Case Summary and Outcome

The European Court of Human Rights found that the United Kingdom had violated Articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights by denying legal aid to two activists in a complex and lengthy libel case. The case arose after McDonald’s sued Steel and Morris, members of the small activist group London Greenpeace, for distributing a leaflet critical of the company’s environmental practices, labor conditions, food safety standards, and advertising targeting children. As defamation cases were excluded from legal aid under UK law, the applicants were forced to represent themselves throughout what became the longest civil trial in English history. In its decision, the Court emphasized that the complexity and public importance of the case required proper legal assistance and that the applicants’ lack of resources and legal training created a serious procedural imbalance that undermined their ability to defend themselves. It also stressed the chilling effect such proceedings could have on public-interest advocacy, particularly for individuals and grassroots groups without institutional support. Crucially, the Court affirmed that individuals, campaigners, and informal activist groups—like traditional journalists and media—play a vital role in democratic public debate and are entitled to strong protection under Article 10 when speaking on matters of public concern.

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Facts

Helen Steel and David Morris, the applicants in this case, are nationals of the United Kingdom who lived in London at the time of the events in question. Ms. Steel, born in 1965, was at times employed as a part-time bar worker, earning approximately £65 per week, and at other times unwaged and reliant on income support. Mr. Morris, born in 1954, was a former postal worker and an unwaged single parent. He was responsible for the day-to-day care of his young son. Both applicants were involved with London Greenpeace, a small campaigning group unconnected to Greenpeace International, which focused on environmental and social issues.

In the mid-1980s, London Greenpeace initiated an anti-McDonald’s campaign. In 1986, a six-page leaflet entitled “What’s wrong with McDonald’s?” was produced and distributed as part of this campaign. The leaflet, last reprinted in early 1987, was visually stylized with cartoon imagery and used the McDonald’s golden arches logo modified with slogans such as “McGreedy,” “McCancer,” and “McMurder.” It included allegations that McDonald’s was complicit in contributing to starvation in global majority countries by promoting export-oriented food production, destroying rainforests to raise cattle, producing unhealthy food linked to serious illnesses such as cancer and heart disease, using misleading advertising aimed at children, engaging in animal cruelty in meat production, selling meat products that carried a risk of food poisoning, and offering poor working conditions with a policy of discouraging trade union membership.

As London Greenpeace was not a legal entity, McDonald’s could not sue it directly. Between October 1989 and early 1991, McDonald’s Corporation (U.S.-based) and McDonald’s Restaurants Limited (U.K.-based), together referred to as “McDonald’s,” engaged private investigators to attend London Greenpeace meetings in order to identify individuals associated with the production or distribution of the leaflet. The investigators attended over 40 public meetings and events. McDonald’s relied on their evidence to identify Helen Steel and David Morris as individuals closely involved with London Greenpeace during the relevant period.

On September 20,1990, McDonald’s issued a writ for defamation in the High Court of England and Wales against Steel, Morris, and three others. The three other defendants later apologized, and proceedings continued against only Steel and Morris. McDonald’s sought damages of up to £100,000 for the alleged libel. The applicants denied responsibility for publication of the leaflet and denied that the words had the defamatory meanings claimed. Alternatively, they argued that the statements were substantially true or fair comment on matters of public interest.

Steel and Morris applied for legal aid but were refused on June 3, 1992, as legal aid was not available in defamation proceedings in the United Kingdom at that time under the Legal Aid Act 1988. As a result, they represented themselves throughout the litigation. Although they received some assistance from lawyers working pro bono—such as help drafting pleadings, legal advice on an ad hoc basis, and representation at a few hearings—most of the work of preparing, managing, and presenting the defense was undertaken by the applicants themselves. They also raised approximately £40,000 from public donations to assist with costs such as court transcripts, printing, and expert witnesses.

Before trial, there were approximately 28 interlocutory hearings. In December 1993, the trial judge, Mr. Justice Bell, ruled that the case should be heard by a judge alone, rather than a judge and jury, due to the length and complexity of the evidence, particularly scientific material. This ruling was upheld on appeal. During the trial, McDonald’s produced public materials, including a leaflet and press briefing that accused Steel and Morris of knowingly distributing false information. In response, the applicants filed a counterclaim for libel against McDonald’s, asserting that the company’s materials had defamed them.

The trial before the High Court began on June 28, 1994 and concluded on December 13, 1996. It lasted 313 court days, making it the longest trial in English legal history. Approximately 40 days of the trial were devoted to legal argument. The applicants called 59 witnesses and McDonald’s called 71. The transcript of the trial ran to approximately 20,000 pages, and around 40,000 pages of documentary evidence were submitted. Ms. Steel gave evidence in person; Mr. Morris did not. The applicants did not have regular access to daily transcripts of the proceedings. McDonald’s initially paid for the transcripts and provided copies to the applicants, but later withdrew this support when the applicants refused to restrict their use of the transcripts solely to trial purposes. After this, the applicants purchased transcripts at a reduced cost but only 21 days after each hearing. They stated that this limited their ability to cross-examine effectively and to prepare submissions.

A separate affidavit signed by Mr. Morris in an unrelated case concerning a housing matter was admitted into evidence at McDonald’s request. This affidavit referred to “leaflets we had produced concerning, inter alia, nutrition of McDonald’s food.” McDonald’s argued that this constituted an admission of authorship. Mr. Morris contested the use of the affidavit, stating that there was a mistake made by his solicitor. The solicitor confirmed this in writing, explaining that Mr. Morris had instructed her to make a correction that was ultimately not made. However, this explanation was not introduced in formal evidence, and the trial judge admitted the affidavit.

Mr. Justice Bell delivered his judgment on June 19, 1997 in a written decision of 762 pages. He found that both applicants were involved in the publication of several thousand copies of the leaflet. Based largely on the affidavit and the testimony of McDonald’s private investigators, the judge found that Mr. Morris had participated in the leaflet’s production in 1986, and both applicants had participated in its distribution. The judge concluded that the publication did not have any measurable impact on McDonald’s sales.

As to the contents of the leaflet, the judge found some allegations to be untrue and defamatory. These included the claims that McDonald’s caused starvation in the developing world, destroyed rainforests, used lethal poisons, forced tribal people off their lands, misled the public about its use of recycled materials, knowingly sold food posing a real risk of cancer and food poisoning, and had a policy of preventing unionization. However, the judge found other allegations to be substantially true. These included the claims that McDonald’s exploited children in its advertising, misrepresented the nutritional value of its food, was culpably responsible for cruel practices in the rearing and slaughtering of some animals, and paid low wages that contributed to the depression of pay in the catering industry in Britain.

The judge awarded damages totaling £60,000: £30,000 to each plaintiff. Mr. Morris was held severally liable for the full amount, while Mr. Morris and Ms. Steel were held jointly and severally liable for £55,000 (£27,500 to each plaintiff). McDonald’s did not request an order for legal costs.

The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal. They argued that the trial had been unfair due to the denial of legal aid, that English defamation law wrongly placed the burden of proof on defendants, and that corporations should not be entitled to sue for defamation without demonstrating actual financial loss. They also challenged the High Court’s factual findings on several of the leaflet’s allegations.

The Court of Appeal heard the case in January 1999 over 23 days and issued a 301-page judgment on March 31, 1999. It upheld the general principles of English defamation law, affirming that corporations had a right to sue for defamation and that a company could bring a claim without having to prove specific financial damage. The Court also rejected the argument that the absence of legal aid rendered the trial unfair. It found that the trial judge had conducted the proceedings fairly, with patience and consideration for the applicants’ position as unrepresented litigants. It acknowledged the burden on the applicants but held that they had been given considerable latitude and time to present their case.

However, the Court of Appeal modified some of the findings. It held that the allegation that eating enough McDonald’s food could increase the risk of heart disease was true, and that certain comments about pay and working conditions were opinions that qualified as fair comment. The damages awarded to McDonald’s were therefore reduced: Ms. Steel was liable for £36,000, and Mr. Morris for £40,000. The applicants sought leave to appeal to the House of Lords, which was refused on March 21, 2000.

At the time of the proceedings, there was no provision in domestic law for legal aid in defamation cases. The general rule in civil cases in England and Wales—that the losing party pays the legal costs of the successful party—was not applied in this instance, as McDonald’s did not seek recovery of its legal costs from the applicants.

Following the conclusion of the domestic proceedings, Helen Steel and David Morris lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on September 20, 2000. They claimed that the lack of legal aid in the defamation case had deprived them of a fair trial, in breach of Article 6 §1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to a fair hearing. They also argued that the outcome of the proceedings and the financial burden imposed on them as a result of the defamation action brought by McDonald’s constituted a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 of the ECHR.

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Decision Overview

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued its judgment in Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom on February 15, 2005. The case concerned defamation proceedings initiated by McDonald’s Corporation and its UK subsidiary against Helen Steel and David Morris, two activists affiliated with London Greenpeace. The applicants were accused of co-authoring and distributing a leaflet titled “What’s wrong with McDonald’s?”, which strongly criticized the company’s environmental impact, labor conditions, food safety, advertising practices, and animal welfare standards. McDonald’s prevailed in domestic courts, and £60,000 in damages was awarded against the applicants. The ECtHR was asked to determine whether the conduct of those proceedings—particularly the denial of legal aid—violated the applicants’ rights to a fair trial and to freedom of expression under Articles 6 §1 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The central issue was whether the United Kingdom had failed in its procedural obligations by denying legal aid to Steel and Morris in a highly complex libel case brought by a powerful multinational corporation. The applicants argued that the exceptional length and complexity of the proceedings—combined with their lack of legal assistance—had rendered the trial unfair and created an unacceptable chilling effect on public-interest expression. Steel and Morris met the financial eligibility criteria for legal aid: Ms. Steel was a part-time bar worker, and Mr. Morris was an unwaged single parent. However, under the Legal Aid Act 1988, defamation cases were excluded from legal aid, regardless of the issues at stake or the imbalance of power between parties. The applicants lacked the legal knowledge, technical resources, and financial means to defend themselves effectively in a trial that spanned 313 days, included roughly 40,000 pages of evidence, and involved over 130 witnesses. While they did receive sporadic support from pro bono lawyers and public donations, the bulk of the trial—including critical phases on the truth of the leaflet’s content—was conducted without formal legal representation. They also carried the burden of proving the truth of the statements, which required gathering extensive factual and expert evidence. They contended that under the circumstances, this burden was virtually impossible to meet.

The UK Government argued that the applicants had managed a capable defense and succeeded in establishing the truth of some key allegations. It also emphasized that the domestic courts had made procedural accommodations for their unrepresented status and that excluding defamation cases from legal aid was a policy choice based on the need to allocate limited public funds. According to the Government, the European Convention does not guarantee legal aid in civil matters as a general rule.

The Court started by reiterating that Article 6(1) does not automatically require legal aid in all civil proceedings, but it does require that access to a court be practical and effective, not merely theoretical. Legal aid may be necessary where a lack of representation results in a denial of a fair hearing. In assessing this, the Court looked at the importance of the interests at stake, the complexity of the legal and factual issues, and the ability of the litigants to represent themselves.

Applying these criteria, the Court found that the applicants had been placed at a substantial procedural disadvantage. The case touched on matters of public importance—such as corporate accountability, health and nutrition, environmental protection, and workers’ rights—and involved legally and scientifically complex material. Even the domestic courts had acknowledged the difficulty of the case by excluding the jury due to the volume and technicality of the evidence. In light of the applicants’ limited legal training and financial resources, the Court considered it unrealistic to expect them to conduct a defense on equal footing with a well-resourced corporate plaintiff represented by a team of specialists.

While the domestic courts had made efforts to accommodate the applicants’ situation, the Court concluded that these measures could not substitute for sustained legal assistance. The imbalance in legal resources created a structural unfairness that violated the applicants’ right to a fair hearing under Article 6(1).

The Court then turned to the applicants’ claim under Article 10, assessing whether the defamation proceedings and the resulting damages constituted a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression. While it was undisputed that Article 10 applied, the Court moved to examine whether the interference was justified.

Steel and Morris argued that the proceedings imposed an excessive burden on them, particularly given the denial of legal aid. They maintained that the leaflet addressed issues of broad public concern—including environmental degradation, health risks, and labor practices—and that such criticisms are essential to democratic debate. Requiring unrepresented campaigners to prove the truth of detailed allegations, they argued, undermined pluralism and discouraged civil society engagement. They also noted that they had not authored the leaflet, much of its content was already public, and that the damages awarded—though modest by domestic standards—were punitive in effect given their personal circumstances.

The Government countered that the applicants were not journalists but activists who led a prolonged, one-sided campaign against McDonald’s. It defended the principle that factual claims must be supported by evidence and rejected the notion that large corporations should be barred from bringing defamation suits. It argued that the company’s commercial reputation was a legitimate interest warranting protection and noted that the applicants had made no effort to verify the leaflet’s claims or allow McDonald’s to respond.

The Court accepted that the interference was lawful and aimed at protecting the reputation of others, but emphasized that under Article 10, such interference must also be necessary in a democratic society. This involves a pressing social need and a proportionate response.

The Court highlighted that freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and that it protects not only favorable or inoffensive opinions but also those that may offend, shock, or disturb. It stressed that the leaflet dealt with serious matters of public interest—such as public health, environmental protection, and corporate conduct—and thus merited a high level of protection under Article 10. In this context, the Court rejected the Government’s suggestion that such protection should be limited to the institutional press. It held that informal campaign groups and individuals outside mainstream media also play an important role in fostering public debate and must be able to contribute freely to discussions on matters of general concern.

Nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that even public-interest expression must respect the rights of others. While exaggeration and provocative language may be tolerated in campaigning literature, the leaflet presented many of its claims as factual assertions. The Court reaffirmed that requiring defendants in defamation cases to prove the truth of factual allegations is not, in itself, contrary to Article 10. Similarly, it found no reason to exclude large corporations from the scope of defamation protections, although public figures and entities must tolerate wider criticism.

What ultimately led to the Court’s finding of a violation of Article 10 was the lack of procedural fairness. The applicants were required to meet a high evidentiary burden without the necessary legal support. In the Court’s view, this deprived them of the opportunity to mount an effective defense, rendering the interference with their freedom of expression disproportionate.

The Court also underscored the broader chilling effect of the case. It warned that public-interest campaigners must not be discouraged from participating in public discourse by the threat of costly and complex litigation they cannot afford to defend. The application of domestic defamation law in this case risked silencing critical voices and unduly favoring well-resourced plaintiffs.

Finally, the Court found that the damages awarded—while not excessive by national standards—were disproportionate given the applicants’ personal and financial circumstances. It emphasized that such awards must maintain a reasonable proportionality to the harm suffered, which was not the case here.

The Court concluded that there had been violations of both Article 6(1) and Article 10 of the Convention. It unanimously awarded non-pecuniary damages of €20,000 to Helen Steel and €15,000 to David Morris to reflect the emotional distress and reputational harm suffered as a result of the proceedings.

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