)

ECtHR, Goryaynova v. Ukraine, App. No. 41752/09 (2020)

ECtHR, Cimperšek v. Slovenia, App. No. 58512/16 (2020)

ECtHR, Reczkowicz v. Poland, App. No. 43447/19 (2021)

ECtHR, Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 40072/13 (2021)

ECtHR, Żurek v. Poland, App. No. 39650/18 (2022)

Opinion no. 25 (2022) of the CCJE for the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the Freedom of Expression of Judges (2022)

* **National law or jurisprudence**:

Pol., Const. (1997)

Pol., Criminal Code (1997)

Pol., Code of Criminal Procedure (1997)

Pol., Act on the Organization of Ordinary Courts (2001)

***Significance***:

The decision establishes a binding or persuasive precedent within its jurisdiction.

***Docs***:

* **Official Case Documents**:

**Reports, Analysis, and News Articles:**

**The Case of Judge Igor Tuleya: Continued Threats to Judicial Independence in Poland (2020)**

<https://www.americanbar.org/groups/human_rights/reports/the-case-of-judge-igor-tuleya--continued-threats-to-judicial-ind/>

**Poland violated rights of judge critical of government reforms, rules European court (2023)**

<https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/07/06/poland-violated-rights-of-judge-critical-of-government-reforms-rules-european-court/>

**"Another battle won". ECHR ruled Poland violated judge Igor Tuleya's rights (2023)**

<https://tvn24.pl/tvn24-news-in-english/echr-orders-poland-to-compensate-judge-igor-tuleya-for-violating-his-rights-st7206880>

**European Court of Human Rights: ICJ welcomes a landmark decision upholding judicial independence in Poland (2023)**

<https://www.icj.org/european-court-of-human-rights-icj-welcomes-a-landmark-decision-upholding-judicial-independence-in-poland/>

**Attachments:**

[**Judgement**](https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-225672%22]})