Case Summary and Outcome

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania held that Article 4, Part 2, Point 16 of the Law on the Protection of Minors from the Negative Impact of Public Information was unconstitutional. The case concerned whether classifying information about family models differing from marriage between a man and a woman as harmful to minors unlawfully restricted freedom of expression and violated the constitutional principle of the rule of law. The Court reasoned that the provision imposed a content-based restriction on expression that was neither necessary nor proportionate in a democratic society, failed to meet requirements of legal clarity and foreseeability, and improperly limited minors’ access to objective information reflecting real social relations, thereby infringing Article 25 of the Constitution and core constitutional values of pluralism and legal certainty.

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Facts

The case concerned the constitutionality of a provision of Lithuanian law regulating the dissemination of public information to minors. The Applicant in the case was the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which applied to the Constitutional Court by a resolution adopted on 14 February 2024. Under Lithuanian constitutional procedure, the Government was entitled to request a review of whether a statute enacted by Parliament complied with the Constitution. The Government asked the Court to examine whether Article 4, Part 2, Point 16 of the Law on the Protection of Minors from the Negative Impact of Public Information, as worded on 22 December 2009, was consistent with multiple provisions of the Constitution, including guarantees of freedom of expression, equality before the law, protection of family life, adherence to international treaties, and the constitutional principle of the rule of law.

The contested legal provision formed part of a broader statutory framework regulating public information accessible to minors. The Law on the Protection of Minors from the Negative Impact of Public Information was originally adopted in 2002 and substantially amended in 2009. The law defined categories of public information considered harmful to minors’ mental, physical, moral, or social development and established rules for restricting or prohibiting the dissemination of such information. Article 4, Part 2 listed specific types of content deemed harmful. Point 16 of that list classified as harmful any public information that “created contempt for family values” and “promoted a concept of marriage and family formation different from that established in the Constitution and the Civil Code.” Under the law, information falling within these categories could not be freely disseminated to minors and was subject to statutory restrictions enforced by supervisory authorities.

In practice, this provision has been applied by administrative bodies and courts to restrict access by minors to information depicting same-sex relationships or family models other than marriage between a man and a woman. Oversight of compliance with the law was exercised by public institutions responsible for media regulation and journalistic ethics. Courts reviewing individual disputes had relied on interpretations by these authorities when assessing whether particular publications could be made available to minors. The provision therefore had concrete legal effects on publishers, authors, and distributors of information, as well as on minors’ access to certain forms of public content.

The Government’s application to the Constitutional Court was submitted in the context of prior international proceedings. In January 2023, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment in Macatė v. Lithuania, in which it examined the application of the same statutory provision under the European Convention on Human Rights. That Court found that Lithuania had violated the right to freedom of expression by restricting the dissemination of a children’s book containing references to same-sex relationships. Following that judgment, questions arose within the Lithuanian legal system regarding the compatibility of the contested provision with both constitutional guarantees and Lithuania’s obligations under international human rights law.

During the constitutional proceedings, written submissions were also received from an interested party represented in Parliament, who supported the Government’s request and argued that the provision was inconsistent with constitutional principles. The Constitutional Court examined the legislative history of the contested provision, including parliamentary debates and committee materials from 2009, as well as its subsequent application by courts and administrative bodies. The Court did not examine individual enforcement cases but focused on the abstract constitutionality of the statutory text itself.

The Constitutional Court conducted the review under its established constitutional jurisdiction, which allowed it to assess whether laws enacted by Parliament conformed to the Constitution. The proceedings were limited to constitutional review and did not involve criminal or civil liability for any individual. The Court’s task was to determine whether the contested provision remained valid within the Lithuanian legal system or conflicted with constitutional norms and principles binding on the legislature.

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Decision Overview

Judge Tomas Davulis of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania delivered the decision. The primary issue before the Court was whether Article 4, Part 2, Point 16 of the Law on the Protection of Minors from the Negative Impact of Public Information complied with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, particularly with respect to freedom of expression, the protection of family life, and equality before the law. 

The Applicant, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, contended that Article 4, Part 2, Point 16 of the Law on the Protection of Minors from the Negative Impact of Public Information imposed an unjustified restriction on freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 25 of the Constitution of Lithuania and by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Government argued that freedom of expression included not only the right to express opinions but also the right to seek, receive, and impart information without undue interference by public authorities. It maintained that the contested provision restricted expression by classifying certain types of public information as inherently harmful to minors and subjecting their dissemination to prohibition or strict limitation, thereby interfering with both the dissemination of information by authors and publishers and the right of minors to access information. According to the applicant, such a restriction concerned the core of expressive freedom because it targeted the content of expression, rather than merely regulating its form or manner.

The Applicant further argued that the restriction failed to meet constitutional requirements for limiting freedom of expression in a democratic society. It relied on constitutional doctrine and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, particularly the judgment in Macatė v. Lithuania, to assert that the contested provision was insufficiently clear and foreseeable and therefore did not satisfy the requirement that restrictions on expression be “prescribed by law.” The Government emphasized that the law did not clearly define what constituted “denigration of family values” or “promotion” of a different concept of family, leaving broad discretion to enforcement authorities and creating a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory application. It also maintained that the restriction was not necessary to protect minors’ health or morals, as required under both the Constitution and the Convention, because international human rights jurisprudence had found no evidence that the mere presentation of same-sex relationships or diverse family models harmed children. On this basis, the applicant asserted that the provision unduly narrowed freedom of expression and was incompatible with constitutional and international standards protecting expressive rights.

Tomas Vytautas Raskevičius, a member of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, contended that Article 4, Part 2, Point 16 of the Law on the Protection of Minors from the Negative Impact of Public Information violated freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 25 of the Constitution of Lithuania. He argued that freedom of expression encompassed not only the right to hold and express opinions but also the right to receive and disseminate information, including information about diverse family models and personal relationships. According to his submissions, the contested provision restricted expression by treating information about families not based on marriage between a man and a woman as inherently harmful to minors, thereby subjecting such information to prohibition or strict limitation. He maintained that this restriction directly targeted the content of expression and therefore constituted a particularly serious interference with constitutional freedom of expression.

Raskevičius further asserted that the restriction on expression was not justified under constitutional or international human rights standards. Relying on the constitutional doctrine of pluralism and neutrality of the state in matters of beliefs and values, as well as on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, he argued that the mere dissemination of information about same-sex relationships or non-traditional family forms could not be presumed to harm minors. He emphasized that the contested provision effectively privileged one state-endorsed concept of family and marriage while suppressing alternative views, which, in his view, was incompatible with a democratic society based on tolerance and diversity. He also argued that the vague wording of the provision allowed authorities broad discretion in its application, increasing the risk of arbitrary interference with expression and undermining legal certainty, a key requirement when restricting fundamental rights such as freedom of expression.

On the Issue of the Restriction of Freedom of Expression of Beliefs and Information

The Constitutional Court began its analysis by situating the case within the constitutional framework governing freedom of expression. It recalled that Article 25 of the Constitution guaranteed the right “to hold opinions and to express them freely” and that a person “shall not be hindered in seeking, receiving and imparting information and ideas.” [para. 10] The Court emphasized that this freedom constituted one of the foundations of an open and democratic society and was inseparable from pluralism and individual self-development, noting that freedom of information was “an important prerequisite for the implementation of various individual rights and freedoms.” [para. 10] It further reiterated its settled doctrine that restrictions on expression were permissible only if they were established by law, pursued constitutionally legitimate aims, and were necessary and proportionate in a democratic society. 

Applying these principles, the Court examined whether Article 4(2)(16) of the Law, which classified certain public information as harmful to minors, amounted to a constitutionally permissible restriction. It found that the provision restricted expression by limiting the dissemination of information about family models that differed from marriage between a man and a woman, particularly information depicting same-sex relationships. The Court stressed that this restriction directly targeted the content of expression, not merely its time, place, or manner, and therefore required especially strict constitutional scrutiny. It concluded that restricting access to such information prevented minors from receiving “objective information that reflects real social relations” and hindered their ability to form a worldview grounded in constitutional values such as human dignity and respect for others. [para. 13]

The Court also relied extensively on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, particularly Macatė v. Lithuania. It cited the European Court’s finding that the purpose of the contested provision had been to limit children’s access to content presenting same-sex relationships as “essentially equivalent to relationships between people of different sexes.” [para. 7, referring to ECtHR para. 198] The Constitutional Court endorsed the ECtHR’s conclusion that such restrictions did not pursue legitimate aims under freedom-of-expression standards and were incompatible with “equality, pluralism and tolerance inherent in a democratic society.” [para. 7, referring to ECtHR paras. 202 and 216] On this basis, the Court held that the Lithuanian provision failed the constitutional test of necessity and unjustifiably narrowed the scope of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 25. [paras. 18.2–18.3]

On the Issue of Legal Clarity and the Rule-of-Law Requirements Governing Restrictions on Expression

In a closely related but analytically distinct inquiry, the Court addressed whether the contested restriction on expression satisfied the constitutional principle of the rule of law, which required that limitations on fundamental rights be clear, precise, and foreseeable. It recalled its longstanding doctrine that legal norms restricting constitutional rights must be formulated “precisely” and “must not contain ambiguities,” especially where they regulated freedom of expression. [para. 9] The Court stressed that concepts used to limit human rights had to be “extremely clear, defined, and understandable.” [para. 9]

Assessing Article 4(2)(16), the Court found that the legislature had failed to define what constituted “denigration of family values” or how such denigration differed from the “promotion” of an alternative concept of marriage and family formation. It was observed that the law did not clarify whether both elements were required cumulatively or could operate independently, leaving broad discretion to administrative and judicial authorities. [paras. 18.1–18.2] The Court stated unequivocally that “the content of the restriction on the dissemination of information established therein is not clear” and that it was “unclear what specific information” the legislature intended to restrict. [para. 18.1] This lack of clarity, the Court held, created a risk of arbitrary and discriminatory application, particularly in matters touching upon sensitive issues of identity and family life.

The Court further explained that vague restrictions on expression were constitutionally unacceptable because they undermined legal certainty and chilled lawful expression. It emphasized that when the state restricted minors’ access to information, it could not establish a regime that treated information about certain family models as “inherently inappropriate for minors.” [para. 13] By failing to meet rule-of-law standards, the contested provision compounded its incompatibility with freedom of expression, as individuals could not reasonably foresee whether lawful discussion of family diversity would be sanctioned. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Article 4(2)(16) violated both the rule-of-law principle and the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, and it declared the provision unconstitutional without proceeding to examine the remaining constitutional claims. [paras. 18.3, 19]

In conclusion, the Court held that Article 4, Part 2, Point 16 of the Law imposed an unjustified and unclear restriction on freedom of expression by limiting minors’ access to information about diverse family models, failed to meet the constitutional requirements of necessity, proportionality, and legal certainty, and therefore violated Article 25 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of the rule of law.

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