Case Summary and Outcome

The European Court of Human Rights held that Ukraine violated the right to life of the applicants, under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by failing to prevent and effectively respond to violent clashes amongst demonstrators and a deadly fire that occurred in Odesa on May 2, 2014, and for conducting a flawed investigation thereafter. The case arose after the death of 48 individuals, amid political unrest between pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan groups. The applicants argued that Ukraine violated Article 2 of the Convention by failing to prevent the violence in Odesa on 2 May 2014, and by conducting an ineffective and delayed investigation that lacked independence. Ukraine responded that the events took place in the context of a broader destabilization campaign, acknowledged certain institutional failures, and emphasized the scope of its investigative efforts and its commitment to accountability. According to the Court, despite intelligence indicating a real and immediate risk of mass disorder, Ukrainian authorities failed to take preventive measures or intervene once violence erupted. The Court held that the police remained passive during the clashes of protestors, that there were credible indications of collusion with anti-Maidan activists, and that emergency services delayed their response to the fire by approximately 40 minutes. Additionally, the Court explained that the domestic investigation into the aforementioned events was gravely deficient, lacked independence, was marked by unreasonable delays, and failed to ensure the participation of the victims’ families or public scrutiny. As a result, the Court ordered Ukraine to provide the applicants with compensation for non-pecuniary damages and legal costs.

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Facts

The events of this case took place in the context of a profound political crisis in Ukraine, which began after the suspension of negotiations for the Association Agreement with the European Union in November 2013. The protests led by the “Maidan” movement culminated in the removal of President Yanukovych and triggered pro-Russian demonstrations in several regions of the country. In Odesa, confrontations between pro-Maidan demonstrators (supporting national unity) and anti-Maidan groups (favoring federalization and sympathetic to Russia) escalated in intensity over several months.

On May 2, 2014, fans of the Chornomorets (Odesa) and Metalist (Kharkiv) football clubs called for a march under the slogan “For a United Ukraine,” starting from Soborna Square towards a stadium 2.5 kilometers away. In response, anti-Maidan activists posted messages on social media describing the march as a “Nazi rally” and calling for its disruption—which raised concerns about potential unrest. That day, the police deployed a limited number of officers following standard protocols for football matches. However, they did not intervene when anti-Maidan protesters began gathering near the starting point of the march. Once the march began, the pro-unity demonstrators were attacked by opponents using firearms, Molotov cocktails, flares, stones, and stun grenades. Despite the violence, the police failed to act to contain the clashes.

At 4:10 p.m., Ivan Ivanov, a pro-unity demonstrator, was shot and died during surgery. Ten minutes later, another pro-unity demonstrator, Mr. Biryukov, was fatally injured. By 5:45 p.m., an individual fired from a balcony at anti-Maidan protesters, killing three more individuals: Mr. Zhulkov, Mr. Yavorskyy, and Mr. Petrov. The clashes in the city center resulted in six fatalities.

After gaining the upper hand in the disturbances, the pro-unity demonstrators moved towards the anti-Maidan camp located at Kulykove Pole Square. Pro-Russian activists took refuge in the five-story Trade Union Building, where they barricaded themselves with furniture and materials from the camp, including Molotov cocktails. From the building’s rooftop, some anti-Maidan protesters threw Molotov cocktails at the crowd. In response, pro-unity demonstrators hurled Molotov cocktails at the building. Gunfire was reported from both sides. At 7:45 p.m., a fire broke out inside the building, whose hoses and extinguishers were non-functional. Despite repeated calls to the firefighters, emergency services did not respond immediately due to orders from the regional head of the emergency service, who required explicit authorization before deploying units. Some individuals attempted to escape by jumping from the windows, including Mr. Dmitriyev, who survived. Others, such as Ms. Vyacheslavova’s father and the sons of Ms. Radzykhovska and Ms. Nikitenko, died from the fall or the fire. Finally, at 8:30 p.m., firefighters entered the building and extinguished the flames.

The fire resulted in the death of 42 people. Law enforcement authorities detained 63 anti-Maidan activists who had been inside or on the rooftop of the building, but they were released two days later after demonstrators stormed the local police station.

National criminal proceedings began in a fragmented and uncoordinated manner, involving different authorities—depending on whether the individuals concerned were civilians, police officers, or fire personnel. Many investigations stalled or were dismissed due to the statute of limitations. In several cases, the accused were acquitted for lack of evidence, or because the investigations lacked key safeguards such as the preservation of forensic evidence, timely inspections, and relevant witness testimonies.

Although Mr. Vyacheslavov’s body was identified and autopsied between May and June 2014, Ukrainian authorities retained the body for over a year, citing expert-related reasons. It was only handed over to his daughter in December 2015, following the intervention of the United Nations Monitoring Mission.

As of May 2020, no individual had been convicted for the 48 deaths that occurred that day. By February 2025, only one conviction in absentia had been issued against the former acting chief of the regional police for his role in facilitating the unrest and obstructing police intervention.

Between June 27, 2016, and October 1, 2018, the applicants submitted seven applications before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), alleging that Ukraine violated Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by failing to adopt preventive measures to avert the unrest and deaths that occurred during the social protests of May 2, 2014 in Odesa, and by not ensuring an effective response during the fire at the Trade Union Building. They also denounced serious deficiencies in the domestic investigations—invoking Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) and Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment)—due to the lack of an independent, diligent, and accessible inquiry.

The applicants further argued that the domestic investigations were marked by serious shortcomings that rendered them ineffective. To underscore this point, they pointed to failures in the preservation and early collection of key evidence, unjustified delays that allowed some crimes to become time-barred, and a single conviction in absentia against an official who had been a fugitive since 2014. They also challenged the independence of the investigating bodies and claimed there was a biased approach that focused on prosecuting anti-Maidan activists without pursuing possible responsibilities on the other side with the same rigor. Finally, they criticized the lack of transparency in the investigative process, both towards the families and the public, which they argued compromised the accountability required under Article 2 of the Convention.

Ukraine, for its part, argued that the events of May 2, 2014, should not be analyzed in isolation but rather in the context of a destabilization campaign driven by actors linked to Russian aggression and former officials opposed to the new government. It asserted that the unrest was premeditated to discredit the authorities and was not the result of a spontaneous clash between demonstrators. Nevertheless, Ukraine acknowledged serious failures on behalf of law enforcement and emergency services—including the failure to prevent violence despite warnings, police miscoordination, and delays in rescue operations during the fire.

Ukraine further contended that the authorities promptly initiated extensive investigative efforts, including witness interviews, searches, and forensic examinations, and provided statistical data to demonstrate the scope of these actions. While it acknowledged certain delays, it attributed them to suspects fleeing, which required the suspension of the proceedings. It noted that several cases had reached the trial stage and emphasized that charges had been brought against senior police officials as evidence of the State’s commitment to accountability. Accordingly, Ukraine maintained that there was no basis to question the thoroughness or overall effectiveness of the investigations.

On October 1, 2018, the ECtHR decided that the seven applications would be examined jointly in a single judgment.

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Decision Overview

The Fifth Section of the European Court of Human Rights delivered a unanimous judgment on 13 March 2025. The main issues before the Court were (i) whether Ukraine failed to take adequate preventive and protective measures to avoid mass violence and to ensure timely rescue efforts during the fire in Odesa, in violation of the substantive part of Article 2; and (ii) whether the national investigations were effective, prompt, independent and participatory, in accordance with the procedural part of Article 2.

The applicants argued that the State violated Article 2 of the ECHR by failing to adopt preventive measures to avert the May 2, 2014’s violent clashes in Odesa and to ensure an effective response during the fire at the Trade Union Building. They also denounced the domestic investigations as ineffective, citing delays, loss of key evidence, and lack of independence. Additionally, they invoked Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) and Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment).

For its part, Ukraine argued that the events of May 2, 2014, should be viewed within the broader context of a destabilization campaign led by actors linked to Russian aggression and former officials opposed to the new government. It claimed that the unrest had been premeditated to discredit authorities, rather than a spontaneous clash between opposing groups. Nonetheless, Ukraine acknowledged serious failures on behalf of law enforcement and emergency services, as noted above. The State reiterated that it initiated thorough investigations and that charges have been brought against senior police officials, as laid out earlier.

At the outset of its analysis, the Court explained the content of Article 2 of the ECHR, which imposes both a negative obligation on the State not to take life intentionally and a positive obligation to adopt effective regulatory and operational measures to safeguard life.

Next, the ECtHR analyzed whether the authorities had met their obligation to prevent violence in Odesa on 2 May 2014. In framing this analysis, the Court noted the broader context of Russian disinformation and propaganda campaigns, referencing European Parliament resolution 2016/2030(INI), to underscore the neighboring country’s influence on the unfolding events. The ECtHR further assessed the availability of detailed information that confirmed the existence of a real and immediate risk to life. To the Court, the authorities were aware of critical facts: “The information which became known to the authorities was sufficient to confirm the existence of a real and immediate risk to life, especially given that they were also aware of the time, meeting place and planned route of the pro-unity march, as well as the location of the anti-Maidan tent camp.” [para. 342]

In this context, the ECtHR held that Ukrainian authorities were aware of credible threats of mass disorder in Odesa prior to the events, including intelligence on planned rallies and calls to violence circulating on social media. Despite this, the Court argued that the authorities failed to take meaningful steps to mitigate the risk. The ECtHR emphasized that “the Government did not bring to the Court’s knowledge a single example of any such preventive or protective operational measures taken” [para. 343], and criticized the officials’ “inexplicable” passivity after a high-level security meeting held just before the violence began.

For the Court, the authorities prepared for an ordinary football match rather than for potential mass disorder, as admitted in the domestic investigations. The ECtHR explained that the lack of reinforcements—both in numbers and in the quality of the equipment—coupled with the failure to act upon the available intelligence, clearly demonstrated that the adopted measures fell short of what could reasonably have been expected in the circumstances.

According to the Court, the police remained passive during the clashes and failed to intervene when the first shootings occurred. The Court stressed that this inaction, alongside “clear indications of possible collusion between the police and the anti-Maidan activists, was one of the reasons, if not the main one, for the wave of violence in reply.” [para. 349] Moreover, the Court recalled that emergency services failed to deploy fire engines for over 40 minutes after the fire began in the Trade Union Building, despite being located nearby.

The ECtHR also found that the Ukrainian authorities did not act to stop the violence between demonstrators once it broke out. To it, the police remained passive during the initial clashes, despite clear evidence, such as video footage and eyewitness accounts, of lethal attacks on pro-unity demonstrators.

The Court held that the failure of officers wearing red identification bands to respond to gunshots in their presence was credible evidence of collusion between police officers and anti-protest activists. The ECtHR said that this inaction not only violated the State’s duty to prevent further violence but also contributed to its escalation—and that such passivity made the authorities partly responsible for the subsequent deaths, including those caused by the fire. The Court also highlighted that the lack of a contingency plan in the event of mass disturbances, poor coordination between law enforcement agencies, and inadequate equipment were indicative of a wider systemic failure.

In addition, the ECtHR considered that the State failed to ensure timely and adequate rescue measures during the fire in the Trade Union building. In the Court’s view, despite multiple emergency calls and the proximity of the fire brigade, the response was delayed by some forty minutes due to a directive from the regional head of the emergency services, who ordered his subordinates not to act without his approval. It considered that this delay, combined with the police’s failure to facilitate a rapid evacuation, contributed significantly to the loss of life. Hence, the ECtHR concluded that the authorities had failed to do all that could reasonably be expected from them to protect life in such a critical situation.

In light of these circumstances, the Court held that Ukraine did not fulfill its duty to prevent foreseeable violence, to intervene effectively, nor to implement timely rescue operations, thus violating the substantive aspect of Article 2.

Furthermore, the Court argued that the investigations were gravely deficient. It criticized the authorities’ failure to secure crime scenes, the lack of coordination between agencies, the omission of key forensic analyses, and the significant investigative delays. The ECtHR emphasized that “the domestic investigation in the present cases was inadequate” [para. 393] and that “the excessive length of proceedings is a strong indication that the proceedings are defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State’s positive obligations under the Convention.” [para. 400]

Additionally, the Court said that the investigation lacked independence, particularly due to the involvement of police bodies inquiring into their own personnel, despite credible indications of collusion. It also concluded that the applicants were not adequately informed or involved during the process, nor was there sufficient public scrutiny. These factors undermined the right to truth.

For all the reasons mentioned above, the ECtHR held that Ukraine violated Article 2 of the ECHR—by failing to prevent and respond to the violent events of May 2, 2014, and for conducting a flawed and ineffective investigation into the matter.

Finally, by way of compensation, the Court ordered Ukraine to pay the applicants various amounts for non-pecuniary damages and costs and expenses.

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