Case Summary and Outcome

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a preliminary injunction preventing law enforcement officials from using excessive force against protestors engaged in constitutionally protected activity during immigration enforcement operations. The dispute arose amidst a high intensity immigration enforcement campaign that prompted sustained community protest, media coverage, and religious ministry, which led to federal agents firing rubber bullets, pepper balls, and flashbang grenades, deploying tear gas, confiscating recording equipment, and threatening individuals with force, often without adequate warning and against individuals who were clearly identifiable as members of the press or clergy engaged in prayer. The Court found that the Defendants had engaged in “an officially sanctioned common practice” of violating constitutional rights, and held that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that the agents’ conduct constituted content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination, First Amendment retaliation, and a substantial burden on religious exercise.

On January 22, 2026, the case was dismissed without prejudice on the ground that Operation Midway Blitz appeared to have ended and the specific conduct restraining relief was no longer ongoing.

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Facts

In September 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) initiated Operation Midway Blitz, a high-intensity enforcement campaign targeting the Chicago metropolitan area (sometimes referred to as “Chicagoland”) in the state of Illinois. Following the launch of this operation, federal agents from ICE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other agencies significantly increased arrest and removal activities at the ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) facility in Broadview, Illinois, and within multiple neighbourhoods throughout the state. According to federal officials, the operation sought to target individuals present in the United States unlawfully, including those with criminal histories. More than 200 CBP agents were redeployed from border assignments elsewhere to support enforcement efforts in northern Illinois. Federal agents conducted arrests in residential neighbourhoods, commercial areas, parking lots, and public spaces across Chicago and surrounding municipalities.

This surge in federal activity prompted an immediate and sustained response from community members, religious practitioners, and journalists. These individuals frequently gathered at and near enforcement sites to protest immigration policies, provide spiritual ministry to those being detained, and document the conduct of federal agents. The resulting demonstrations were marked by increasingly volatile confrontations and federal agents were accused of targeting peaceful participants and members of the media with excessive force, threats, and detainment. Those present at the demonstrations accused agents of firing rubber bullets and pepper balls, launching flashbang grenades, and indiscriminately spraying tear gas at protesters, clergy members, and journalists, often without providing legal justification or adequate warning.

The Broadview ICE facility, operated by ERO Chicago, served as the primary site of the initial confrontations between federal agents and the public. The facility was bordered by public streets, including Beach Street and Harvard Street, and its driveway served as the principal access point for vehicles entering and exiting the premises. Beginning in early September 2025, individuals gathered on the public sidewalks and streets near the facility’s driveway and gate to protest the federal government’s immigration enforcement activities. Religious practitioners, including clergy members from various denominations, also gathered at the facility to pray, recite the Rosary (a Catholic prayer practice) and provide spiritual comfort to those detained inside who were “facing fear and uncertainty.” [p. 2] Members of the media were present to document and report on both the protests and the enforcement operations.

Clergy had conducted peaceful prayer vigils outside the Broadview facility for many years prior to September 2025. Father Brendan Curran, a Catholic priest, had organized weekly Friday prayer services for nearly two decades and participants included Catholic priests, ministers, nuns, lay congregants, and other community members. These gatherings typically involved prayer, singing, and quiet reflection near the sidewalk and grassy areas adjacent to the facility entrance. According to the religious practitioners involved in this case, these gatherings occurred without incident for years and without any use of force by federal authorities.

Beginning in September 2025, however, the atmosphere surrounding the Broadview facility changed significantly. Federal agents were observed stationed on the facility roof wearing camouflage uniforms, tactical gear, helmets, and masks, and agents were equipped with projectile launchers and chemical munitions. In response to growing protest activity, federal authorities erected fencing around the facility perimeter without prior notice to local authorities, installed high-intensity lighting, and increased the number of agents stationed outside the building.

DHS and its component agencies had existing written policies governing the use of force, body worn cameras (BWC), and interactions with individuals engaged in expressive activity. DHS’s February 2023 “Use of Force Policy” provides that officers may use force only when no reasonably effective alternative exists and only to the extent that it is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. CBP’s January 2021 policy similarly requires objectively reasonable and necessary force, prohibits excessive force, and regulates the deployment of less lethal munitions, including requirements to provide warnings where feasible and to avoid targeting vulnerable individuals. ICE maintains a comparable graduated use of force directive. Both CBP and ICE also had BWC directives requiring activation during specified enforcement encounters, and DHS policies expressly recognize individuals’ rights to engage in peaceful protest, record law enforcement activity in public spaces, and participate in religious expression, instructing agents to distinguish between protected conduct and unlawful activity.

On September 12 and 13, 2025, protests at the Broadview facility intensified. Protesters gathered on public streets and sidewalks near the facility driveway and demonstrators chanted, held signs, and engaged in nonviolent protest. On September 12, in the late afternoon, federal agents exited the facility in tactical gear and, without any audible dispersal order or warning, deployed pepper balls and chemical agents toward individuals gathered near the driveway. One protester, Ashley Vaughan, who has a neurological condition requiring the use of a mobility cane, attended the protest and sat on public property near the garage entrance. She was suddenly struck in the face by a pepper-ball projectile fired from the direction of agents positioned on the roof, without any warning that she heard. Unable to open her eyes or stand, she began crawling as agents continued deploying pepper balls. An agent then sprayed her at close range with a chemical agent, causing burning to her eyes, lungs, and skin and restricting her breathing. Other protesters assisted her away from the area, and she was transported to a hospital, where she was treated for a head injury consistent with a mild concussion. The following day, September 13, federal agents reported that protesters obstructed vehicles attempting to exit the facility and that certain individuals vandalized government vehicles. However, no evidence was presented that the injured protesters posed a threat of serious bodily harm to agents.

On September 19, 2025, protest activity occurred in the morning and evening at the Broadview facility. In the morning, federal agents attempted to exit the facility in marked vehicles and protesters stood or sat in the driveway and street. Federal agents deployed pepper-ball launchers, smoke canisters, and tear gas. During one incident, Reverend David Black stood near the facility fence wearing clerical attire and extended his arms in prayer toward agents positioned on the roof. Video footage shows Reverend Black in a non-threatening posture when he was struck multiple times by pepper-ball projectiles in the head, arms, and torso. He fell to his knees and experienced burning sensations and difficulty breathing and shortly thereafter, agents sprayed chemical irritants directly toward him as he attempted to retreat.

Reverend Beth Johnson and Reverend Abby Holcombe also reported being struck with pepper balls while engaged in prayer. Both stated that they were not given warnings before force was used. Reverend Johnson, who suffers from asthma, reported difficulty breathing due to exposure to chemical agents.

In the days leading up to September 23, ICE leadership circulated internal communications referencing online calls for demonstrators to form a “human wall” around the facility and reporting intelligence that some participants were being instructed in confrontation tactics. Agency updates also described incidents of individuals rattling gates, striking windows, slashing tires, and monitoring vehicles entering and leaving the premises. In response, ERO Chicago installed fencing around the facility to reduce the likelihood of physical confrontation.

On the morning of September 26, between 100 and 150 individuals gathered near the Beach Street entrance. Several attendees stated that agents deployed tear gas and pepper-ball projectiles without issuing audible dispersal warnings and at times when no vehicles were entering or exiting the facility.

Journalists covering the events at Broadview on September 26 were also subjected to force. Raven Geary, wearing “a visible press credential lanyard around her neck, a helmet labeled ‘PRESS’ on the front and back, and ‘PRESS’ patches on her backpack,” was shot in the face with pepper bullets when an agent aimed at her without warning which she was sheltering behind a vehicle. [p. 75] Charles Thrush, a freelance journalist, who was wearing press credentials around his neck, was filming “officers firing on two protesters holding an umbrella as a shield” when he was shot at with pepper bullets. [p. 74]

The effects of the enforcement activity were also felt by nearby residents and business owners. On September 26, one local business owner was initially unable to access his premises because streets near his business had been closed by federal agents. After eventually entering the building, he stepped outside upon hearing tear gas canisters and seeing individuals running past, at which point an officer instructed him to return indoors. He reported difficulty breathing due to the presence of tear gas. The following day, he and other local businesses received a communication from the Mayor of Broadview indicating that ICE activity would intensify and that tear gas might be deployed in the vicinity of commercial properties.

The enforcement measures and related confrontations were not limited to the Broadview facility. Beginning in October 2025, federal agents affiliated with CBP conducted immigration operations across several Chicago neighborhoods, where accounts reflected comparable uses of force affecting protesters, members of the media, and uninvolved bystanders.

On October 12, 2025, in Chicago’s Albany Park neighborhood, CBP agents, some wearing tactical uniforms and others in plain clothes, approached a man and woman who ran away from them, resulting in agents apprehending one while the other evaded capture. Agents reported that within minutes, approximately 40 to 50 people converged on the scene and impeded a CBP vehicle by positioning bicycles and cars in its path and by forming a human chain. According to the agents, this interference restricted their movement and operational activity, leading them to request assistance from a CBP Quick Reaction Force team for crowd management.

On October 22, 2025, Gregory Bovino, Chief Border Patrol Agent for CBP’s El Centro Sector, participated in immigration enforcement activity in Chicago’s Little Village neighborhood. Several individuals gathered in a parking lot where they recorded the agents and voiced opposition to the operation. Deputy Chief Patrol Agent Daniel Parra claimed that members of the group verbally insulted agents and moved closer despite instructions to step back. Four or five agents, including Bovino, approached a woman who was standing and recording and Parra claimed that this woman “threatened to kill Chief Bovino,” but no threat could be heard on video of the incident presented to the Court. [p. 129] As agents approached the woman, Bovino said “What’d you say? Did you make a threat?” [p. 129] The woman denied doing so, after which Bovino directed the agents to seize her phone.

On October 6, 2025, a coalition of media organizations, demonstrators, and clergy members filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. These plaintiffs organized themselves into three groups: journalist Plaintiffs, protester Plaintiffs, and religious practitioner Plaintiffs. The journalist Plaintiffs included the organizations the Chicago Headline Club, Block Club Chicago, the Chicago Newspaper Guild Local 34071, NABET-CWA Local 54041, and individual journalists Raven Geary, Charles Thrush, and Stephen Held. The protester Plaintiffs included William Paulson, Autumn Reidy-Hamer, Leigh Kunkel, Rudy Villa, and Jennifer Crespo. The religious practitioner Plaintiffs included Reverend David Black, Father Brendan Curran, Reverend Dr. Beth Johnson, and Reverend Abby Holcombe.

The case was filed against senior federal officials within the DHS, ICE, and CBP including Kristi Noem, Secretary of DHS; Todd Lyons, Acting Director of ICE; Russell Hott, former Chicago Field Office Director of ICE; Rodney S. Scott, Commissioner of CBP; Gregory Bovino, Chief Border Patrol Agent of CBP’s El Centro Sector; Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States; and Donald J. Trump, President of the United States. A subsequent amendment to the complaint on October 21, 2025, added additional Defendants, including Stephen Miller, White House Deputy Chief of Staff and Homeland Security Adviser, and Kash Patel, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The suit challenged the federal officers’ conduct under the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 42 U.S.C. section 2000bb-1 , which protects individuals against substantial burdens on religious exercise imposed by the federal government. It sought injunctive relief to restrain the Defendants from continuing to engage in the alleged violations.

The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

The Fourth Amendment states that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

On October 8, 2025, the Plaintiffs moved for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking immediate protection from alleged interference with protest activity, newsgathering, and religious exercise. The Court granted the TRO on October 9, 2025, and later amended it on October 17, 2025, to require federal officers to wear BWCs when engaging with protesters except in undercover situations.

Following the amended complaint, on October 22, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, asserting that additional incidents had occurred despite the TRO’s restrictions. Between October 23 and November 1, 2025, the Plaintiffs submitted multiple notices to the Court describing further uses of force, deployments of chemical agents, arrests, and confrontations involving officers who allegedly lacked required identification, including incidents in Broadview, Old Irving Park, and Lakeview. The Plaintiffs also submitted video evidence and documentation of arrests and use-of-force events during this period.

On October 27, 2025, the Plaintiffs moved to modify the TRO to prohibit the use of tear gas pending resolution of the preliminary injunction motion, citing repeated instances in which officers had deployed chemical agents against non-violent individuals. The Court granted the request on October 28, 2025, and further directed the Defendants to provide the Court with all body-camera footage associated with uses of force, related reports, and a list of arrests occurring between September 2 and October 29, 2025. The Defendants filed their opposition to the preliminary injunction on October 31, 2025. The Plaintiffs continued to notify the Court of additional incidents allegedly occurring in violation of the TRO, including an event reported on November 1, 2025, involving the use of force near an elementary school parking lot.

Because the Plaintiffs could obtain relief to remedy the harms they faced without enjoining the President directly, the Court excepted President Trump from the scope of the injunction. The Court also granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, issued oral findings, imposed compliance and reporting requirements on the Defendants, and set further status proceedings. On November 6, 2025, following hearings held on November 5 and 6, the Court ruled on the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and issued an opinion and order. The case remains in progress.

The Defendants filed a notice of appeal, and on November 19, the Seventh Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal.

On December 2, 2025, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the case in district court on the ground that Operation Midway Blitz appeared to have ended and the specific conduct restraining relief was no longer ongoing.

On January 22, 2026, the case was dismissed without prejudice.

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Decision Overview

Judge Sara L. Ellis delivered the opinion and order on November 20, 2025. The main issues before the Court were whether the Defendant federal agents had systematically violated the First Amendment rights of the Plaintiff protesters, journalists, and religious practitioners by deploying excessive force against them during immigration enforcement operations, and whether the agents’ deployment of force against clergy members engaged in prayer constituted a substantial burden on religious exercise in violation of the RFRA.

The Plaintiffs, comprising the three groups of journalist Plaintiffs, protester Plaintiffs, and religious practitioner Plaintiffs, argued that federal agents had “targeted peaceful individuals, religious practitioners, and members of the media participating in or reporting on these protests with excessive force, threats, and/or detainment,” including that they fired “rubber bullets and pepper balls, launched flashbang grenades, and indiscriminately sprayed tear gas at protesters, religious practitioners, and journalists without legal justification or adequate warning.” [p. 2] The individual journalist Plaintiffs submitted that agents had fired rubber bullets and pepper balls at clearly identified members of the press who wore press credentials, carried cameras, and wore helmets marked “PRESS,” and had thrown tear gas at groups of journalists standing apart from protesters on public streets, and that agents had confiscated recording equipment from individuals exercising their First Amendment right to record law enforcement activity. The journalist Plaintiffs highlighted an occasion where Chief Bovino instructed agents to “take her phone” from a woman who was standing and recording. [p. 129] The organizational journalist Plaintiffs submitted that they had suffered concrete injuries beyond their baseline activities, with the Chicago Headline Club’s president, Jeff Arnold, having spent “at least ten hours personally responding to such incidents between September 27 and October 4,” diverting “significant time and resources from other organizational activities to address press rights violations by law enforcement personnel.” [p. 185]

The protester Plaintiffs argued that they were subjected to excessive force while participating in peaceful, nonviolent demonstrations on public sidewalks and streets, which are traditional public forums entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection. They submitted that the agents’ use of force was not justified by any legitimate governmental interest and was not narrowly tailored to serve such an interest, and that the deployment of chemical agents and impact munitions against nonviolent individuals constituted unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. They noted specific incidents in which force was allegedly deployed without provocation, including when one Plaintiff observed an agent “running across the roof of the facility and, without warning, firing pepper balls into the crowd” at a time when “no vehicles tried to enter or exit the facility.” [p. 68]

The religious practitioner Plaintiffs argued that federal agents substantially burdened their exercise of religion by deploying force against them while they were engaged in prayer, recitation of the Rosary, and other religious activities at immigration enforcement sites. They maintained that their presence was motivated by sincerely-held religious beliefs and that the Defendants could not demonstrate a compelling governmental interest justifying this burden under RFRA, nor that the use of force against praying clergy constituted the least restrictive means of furthering any such interest. In support of their claim, they referenced the incident in where Pastor Benjamin Squires was threatened with pepper spray by a federal agent as he attempted to record the scene of an enforcement operation at a high school. [p. 152]

The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants’ conduct constituted content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination, not merely neutral time, place, and manner regulation as agents targeted them specifically because of their message opposing the immigration enforcement operations and that there was evidence that the Defendants would treat pro-ICE and pro-CBP demonstrators more favorably than those protesting against the operations. They argued that this differential treatment triggered strict scrutiny, requiring the government to prove its actions were the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest, a burden they claimed the Defendants could not meet. On their First Amendment retaliation claim, the Plaintiffs argued that their protected activity was a “motivating factor” in the agents’ decision to use force. [p. 203] They relied on public statements from high ranking officials to demonstrate retaliatory intent, including Secretary Noem’s instruction to “go hard” against those “advocating for violence,” a category she defined to include videotaping agents, and Bovino’s statement that “if someone strays into a pepper ball, then that’s on them. Don’t protest, and don’t trespass” [pp. 41-42] They submitted that the indiscriminate nature of the force, targeting clearly identifiable clergy and journalists standing apart from any disruptive elements, was circumstantial evidence of a retaliatory motive.

The Defendants maintained that the Chicago area was beset by violent, organized resistance to lawful immigration enforcement operations and that the agents’ uses of force were necessary and justified. In support, they relied on declarations from senior officials, including Hott, who stated that “hundreds of protesters gathered at the facility on the morning of September 26 with boxes of fireworks, face masks, gas masks, goggles, knee and elbow” pads, [p. 79] on ERO Chicago emails documenting that “intelligence indicate[d] protesters are being trained on physical techniques to assault law enforcement,” [p. 66] and on evidence that criminal enterprises had placed “bounties” on federal personnel, offering up to $50,000 for the assassination of high ranking officials. [p. 37] They further argued that the act of videotaping agents constituted a form of “violence” because it was used to dox (to publicly identify someone) agents and their families, with some officers’ home addresses appearing on social media. [p. 39]

On the merits, the Defendants maintained that agents’ actions were directed at individuals physically obstructing operations, not at protected speech, and that any incidental impact on First Amendment activity was justified by the government’s compelling interest in enforcing immigration law and maintaining officer safety. They advanced an “intermingled crowd” justification, arguing that the intermixed nature of the crowd with obstructors and lawless actors justified dispersal of the entire group regardless of whether every individual was acting violently. On the RFRA claims, they maintained that any burden on religious exercise was incidental to legitimate law enforcement activity. They submitted that agents had provided adequate warnings and that the force was proportionate, and further argued that Chicago and Illinois’ immigration sanctuary laws hindered their ability to enforce federal law and exacerbated the dangers faced by agents. [p. 150] A “sanctuary city” is one which limits its cooperation with federal immigration officials.

The Defendants did not argue before the Court at any time that the proposed injunctive relief reached too broadly and enjoined more parties than necessary or allowable.

The Defendants challenged the Plaintiffs’ standing, maintaining that the injuries were isolated incidents unlikely to recur, and argued that the proposed injunction would be unworkable given the fluid nature of enforcement operations, and raised a “separation of powers” argument, maintaining that a preliminary injunction would result in the Court “micromanaging” law enforcement operations and that the judiciary should not intrude into the tactical decision making of the Executive Branch. [p. 227] Citing the Supreme Court’s June 2025 decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., they argued that the Court could not issue a “universal injunction,” submitting that federal courts are prohibited from issuing relief broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing. [p. 226]

The Court opened its opinion with an evocation of Carl Sandburg’s poem Chicago, written while the poet lived in the Ravenswood neighborhood, and framed the central factual dispute as whether Chicagoland was “the City of Big Shoulders or Chipocalypse Now.” [p. 1] The Court made clear which version it found supported by the record, describing the Chicagoland it observed “from Aurora to Cicero, from Chicago to Waukegan, and all points in between” as “a vibrant place, brimming with life and hope, constantly rebuilding itself to create a more just society.” [p. 1] Against this backdrop, the Court stated that the Defendants “would have people believe instead that the Chicagoland area is in a vise hold of violence, ransacked by rioters, and attacked by agitators,” a narrative the Court found “simply is untrue” and one that the “Defendants’ own evidence in this case belies.” [p. 1] The Court emphasized that “the merits of this case do not turn on whether [the Court] sympathizes with the current administration’s immigration policies or prefers the immigration policies of the prior administration,” nor on “whether [the Court] agree[s] with the federal government’s immigration enforcement efforts in Chicago or whether [the Court] believes Chicago should be a sanctuary city.” [p. 5] It stressed that the case turned on whether the Defendants’ uses of force against protesters, journalists, and religious practitioners were consistent with the Constitution.

The Court first addressed the Plaintiffs’ standing to bring the case. The Court reiterated that plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and that presents a “real and immediate” threat of future harm. [p. 179] The Court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiffs had not shown their injuries were likely to recur, stating that “the record reflects that Defendants have engaged in an officially sanctioned common practice of violating the First and Fourth Amendment rights of protesters, journalists, and religious practitioners.” [p. 179] It found that the individual Plaintiffs had suffered concrete injuries, including being struck with impact munitions, exposed to chemical agents, and having recording equipment seized, and that they intended to continue engaging in protest, reporting, and religious ministry. Given what the Court described as an “ongoing, sustained pattern of conduct,” the risk of future harm was “not speculative.” [p. 179] The Court concluded that the organizational Plaintiffs established standing based on diversion of resources beyond their baseline activities, finding that the Chicago Headline Club’s reallocation of time and resources to address press rights violations constituted a concrete injury. The Court also certified a class consisting of all persons who are or will be nonviolently engaged in protest, observation, documentation, or religious expression at DHS immigration enforcement operations in the Northern District of Illinois, including a Religious Exercise Subclass and a Press Subclass.

The Court examined the substantive requirements governing preliminary injunctive relief, following the three part test that the Plaintiffs must satisfy: whether there is (i) a likelihood of success on the merits; (ii) the absence of an adequate remedy at law; and (iii) irreparable harm absent relief. If these threshold requirements were met, the Court would then conduct a balancing test, weighing the harm the denial of the injunction would cause the Plaintiffs against the harm to the Defendants if the Court were to grant it, taking into account the public interest. The Court clarified that the “likelihood of success” requirement demands a strong showing supported by a concrete explanation of how the plaintiff intends to prove the essential elements of the claim, and that a mere possibility of success is insufficient. [p. 187]

The Court conducted its merits analysis of the First Amendment claims, first considering whether the Plaintiffs were engaged in protected speech. The Court recognized that demonstrating, protesting, observing government conduct, recording law enforcement activity, and engaging in religious expression constitute core First Amendment activity. It reaffirmed that public sidewalks and streets are “traditional public forums” that “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” [p. 188] The Court rejected the Defendants’ contention that the Plaintiffs’ conduct lost constitutional protection because they were allegedly “intermingled” with unlawful actors. Although the Defendants had catalogued what they described as violent and obstructive conduct by certain individuals, the Court found that narrative not credible and emphasized that the Plaintiffs expressly excluded individuals engaged in violence or true threats from the relief sought. The Court reiterated that the government “may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions,” and that isolated unlawful acts cannot justify the indiscriminate suppression of protected expression. [p. 192] After reviewing declarations, testimony, and extensive video evidence, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs had made a strong showing that they were engaged in peaceful, nonviolent speech and assembly, and that the certified class was limited to those who “non-violently demonstrate, protest, observe, document, or record” immigration enforcement operations. [p. 193]

On the issue of newsgathering, the Court held that the First Amendment protects nonviolent efforts to observe and document government conduct. Emphasizing that “a major purpose of the First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,” the Court explained that this protection reflects a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” [p. 193] It further noted that the freedom of speech and press “embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.” [p. 194] Applying these principles, the Court found that the journalist Plaintiffs were engaged in protected newsgathering when force was used against them. The record demonstrated that the reporters wore clear press identification, did not participate in protests, and interacted with officers only for journalistic purposes. The Court rejected any suggestion that the press sought special treatment, clarifying instead that “the Supreme Court has long recognized a qualified right of access for the press and public to observe government activities.” [p. 194]

Having concluded that Plaintiffs were engaged in protected expression, the Court next considered whether the Defendants’ actions constituted content-based discrimination. The Court explained that government restrictions targeting speech based on its communicative content are “presumptively unconstitutional.” [p. 195] A regulation is content based if it draws distinctions based on the message conveyed or if enforcement requires examination of the speech’s meaning. The Court found that the Plaintiffs were likely to show that the Defendants restricted their speech, assembly, and press activities based on content as the record reflected that protesters openly expressed opposition to Operation Midway Blitz through chanting, signs, and verbal criticism, while journalists documented enforcement activities. In response, federal officials publicly signaled hostility toward such protest activity, and agents repeatedly expelled and used force against individuals who were holding signs, chanting, recording, or otherwise expressing dissent. The Court also noted that the Defendants admitted they would treat pro-ICE demonstrators more favorably, which further supported the conclusion that the restrictions were content based.

Because the restrictions were content based, the Court applied strict scrutiny – the highest form of constitutional scrutiny – under which the Defendants were required to “prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” [p. 198] The Court accepted that the government has a compelling interest in protecting federal property, personnel, and enforcing federal law, but concluded that the Defendants were unlikely to demonstrate that their deployment of tear gas, pepper balls, and other less lethal force was narrowly tailored. The Court found that the Defendants’ assertions of widespread riots and violence lacked credibility and referred to multiple instances in which agents appeared to escalate rather than de-escalate situations, including deploying chemical agents against retreating crowds, tackling non-threatening individuals, and driving vehicles into protesters. The Court reiterated that peaceful protesters and journalists “cannot be punished for the violent acts of others” and that the proper response to isolated unlawful conduct is targeted enforcement rather than suppression of protected expression. [p. 200] Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that the Defendants’ actions could not survive strict scrutiny.

The Court further noted that even if the Defendants’ actions were characterized as content neutral, they would still fail under intermediate scrutiny. Under that standard, the government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and leave open alternative avenues for communication. The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that Defendants’ actions were not narrowly tailored to its interest in protecting property and personnel. Applying the requirement that there be “a reasonably close fit” between the government’s means and its ends, the Court found no credible justification, for example, for shooting pepper balls at Reverend Black while he was praying, particularly in the absence of evidence that he posed a threat or was warned to move. [p. 201] The Court noted that “the record before the Court suggests that agents have indiscriminately used force when confronted with any type of resistance, even peaceful, which the Court finds indicative of their claimed safety and immigration enforcement rationales being pretextual.” [p. 201] The Court similarly found that the Defendants offered no persuasive explanation for targeting journalists and protesters who were not impeding enforcement operations or threatening officer safety. The record, including BWC footage, reflected instances in which agents deployed less lethal munitions against individuals who were retreating, standing at a distance, or merely shouting criticism and the Court stated that intermediate scrutiny does not permit the government to “sacrific[e] speech for efficiency” or to “regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” [p. 202]

Accordingly, the Court concluded that, under either strict or intermediate scrutiny, the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their First Amendment claim.

On the First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court applied the three part framework articulated in Bridges v. Gilbert, which requires a plaintiff to show that: (i) they engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (ii) they were subjected to an adverse action that would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to exercise those rights; and (iii) their protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendants’ decision to undertake the retaliatory action. [p. 202] The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs had made the necessary showing at this stage. With reference to L.A. Press Club v. Noem, the Court reaffirmed that “[n]ewsgathering, observing government conduct, and protest are each considered paradigmatic protected activities.” [p. 202] With respect to the second element, the Court found that being struck with less lethal munitions, exposed to tear gas and pepper spray, threatened with arrest for recording, tackled, or having firearms pointed at oneself “would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected activity,” quoting Surita v. Hyde. [p. 203] The Court again referred to L.A. Press Club, which held that being subjected to “rubber bullets, tear gas, pepper balls, and other crowd control weapons” would deter ordinary individuals from continuing protected activity. [p. 203]

On the element of retaliatory motive, citing Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, the Court explained that the Plaintiffs may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence, including “suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior towards or comments directed at other [people] in the protected group”. [p. 203] The Court referred to senior officials’ public statements highlighted by the Plaintiffs, including Secretary Noem’s admonition to “go hard” against individuals based on “the way that they’re talking, speaking, who they’re affiliated with, who they’re funded with, and what they’re talking about as far as consequences for what we’re doing by protecting this country,” as well as her statement that violence includes “doxing” and “videotaping” federal agents. [p. 204] It also referenced statements attributed to President Trump and Chief Bovino, as well as BWC footage reflecting agents’ hostility toward protesters expressing opposition to Operation Midway Blitz. In one encounter, an individual identified himself as a “combat veteran who served [his] country, and what [[the] agent [was]] doing is the opposite,” and an agent had then leaned out of a vehicle window with his firearm and said “bang bang,” followed by words to the effect of “you’re dead, liberal.” [p. 204]

The Court rejected the Defendants’ contention that the presence of some unruly actors justified the force deployed against all present. Quoting L.A. Press Club, the Court stated that the presence of disruptive individuals does not give the Defendants “a blank check to employ unrestricted use of crowd control weapons.” [p. 205] It further adopted the reasoning that the “use of indiscriminate weapons against all protesters – not just the violent ones – supports the inference that federal agents were substantially motivated by Plaintiffs’ protected First Amendment activity,” quoting Black Lives Matter Seattle-King Cnty. v. City of Seattle. [p. 205] Based on this evidence, and under the governing retaliation framework, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim.

On the Free Exercise and RFRA claims, the Court outlined the governing framework. The Free Exercise Clause is the clause in the First Amendment that prohibits the government from placing a substantial burden on religious practice without a compelling justification. However, because the RFRA provides broader protection than the First Amendment, the Court focused primarily on the statute, which bars the federal government from imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise unless it demonstrates that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. Once a plaintiff establishes a substantial burden, the burden shifts to the government to satisfy strict scrutiny. Applying that framework, the Court found that Reverend Black, Reverend Holcombe, Reverend Johnson, Father Curran, and the Religious Exercise Subclass were likely to establish that the Defendants substantially burdened their religious exercise. The record reflected multiple incidents in which agents fired pepper balls and deployed tear gas at clergy members who were visibly praying, singing hymns, and engaging in ministry outside the Broadview facility, and the Court also credited evidence showing that clergy were struck with projectiles, sprayed with chemicals, and forced to retreat due to health effects, and that some religious leaders curtailed or modified their vigils because of the risk of violence. The Court concluded that forcing individuals to choose between practicing their faith and risking physical harm constitutes a substantial burden on their exercise of Free Exercise First Amendment rights.

In applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court acknowledged that the government has a compelling interest in protecting federal property, personnel, and enforcing federal law. Even so, it found that the Defendants were unlikely to show that firing less lethal munitions and deploying chemical agents at peacefully praying clergy was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The record contained repeated examples of force used against visibly nonthreatening religious practitioners, and the Court emphasized that less restrictive alternatives were plainly available given the peaceful nature of their conduct. The Court therefore held that the Religious Exercise Subclass was likely to succeed on its RFRA claim.

On the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court held that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their excessive force theory, and, in assessing reasonableness, the Court stated it saw “little justification for the extent of the use of force” against peaceful individuals and expressed concern over indiscriminate deployment of crowd control weapons. [pp. 215-216] It further held that even under a substantive due process framework, the conduct could “shock the conscience,” given evidence of force used against praying clergy, journalists recording, and bystanders, including children and pregnant individuals. [pp. 216-218] The Court highlighted that “[t]ackling someone dressed in a duck costume to the ground and leaving him with a traumatic brain injury, and then refusing to provide any explanation for the action, shocks the conscience.” [p. 217]

In its assessment of whether the Plaintiffs had demonstrated that there would be irreparable harm absent an injunction, the Court held that this requirement was readily satisfied with respect to the First Amendment and RFRA claims. Quoting Elrod v. Burns, the Court reiterated that “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” [p. 218] Under governing precedent, irreparable harm is presumed in First Amendment cases, and the same analysis applies to RFRA because it protects free exercise rights. The Court further noted that quantifying a First Amendment injury “is difficult and damages are therefore not an adequate remedy.” [p. 219] Having found a likelihood of success on these claims, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs had established both irreparable harm and the inadequacy of legal remedies. With respect to the Fourth Amendment, citing precedent recognizing that “the existence of a continuing constitutional violation constitutes proof of an irreparable harm,” the Court found that the Plaintiffs faced a real risk of repeated exposure to unconstitutional force during future protests and enforcement operations. [p. 219]

On the balance of harms and the public interest, which merge when the government is a party, the Court concluded that the equities favored the Plaintiffs. While the government asserted an interest in public safety and immigration enforcement, the Court emphasized that the injunction did not prevent lawful enforcement activity but required compliance with constitutional limits. It stated that “injunctions protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest,” and that it is “difficult to conceive of how an injunction requiring [a party] to comply with the Constitution could be harmful.” [p. 222] The public, the Court stressed, has a compelling interest not only in effective law enforcement but in “bodily integrity, the right to peaceful protest, the right to assemble, the right to a free press, and the right to peaceful free exercise of religion.” [p. 220] Accordingly, the Court held that Plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief on their First Amendment, retaliation, RFRA, and Fourth Amendment claims. [p. 224]

On the question of whether the injunction should apply universally, the Court addressed the Defendants’ argument, grounded in the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., and agreed with the assessment that federal courts are prohibited from issuing relief broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing, but concluded that the relief ordered was properly tailored to a certified class. Because the challenged conduct was indiscriminate and directed at categories of activity rather than specific individuals, limiting relief to the named Plaintiffs would render the injunction ineffective, and any benefit to nonparties was incidental to affording complete relief. The Court rejected the claim that the order intruded into executive prerogatives, explaining that it did not dictate staffing or strategy but required compliance with constitutional limits and existing DHS, CBP, and ICE policies. It noted that officials themselves testified the TRO had not impeded legitimate enforcement efforts, undermining claims of operational interference.

In addressing the Defendants’ request for a stay pending appeal, the Court denied relief under Nken v. Holder, noting that the Defendants failed to meaningfully address the governing factors and did not demonstrate either a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. Having concluded that the requirements for preliminary relief were satisfied, the Court entered an injunction prohibiting the use of force against individuals engaged in nonviolent protest, newsgathering, or religious exercise during immigration enforcement operations within the Northern District of Illinois, and requiring the activation of BWCs during such operations in accordance with agency policy. [p. 232]

In summary, the Court held that the Plaintiffs made a “strong showing” of a likelihood of success on their First Amendment, First Amendment retaliation, RFRA, and Fourth Amendment claims, finding that the federal agents’ “ongoing, sustained pattern of conduct,” characterized by the indiscriminate use of chemical agents and impact munitions constituted unreasonable seizures and conscience-shocking force. [p. 180] The Court concluded that the government’s tactics failed to satisfy strict or intermediate scrutiny because they were not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest and often served to escalate rather than de-escalate peaceful gatherings. Consequently, the Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Defendants and their agents from using force against any person non-violently engaged in protest, newsgathering, or religious exercise during immigration enforcement operations in the Northern District of Illinois. The order additionally mandated that all agents equipped with BWC activate them during such encounters, in accordance with DHS, CBP, and ICE policies, and denied the Defendants’ request for a stay pending appeal.

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