Case Summary and Outcome

A United States District Court granted a preliminary injunction requiring university officials to remove any reference to a student’s involuntary disenrollment from his academic transcript as retaliation for speech the university deemed threatening and disruptive. The matter arose after the university disenrolled the student based on social media posts he had made about the Israel–Palestine conflict, during non-term time and when he was off campus. The Court found that there was no evidence that the speech constituted incitement to imminent violence or would be disruptive to academic activities, and that it was clear that the disenrollment was done in response to the student’s posts. It found that all factors supported a granting of a preliminary injunction.

---

Facts

On May 22, 2025, an American social media influencer and political activist, Guy Christensen, posted two videos on the social media platform, TikTok. Identifying as a “fervent supporter of the Palestinian liberation movement and critic of Israel’s conduct in the way”, Christensen had more than three million followers on TikTok and regularly posted political commentary and advocacy-related content. [p. 1]

The two videos addressed the Israel-Palestine conflict. The first video concerned the May 21, 2025 killing of two Israeli embassy employees in Washington, D.C by Elias Rodriguez. In that video, Christensen withdrew his earlier condemnation of the attack and stated that he did “not condemn the elimination” of the two officials. The video reminded his followers that “Israel has murdered thousands of Palestinian civilians” and referred to responding to the D.C. killings with “our own greater resistance and escalation”. [p. 3] Christensen also quoted from a manifesto written by Rodriquez.

The second video criticized U.S. Congressman Ritchie Torres, who represents New York, for not characterizing Israel’s actions in Palestine as a genocide and for accepting money from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Christensen described Torres as a “Zionist scumbag” and said that he would “end up in a Nuremburg trial for all the elected officials in America who facilitated and protected this genocide”. [p. 4] He added, “how many children have to die before the AIPAC money is outweighed by the crimes?” [p. 4]

In the days following the May 22 posts, Christensen uploaded additional videos responding to criticism and backlash he had received. In a May 23, 2025 video, he stated that he would “never make a threat” that would jeopardize his platform or influence. [p. 5] In a May 27, 2025 video, he denied antisemitism, stated that he did not incite violence, and described himself as non-violent.

Christensen was a student at Ohio State University (“OSU”), a public institution. He had enrolled at the start of the academic year in 2024, but left campus (and the state of Ohio) after completing the semester in April 2025. He intended to return only at the beginning of the next semester in September 2025, and so was not on campus when he posted the two videos.

On May 25, 2025, OSU issued two formal letters to Christensen. The first imposed an immediate interim suspension under Section 3335-23-20 of the university’s Code of Student Conduct, and stated that there was “reasonable cause to believe” that his continued presence on university premises posed “a significant risk of substantial harm to the safety or security” of persons or property. The suspension barred him from campus and university activities and warned that returning to campus during the suspension could result in criminal trespass charges under Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.21. The second letter directed him to schedule a meeting regarding the interim suspension. The meeting was scheduled for June 5.

On May 30, 2025, before the scheduled meeting took place, OSU issued a disenrollment letter, from the Senior Vice President for Student Life, Melissa Shivers. The disenrollment was enforced under Section 3335-23-21(A) of the Code of Student Conduct, which permits administrative disenrollment where there is “clear and convincing evidence” that a student’s continued presence poses “a significant risk of substantial harm” to the health, safety, or property of the university community. [p. 7] The letter stated that the university considered that Christensen’s “continued presence at the university poses a significant risk of substantial harm to the safety of the university community”, as they interpreted the May 22 video as “inciting violence,” the Torres video as having been interpreted by Congressman Torres himself as a threat, and that there were “myriad communications” from members of the university community expressing fear. [p. 7] The disenrollment letter outlined a petition process through which Christensen could seek re-enrollment. The process required submission of documentation demonstrating that the conditions leading to the disenrollment “no longer exist and will not recur.” [p. 7]

The previously scheduled interim suspension meeting was cancelled following issuance of the disenrollment letter.

On June 23, 2025, Christensen submitted such a petition against his disenrollment, asserting that he did not pose a safety threat and that the disenrollment violated his constitutional rights. The university rejected the petition, stating that he had not provided evidence that the underlying safety conditions had changed and characterizing it as a disagreement with the original “clear and convincing evidence” determination rather than proof of changed circumstances.

OSU placed a notation on Christensen’s academic transcript stating that he had been “administratively disenrolled pursuant to 3335-23-21.” Christensen was attending another university at the time of the hearing and planned to apply to institutions abroad by February 2026, which would require submission of his OSU transcript. The presence of the disenrollment notation therefore had potential academic and professional consequences beyond the immediate loss of enrollment.

In September 2025, Christensen filed a lawsuit against Walter “Ted” Carter, Jr., in his official capacity as President of OSU, Shivers, in her official capacity, and Ryan Hunt, in his official capacity as University Registrar. He argued that his disenrollment violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it was imposed in response to protected political speech, and that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment because he was deprived of his interest in higher education without adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

Christensen subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction requesting that the Court order the removal of any reference to involuntary disenrollment from his transcript and prohibit the university from making equivalent representations through academic records or other means while the case proceeded.

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, states that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

---

Decision Overview

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. delivered the Opinion and Order on the motion for a preliminary injunction. The central issue for the Court’s determination was whether Christensen demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of a First Amendment retaliation claim in that OSU disenrolled him because of protected political speech, and – if so – whether the other preliminary-injunction factors warranted an order requiring OSU to expunge the “involuntary disenrollment” reference from his academic transcript and to refrain from making equivalent representations through academic records or other means.

Christensen argued that the videos were core political speech, and that OSU’s disenrollment constituted retaliation for protected expression. He submitted that the speech did not fall within any unprotected category, particularly incitement, and that OSU could not justify disenrollment by citing a hostile audience reaction or generalized fear.

OSU did not deny the political character of Christensen’s videos but argued that they did not constitute protected speech because they constituted incitement under Brandenburg v. Ohio, and because the videos posed a risk of substantial disruption and safety concerns justifying university intervention. OSU also argued its administrative disenrollment procedure was motivated by a desire for campus safety rather than punishment of Christensen.

The Court underscored that the First Amendment “applies to loathsome and unpopular speech” with the same force as celebrated speech (quoting Bible Believers v. Wayne County, Michigan), and that speech on matters of public concern “cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt” (quoting Snyder v. Phelps). [pp. 1-2] It also reiterated First Amendment baseline principles, including that speech is protected even if it is “provocative and challenging” or has “profound unsettling effects” (citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago), and that only limited categories of speech fall outside protection.

The Court explained that the governing preliminary-injunction framework is that a plaintiff must show: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm, (3) substantial harm to others, and (4) the public interest.

The Court examined Christensen’s likelihood of success on the merits in his First Amendment retaliation claim. With reference to Nieves v. Bartlett, the Court noted that, as a general matter, the First Amendment “prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions’ for engaging in protected speech.” [p. 11] In order to succeed in his claim, Christensen would have to demonstrate that he engaged in protected speech, OSU took “adverse action” against him, and that there was a causal connection between the speech and the action. [p. 11]

In determining whether the videos were protected speech, the Court assessed OSU’s argument that they were not protected because they constituted incitement. The Court stressed, with reference to Brandenburg v. Ohio and Bible Believers, that the First Amendment does not protect incitement to violence. Courts determine whether speech is incitement by examining whether there was: “(1) encouragement of violence or lawless action (explicitly or implicitly), (2) intent to produce such violence or lawlessness, and (3) imminence/likelihood of such violence or lawlessness.” [p. 12] The Court found that Christensen’s videos, and their use of the words “resistance” and “escalation”, did not explicitly encourage violence and were “unlikely to be an implicit endorsement” of violence or lawlessness; the Court viewed the statements, in context, as encouraging resistance and escalation in the form of lawful action and noted that Christensen issued clarifications stating he would not make threats and did not incite violence. [p. 13]

The Court stressed that, “[e]ven if Mr. Christensen’s use of the terms ‘resistance’ and ‘escalation’ referred to the use of illegal violence,” this could still be protected because because the First Amendment “protects endorsement of lawlessness that do not contain a specific call to action”. [p. 14] The Court also dismissed OSU’s argument that Christensen’s “demeanor” suggested incitement, quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. that “[a]n advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause”. [p. 15]

The Court also found that Christensen did not intend “for his statements to result in the use of violence or lawless action”, [p. 15] and that his statements were “unlikely to result in the imminent use of violence or lawless action”. [p. 16]

In examining whether OSU was justified in its actions because Christensen’s speech had caused “substantial disruption”, the Court referred to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and stressed that although courts recognize the need for schools to govern conduct, “Students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate’.” [p. 17] The Court noted that it was not clear to what extent Tinker – which had permitted the prohibition of speech in public high and middle schools if that speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of rights of others” – applied to the regulation of speech at universities. [p. 18] It added, quoting Tinker, that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough” to overcome free expression and, with reference to Bible Believers, that the First Amendment does not envision a “heckler’s veto” and so government actors may not restrict protected speech because third parties react adversely. [p. 19]

The Court held, with reference to Mahanoy Area School District v. B. L. by and through Levy, that a school’s interest in “regulating student speech is ‘diminished’ when the speech occurs off campus”, and stressed that Christensen had made the statements when he was off campus and the semester had concluded, had not mentioned OSU in the videos and no student had voiced concerns to OSU. [p. 17]

Accordingly, the Court held that there was no evidence to support OSU’s contention that Christensen’s speech would meet the Tinker standard of substantial disruption.

The Court found that Christensen had met the “adverse action” requirement as his disenrollment from OSU was “an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected speech”. [p. 20] It noted that in demonstrating the causal connection, a plaintiff must “show that his protected activity was a motivating factor in the adverse decision”, before the onus shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that “it would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity”. [p. 20] The Court rejected OSU’s argument that the disenrollment was motivated by a need to protect campus security rather than to punish Christensen, and stated that this “does not change the fact that they disenrolled Mr. Christensen because of his speech” and their justification that it was to protect students’ safety “does not make their conduct constitutional”. [p. 22]

Accordingly, the Court found that Christensen had demonstrated a “strong likelihood of success” in showing that he had engaged in protected speech, OSU had taken an adverse action against him and that there was a causal connection between the two. [p. 22]

The Court also found that Christensen had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in proving his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Turning to the remaining preliminary-injunction factors, quoting Elrod v. Burns, the Court found irreparable harm because “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”. [p. 27] It added that Newsom v. Norris explained that when someone experiences “direct and intentional retaliation” they continue to experience “irreparable injury”. [p. 27] The Court found that without an injunction Christensen’s transcript will continue to show that he was involuntarily disenrolled and so had clearly demonstrated irreparable harm.

In weighing the harm caused to Christensen if no injunction were issued against the harm caused to others if it were, the Court found that OSU’s argument that the harm to other academic institutions in not knowing why Christensen was disenrolled did not qualify as substantial or would outweigh the harm to Christensen.

The Court assessed whether the injunction would serve the public interest and stressed, with reference to jurisprudence, that the public has an interest in the protection of First Amendment rights and so “the determination of where the public interest lies . . . is dependent on a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits of the First Amendment challenge because ‘it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.’” [p. 29]

Accordingly, the Court held that “all four preliminary injunctions weigh in favor of granting Mr. Christensen’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction”. [p. 29] It ordered that OSU “expunge any reference of involuntary disenrollment” from Christensen’s academic transcript and prevented them from making any other “equivalent representation through academic records”. It ordered Christensen pay security of US$100 – a nominal amount “given the strength of Mr. Christensen’s likelihood of success on the merits”. [p. 30]

---