Case Summary and Outcome

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted a preliminary injunction in part, finding that a group of Minnesota residents who were observing the actions of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officials were likely to succeed on their claim that certain actions by federal agents unlawfully interfered with protected freedom of expression. The case arose from activities carried out by ICE officers during which individuals who were peacefully observing, recording, and protesting government activity alleged that federal agents engaged in intimidation, retaliatory detention or arrest, vehicle stops, and the use of chemical agents, all of which had a chilling effect on their expressive activities. The Court found that the observation was conduct protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which protects freedom of expression, and that without an injunction there was a likelihood of irreparable harm to the exercise of freedom of expression.

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Facts

In December 2025, the American Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) began “Operation Metro Surge” in the twin cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul in the state of Minnesota. The operation included ICE officers conducting arrests and enforcement activities in residential neighborhoods and other public areas, and these operations attracted members of the public who gathered to observe, record, and protest what they perceived as aggressive or abusive enforcement practices.

Six of these members of the public, Susan Tincher, John Biestman, Janet Lee, Lucia Webb, Abdikadir Noor, and Alan Crenshaw (“the observers”) observed, recorded, and/or protested immigration enforcement activities carried out by ICE and DHS officers.

On December 9, 2025, in the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, Crenshaw, was present to observe and protest ICE operations. While he acknowledged that some individuals in the broader crowd engaged in disruptive behavior, he did not throw objects, obstruct vehicles, or engage in violence. Crenshaw was standing on the side of the road, an ICE vehicle sprayed him with a chemical irritant, while he was observing and protesting from a distance and not blocking any ICE vehicles.

In a separate event, Noor was arrested after verbally criticizing ICE officers during an enforcement action by repeatedly expressing disapproval of the officers’ conduct, including telling officers that they should release a pregnant woman they were restraining. Noor had attempted to calm others in the crowd and encouraged them to remain nonviolent, and after he made these comments and continued to observe ICE activity, an officer said, “[l]et’s get this guy,” after which several officers approached him, seized him, and threw him to the ground. Noor maintained that he was arrested immediately following his verbal criticism of ICE and that he did not engage in physical violence against officers.

Tincher was arrested while protesting ICE operations peacefully in a public place. She maintained that she was engaged in expressive activity at the time of her arrest and that any alleged resistance occurred only after officers had already used force against her and that the timing of Tincher’s arrest demonstrated a connection between her expressive conduct and the enforcement action taken against her, rather than a response to unlawful behavior.

Webb had followed suspected ICE vehicles to their headquarters after hearing about ICE activity in an area of Minneapolis. At the headquarters, her car was surrounded by more ICE vehicles and she was verbally harassed and threatened with arrest by ICE officials. Before driving away she told the agents that she was “ashamed of them for kidnapping people”. [p. 16]

Lee and Biestman, a married couple, had observed ICE activity at a church and were surrounded by four ICE vehicles when they left the church. The ICE agents pointed semi-automatic weapons at them, ordered them to roll down their car windows and threatened them with arrest.

The observers maintained that their activities were conducted lawfully, peacefully, and without interference with law-enforcement operations, and that they were undertaken to express dissent, gather information, and document government conduct of public concern.

On December 17, 2025, the observers filed a civil action in the District Court for the District of Minnesota, arguing that their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution had been infringed. The action was brought against Kristi Noem, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and various other named and unnamed ICE and DHS officials in their official capacities.

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

The Fourth Amendment states that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

The complaint included five claims, two of which directly concerned the First Amendment, including a retaliation claim based on alleged punitive actions taken in response to protected expression. The observers sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, press, and assembly, as well as retaliation for engaging in protected expressive activity. They also sought to represent a proposed class consisting of individuals who record, observe, or protest DHS immigration operations in the district.

In addition to their First Amendment claims, the observers alleged violations of their rights under the Fourth Amendment on the grounds that several of them were subjected to arrests, detentions, and uses of force without probable cause and without individualized suspicion of criminal activity. These alleged seizures occurred during or immediately following the observers’ observation, recording, or verbal criticism of ICE officers conducting immigration enforcement operations in public spaces.

Shortly after filing the complaint, the observers sought a temporary restraining order to prevent further interference with their expressive activities, but they later tailored their request to more narrow relief.

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Decision Overview

Judge Katherine Menendez delivered the judgment. The primary issues before the Court were whether the observers had standing to seek forward-looking, class-wide injunctive relief; whether they demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their First and Fourth Amendment claims; and whether the remaining preliminary-injunction factors (irreparable harm, balance of equities, and the public interest) favored issuance of interim relief while the litigation proceeds.

The observers submitted that their observation and recording of ICE activities were expressive in nature and that they intended to disseminate recordings or information about ICE conduct to the public and to express criticism of federal immigration policy and enforcement tactics. They argued that this meant they had engaged in constitutionally-protected activities, including peaceful protest, public observation of law enforcement, and recording of immigration enforcement operations in public spaces, and that their actions were not passive but communicative conduct protected by the First Amendment. They submitted that federal agents responded to their expressive activities with a range of coercive and excessive measures, including the use of physical force, chemical irritants, arrests and detentions without probable cause, and intimidation through the pointing of firearms. The observers added that the federal officers deployed such force in circumstances where the observers were not actively resisting, fleeing, or obstructing law-enforcement activities, but were instead standing at a distance, walking away, or engaging in verbal protest without physical interference. The observers argued that these actions were disproportionate to any alleged threat, were applied in the absence of conduct justifying a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and were not isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern of conduct aimed at deterring the observation, recording, and protest of ICE activities.

The observers explained that this conduct had a “chilling effect” on ongoing and future protest and observation; they stated that the repeated use of force and intimidation created an ongoing fear of arrest or physical harm, which deterred them from exercising their First Amendment rights. The observers relied on the factual pattern of repeated incidents to demonstrate that the chilling effect was not speculative but grounded in documented interactions with federal officers. The observers also argued that the federal agents’ conduct constituted retaliation for protected speech as well as unreasonable searches and seizures.

In support of their First Amendment claims, the observers argued that the protections extend to the act of observing and recording law-enforcement officers performing their duties in public spaces. The observers cited their own declarations made in the litigation to establish that their conduct was intended to convey information and express dissent, including statements such as: “I plan to continue to exercise my constitutional right to observe and document federal authorities’ activities and presence in public spaces”. [para. 52] In bringing their Fourth Amendment claims, the observers relied on the factual assertion that they were subjected to seizures and uses of force without warrants, probable cause, or exigent circumstances.

The ICE and DHS officials denied that their actions violated the Constitution and opposed class-wide relief. They argued that the operational context was volatile and dangerous, that agents faced interference and safety risks, and that enforcement actions – including arrests, use of force, and vehicle stops – were justified responses to obstruction, threats, or potential violations of federal law. The officials submitted that some of the observers’ conduct, particularly the following of law enforcement vehicles, fell outside the scope of First Amendment protection.

Before addressing the merits, the Court examined the observers’ standing. It emphasized that when plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, “allegations of past injury alone are insufficient,” and that plaintiffs must demonstrate “an ongoing injury or an immediate threat of injury.” [p. 41] The Court explained that the observers were required to make a “clear showing” that they were likely to establish standing, including a real and immediate risk of future harm attributable to the officials’ conduct. [p. 41] The Court set out the governing standard for preliminary injunctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and the factors the Eighth Circuit set out in Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc and reiterated that likelihood of success on the merits is the “most important” factor and clarified that the observers were not required to prove they would ultimately prevail, but only that they had a “fair chance of prevailing” on their constitutional claims. [p. 35]

Quoting GLBT Youth in Iowa Schs. Task Force v. Reynolds, the Court noted that “[t]he First Amendment standing inquiry is lenient and forgiving.” [p. 42] It described that the most relevant type of injury grounding standing in this case is a “credible threat of prosecution” as this threat constitutes a “chilling effect” on their exercise of their First Amendment Rights. The Court held that the observers had been exposed to various retaliatory actions, such as “traffic stops, arrests, the indiscriminate use of chemical irritants, and pointing of firearms”, and described this conduct as giving rise to an “objective chill” of the observers’ rights. [p. 43] The Court added that the officials’ conduct was ongoing, referring to media reports of “continuing protest activity met with continuing aggressive responses”. [p. 44]

Accordingly, the Court held that the observers had established standing to bring their First Amendment claims.

In assessing whether the observers would be likely to succeed on the merits, the Court found that Tincher and Noor had met this requirement as they had been arrested; Crenshaw as he had been exposed to chemical irritants; and Lee, Biestman and Webb as they had been stopped without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Throughout, the Court accorded greater weight to the declarations made by the observers than that made by the representative of the officials – David Easterwood – because Easterwood was not personally present at any of the events.

With respect to the First Amendment, the Court focused primarily on the observers’ retaliation claims. It articulated the settled principle that the First Amendment “prohibit[s] government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” [p. 48] The Court applied the Eighth Circuit’s three-part test, requiring the observers to show: “(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) the government took adverse action against the plaintiff that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.” [p. 48]

A central question under the first element was whether the activities of observing and recording law enforcement officers in public are protected activities under the First Amendment. The Court rejected the officials’ reliance on the Molina v. City of St. Louis precedent that observing law enforcement is not protected by distinguishing that case from the present one as in Molina the central issue had been whether there was a “clearly established right” rather than whether the conduct was protected or not. [p. 49] With reference to the Eighth Circuit cases of Ness v. City of Bloomington and Hoyland v. McMenomy, the Court found that “the First Amendment protects the right to peacefully observe government officials, including law enforcement officers,” grounding this conclusion in access-to-information principles. [p. 49-50]

In support of this conclusion, the Court surveyed decisions from other federal courts of appeals and noted that “every other Court of Appeals to have considered the issue has found that the First Amendment protects a right to peacefully observe and/or record law enforcement officers who are engaged in their official duties in public.” [p. 51] The Court quoted approvingly from the Third Circuit, in Fields v. Philadelphia which held that “under the First Amendment’s right of access to information the public has the commensurate right to record – photograph, film, or audio record – police officers conducting official police activity in public areas.” [p. 51]

However, the Court declined to extend First Amendment protection, at this stage, to the act of following law enforcement vehicles. It stated that “[a]t this time, the Court does not find that following law enforcement vehicles is protected by the First Amendment,” emphasizing that this activity raised distinct concerns and that the record and briefing were insufficient to treat following as coextensive with observation or recording. [FN 24]

The Court explained that the second element of the test was that the observers had to demonstrate that the officials had taken “adverse action that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected activity. [p. 53] The Court stressed that the officials’ argument that there had been no “chilling” because the observers had continued their observation was immaterial because the test is an objective, not subjective, one. It held that the officials’ conduct would chill a “person or ordinary firmness”. [p. 53]

The Court described the third element of the observers’ First Amendment claim – causation – as the “most difficult”. [p. 55] Here, the observers had to demonstrate that it was “their protected conduct – speech, protest, observation – that motivated [the officials’] adverse actions”. [p. 55] The Court found that Tincher and Noor’s arrests were in retaliation for their engaging in protected conduct, rather than the officials acting on “probable cause” for an arrest. [p. 60] It also found that Crenshaw would have a “fair chance of prevailing on his First Amendment retaliation claim” because it found that the officials used the chemical irritant even though Crenshaw was not obstructing any official vehicles. [p. 61] Here the Court distinguished the present case from Aldridge v. City of St. Louis which had held that the use of pepper spray on protesters was not retaliation to First Amendment conduct; it held that in the present case the evidence was that Crenshaw was engaging in “protected First Amendment Conduct” and that there was a “clear causal relationship between the protected activity and the retaliation”. [p. 62]

The Court addressed the observers’ arguments that their First Amendment rights had been infringed based on “content and viewpoint-discrimination”, that is that their conduct had been singled out because of its specific message. While recognizing that content and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are “particularly disfavored,” the Court declined to issue a definitive ruling on these theories at the preliminary-injunction stage. [p. 64] It explained that “exactly what is being asserted as a content- and viewpoint-based discrimination claim remains elusive,” and that the arguments were insufficiently developed to support interim relief on that basis. [p. 62]

On the Fourth Amendment claims, the Court found that Biestman, Lee and Webb had a “fair chance of showing whether [they] were subjected to unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment”. [p. 64]

The Court accepted that the observers had demonstrated sufficient threats of irreparable harm to meet the standards for a preliminary injunction. With reference to the Rodgers v. Bryant case, the Court held that “by demonstrating a likelihood of success on their constitutional claims, they have also supported a finding of irreparable harm”. [p. 69] The Court noted that the officials had continued to “maintain that the actions of their officers are a lawful response to ongoing widespread protest activity” and so “the challenged conduct is likely to continue absent injunctive relief”. [p. 71]

In balancing the equities and assessing the public interest, the Court acknowledged the government’s interest in effective law enforcement and officer safety. However, it noted that an injunction would not prevent law enforcement officials from enforcing immigration laws, and explained that “it does not constitute irreparable harm to require the government to honor the constitutional rights of those who peacefully protest and observe law enforcement activities.” [p. 72] The Court acknowledged the officials’ arguments that a “sweeping” injunction would threaten the constitutional principle of separation of powers between judicial and other governmental powers, but noted that the observers had narrowed their injunction request and that the order the Court would be issuing was narrower than the observers’ request. With reference to the Rodgers case, the Court also stressed that when balancing the harms that the plaintiffs would experience without an injunction and the harm caused to the defendants by the injunction, when plaintiffs succeed in proving the likelihood of First Amendment harm “the other requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction are deemed to have been satisfied”. [p. 72]

The Court also addressed the scope of the relief sought as the observers had sought the injunction “on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals”. [p. 73] It held that this type of relief was appropriate and denied that the Supreme Court precedent prevented them from ordering that scope of the relief.

In making its order, the Court explained that it had not accepted either of the two versions of a proposed injunction presented by the observers, issuing an order that was “less broad and more tailored”. [p. 78] It declined to interdict conduct that the observers themselves had not experienced, and so the order did not cover crowd dispersal orders or the interruption of the use of mobile phones to record officials’ conduct. The Court also noted that the type of protest occurring in Minneapolis and Saint Paul was unprecedented, and so it “hesitat[ed] to adopt overly prescriptive rules that will prevent the [officials] from responding as necessary to such protest activity when it crosses the line from protected to unlawful”. [p. 79]

Accordingly, the Court granted the motion in part and issued class-wide injunctive relief applicable to “all persons who do or will in the future record, observe, and/or protest Operation Metro Surge” and to “Covered Federal Agents.” [p. 81] The injunction prohibited agents from retaliating against peaceful, unobstructive protest or observation; from arresting or detaining individuals absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion; from using pepper spray or similar crowd-control tools in retaliation; and from stopping vehicles without reasonable suspicion of forcible interference. The Court expressly held that the “act of safely following Covered Federal Agents at an appropriate distance does not, by itself, create reasonable suspicion to justify a vehicle stop.” [p. 82] The Court provided that the injunction would remain in effect until Operation Metro Surge concludes or circumstances materially change.

The government officials filed an interlocutory appeal against the injunction, and on February 19, 2026, the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit stayed the enforcement of the injunction pending the final determination in the case.

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